Introduction

Across 1839 and early 1840 a series of letters addressed to Britain's Protestants, entitled 'Popery – the Duties of Protestants', appeared in provincial newspapers across England.[1] Written by the Rev. James Dixon, a Wesleyan minister who would go on to be elected President of the Methodist Conference in 1841, the letters offer a window into the fear and anxiety evinced by many Protestants at the rapid social, religious, and political changes they witnessed in the 1830s. Dixon, who gained prominence as one of 'the most powerful, popular, and active anti-popish lecturers and speaker', equated the United Kingdom's political stability and geopolitical dominance with Protestantism.[2] He worried that those in power, the Whig government led by Lord Melbourne, were animated by a commitment to 'liberal principles' that threatened to unmoor the country from its foundation of freedom and liberty and imperil the wider empire. 'For ages the empire, reposing under the peaceful influence of Protestant institutions, appeared like the blue ocean beneath the bright sunshine of heaven', wrote Dixon, 'whilst the setting in of Popery, has been like a mountain deluge, rendering muddy and turbid the pure and tranquil waters'.[3] The struggle between the Conservative Party and the Whig Party was not one based on political principles; rather, it was about 'Protestantism on the one side, and Popery on the other'. Dixon stressed that '[i]n this as in other things England has been assimilated to Ireland', before asking his readers: 'Then, from all these facts and circumstances, it may be asked, is it *safe*, is it *rational*, is it *English*, is it *Christian*, to confide the religious destinies of the country to such hands as these?'[4]

It is questionable whether a few letters printed in provincial newspapers by a Methodist pastor in 1840 are worthy of historical memory. Reading

---

[1] These letters were later collected into pamphlet form, published in 1840. See Rev. James Dixon, *Letters of the Duties of Protestants with Regard to Popery* (Sheffield: G. Chaloner, 1840).

[2] Richard Watson Dixon, *The Life of James Dixon, D. D., Wesleyan Minister* (London: Watson and Hazell, 1874), 222.

[3] Dixon, *Letters*, 18.   [4] Dixon, *Letters*, 19, 24.

them is to plunge oneself into a litany of anti-Catholic stereotypes meant
to jar mid-nineteenth-century sensibilities, to say nothing of today's.
Nevertheless, they serve as a useful starting point for this book for two
reasons. First, Dixon's writing was simply one example among dozens, if
not hundreds, on similar themes of anti-Catholic sentiment that linked
'popery' with foreign tyranny, embroiling the Irish politician Daniel
O'Connell and the supposed 'barbaric' state of Ireland into its narrative:
'The fond aim of these parties [the Whigs] is to make us all brother Papists
with themselves. . . . Would this advance our freedom? . . . Let the present
enslaved, ignorant, barbarous, and wretched state of the Irish peasantry
answer this question.'[5] Other controversialists, offering riffs in the same
key, promised 'the righteous judgment of God' would 'overtake the
British empire', or stressed that the calamity of the Famine was
a consequence of the British Parliament passing 'anti-Christian laws'
that provided a permanent state endowment for the Catholic seminary
at Maynooth College.[6] The variety of tracts, newspapers, poems, and
magazines produced on anti-Catholic/anti-Irish themes in the 1830s and
1840s became political fodder for audiences, as Dixon and others of his
ilk used stereotypes about Irish backwardness and violence toward politi-
cal ends and suggested that if Catholicism was allowed to flourish, Great
Britain might devolve into another Ireland.

Dixon's letters, and the countless other works of anti-Catholicism, also
underscore another salient feature of political realities in the 1830s and
1840s – that Ireland, and Irish issues, did not function as a parochial
backwater (even if many perceived Ireland as such) but stood instead at
the crux of British politics during the 'age of reform', constraining its
actions and shaping its outcomes. Ireland's role in shaping British politics
is a fact that historians have often highlighted. One of the most exciting
and enduring examples is George Dangerfield's *The Strange Death of
Liberal England*, which despite its parochial title, advocated with witty
vigour how the 'Ulster Question' offered one *casus belli* in a civil war that
never happened but that nevertheless destroyed a particular cultural
formation – 'Liberal England' – and a political party.[7] In the late nine-
teenth century the reoccurring question of Home Rule ensured that Irish
questions were never far from parliamentary business. Eugenio Biagini

