INTRODUCTION

The first two chapters of Luke’s Gospel present a christological conundrum: Multiple times in Luke 1–2 characters acknowledge Jesus as Messiah (2:11, 26, 28–32; cf. 1:32–33, 69), Son of God (1:32, 35; cf. 2:49), and Lord (1:43; 2:11).¹ Lukan characters also speak of John the Baptist going before the Lord God (1:16–17, 76), raising the question of whether Jesus might be the Lord in view, and connect Jesus with OT YHWH-passages (2:34; cf. 1:16–17, 76). Such features have made Luke 1–2 a key locus for Lukan Christology and particularly discussions of whether Luke presents Jesus as divine.² However, these same features also create a tension within the narrative, for in the body of the Gospel merely human characters are initially ignorant that Jesus is Messiah, Son of God, or Lord, and Jesus’s divinity (if Luke affirms it) does not seem to be perceived until after the resurrection. This apparent disconnect between the beginning and body of the Gospel is not present in Mark, where the initial notices that Jesus is Messiah and Son of God and the suggestion that he is divine Lord are spoken outside the narrative (1:1–3). Nor is it present to the same degree in Matthew, where within the birth narrative it is only implied that Jesus is the Messiah (1:21; 2:3–6) and nothing is said about him being Son of God or Lord.

Luke’s narrative thus poses a pressing question that is distinctive among the Synoptics: How does the Christology of the beginning of the Gospel (Luke 1–2) relate to that of the subsequent narrative (Luke 3–24 and Acts)? To answer this question one must, of course, make some judgment about how Luke 1–2 presents Jesus in the first place. In this

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¹ Throughout this study I will use Luke 1–2 as a shorthand for Luke 1:5–2:52 unless otherwise noted.
study, I wish to offer an answer to this question that is more compelling than those presently available. Before advancing my own proposal, however, it will be helpful to examine how previous scholarship has dealt with this issue.

History of Research
In his seminal study *Structure et théologie de Luc I–II* (1957), René Laurentin remarks, “The bibliography of Luke 1–2 is immense, discouraging.” In the intervening six decades, the literature on Luke 1–2 has only grown. Rather than attempting to treat everything that has been said about the Christology of Luke 1–2 and its relationship to Luke-Acts, I will present four models that capture the major ways in which scholars have answered our question. I will explore each model through the lens of a representative scholar who will function as a major dialogue partner.

Resurrection Retrojected
Our first model sees the Christology of Luke 1–2 as retrojected post-resurrection Christology that is incongruous with the body of the Gospel. The primary representative for this view is Raymond E. Brown. In *The Birth of the Messiah* (1977), Brown argues that the Gospel birth narratives are the latest stratum of the Gospel tradition and represent the final stage in a process of back-reading post-resurrection convictions about Jesus onto his earthly life. Through the resurrection, Jesus’s disciples came to understand him as Messiah, Son of God, and Lord for the first time.

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time. However, by the time the Gospels were composed “a more developed view was dominant whereby Jesus was seen already to have been the Messiah and Son of God during his ministry, so that the resurrection simply revealed more publicly what was there all the time.” Eventually, this post-resurrection identity was pressed back to Jesus’s childhood and even conception. But, Brown notes, this results in a narrative incongruity:

If it was made clear through an angelic message to the parents of Jesus who Jesus was (the Davidic Messiah, the Son of God), why is it so difficult for his disciples to discover this later on, even though Mary was alive at the time of the ministry? … If JBap was a relative of Jesus who recognized him even before his birth (Luke 1:41, 44), why does JBap give no indication during the ministry of a previous knowledge of Jesus and indeed seem to be puzzled by him (7:19)? … Ingenious harmonizing has been invoked to solve such conflicts. But such ingenuity may be dispensed with when the backwards process of Gospel formation and christological development is understood. The stories of the ministry were shaped in Christian tradition without a knowledge of the infancy material; and the evangelists never really smoothed out all the narrative rough spots left by the joining of two bodies of once-independent material, even though in their own minds they presumably would have reconciled the different theologies therein contained.

Here Brown puts his finger on a real tension: Regardless of how divine or nondivine a Christology one finds in Luke 1–2, these chapters reveal things about Jesus within the narrative that the body of the Gospel shows no awareness of. Brown’s explanation for this seems to be that the backwards development of Christology impacted Luke 1–2 more than the ministry material, and Luke (at least in writing) never reconciled the differences.

