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The Late Ottoman Intellectual Tradition

A Historiographical Review

INTRODUCTION

This book is a study of religious thought in an age of radical thinking. It looks specifically at three Late Ottoman thinkers – two of them ulema (Ar. ‘ulama’),¹ or scholars of the established forms of Muslim knowledge, and one a poet among the class of devout Muslim intellectuals² of the era – whose active period of work was marked by two political events in the countries they moved between, namely the rise to power of the Young Turk movement in Istanbul in 1908 and of the Free Officers in Egypt in 1952.³ These three figures are Mustafa Sabri Efendi (1869–1954), the last major sheikh ül-Islam (Ar. shaykh al-Islam; chief mufti) of the Ottoman state; Mehmed Zahid Kevseri (1879–1952), Sabri’s deputy for education (*ders vekili*) in the Ottoman religious bureaucracy known as the İlmîye; and Mehmed Akif Ersoy (1873–1936),⁴ public intellectual and the poet who wrote the words to Turkey’s national anthem. Disaffected with the

¹ I use ulema when discussing the Ottoman Turkish texts but ‘ulama’ when the language is Arabic.

² I have used thinkers as a term, while imperfect, to encompass both the ulema and devout Muslim intellectuals. They are separate categories in that ulema are trained as the recognised interpreters of a specific body of sacred knowledge. On the use of ‘devout intellectual’ see Brett Wilson, *Translating the Qur’an in an Age of Nationalism: Print Culture and Modern Islam in Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), *passim*.

³ I use the name Istanbul although Turkey only changed its official name from Constantinople in 1930.

⁴ Turkey’s surname law of 1934 obliged citizens to adopt Turkish surnames. Akif’s family adopted Ersoy, but on second reference I use Akif since it is the convention in most of the literature.

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republic and its adoption of radical European positivist and materialist philosophies,⁵ they each found themselves drawn to Egypt as a place of refuge from the nationalist movement of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938).

Although in exile, they were able to engage with their Egyptian counterparts regarding the iconoclastic ideas of the era impacting Islamic political, legal, and theological culture. Nationalist historiography, through ordering knowledge as variously Egyptian, Arab, or Turkish, has served to conceal this kind of transnational collaboration in the post-Ottoman intellectual world by which thinkers could still operate across national-linguistic lines. For example, a pervasive theme in scholarship regarding republican Turkey has been that Said Nursi (1877–1960), the celebrated *‘ālim* (religious scholar) who remained in Turkey during the early republic, single-handedly carried the torch of Ottoman Islam through his writing while enduring persecution at the hands of the Kemalist state. Yet this misses the role of the Cairo exiles in formulating the first systematic response to secular Turkey and establishing a blueprint for an Islamic Turkish nationalism that in the fullness of time was to win out against its rivals. It was easy to focus attention on Nursi because he shifted from using the Arabic of the ulema class to Turkish at a critical point in the trajectory of the modern state, while Sabri and Kevseri were equally deliberate in choosing to stick with Arabic. Turkish in its Late Ottoman form was essential to Akif’s art and message, and his reception in Turkey and the Islamic world was impacted in turn by that fact. These were thinkers then who presented different challenges to the political and cultural categories that dominated following the demise of the Ottoman milieu.

The study examines a corpus of printed materials, including books, articles, and letters, written in Arabic, Ottoman, and Turkish by the three Muslim thinkers in question, tracing the transformation of concepts and terminologies across linguistic and discursive fields, from the Late Ottoman period to their post-Ottoman years in Cairo. Key works include Sabri’s *Mawqif al-‘Aql wa-l-‘Ilm wa-l-‘Ālam min Rabb al-‘Ālamīn wa-Rusulihi* (The Position of Reason, Knowledge, and the World on

⁵ The Young Turk movement was influenced by the French positivism of Auguste Comte and its notion of religion as an impediment to societal progress and the German materialism of Ludwig Büchner and its belief in natural forces as the organising principle of the universe. See M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 48–67; also, Banu Turnaoğlu, ‘The Positivist Universalism and Republicanism of the Young Turks,’ *Modern Intellectual History*, 14/3 (2017): 777–805.