---

[5] Dixon, *Letters*, 18.
[6] Robert James M'Ghee, *A Sermon Preached in Harold's Cross Church [. . .]* (Dublin: Grant
and Bolton, 1843), 24; Anon., *Popery in Power, and Britain Betrayed [. . .]* (London,
J. F. Shaw, 1854), 50.
[7] George Dangerfield, *The Strange Death of Liberal England*, 20th ed. (New York: Perigee
Books, 1980). Dangerfield would return to the Irish theme in his *The Damnable Question:
A Study of Anglo-Irish Relations* (London: Little, Brown, 1976).

has noted that Irish mass immigration to Britain, along with Irish MPs
making nearly one-sixth of the Westminster Parliament's membership,
ensured that between 1876 and 1906, 'Ireland was *the* pressing question
of the day and was treated as such by both Liberals and Unionists'.[8] But
Irish MPs also showed up in unexpected places to exert political influ-
ence, much to the chagrin of their British counterparts, such as at critical
moments of imperial interventions or on questions of fiscal policy and
taxation.[9]

This book continues in this scholarly tradition by demonstrating the
ways that Ireland shaped the crucial decade of reform – a period of
monumental change in the United Kingdom that saw the end of the
confessional state, with the passage of Catholic Emancipation in 1829
and the Great Reform Act of 1832, but also the growing remit of the
central state to enumerate and tackle problems that had previously been
handled by localities in a rising 'reform' agenda.[10] This book puts Ireland,
especially the fundamental threat of Irish agrarian violence (known as
'outrages'), front and centre in the political narrative of the 1830s and
1840s. It argues that Irish 'problems' shaped British political culture in
the 1830s, motivated politicians to apply their reformist vision in new
ways, and profoundly influenced political outcomes in ways that hereto-
fore have been underappreciated.[11] In short, if we fail to incorporate the
Irish dimension of the 1830s, we run the risk of missing an important
piece of the story of the 'age of reform'; one, I will add, that is hiding in
plain sight, as a cursory glance at newspapers and the periodical press
confirms.

The book advances three interrelated arguments that have implications
for our understanding of the political history of Great Britain and Ireland,

[8] Eugenio F. Biagini, *British Democracy and Irish Nationalism, 1876–1906* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 2.

[9] Paul A. Townend, *The Road to Home Rule: Anti-Imperialism and the Irish National Movement*, History of Ireland and the Irish Diaspora (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2016); Douglas Kanter, 'The Politics of Irish Taxation, 1842–53', EHR 127, no. 528 (1 October 2012): 1121–55; Douglas Kanter, 'The Campaign Against Over-Taxation, 1863–65: A Reappraisal', in *Taxation, Politics, and Protest in Ireland, 1662–2016*, ed. Douglas Kanter and Patrick Walsh (Cham: Springer, 2019), 227–52, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04309-4_9.

[10] J. C. D. Clark, *English Society 1688–1832: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice During the Ancien Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Arthur Burns and Joanna Innes, 'Introduction', in *Rethinking the Age of Reform: Britain 1780–1850*, eds. Arthur Burns and Joanna Innes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1–70, at 47.

[11] Shunsuke Katsuta has recently highlighted the way the Rockite Rebellions of the early 1820s influenced political debate in Westminster. See Shunsuke Katsuta, *Rockites, Magistrates and Parliamentarians: Governance and Disturbances in Pre-Famine Rural Munster* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020), ch. 4.

as well as the meaning of agrarian violence in the Irish countryside prior to the Famine. First, the book argues that the reforming agenda of the 1830s found its expression in a group of relatively young, aristocratic Whig politicians who believed that government had a positive and active role to play in solving social wrongs and who approached governing Ireland in novel ways between 1835 to 1841. This group of politicians sought to solve Ireland's innumerable problems, including Irish agrarian violence, by offering a number of legislative reforms from Westminster in an effort to win Irish hearts and minds to the reality of British rule – a policy they identified as 'justice to Ireland'. This policy differed from those of previous governments because the Whigs in power scorned coercive legislation against Ireland and instead sought remedial legislation for that country. At a more localised level, their governing strategy included attempts to make the mechanics of Irish law and order a popular instrument by opening positions in the state bureaucracy, including the constabulary, law offices, and positions in Dublin Castle, to Catholics. Whigs intended these measures to alleviate the conditions that in their minds had bred agrarian violence, which in turn would more fully incorporate Ireland into their political union and create stability throughout the British Empire. This argument builds on, and seeks to complicate, the structure laid out in K. T. Hoppen's magisterial *Governing Hibernia*, which charted British governing strategy during the Union on a spectrum between 'policies of differentiation' and 'policies deliberately conceived to assimilate Ireland into the norms and behaviour patterns of a larger metropolitan (that is, British) centre'.[12] On the one hand, the discussion that follows, especially concerning Whig government intentions, underscores how governing policy shifted towards assimilation extremes in the late 1830s. On the other hand, this shift was predicated on an existing structure in the apparatus of state control that treated Ireland separately and employed powerful coercive and surveillance powers to legitimise its control.