In his exegesis, Brown finds no trace of divine Christology in Luke 1–2. He emphasizes that in 1:17 the divine Lord of Malachi whom John precedes is “the Lord God, not Jesus.” When Elizabeth calls Mary “the mother of my Lord” (1:43), she simply recognizes him as the Messiah, and Brown seems to presuppose such a meaning for 2:11 as well. He is

5 Brown, Birth, 30.
6 Brown, Birth, 32, emphasis added.
7 Brown, Birth, 261.
8 Brown, Birth, 344, 424–25.
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not certain what Luke means by “Son of God” (1:35; cf. 1:32; 2:49), but highlights the Davidic and Adamic connections and stresses that it does not imply preexistence or deity.⁹ Nor do other christological affirmations suggest Jesus’s divinity (1:78; 2:34–35).¹⁰ Brown does not discuss Lukan Christology beyond Luke 1–2 at length. However, his backwards development paradigm, nondivine Christology reading of Luke 1–2, and occasional comments on passages elsewhere in Luke-Acts,¹¹ suggest that he does not find divine Christology in Luke’s writings at all.

However, it is important to remember that Brown’s actual judgment about whether Luke 1–2 evinces a divine Christology is not central to his model as presented here; one could adopt his paradigm wholesale and (perhaps more easily) find a divine Christology in Luke 1–2. Joseph Fitzmyer exemplifies this. He shares Brown’s basic presuppositions about Luke 1–2.¹² However, he concludes that Luke’s uses of κύριος for Jesus (1:43; 2:11) verge on a divine Christology, precisely because he thinks that the early Christian community “in some sense regarded Jesus as on a level with Yahweh.”¹³ Indeed, if (as Brown affirms) the birth narratives were the latest part of the Gospel tradition to emerge and more than any other part reflected the beliefs of the later church, one might expect to find a divine Christology in Luke 1–2 more than anywhere else in the Gospel.

The heart of Brown’s model is the idea that Luke 1–2 bears the mark of post-resurrection christological convictions more strongly than – and is therefore incongruous with – the body of the Gospel. Brown’s greatest strength is that he grasps the apparent christological disjunct between Luke 1–2 and the rest of Luke: If Jesus is known to be Messiah, Son of God, and Lord (whatever that may mean) in Luke 1–2, why are characters in the body of the Gospel ignorant of this? His solution, however, is less than compelling. Brown seems to assume that Luke was a ham-fisted copy-and-paster, throwing together traditions with disparate Christologies with little concern for how they related to each other.

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⁹ Brown, Birth, 314 n. 48, 316 n. 56.
¹⁰ Brown, Birth, 373–74, 460–66.
¹¹ E.g., Brown, Birth, 344.
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Yet Lukan scholarship in recent decades (including Brown’s own work) has, if anything, demonstrated just the opposite: Luke was a thoughtful author with theological intent.14 If this is so, then one should appeal to authorial oversight only after exhausting the possibility that behind the apparent discontinuity lies a Lukan logic. Therefore, while Brown places an important question on the table (Why does the Christology of Luke 1–2 seem to conflict with the body of the Gospel?), his answer leaves something to be desired.

Nondivine to Divine Christology

A second model sees Luke as taking the reader from a merely human Christology in Luke 1–2 to a divine Christology later in Luke-Acts. Our main representative for this view is Darrell L. Bock, who has argued in a number of publications that Luke begins with a Messiah-Servant Christology but toward the end of the Gospel challenges the reader to see Jesus as “more than Messiah” and in Acts presents Jesus as divine Lord.15 Luke 1–2 constitutes the crucial first stage of this schema: Here Bock must demonstrate that Luke portrays Jesus as Messiah-Servant and not divine Lord.

In Proclamation from Prophecy and Pattern (1987), his published dissertation, Bock articulates the basic view that he reiterates in his later works. Like Brown, Bock asserts that in 1:17 the Lord of Malachi whom John precedes is God, not Jesus. In 1:26–38, he argues that Luke develops Jesus’s virginal conception and status as Son of God as a fulfillment


of regal Davidic expectations rather than a statement of Jesus’s metaphysical divinity. Bock interestingly contends that Elizabeth’s designation of Jesus as κύριος (1:43) is “a prophetic foreshadowing of who Jesus is. Luke, however, chooses not to define the term at all here by reference to the OT. The term is left to be developed.” Similarly he maintains that when Jesus is called κύριος in 2:11, this “contains a foretaste of the unique identity that Jesus has in his person and work with God himself. Luke tips his hand about Jesus here, but he does not attempt to define or stress this designation yet.” Bock concludes his discussion of Luke 1–2 by treating Simeon’s oracles, which he argues relate Jesus to the Isaianic Servant. This Messiah-Servant Christology remains the dominant paradigm until the end of the Gospel, when Luke indicates through three key passages (20:41–44; 21:27; 22:69–71) that Jesus is much more than a Messiah. In Acts, Luke presents Jesus as Lord of all. In sum, “Luke in his presentation of OT Christology consciously takes us from a consideration of Jesus as the Messiah-Servant to the declaration that he is Lord of all in the fullest divine sense.”