God and His Messengers, 1949), the collection of Kevseri's writings published as *Maqālāt al-Kawtharī* (Kevseri's Articles, 1953), Akif's poetry collection *Safahat* (Şafaḥāt, meaning phases or pages), and the journals *Sırat-ı Müstakim*/*Sebilürreşad*⁶ and *Beyanülhak* (Statement of Truth/God). The research takes in many other Ottoman and Arabic works by intellectuals who contributed to the modernist and Salafi discourse (which I take as distinct categories) of the period and who engaged, often directly, with Akif, Sabri, and Kevseri, including Muḥammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), Mūsā Jārullāh Bigiev (1874–1949), Muḥammad Iqbāl (1877–1938), Sayyid Quṭb (1906–66), Abū al-A'lā Mawdūdī (1903–79), and Nāşir al-Dīn al-Albānī (1914–99), as well as an array of Turkish-, Arabic-, and English-language secondary literature.

The introductory chapter (Chapter 1) looks at historiographical problems in both Islamic history and the intellectual history of the Late Ottoman period.⁷ Chapter 2 gives in-depth profiles of Akif, Sabri, and Kevseri and considers how they have been treated in different fields of scholarship. Chapter 3 examines Sabri's response to the liberal Islamic trend he found dominating public space in the Egypt of the 1930s and 1940s, which had imbibed Europe's secular humanistic understanding of religion, and contrasts this with Akif's work in centering Late Ottoman Islamism around the ideas of 'Abduh, the leading figure of this school of self-described reformist Islam. Chapter 4 looks at Zahid Kevseri's problematisation of the concept of the terms *salafī* and *salafiyya*, his attempt to withhold the legitimating potential inherent in the 'Salafi' label from the trend (distinct from that of 'Abduh) that framed its iconoclastic approach to the Islamic legal and theological tradition in those terms. Chapter 5 looks at the three thinkers' views on the modern state as a universal model received from Europe, specifically, Akif's compromise with Turkish nationalism and Sabri's theorising on faith in a post-shari'a society. The concluding chapter (Chapter 6) considers their impact on the ideological

⁶ Both are Qur'anic terms meaning the right/righteous path.

⁷ Turkish nationalist historiography for long excluded the voices of ethno-religious minorities. On the Ottoman Jewish intellectual Avram Galanti (1873–1961) and his engagement with the republic, see Kerem Tinaz, *An Imperial Ideology and Its Legacy: Ottomanism in a Comparative Perspective, 1894–1928* (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2018). On Late Ottoman literature see Laurent Mignon, 'Lost in Transliteration: A Few Remarks on the Armeno-Turkish Novel and Turkish Literary Historiography,' in *Between Religion and Language: Turkish-speaking Christians, Jews and Greek-Speaking Muslims and Catholics in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Evangelia Balta and Mehmet Sönmez (Istanbul: Eren 2011), 111–23.

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trend created by the conditions of modernity known as ‘political Islam’ (*al-islām al-siyāsī*), making use of interviews with Islamist figures active in the early period of transnational collaboration.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF ISLAM AS A WORLD RELIGION

Enlightenment ideas and their universalisation through European colonial expansion engendered new ways of thinking about religion, rooted in Europe’s experience of religious institutions as an oppressive force in political and social life. European scholars and politicians came to objectify Islam as a category of world religion, as historian Wilfred Cantwell Smith theorised in his book *The Meaning and End of Religion* (1962). In the Islamic case this process of what Smith called reification entailed the production of the term Islam itself by Europeans, and then through apologetic osmosis by Muslims themselves, in unfamiliar contexts and senses. This approach to the Islamic tradition located in the conceptual framework of European thought I term modernist. One line of Muslim modernism – defined by its highly political and activist nature – would subsequently develop a theory of Islam as a complete system of life, which had implications for not only the individual but the state, expressed through innovative use of words such as *niẓām*,⁸ while another strand within Muslim modernism – mimicking secular humanism – would be comfortable with the Enlightenment’s individualist notion of religion as, in anthropologist Talal Asad’s description, ‘anchored in personal experience, expressible as belief-statements, dependent on private institutions, and practised in one’s spare-time’, on which basis various versions of secularism would develop.⁹ In *Orientalism* (1978) Edward Said would re-frame this Islam-made-in-Europe through the prism of his discursive framework of ‘Orientalism’, which for him was a term that not only described scholars who studied ‘the East’ but the paradigm of thought made possible by European power and by which Europeans conceived of outside cultural groupings in a manner that stressed difference and need for reform.