The election of Daniel O'Connell as an MP in 1828, and the subsequent passage of Catholic Emancipation, irrevocably altered the contours of the British state. Politics in pre-Famine Ireland operated on a zero-sum basis, and Protestant peers and gentry members saw Emancipation as an apocryphal event with grave portent for their political power – that Catholic Emancipation was identified with ideas like 'reform' or was encompassed in the 'spirit of the age' made it that much more threatening to a Protestant sociopolitical order. As a result, Protestants began an active campaign to undermine the effects of Catholic Emancipation

[12] K. Theodore Hoppen, *Governing Hibernia: British Politicians and Ireland, 1800–1921* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 2.

through organising Protestant communities in Ireland and Great Britain and publishing anti-Catholic/anti-Irish propaganda in influential periodicals and the popular press. The second argument of this book focuses on this reaction to Catholic Emancipation and to the active inclusion of Catholics in the apparatus of the state. It suggests that Protestants on both sides of the Irish Sea used fears around agrarian violence and the alleged role in its organisation played by the Catholic Church's hierarchy as a political tool to stir latent anti-Catholic/anti-Irish feeling in Great Britain. This strategy included casting Irish violence in wider imperial contexts, suggesting either the potential inspiration Irish violence might offer in other colonial spaces or the potential for connection between revolutionary organisations. The book traces how this strategy was implemented successfully in the overwhelming Tory electoral victory of 1841, as well as the role that the aftermath of these sentiments played on the eve of the Famine.

Irish agrarian violence was an endemic feature of pre-Famine society, and many identified it (along with widespread poverty) as the chief inhibitor to Ireland's development as an integral part of the United Kingdom. In the eyes of propertied interests, Irish outrages threatened the free exercise of legal rights over private property and thus created a hostile environment for capital investment. For others, outrages signified the social fissures of class and religious background. The meaning of agrarian violence among those that perpetrated the violence, or suffered from it, has been a source of considerable debate in historiography, which I will discuss in greater detail below. However, I argue that for many among Ireland's underclass, the Whig efforts at 'justice for Ireland', which included the opening up of some professions in the state's apparatus, were not sufficient to satisfy their long-standing grievances. Instead, the rural poor often enacted justice on a local level defined by communal understandings of 'what was right'. This was interpreted by many government officials as a form of popular sovereignty that challenged the expanding sovereignty of the state. In short, I argue that Irish agrarian violence was an attempt to maintain a form of sovereignty exercised by Irish people over a range of social, economic, religious, and political relationships, thus resisting the encroachment of British institutions that were in the process (through 'reform') of seeking to gain legitimacy among Ireland's population.

Ireland and Great Britain: Four Nations, One Union

This book examines Ireland and Great Britain after its political union in 1801, and therefore, it builds on the assumption that a proper historical

understanding of Ireland must start with its relationship with the larger, more powerful, and politically dominant island across the Irish Sea – Great Britain. Although this assumption seems like common sense (and it is), it is also building on a larger historiographical tradition that has asserted the need to reclaim a contested, pluralist, and varied history of the British Isles from the standard Anglocentric history that too often has passed for British history. Indeed, one need look no further than the constitutional crisis surrounding Brexit to see the historical legacy that the four nations played in shaping the complexities of the United Kingdom as a multinational, multi-ethnic state. Therefore, Ireland in the nineteenth century (to say nothing of the seventeenth, eighteenth, or twentieth centuries) simply cannot be understood without placing it within the context of an expanding, increasingly powerful polity that had absorbed Ireland into its sphere and created a brand-new political entity – the United Kingdom.

