

The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule

In *The Two Logics of Autocratic Rule*, Gerschewski argues that all autocracies must fulfil three conditions to survive: the co-optation of key elites into their inner sanctum, the repression of potential dissent, and popular legitimation. Yet, how these conditions complement each other depends on alternative logics: over-politicization and de-politicization. While the former aims at mobilizing people via inflating a friend-foe distinction, the latter renders the people passive and apathetic, relying instead on performance-driven forms of legitimation. Gerschewski supports this two-logics theory with the empirical analysis of forty-five autocratic regime episodes in East Asia since the end of World War II. In simultaneously synthesizing and extending existing research on non-democracies, this book proposes an innovative way to understand autocratic rule that goes beyond the classic distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. It will be of interest to scholars and students of comparative politics, political theory, and East Asian politics.

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Abbreviations

AFPFL	Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, Myanmar
AREA	Autocratic Regimes in East Asia dataset
BMR	Boix, Miller, Rosato Dichotomous Coding of Democracy, 1800–2015 dataset
BSPP	Burmese Socialist Program Party
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CEC	Central Executive Committee, Singapore
CIRI	Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights dataset
CLD	Civil Liberties Dataset
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
DD	Democracy and Dictatorship dataset
fsQCA	fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GWF	The Geddes Wright and Frantz Autocratic Regimes dataset
ICRG	The International Country Risk Guide
ISA	Internal Security Act, Malaya/Malaysia
KINU	Korean Institute of National Unification
MP	Member of Parliament
NDC	National Defense Commission, North Korea
NEP	New Economic Policy, Malaysia
NLD	National League for Democracy, Myanmar
PAP	People's Action Party, Singapore
PRI	Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Mexico
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo dataset
PTS	The Political Terror Scale dataset
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
QoG	Quality of Government dataset
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program dataset
UMNO	United Malays National Organization, Malaysia
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WPK	Workers Party of Korea, North Korea