⁸ Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 115–17.

⁹ Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 207. For German philosopher Immanuel Kant (d. 1804) the key point of the Enlightenment was attaining untutored freedom of thought, first and foremost in religious affairs; see ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’ (1784); www.projekt-gutenberg.org/kant/aufklae/aufkl001.html.

Scholars across numerous fields of the humanities have examined how Muslim intellectual, cultural, historical, and moral understandings of the world were systematically described, deconstructed, and denigrated as unfit for what European intellectuals considered to be a new stage of social organisation.¹⁰ The German philosopher Hegel (1770–1831) was one of the first prominent voices to present a systematic theory of Islam ('Mohametanism') as a civilisation that had run out of steam. In his series of lectures on the philosophy of history, first delivered in 1822, Hegel said Islam reflected an Arab obsession with the abstract that made for poetry good enough to fire the imagination of Goethe and science and philosophy useful to medieval Europe. But now that the north Europeans were marching to glory through the 'all-enlightening sun' (*die Alles verklärende Sonne*) of the Reformation, Islam had 'vanished from the stage of history' and 'retreated into Oriental ease and repose', he declared.¹¹ French historian and politician Francois Guizot's *Histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe* (General History of Civilisation in Europe, 1828) also posited the Reformation as the great event that unleashed Europe's creative powers and facilitated its civilisational advance ('une insurrection de l'esprit humain contre le pouvoir absolu dans l'ordre spirituel'),¹² while Arab-Islamic civilisation was in a state of stagnation (*état stationnaire*) because of its 'confusion of moral and material authority',¹³ – a theme of modernist reform discourse that was to echo throughout the century as European entanglement with Muslim societies increased.

In *Islam in Liberalism* Joseph Massad identifies a second impulse for negative depictions of Islam. He examines the manner with which nineteenth-century European liberalism projected anxiety over the injustices of Europe's incomplete project of progress – the mass violence of colonialism, the dark Satanic mills of industrialisation, political and economic marginalisation of subaltern groups – onto an Oriental exterior.

¹⁰ Recent studies of note include Joseph Massad, *Islam in Liberalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Shahab Ahmed, *What Is Islam?: The Importance of Being Islamic* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Khaled El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Muḥammad Qasim Zaman, *Modern Islamic Thought in a Radical Age: Religious Authority and Internal Criticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

¹¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1956), 355–60.

¹² François Guizot, *Histoire générale de la civilisation en Europe* (Paris: Victor Masson Libraire, 1851), 295.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 71.

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This procedure allowed for a proliferation of phenomena understood as Islamic, including history, peoples, philosophy, sexual practices, cuisine, sartorial standards, and culture,¹⁴ while Christian traditions were the template for thinking of *kalām* (rationalist discussion of Islamic doctrine) and *‘aqīda* (dogma, belief, tenet) as theology, *shari‘a* as law, or *ṣalāh* as prayer. The breadth of terms deployed in Ottoman Turkish texts for Islam – *İslam*, *İslamiyet*, *İslamlık*, *Müslümanlık*, *İslam dini* – gives some indication of how jarring this reductive, homogenising construction of Islam must have been. Turkish republican historiography tended to parallel British and French scholarship in presenting Islamic institutions and belief systems as an impediment to progress.¹⁵

A third motivation behind the production of this Europeanised Islam was, as Said established, the tying of its fortunes to the colonial project.¹⁶ Progress in other societies would come through the civilising mission of their ideas, whether delivered through colonialism or otherwise, but Islam was viewed as a dangerous creedal force commanding fanatical impulses of potential resistance to European power in the many colonies where Britain and France ruled over Muslim-majority populations. It was in this context that the term pan-Islamism was produced in British and French policy debate.¹⁷ In the late nineteenth century Britain was troubled by the Ottoman state’s use of Islamic motifs because of a perceived potential to stoke resistance to British power in Egypt and India.¹⁸ This fed a tendency to stress division between putative national Islams. Wilfred Scawen Blunt, a British diplomat then writer, outlined a blueprint for an Arab caliphate in the Hijaz with symbolic spiritual powers that would engender an Islamic

¹⁴ Massad, *Islam in Liberalism*, 4–6.

