

Part I

Traditions in Ethics and Education

This part invites the reader to survey a variety of ethical traditions that have historically informed, and still inform, our educational thought and practice. Dedicating a section to ethical traditions in education comes with obvious challenges. Not only is there an almost infinite number of traditions one could justifiably consider; it is also unclear what traditions rooted in the past can contribute to the complex and ever-changing concerns of the present age. Some of our readers no doubt share Hannah Arendt's view that the dismantling of metaphysics has also meant that "the thread of tradition is broken and that we shall not be able to renew it," leaving us with little more than "a *fragmented* past, which has lost its certainty of evaluation."¹ Many are more than happy to move on from ideas and traditions that they consider to be forever linked to structures of oppression and injustice. But for others, including some contributors in this section, ethical traditions have neither lost their significance nor relinquished their prominent place in framing our ethical orientation toward education and society. According to this view, not only can traditions be renewed, but it would be irresponsible to abandon or dismiss them outright as having nothing of value to add to our lives. In some form or another, ethical traditions still provide structure to our lives and contain within them the blueprints for preparing our children for the future.

Our justification for this section is relatively modest. We take the view that whether we acknowledge it or not, ethical traditions still partly inform our understanding of the good life and provide justification for many of our educational aims. In fact, ethics (from the Greek *ethos*, meaning habit) and education (from Latin *educare*, meaning to train, and *educere*, to bring out) have always been interconnected in practice. Whether the purpose of education is to initiate the young into a community, facilitate self-realization, cultivate virtues or flourishing lives, prepare the young for work, or fight for a just future, ethical traditions influence how we approach, practice, and assess teaching and learning.² Besides, there is so much to learn from the past.

¹ Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind* (London: Harcourt, 1971/1978), 212.

² Even Arendt cautions against employing the "technique of dismantling" without taking proper care "not to destroy the 'rich and strange,' the 'coral' and the 'pears,'" of history. Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, 212.

At the same time, the impact of past traditions on the present is never straightforward. There are fundamental differences within and across cultures and historical periods about the meaning and nature of the good life and the role that education might play in its promotion. Since the emergence of liberal democracies and global capitalism this relationship has become even less apparent. While ethical frameworks and conceptions of the good life continue to play a vital role in educational thought and practice, they are also contested at every turn. In the present climate, traditions intermingle, cross cultural boundaries, and form new and complex configurations of thought and action, often with their own contradictions and unforeseen effects. Like our past, the present is fragmentary. It is therefore best not to think of these traditions as merely the dead weight of time, resistant to critical analysis or to the possibility of transformation. All of the traditions in this section have influenced and have been in turn influenced by each passing generation and the unique context in which they have lived. It is therefore not surprising to find many of these traditions renewed and reimagined in Parts II and III.

With these issues in mind, contributors have been given wide latitude to take creative risks in exploring the connections between their featured ethical tradition and educational thought and practice. Some of the contributors have chosen to defend original arguments, while others prefer to present a more conventional overview of their subject matter. All of the contributors address the three questions pertaining to the distinctive positions of their featured tradition(s):

1. How should we live?
2. What is the role of education in promoting the good life?
3. How does this tradition impact curriculum and instruction today?

Of course, this part can only address some of the many traditions deserving serious scholarly attention. While far from comprehensive, we include chapters on traditions that have resisted colonization and the threat of cultural erasure as well as traditions that have played prominent roles in promoting or resisting the seismic cultural, political, economic, and educational shifts that have occurred over the last two centuries.

We begin Part I of the handbook with ethical traditions from distinct geographical regions. In Chapter 1, “Ancient Chinese Ethics and Education,” Charlene Tan examines the concept of virtue (*de* 德) in the traditions of Confucianism and Daoism. Kirsten Welch explores several fundamental features of Greek and Roman thought and their contemporary educational impact in Chapter 2, “Ancient Greek and Roman Ethics and Education.” Agrippa Chingombe and Thenjiwe Major contribute Chapter 3, “Ubuntu Ethics and Education in Southern Africa,” in which they argue that Ubuntu ethics offers the world a pedagogical-ethical approach that embraces diversity and promotes dialogue across differences. In Chapter 4, “Ethical and Environmental Knowledge and Education: Indigenous Cultures from Latin America,” Angelica Serna Jeri examines the pedagogical ethics of writing in the colonial period and argues that the diversity of practices that characterize indigenous languages and cultures in the region share a common focus on indigenous pedagogical interventions tied to an Earth-grounded philosophy; and finally, in Chapter 5,