In 1973, the year of Britain and Ireland's entrance into the European Economic Community (EEC), the historian J. G. A. Pocock delivered remarks at the inaugural Beaglehole memorial lecture in New Zealand that subsequently became a seminal turn in British historiography. The address called for a new 'British history' that embraced the complex, plural, contested histories of what Pocock termed the 'Atlantic archipelago'. Pocock argued that what often passed in textbooks for British history was really only the history of English actors that included Scots, Welsh, or Irish as 'peripheral peoples . . . disturb[ing] the tenor of English politics'. Furthermore, the histories produced by scholars in Scotland, Ireland, or Wales tended to scorn Anglocentric accounts and create nationalist alternatives that further fractured scholarship, and created segregated audiences.[13] Pocock suggested investing new meaning into 'British history' by exploring the 'plural history of a group of cultures situated along an Anglo-Celtic frontier and marked by an increasing English political and cultural domination'.[14] Inspired in part by Queen's University Belfast historian J. C. Beckett's reinterpretation of the English Civil War into the now paradigmatic Wars of the Three Kingdoms, Pocock recognised the overlapping narratives that contributed to how events unfolded in Britain and Ireland, which historians who were determined to recount an English story largely ignored.[15]

Coming on the heels of Britain's entrance into the European community, Pocock's project had a certain present-mindedness worth exploring.

---

[13] J. G. A. Pocock, 'British History: A Plea for a New Subject', *Journal of Modern History* 47, no. 4 (December 1975): 603–4.
[14] Ibid., 605.
[15] J. C. Beckett, *The Making of Modern Ireland: 1603–1923* (London: Faber, 1966), ch. 4.

While on the one hand Pocock's model embraced the plural, diverse, and contested histories across the British Isles, its emphasis on sovereignty and empire underscored his profound unease with Britain's entrance into the EEC. Central to this uneasiness was Pocock's assertion that a nation needed to exercise sovereignty in order for it to have a history and national identity; by ceding its sovereignty to a supranational European state, he feared Britain would surrender its collective past. Pocock grounded this British identity crisis in the abrupt end of the British Empire after two world wars, coupled with the loss of the 'capacity to act' on the world stage with the country's reduced capability as an oceanic and imperial power.[16] Interrogating exactly what was meant by 'European', Pocock feared that in Britain's eagerness to cede its national sovereignty to the EEC it risked rewriting its distinctly insular, oceanic, and Atlantic past.[17] As a man who had grown up in New Zealand, Pocock also feared what Britain's turn towards Europe meant for the identities of many Commonwealth nations whose history and identity (to say nothing of their economy) centred on their relationship with Britain.[18]

In addition to his concern regarding Britain's sovereignty, and therefore the nation's history, Pocock's call for a new British history came a few years after conflict erupted in Northern Ireland in 1969, and nearly concurrently with the imposition of Direct Rule from Westminster, which led to an attempt at a power-sharing government embodied in the Sunningdale Agreement of December 1973 and its rapid demise in May 1974. The seeming intractability of the Ulster question, the multitude of identities associated with Northern Ireland, and the contestation over sovereignty offered a present-day problem that could be understood by means of Pocock's emphasis on the plurality of experiences and attempt to understand historically what being 'British' actually meant. The Troubles also pointed to the fact that Irish history could not be understood in isolation, or even as the antithesis of British imperialism, but rather needed to be incorporated within 'the processes of politicisation . . . the formation and disruption of state structures . . . and the reactions against that attempt and its consequences',[19] an acknowledgement that dovetailed nicely with

---

[16] J. G. A. Pocock, 'History and Sovereignty: The Historiographical Response to Europeanization in Two British Cultures', JBS 31, no. 4 (October 1992): 362–3. On Pocock's critique of Europe, see J. G. A. Pocock, 'Deconstructing Europe', in *The Discovery of Islands: Essays in British History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 269–88.

[17] Pocock, 'History and Sovereignty', 365, 377–8.

[18] Ibid., 361; J. G. A. Pocock, 'The New British History in Atlantic Perspective: An Antipodean Commentary', *The American Historical Review* 104, no. 2 (April 1999): 492.

[19] J. G. A. Pocock, 'The Limits and Divisions of British History: In Search of the Unknown Subject', *The American Historical Review* 87, no. 2 (April 1982): 318.

contemporaneous trends within Irish historiography among 'revisionists' attempting to reclaim Ireland's history from nationalist myth and hagiography.[20] Pocock himself acknowledged Ireland's profound importance in his historiographic endeavour, reframing the 'modern' period of British history as one defined by the 1801 Act of Union and the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922.[21]