¹⁵ Bernard Lewis in *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) refers to ‘reactionaries’, and reaction (*irtica*) is a theme in Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950–1975* (London: Hurst, 1977). French histories such as Robert Mantran’s *Histoire de la Turquie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952) followed in the footsteps of Pierre Loti (1850–1923) et al. who presented Islam as an oppressive force in Late Ottoman society.

¹⁶ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 1–3, 58–9, 113–22, 343.

¹⁷ This term appears as early as 1883 in French journalist Gabriel Charmes’ *L’avenir de la Turquie: Le panislamisme* (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1883). See Cemil Aydın, *The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History* (Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 2017).

¹⁸ On how this played out in the Arabian Peninsula see William Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: The Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840–1908* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984), and Frederick Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

reformation outside ‘the incubus of Turkish scholasticism’ and disabused of the ‘dream of empire’.¹⁹ Even those Muslim intellectuals who grasped instinctively that European knowledge could not be disassociated from the physical control Europe exerted over their societies – that this knowledge was tainted by its serving imperial interests – were susceptible to the notion that Islam as the Europeans had constructed it was fundamental to their failure to maintain a pace of civilisational advance that would have kept European interventions at bay. In other words, European criticisms of Islam, however much they were repudiated, succeeded in problematising aspects of belief and practice in the minds of thinkers across Muslim societies who operated within a paradigm of reform derived terminologically from the Arabic *tajdīd* (renewal).²⁰

European modernity’s view of religion as irrational and a bar to civilisational progress brought with it a specific compartmentalisation of pre-modern time. With Europe’s self-awareness of itself in the eighteenth century as experiencing what was termed an age of Enlightenment (*die Aufklärung*; *le siècle des Lumières*), new thinking conceptualised history as a discipline demarcating time via a tripartite division of ancient, medieval, and modern.²¹ From the 1980s post-colonial studies began to push back against this taxonomy as an inaccurate, colonial imposition and to experiment with the notion of the pre-modern, which would fit somewhere between the late medieval period and the industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century. The pre-modern also served the purpose of restoring agency to non-European cultural groups in the Western story of what

¹⁹ Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *The Future of Islam* (Richmond: Curzon, 2001); 130–1, 174–5. Sylvia Haim suspected that ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Kawākibī derived his idea of an Arab caliphate in *Umm al-Qurā* (1900) from Blunt; ‘Blunt and Kawakibi,’ *Oriente Moderno*, 35/3 (1955): 132–43. This thesis is not widely accepted.

²⁰ Many scholars in the early Islamic centuries were bestowed with the title *mujaddid* by their followers on the basis of the hadith in which the Prophet says that every hundred years God will send someone who renews (*yujaddid*) the *dīn* of the *umma*; see Abū Dāwūd, ‘Kitāb al-Malāḥim,’ in *Sunan Abī Dāwūd*, ed. Shu‘ayb al-Arnā‘ūt, 8 vols (Damascus: al-Risāla al-‘Ālamiyya, 2009), 5/349, no. 4291. The concept of the millennial *mujaddid* likely began with Indian Naqshbandī Sufi shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī (1564–1624), whose *mujaddid* fulfils some functions of prophecy after Muḥammad; see Yohanan Friedmann, *Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī: An Outline of His Thought and a Study of His Image in the Eyes of Posterity* (New Delhi/Oxford: Oxford University Press), 13–21. In the late nineteenth century *tajdīd* emerges in public discussion as a broad concept for meeting the European challenge, overtaking previous notions of the *mujaddid*.