“Ethics, Education, and the Inheritance of Abraham: An Essay in the Pedagogy of Difference,” Hanan Alexander considers the major Abrahamic faiths on a continuum from dynamic to dogmatic and argues that a more dynamic reading of Abrahamic tradition provides more potential for dialogue across faiths.

The second group of chapters addresses the conventional division between rights-based, consequentialist, and virtue ethics. In Chapter 6, “Prioritizing Outcomes: Utilitarian Ethics and Education,” Tal Gilead discusses the influence of two strands of utilitarianism on education and maintains that reviving one traditional form of utilitarianism has significant potential for improving education. Christopher Martin provides Chapter 7, “Freedom and the Ethics of Educational Authority,” which addresses two different justifications of political authority over education that might help us establish the proper relationship between education and freedom. Finally, in Chapter 8, “Moral Education in the Virtues,” Michael S. Pritchard and Elaine E. Englehardt explore some central features of morality in terms of what are commonly regarded as virtues and discuss ways in which it might be taught in schools.

The remaining group of chapters focus on ethical currents that gained prominence during the last two centuries with the rise of liberal democracy, compulsory public education, and global capitalism. In Chapter 9, “The Ethics of *Bildung* and Liberal Education,” Seamus Mulryan traces the long history of *Bildung* and liberal education, from its origins in ancient Greece to the critical role it played and still plays in education and literature since the nineteenth century. In Chapter 10, “American Pragmatism, Democratic Ethics, and Education,” Leonard Waks, Chris Voparil, and Justina Torrance explore the topic through the lens of pragmatist thinkers William James, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty. In Chapter 11, “Radical Ethics: Marxism and Habermasian Critical Theory,” Katie Haus and Barbara Dennis discuss the impact of critical theory and describe a critical pedagogical approach linking human ethics and action with both reflection and emancipatory interests. In Chapter 12, “The Ethics of Phenomenology and Hermeneutics in Education,” Clarence Joldersma draws from the work of Edmund Husserl, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Emanuel Levinas to provide a phenomenological approach to human flourishing and living well together, and a role for education in fostering ethical subjects that would enact such societies. In Chapter 13, “Feminist Ethics and the Contradictions of Gender,” Cris Mayo makes connections between several major feminist philosophers and transgender theorists who approach differences in ways that also work through the contradictions of wanting to recognize how diverse women are but also not wanting to remain within the complex and constitutive, but insufficient, cultural definitions of gender. And finally, in Chapter 14, “Postmodern/Poststructuralist Ethics and Education,” Marianna Papastephanou examines the postmodern-poststructuralist turn with its incredulity toward settled truths on ethics and the aims of education. She ends the chapter with some critical remarks on the challenge of rethinking educational ethics after post-isms.

1

Ancient Chinese Ethics and Education

Charlene Tan

Introduction

The words “ethics” (伦理 *lunli*) and “morality” (道德 *daode*) do not appear in ancient Chinese vocabulary. But this does not mean that normative considerations are unimportant to the Chinese in antiquity. On the contrary, a perennial concern of Chinese thinkers and educators in classical times was to identify and propagate *dao* (道 Way) – a shared vision of human excellence to guide humanity on what is true and false.¹ This chapter explores the salient characteristics of ancient Chinese ethics and their enduring relevance on educational thought and practice. Centering on the two influential indigenous philosophies in China – Confucianism and Daoism – this essay analyses the concept of virtue (*de* 德) in the Chinese classics. The first part of the chapter provides a brief introduction to ancient Chinese philosophical traditions. The next section expounds on the notion of virtue from Confucian and Daoist perspectives. The last section highlights the major educational implications from our elucidation of ancient Chinese ethics.