Bock’s proposal is initially compelling, not least because it is so straightforward. Whereas Brown has the reader performing tradition-historical acrobatics, Bock posits a simple linear progression: Luke takes the reader from Jesus as Messiah-Servant to Jesus as divine Lord. However, one must wonder if Bock has oversimplified matters. On Bock’s view, Luke affirms a divine Christology, deems this a basic Christian conviction, and writes for fellow Christians. However, when he presents Jesus as κύριος (which in Acts connotes Jesus’s divine Lordship) in Luke 1–2, he does not want the reader to think of Jesus as divine Lord, but simply Messiah-Servant. Savvy readers who recognize Jesus as divine Lord in Luke 1–2 are therefore reading against the grain of Luke’s intention. This is odd: If Luke does not want the reader to think of Jesus as divine Lord at the beginning of the narrative, why not simply forego calling him κύριος? And if he does call Jesus κύριος and affirm that this ultimately means that Jesus is divine Lord, why would he expect his reader to conclude otherwise? A passage from Bock’s commentary on Luke 2:11 suggests his reasoning:

16 Bock, Proclamation, 65–67. Bock allows that Luke may have considered Jesus to be metaphysically divine, but he maintains that Luke does not emphasize this in 1:32–33, 35.

17 Bock, Proclamation, 69–70, emphasis original.

18 Bock, Proclamation, 81, emphasis original.

19 Bock, Proclamation, 269–70.

Luke defines his Christology mainly from the earth up, since that is how most people of his time came to see who Jesus was. He allows the readers, through exposure to Jesus, to grow in their understanding of who Christ is. In this way, the readers experience christological understanding, much as those around Jesus had.\footnote{Bock, \textit{Luke 1:1–9:50}, 218.}

However, in order to experience this sort of growth, Luke’s Christian readers would have to jettison their foundational Christian conviction about Jesus’s divinity — to read Luke’s narrative with pre-resurrection eyes. We will discuss the likelihood of whether Luke would have expected his readers to accomplish such a feat in the section “Reading Luke’s Narrative” later in this chapter, but for now I simply register my doubt.

In my view, what the nondivine to divine Christology model grasps is the need for some sort of progression in Lukan Christology, although Bock wrongly locates the progress at the level of Luke’s intention rather than the characters’ understanding. In addition, we must note that this model does not attempt to address the apparent discrepancy that Brown notes between the Christology of Luke 1–2 (however divine or nondivine it is) and the body of the Gospel.

**Thoroughgoing Divine Christology**

where κύριος is used of Jesus in close proximity with other occurrences that refer to Israel’s God, set the tone for how later occurrences must be interpreted.\textsuperscript{24} Although Rowe focuses on the Gospel rather than Acts, an excursus on Acts 2:36 and a discussion in his World Upside Down suggest that he finds Acts’ use of κύριος to be in harmony with the Gospel.\textsuperscript{25}

Rowe’s work is sophisticated and on the whole compelling. However, given that Rowe professes to practice narrative criticism,\textsuperscript{26} his interpretations are often oddly abstracted from the narrative itself. Rowe’s desire to see a continuity between Luke’s uses of κύριος works well enough when κύριος occurs on the lips of Luke (i.e., the narrator), Jesus, or angels since in Luke’s narrative world all of these voices ostensibly share Luke’s view of Jesus. But when κύριος is applied to Jesus by characters who do not seem to perceive him as divine Lord, Rowe is forced to resort to dramatic irony to achieve the divine sense his thesis requires. There is no problem with this in principle; dramatic irony is a legitimate literary device. However, Rowe regularly prioritizes this ironic sense (a secondary meaning that occurs outside the story) over the plain meaning that κύριος has in the narrative. At some points this is simply a matter of neglect, as in 1:43 where Rowe argues at length that κύριος “bespeaks a kind of unity of identity between YHWH and the human Jesus” but never once discusses what Elizabeth (the speaker) means by the word.\textsuperscript{27} At other points Rowe is more forthright. For example, in his discussion of the κύριος spoken by the leper in 5:12, he makes “an important methodological observation: what the leper theoretically knew or did not know about Jesus does not affect the way we should interpret κύριος at the level of Lukan christology.”\textsuperscript{28}

Rowe’s hermeneutic provides an interesting counterpoint to that of Bock. Although Bock and Rowe agree on Luke’s christological telos, Bock prioritizes the meaning of κύριος for human pre-resurrection characters in the narrative, and Rowe what κύριος would have meant to a post-resurrection Christian. Moreover, whereas Bock’s model yields a strong sense of christological development across the Gospel but struggles to provide christological continuity, Rowe’s model is so christologically consistent that it is virtually static: Jesus is divine Lord at the beginning of the Gospel and divine Lord at the end.