²¹ Alexander Woodside, *Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea, and the Hazards of World History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 35. Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 235.

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came in the late nineteenth century to be called modernity.²² It has allowed scholars to develop the notion of multiple modernities,²³ or nineteenth-century global history in which non-European peoples are integrated into a comprehensive narrative of a world system in formation.²⁴ This new terminology opened space for efforts to uncover modern temporality in India in response to British colonial scholars who developed the trope of the ‘Hindu mind’ that lacked a concept of historical time²⁵ and to discover early modern practices in diverse contexts such as eighteenth-century Japan, thirteenth-century China, and eleventh-century Java.

The field has not been without its critics,²⁶ but it is striking how long disinterest in writing Muslims into the category of pre-modernity has persisted²⁷ – a consequence, it would appear, of the pervasive theory of decline among both Orientalist and Muslim scholars in the nineteenth century.²⁸ Indeed, the ancient/medieval/modern arrangement of historical time meshes remarkably well with their classificatory framework – of the classical period of the early Islamic era with its imperial expansion and

²² The term *modernité* was coined by French writer Charles Baudelaire in his essay on artistic expression and its ability to express fast-developing Parisian life in *Le Peintre de la vie moderne* (1863); Baudelaire (trans. Jonathan Mayne), *The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays*, 2nd ed. (London: Phaidon, 1995), 12–15.

²³ S. N. Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities,’ *Daedalus*, 129/1 (Winter 2000): 1–29. Sudipto Kaviraj emphasises the divergent paths within Europe, contrasting British and French models of industrialisation and democracy with Germany, Italy, and Russia; Kaviraj, ‘An Outline of a Revisionist Theory of Modernity,’ *European Journal of Sociology*, 46/3 (2005): 497–526.

²⁴ Christopher Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis,’ *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 16/4 (1974): 387–415.

²⁵ Velcheru Narayana Rao and David Shulman, *Textures of Time: Writing History in South India, 1600–1800* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2001); and Rosalind O’Hanlon, ‘Contested Conjunctures: Brahman Communities and “Early Modernity” in India,’ *American Historical Review*, 118/3 (2013): 765–87.

²⁶ See Sheldon Pollock, ‘Pretextures of Time,’ *History and Theory*, 46 (October 2007): 366–83; Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Muddle of Modernity,’ *American Historical Review*, 116/3 (June 2011): 663–75; and Jack Goldstone, ‘The Problem of the “Early Modern” World,’ *Journal of Sociology* 46/3 (2005): 249–84. The Marxist analysis of the Subaltern Studies group of Ranajit Guha also disliked the notion of pre-modernity; see Christopher Chekuri, ‘Writing Politics Back into History,’ *History and Theory* 46 (October 2007): 384–95.

²⁷ The alternative term ‘early modern’ has seen a profusion of scholarly output since the 2000s in relation to the Ottoman empire in particular.

²⁸ In 2010 the American University of Beirut held a symposium entitled ‘Inhabit: Its Influence and Persistence in the Writing of Arab Cultural History’; www.beirut.com/l/5486 (accessed 19 June 2016).

The Modernist View of Decline

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construction of a vast legal-theological edifice (posited as ending with the Mongol destruction of Baghdad in 1258 and/or the rise of the Ottomans), followed by a post-classical decline (*inhiṭāt*) in Muslim political power and the vitality of the Islamic system of knowledge, before recovering through the paradigm shifts of renaissance (*nahḍa*) and revival (*tajdīd*) from the nineteenth century (for modernists) or from the Wahhabi movement in the eighteenth century (for Salafis).