Ancient Chinese Philosophical Traditions

Ancient Chinese philosophical traditions are comprised of many schools of thought, proponents, historical developments, and sociocultural systems. The two leading and impactful indigenous philosophies since the Zhou dynasty (1046–256 BCE) in China are Confucianism and Daoism. These two “complement each other, running side by side like two powerful streams through all later Chinese thought and literature.”² It is therefore instructive to give a brief

¹ Antonio S. Cua, *Ethical Argumentation: A Study of Hsun Tzu's Moral Epistemology* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Charlene Tan, *Confucian Philosophy for Contemporary Education* (London: Routledge, 2020).

² W. M. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, *Sources of Chinese Tradition: From Earliest Times to 1600*, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 77.

introduction to these two philosophical traditions before we discuss ancient Chinese ethics.

Confucianism, as indicated by its name, is closely identified with Confucius (孔子 *Kongzi*) (551–479 BCE), whose teachings and conduct are documented in a Chinese classic known as the *Analects* (论语 *Lunyu*). But it is important to clarify that Confucius is not the founder of Confucianism. Rather, Confucianism, as a cultural and intellectual system, predated Confucius.³ The Chinese equivalent of Confucianism is *ru*xue 儒学, which means “the study of *ru*.” The *ru*, whose membership included Confucius, are learned persons and facilitators of rituals for the aristocrats in traditional China.⁴ Confucius’ ingenuity lies in expanding the knowledge and expertise of *ru* by adding novel elements to them. From the time of Confucius, Confucianism has spread to other parts of East Asia, framing the mental models and lifestyles of Chinese over the centuries. Rather than a monolithic ideology, Confucianism is more appropriately described as “a worldview, a social ethic, a political ideology, a scholarly tradition, and a way of life.”⁵

Besides Confucianism, Daoism is the other native philosophical tradition that has molded the thinking, value systems, and behaviors of the Chinese for millennia. The term “Daoism” (道家 *Dao Jia*), literally, “the school of *dao*,” was coined in China in the second century BCE. But its philosophical thought was already known by the populace as “the teaching of Laozi and Zhuangzi.”⁶ Laozi 老子, who lived during the sixth century BCE, and Zhuangzi 庄子, who lived during the fourth century BCE, are the two preeminent Daoist thinkers. They are also the authors of two seminal Daoist texts, *Daodejing* 道德经 and *Zhuangzi* 庄子, respectively. Unlike Confucius where much has been written about his life – although not everything that has been documented is reliable – relatively little is known about Laozi and Zhuangzi. Consequently, there are also doubts and controversies over the authorship of the before-mentioned Daoist classics. The general consensus is that *Daodejing* and *Zhuangzi* were probably written not only by Laozi and Zhuangzi, but also by several unknown authors over a period of time.⁷ Hence this chapter shall use “Laozi” and “Zhuangzi” throughout the discussion to refer to the writers of the two texts in general.

Despite their different and even competing doctrines, Confucianism and Daoism are united in placing ethics at the heart of their teaching and practice. A common mission is to provide a *dao* 道 or Way to guide the general population to achieve some moral good, such as social harmony or personal contentment.⁸

³ Xinzhong Yao, *An Introduction to Confucianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

⁴ John Knoblock, *Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works*, vol. 1 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); Eric L. Hutton, *Xunzi: The Complete Text* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); Charlene Tan, “A Confucian Perspective of Self-Cultivation in Learning: Its Implications for Self-Directed Learning,” *Journal of Adult & Continuing Education* 23, no. 2 (2017): 250–262.

⁵ Wei-ming Tu, “Confucius and Confucianism,” in *Confucianism and the Family*, ed. Walter H. Slote and George A. DeVos (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 3.

⁶ De Bary and Bloom, *Sources of Chinese Tradition*.

⁷ Angus C. Graham, *How Much of Chuang Tzu Did Chuang Tzu Write?* (Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986); Charlene Tan, “Revisiting Donald Schön’s Notion of Reflective Practice: A Daoist Interpretation,” *Reflective Practice* 21, no. 5 (2020): 686–698.

⁸ Brook Ziporyn, *Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional Commentaries* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009).

