

Churchill, Chamberlain and Appeasement

Was Churchill correct when he claimed the Second World War could easily have been prevented if Chamberlain had not appeased Hitler? How far did Churchill and Chamberlain differ on defence and foreign policy? To what extent was Chamberlain responsible for military defeats in 1940? In this new account of appeasement, G. C. Peden addresses these questions and provides a comparative analysis of Chamberlain's and Churchill's views on foreign policy and strategic priorities; explores what deterrence and appeasement meant in the military, economic and political contexts of the 1930s; and looks at where Chamberlain and Churchill agreed and disagreed on how best to deter Germany. Beginning in 1931 when Chamberlain became chancellor of the exchequer, this book explores the evolution of British policy towards Germany through to the Munich Agreement and its aftermath within the context of Britain's power to influence international affairs in the 1930s and of contemporary intelligence.

G. C. Peden is Emeritus Professor of Stirling University. His previous publications include *Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs* (2007), *The Treasury and British Public Policy, 1906–1959* (2000) and *British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932–1939* (1979). He is a fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, Scotland's national academy.

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Abbreviations

ADM	Admiralty records
ADR	Air Defence Research
AIR	Air Ministry records
ATB	Advisory Committee on Trade Questions in Time of War
BEF	British Expeditionary Force
c./cc.	column/columns
CAB	Cabinet Office records
CC	Cabinet conclusions
<i>CD</i>	<i>Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan</i>
CHT	Chatfield papers
CID	Committee of Imperial Defence
CIGS	chief of the imperial general staff
Cmd	Command paper
COS	Chiefs of Staff Committee paper
CP	Cabinet paper
<i>CWP</i>	<i>Churchill War Papers</i>
<i>DBFP</i>	<i>Documents on British Foreign Policy</i>
DC(M)	Defence Committee (Ministerial)
<i>DGFP</i>	<i>Documents on German Foreign Policy</i>
DP(P)	Defence Plans (Policy) Sub-Committee
DPRC	Defence Policy and Requirements Sub-Committee
DPR	Defence Policy and Requirements (Defence
(DR)	Requirements)
DRC	Defence Requirements Sub-Committee
FCI	Industrial Intelligence in Foreign Countries Sub-Committee
FO	Foreign Office records
fol./fos.	folio/folios
FP	Foreign Policy (Sub-Committee of Cabinet)
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
GC&CS	Government Code and Cypher School
GDP	gross domestic product

List of Abbreviations

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HC Deb.	House of Commons Debates
HMSO	Her Majesty's Stationary Office
HNKY	Sir Maurice Hankey papers
IIC	Industrial Intelligence Centre
<i>JMK</i>	<i>Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes</i>
LSE	London School of Economics
NC	Neville Chamberlain papers
<i>NCDL</i>	<i>Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters</i>
NCM	Naval Conference Ministerial
n.d.	no date
NDC	National Defence Contribution
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PREM	Prime Minister's Office paper
RAF	Royal Air Force
SAC	Strategic Appreciation Sub-Committee
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service
T	Treasury records
TA	Territorial Army
TNA	The National Archives of the United Kingdom
WM	War Cabinet conclusions
WO	War Office records
<i>WSCC</i>	<i>Winston S. Churchill Companion</i>