THE MODERNIST VIEW OF DECLINE

Decline has been a powerful and persistent paradigm for understanding the trajectory of Islamic societies before the colonial encounter.²⁹ Halil İnalcık's *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600*, which has gone through numerous imprints since its publication in 1973, claims to find the beginnings of failure to meet the nineteenth-century challenge of Europe in a sixteenth-century 'triumph of fanaticism',³⁰ by which he means the juridical culture of the shari'a schools and the rise of the Kadızadeli (Kāzizādelī), the puritan movement that took up the anti-Sufi ideas of theologian Birgivi Mehmed (d. 1573). Writing firmly within the discursive framework of European Orientalism and the Muslim modernists, İnalcık depicts the shari'a tradition of compilation, annotation, and commentary of foundational legal texts as hindering later jurists' ability to innovate³¹ and he sees the Janissaries' storming of the Galata observatory in 1580 after the Ottoman ulema condemned astronomy and astrology³² as an example of the zealotry that came to dominate. A professor at Chicago University who published mainly in English, İnalcık was typical of a tradition of republican historiography that fell

²⁹ See Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934); Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Ali Bulaç, *İslam Dünyasında Düşünce Sorunları* (İstanbul: Burhan Yayınları, 1983); Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Nabil Matar, 'Confronting Decline in Early Modern Arabic Thought,' *Journal of Early Modern History*, 9/1 (2005): 51–78.

³⁰ Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), 3–4. Another definitive text is Bernard Lewis, 'Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire,' *Studia Islamica*, 9 (1958): 111–27.

³¹ İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, 173.

³² *Ibid.*, 179.

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under the influence of Orientalist problematisation of Islam.³³ There are few fields in Late Ottoman history that the discourse of decline has not touched. E. J. W. Gibb could describe the Turks in racialist terms in his *A History of Ottoman Poetry* (1900–9) as a people who, after the wholesale adoption of Persian culture, were unable to produce an original literature of their own since their true genius ‘lies in action, not in speculation’.³⁴ Laurent Mignon argues that this rejection of the Ottoman past was internalised in two stages: via the writings of poet, playwright, and Ottoman bureaucrat Namık Kemal (1840–8), who derided the literature as nothing more than ‘old wives tales’ (*kocakarı masalı*), and the work of the theorist of Turkish nationalism Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), who described the Ottoman ruling class and their literary output as foreign, even colonial, in that its overlay of Arabic and Persian language and multi-ethnic authorship did not reflect a Turkish aesthetic or interest.³⁵ Indeed, in the republican era the Late Ottoman novel was for long regarded as a failure because it did not conform to European conventions.³⁶

‘Abduh was also susceptible to the trope of decline as both an Arab and an Islamic phenomenon through the influence of European intellectuals he read such as Guizot, liberal Protestant theologian David Strauss, and positivists such as Herbert Spencer, whom he met during a trip to Britain.³⁷ Guizot was cited in *al-Radd ‘alā al-Dahriyyīn* (Refutation of the Materialists, 1886), the Arabic translation of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī’s

³³ Republican historians who took this approach include Fuat Köprülü, Şemsettin Günaltay, Yüsf Akçura, İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Ömer Lütfi Barkan. Like Balkan historians, they treated the Ottoman Empire as a foreign occupation. See Buşra Ersanlı, ‘The Ottoman Empire in the Historiography of the Kemalist Era: A Theory of Fatal Decline,’ in *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography*, ed. Fikret Adanir and Suraiya Faroqhi (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 115–54.

³⁴ E.J.W. Gibb (ed. Edward G. Browne), *A History of Ottoman Poetry*, 6 vols. (Warminster: The E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 2013), 1: 6–7. On Gibb, see Walter G. Andrews, ‘Ottoman Lyrics: Introductory Essay,’ in *Ottoman Lyric Poetry: An Anthology*, ed. Walter G. Andrews, Najaat Black, Mehmet Kalpaklı (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 3–24; and Victoria Holbrook, *The Unreadable Shores of Love: Turkish Modernity and Mystic Romance* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 16–31.

³⁵ Laurent Mignon, ‘Sömürge Sonrası Edebiyat ve Tanzimat Sonrası Edebiyat Üzerine Notlar,’ in *Elifbâlar Sevdası*, Laurent Mignon (Ankara: Hece Yayınları, 2003), 77–89.

³⁶ This view was challenged by the seminal study of Berna Moran, *Türk Romanına Eleştirel bir Bakış: Ahmet Mithat’tan, A. H. Tanpınar’a* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983).

³⁷ Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 135.