Consistent with the emphasis on morality, the notion of learning carries an unmistakable ethical import for both Confucianism and Daoism. Confucian learning is essentially about “moral striving”⁹ or moral self-cultivation, which is “a gradual process of building up one’s character by making oneself receptive to the symbolic resources of one’s own culture and responsive to the sharable values of one’s own society.”¹⁰ Likewise, Laozi and Zhuang spoke out against man-made and authoritarian laws that oppress the masses and diminish human well-being. They propose instead a form of learning where one empties one’s ego and obtains moral power by developing one’s nature or innate disposition.¹¹

Having provided the background information on ancient Chinese philosophical traditions, the next section expounds the concept of virtue in Confucianism and Daoism. The attention is on the views of Confucius in the Confucian traditions, and the ideas of Laozi and Zhuangzi for Daoist traditions.

The Concept of Virtue in Confucianism and Daoism

The Notion of Virtue in Ancient China

The Chinese word for virtue is *de* 德, which has also been rendered variously as “moral excellence,” “ethical nature,” “spiritual powers,” “power imparted from *dao*,” “moral force,” “the powers native to beings and things,” and “virtus,” among other terms, in the Chinese traditions.¹² The etymology of *de* informs us that virtue revolves around two broad components: moral excellence and moral influence.

First, virtue is historically tethered to the ideal of *moral excellence*. The oracle bones, which were used for divination in ancient China, depict *de* as a person walking on a straight path. This illustrates a morally excellent person who is true and uncrooked.¹³ Such a person possesses *de* as a form of “power” within oneself, similar to the Latin meaning of *virtus*, which points to a thing’s intrinsic and distinctive character.¹⁴ It needs to be added that *de* as moral excellence is not about individualistic achievement. Rather, *de* has an inherent interpersonal aspect, which is illuminated through the quality of *moral influence*. *De* in early Shang dynasty designated the charismatic power given to a ruler by heaven (天 *tian*) or ancestral spirits.¹⁵ Describing *de* as “Royal Virtue,” Ivanhoe and Van Norden note that this spiritual power validates the legitimate rule of the leader, enabling one to gain the trust of followers in a natural way.¹⁶ This is achieved by the ruler exerting a moral power and charismatic attraction over others, leading

⁹ Jin Li, “The Core of Confucian Learning,” *American Psychologist* 58 (2003): 147.

¹⁰ Tu Weiming, *Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 68.

¹¹ Knoblock, *Xunzi*.

¹² David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Thinking through Confucius* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987).

¹³ Roger T. Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2011).

¹⁴ Edward Slingerland, *Confucius. Analects with Selections from Traditional Commentaries* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003).

¹⁵ Slingerland, *Confucius*.

¹⁶ Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, eds., *Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001).

to the ethical transformation of the subjects.¹⁷ Put otherwise, the moral influence of a sovereign produces patterns of deference from the people, who are inspired to emulate the leader's way of behaving.¹⁸

To sum up this portion, *de* in ancient Chinese traditions denotes the supreme moral quality and impact of individuals, particularly political leaders. Virtue describes “the *acquired excellence* of human beings and the *attendant influence* that such an achievement brings with it.”¹⁹ It follows that *de*, from an ancient Chinese perspective, is necessarily interpersonal and other-regarding. The next section elaborates on the two components of *de* – moral excellence and moral influence – by examining it from the Confucian and Daoist viewpoints, respectively.

Virtue in Confucianism

This section gives details on a Confucian interpretation of virtue by turning to the thought of Confucius as recorded in the *Analects*. Confucius' views on virtue are summarized through two main ideas: the exaltation of virtue, and the ethical charisma of exemplary persons.

Moral Excellence through Exalting Virtue

First, Confucius stresses the importance of exalting virtue, as noted in the following passage from the *Analects* 12.10:²⁰

Zizhang asked about the exaltation of virtue and the recognition of misguided judgement.

The Master said, “Make it your guiding principle to do your best for others and to be trustworthy in what you say, and move yourself to where rightness is, then you will be exalting virtue.”

The expression “exaltation of virtue” (崇德 *chongde*), also translated as the “accumulation of excellence,”²¹ is the Confucian idea of self-cultivation (修身 *xiushen*). The idea here is to value and acquire moral excellence by developing one's character and demonstrating one's virtues in everyday life, so that one overcomes misguided decisions. Three moral qualities for the exaltation of virtue are singled out by Confucius in the above passage: doing one's best, being trustworthy, and doing what is right. It is helpful to shed light on each of them.