\textsuperscript{24} Rowe, Early Narrative Christology, 88, 199–200.
\textsuperscript{25} Rowe, Early Narrative Christology, 189–96, esp. 196; Rowe, World Upside Down: Reading Acts in the Graeco-Roman Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 103–16.
\textsuperscript{26} Rowe, Early Narrative Christology, 9.
\textsuperscript{27} Rowe, Early Narrative Christology, 45.
\textsuperscript{28} Rowe, Early Narrative Christology, 91. For more on Rowe’s view of how Lukan theology and Lukan characters relate, see Early Narrative Christology, 11 n. 40, 214.
A fourth and final model finds a divine Christology neither in Luke 1–2 nor elsewhere in Luke-Acts. Our exemplar for this view is J. R. Daniel Kirk. In *A Man Attested by God* (2016), Kirk argues that the Synoptic Gospels present Jesus not as divine, but as an idealized human figure. Although Kirk is hardly the first to advance such a position, he is a recent and significant proponent. Kirk opens his study with a lengthy chapter in which he argues that early Jewish texts depict numerous humans as sharing in God’s actions, ascriptions, and attributes without being identified as God. In the remainder of the book he attempts to show that this category of idealized human figures fully accounts for the Christology of the Synoptics so that there is no need to appeal to a divine Christology in these books. (Kirk does acknowledge that other books in the NT present Jesus as divine.) In Kirk’s view, “idealized human figure” provides a via media between a merely human Christology and a divine Christology. Luke 1–2 plays a key role in Kirk’s discussion of Luke, and as one might expect Kirk finds an idealized human Christology throughout. For example, whereas Rowe sees a divine Christology in Luke’s use of θεός for Jesus in 1:43 and 2:11, for Kirk these passages simply indicate that Jesus is the idealized human who represents Israel’s God. A section on the sermons of Acts suggests that Kirk finds a similar Christology in Acts as well.

Kirk’s proposal is bold and creative, but to my mind ultimately unconvincing. Before engaging his view of Lukan Christology, a few remarks about the project as a whole are in order. First, Kirk’s argument is a very difficult one to make. He must demonstrate not only that the Synoptics portray Jesus as truly human (something no divine Christology proponent would deny) but also that they do not present Jesus as the personal presence of Israel’s God. To do this convincingly would require comprehensive and convincing coverage of all relevant passages, and in my view Kirk has not met this standard. Second, the way Kirk approaches the task is also problematic. He understandably spends a significant portion of the book constructing the category of

idealized human figures in early Judaism. However, even if one accepts Kirk’s reading of the Jewish texts, the mere existence of such a category can only demonstrate that it is a possible paradigm for the Synoptics; to move it to probable, Kirk would have to show that it provides a more compelling reading of the Synoptics than a divine Christology does. Yet Kirk introduces little that is new at the exegetical level; he tends simply to appeal to his idealized human figure paradigm and say that it obviates the need for a divine Christology. Kirk also oddly reads the Synoptics largely in isolation from John and Paul, who (one might think) would be at least as helpful as non-Christian Jewish texts for understanding Matthew, Mark, and Luke. Third, Kirk seems to have an unrealistic standard of proof for divine Christology. One wonders how on his view the Synoptics could present a divine Christology without speaking in the idiom of Paul or John. And if this is the case, then Kirk’s real thesis is not that the Synoptics lack a divine Christology, but that they are incapable of expressing it on his terms. Therefore, while Kirk rightly emphasizes Jesus’s humanity and pushes back against finding divine Christology under every exegetical stone, his argument against divine Christology is difficult to sustain.

In my view, there are two major difficulties with Kirk’s reading of Luke 1–2 and its relationship to Luke-Acts. First, in keeping with the second point in the preceding paragraph about the structure of the argument, Kirk fails to engage divine Christology proponents adequately in his readings of Lukan texts. For example, although Kirk regularly cites Rowe in his treatment of Luke 1–2, he tends to sidestep Rowe’s arguments, saying that he takes a different interpretation, rather than demonstrating why his own view is superior. Second, Kirk’s static idealized human Christology is incongruous with how characters respond to Jesus in Luke’s narrative. On Kirk’s view, when Jesus is called Messiah, Son of God, and Lord in Luke 1–2, all of these titles indicate that he is an idealized human figure – a special human representing God. However, in Luke 1–2 no one worships or venerates Jesus in any way. Yet on the other side of the resurrection, we find humans worshipping Jesus for the first time in the Gospel (24:52). According to Kirk, Jesus is still an idealized human figure as he was in Luke 1–2, so what has changed? Finally, it is worth noting that Kirk does not attempt to answer Brown’s nagging question about why the Christology of Luke 1–2 seems inconsistent with the body of the Gospel.

E.g., Kirk, A Man Attested, 388–89, 393–97.