First, doing one's best (忠 *zhong*) is about the disposition of whole-heartedness, sincerity, enthusiasm, and steadfastness – the basic ingredients for one to cultivate moral excellence. This character trait is coupled with two other indispensable attributes that spur a person on to perform social roles and navigate

¹⁷ Daniel K. Gardner, *The Four Books: The Basic Teachings of the Later Confucian Tradition* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2007).

¹⁸ Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics*. ¹⁹ Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics*, 208 (emphasis added).

²⁰ All citations are taken from this text and adapted from D. C. Lau, *Confucius: The Analects* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1997).

²¹ Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998).

human relationships. The characteristic of trustworthiness (信 *xin*) is about making good on one's word, which ensures that such a person is reliable and conscientious in carrying out one's duties and obligations. It is noteworthy that trustworthiness, for Confucius, does not mean or imply that one has to keep one's word in a naïve or unthinking manner. Rather, trustworthiness is complemented by rightness (义 *yi*) or "appropriateness," which is the third moral quality.

Yi involves the exercise of discretion and judgment based on particular circumstances. Such a person avoids poorly formulated judgments by creating personal meaning and value.²² *Yi*, which is essentially Confucian wisdom, approximates Aristotelian *phronesis* as both ideas are about ethics-based and situation-centered reasoning.²³ Confucius prizes *yi* by averring that this is what makes a person worthy of emulation. In his words, "In one's dealings with the world the exemplary person is not invariably for or against anything; such a person is on the side of what is *yi*" (4.10, also see 4.16, 17.23). The *Analects* is replete with instances of *yi* in daily life, such as conversing with someone (10.2, 10.15), receiving gifts (10.23), traveling (10.26), and participating in social events (10.3, 10.4). Confucius gives the following advice on whether, when, and how one should communicate with another person:

To fail to speak to a person who is capable of benefiting is to let a person go to waste. To speak to a person who is incapable of benefiting is to let one's words go to waste. A wise person lets neither persons nor words go to waste.

(15.8)

It is clear from the above passage that *yi* is needed to help a person to assess the readiness of the other person and make the correct judgment according to the evolving circumstances. Bringing together the three moral qualities, a person upholds virtue by making good on their word wholeheartedly and wisely.

It is evident that the exaltation of virtue is not a solitary endeavor but a communal one. Confucius observes that "virtue never stands alone; it is bound to have neighbours" (4.25); the "neighbours" in question are like-minded friends (1.1) who are "straight, trustworthy in word and well-informed" (16.4). One becomes virtuous by carrying out one's duty and obligation in accordance with one's roles and positions in society.²⁴ The Confucian accumulation of virtue shows up collective ethics, ethos, and experiences: as one gives of oneself by serving others, one stores up moral excellence concomitantly.²⁵

Moral Influence through the Ethical Charisma of Exemplary Persons

Besides the exaltation of virtue, Confucius also underscores the ethical charisma of exemplary persons. Ethical charisma refers to a capacity to attract, impact, and inspire others because of one's moral character.²⁶ Undergirded by the principle of equality, moral charisma is not restricted to an elite group such as kings and aristocrats, and is available to anyone who invests in cultivating

²² Hall and Ames, *Thinking through Confucius*. ²³ Slingerland, *Confucius*. ²⁴ Cua, *Ethical Argumentation*.

²⁵ Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics*. ²⁶ Ivanhoe and Van Norden, *Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy*.

oneself. A person who succeeds in doing so is known as a *junzi* (君子 exemplary person), as taught by Confucius:

The virtue of the exemplary person (*junzi*) is like wind; the virtue of the small person is like grass. Let the wind blow over the grass and it is sure to bend.
 (12.19)

Here Confucius makes a direct link between the virtue of an exemplary person and that of a “small person” (小人 *xiaoren*). What sets an exemplary person apart from a small person is not social status or other background factors but virtue. An exemplary person, as Confucius puts it, “reveres virtue” (14.5). This point is affirmed in the above passage that likens the virtue of an exemplary person to wind that is overpowering and irresistible. In contrast, the small person, also known as a petty person, is a morally undeveloped person whose displayed virtue is only superficial. The paradigmatic small person is the “village worthy” (鄉原 *xiangyuan*), who is castigated by Confucius as “the ruin of virtue” (17.13). Ann-Ping Chin explains how the “village worthy” manages to deceive people through a façade of virtue:

if you want to censure him, you cannot find any evidence of his wrongdoing, and if you want to attack him, you cannot find a clear target. He is in tune with the prevalent custom and blends in with the sordid world. When in a state of repose, he appears to be conscientious and trustworthy. When actively engaged with the world, he appears to be principled and immaculate. People all like him, and he thinks he is in the right.²⁷

The expression used by Confucius to describe the village worthy is *de zhi zei* (德之賊), which is literally “a thief of virtue.” Such a person “steals” virtue by taking what one does not have – the person is only pretending to be moral. The village worthy exhibits virtue “under false pretences” by merely going through the motions of ethical behavior without the desired values and attitude.²⁸

Returning to 12.19, the small person does not possess authentic moral excellence, unlike that of an exemplary person. That is why the so-called virtue of the small person is analogous to grass, which, when compared with the wind, is weak and powerless. Confucius’ point is that only the exemplary person possesses the ethical charisma to win over others effectively and naturally. Because of one’s ethical charisma, an exemplary person does not need to resort to force or pressure. Such a person reaches out to become coextensive with people, inspiring others to move in the same direction, thereby building harmonious connections.²⁹ In the case of an exemplary person who happens to be a ruler, such a person is capable of leading by virtue without resorting to punitive measures. As articulated by Confucius,

Lead them by edicts, keep them in line with punishments, and the common people will stay out of trouble but will have no sense of shame. Lead them by virtue, keep them in line with li (normative behaviours), and they will, besides having a sense of shame, reform themselves.

(2.3, emphasis added)

²⁷ Ann-ping Chin, *The Authentic Confucius: A Life of Thought and Politics* (New York: Scribner, 2007), 155.

²⁸ Ames and Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius*, 207. ²⁹ Hall and Ames, *Thinking through Confucius*.

According to Confucius, to lead by edicts is to rely on law and punishment to effect obedience and induce fear in the followers. This form of governance only achieves outward compliance in the masses without moral transformation – this is what having “no sense of shame” means in the above passage. In contrast, to lead by virtue is to model moral excellence so that one’s ethical charisma is visible and appealing to all and sundry. Leading by virtue is linked to keeping the people “in line with *li* [normative behaviors],” which means directing and motivating the people to do what is virtuous. The desired outcome of the moral transformation of the masses is attainable only if the ruler is a moral exemplar in the first place. A virtuous leader is like “the Pole Star which commands the homage of the multitude of stars without leaving its place” (2.1). Whether it is the Pole Star or the wind, the exemplary person relies on role-modeling, inspiring everyone to look up to and follow the leader willingly.

Having delineated a Confucian reading of virtue, the next section shifts our focus to a Daoist understanding of virtue.

Virtue in Daoism

According to Laozi and Zhuangzi, virtue is achieved through the following two ways: moral excellence through emptying one’s heart and mind, and moral influence through *wuwei* (noncoercive action).

Moral Excellence through Emptying One’s Heart and Mind

Unlike a Confucian orientation of achieving moral excellence through exalting virtue, a Daoist remedy is to empty one’s heart and mind through “sitting and forgetting” (坐忘 *zuowang*). This is explicated in this passage where Zhuangzi sketches an imaginary conversation between Confucius and his disciple Yan Hui:³⁰

Yan Hui said, “I am making progress.”

Confucius said, “What do you mean?”

Yan Hui said, “I have forgotten Humanity and Responsibility.”

Confucius said, “That’s good, but you’re still not there.”

Another day he came again and said, “I am making progress.”

“What do you mean?”

“I have forgotten ritual and music.”

Confucius said, “That’s good, but you’re still not there.”

He returned another day and said yet again, “I am making progress.”

“What do you mean?”

³⁰ All citations are taken from Ziporyn, *Zhuangzi*.