Pocock's call garnered mixed reactions among British and Irish academics. Some historians argued that this polycentric approach posed more questions than it could answer, that an archipelagic model failed to properly take into account Atlantic dimensions, or that Pocock's emphasis on sovereignty and the state was too present-minded, or too exclusive.[22] Others worried an archipelagic model underappreciated Ireland's continual connections with continental Europe. *The Irish in Europe 1580–1815*, an edited volume following a 1999 conference at NUI Maynooth, stressed Ireland's continual continental connections throughout the early modern period, causing one reviewer to dismiss the 'alleged uniqueness of "The British Isles"' and praise the volume for persuasively arguing that 'Irish culture was not, and could not be, contained by the island's surrounding waters'.[23] Other scholars wondered if the new British history was not justh another way to 'perpetuate the Anglocentricism characteristic of the study of early modern English history', comparing it to a 'poisoned chalice', and in any event stressing early modern Ireland's ambiguous ability to fit into either a strictly Old World or New World paradigm.[24] Those suspicious of 'Irish revisionism' also argued persuasively for a narrative in tension with the new British history

---

[20] On revisionism in Irish historiography, and its controversy, see Ciaran Brady, *Interpreting Irish History: The Debate on Historical Revisionism 1938–1994* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1994); D. George Boyce and Alan O'Day, eds., *The Making of Modern Irish History: Revisionism and the Revisionist Controversy* (London: Routledge, 1996); Kevin Whelan, 'The Revisionist Debate in Ireland', *Boundary 2* 31, no. 1 (2004): 179–205; Ian McBride, 'The Shadow of the Gunman: Irish Historians and the IRA', *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 3 (July 2011): 686–710.

[21] Pocock, 'Limits and Divisions', 331.

[22] Raphael Samuel, 'British Dimensions: "Four Nations History"', *History Workshop Journal*, no. 40 (Autumn 1995): iii–xxii; David Armitage, 'Greater Britain: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis?', *The American Historical Review* 104, no. 2 (April 1999): 427–45; Richard Bourke, 'Pocock and the Presuppositions of the New British History', *The Historical Journal* 53, no. 3 (August 2010): 747–70; Dana Simmons, 'The Weight of the Moment: J. G. A. Pocock's Politics of History', *History of European Ideas* 38, no. 2 (June 2012): 288–306.

[23] Karl S. Bottigheimer, review of *The Irish in Europe, 1580–1815*, Thomas O'Connor, ed., *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 33, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 264–6.

[24] Jane Ohlmeyer, 'Seventeenth-Century Ireland and the New British and Atlantic Histories', *The American Historical Review* 104, no. 2 (April 1999): 448; Armitage, 'Greater Britain', 433. Armitage quotes Raymond Gillespie's 'Explorers, Exploiters and Entrepreneurs: Early Modern Ireland and Its Context, 1500–1700', in *An*

---

advocated by Pocock, especially regarding Ireland's colonial past. According to revisionism's critics, rather than understanding the resurgence in sectarian violence in the north of Ireland as a product of British colonialism, revisionists simply ignored this process and focused on the internal nature of Ireland's difficulties, doing so in a clinical style unable to engage with parts of Ireland's traumatic past.[25] Ambiguities in Ireland's position and role in the British Empire were also highlighted, making it difficult to determine how best to understand the Irish experience within the history of the British Isles.[26]

While ambiguities may exist that make it difficult to categorise Ireland's place within the British Empire, or even with the British Isles, the political union of 1801 stands as a concrete event that attempted to integrate Ireland politically with its larger neighbour. The Union fundamentally transformed Ireland and Great Britain's relationship, resulting in the absorption of Ireland's subordinate parliament, the expansion of British sovereignty, and the unhinging of Protestant privilege across both islands with Catholic Emancipation in 1829. Born out of violent revolution and in the wider context of European war, the Union produced violent reactions among segments of Ireland's population and violent counter-reactions from the state defending its claim to the monopoly of the use of legitimate physical force. At the heart of this process of integration are a number of interrelated questions that this book explores, all of which are inspired in part by Pocock's suggestion to 'study "empire" as the distribution of sovereignty shaped by forces operating within the Atlantic archipelago'.[27]

The Act of Union and State Power

If the Act of Union was an attempt to integrate Ireland into its political union, how successful was this process? The failure to incorporate

Historical Geography to Ireland, eds. B. J. Graham and L. J. Proudfoot (London: Academic Press, 1993), 152.

[25] Whelan, 'Revisionist Debate', 188; Brendan Bradshaw, 'Nationalism and Historical Scholarship in Modern Ireland', IHS 26, no. 104 (November 1989): 329–51.

[26] The historiography on this topic is too vast to cover in one footnote. For starters, readers should consult Keith Jeffery, ed., *'An Irish Empire'? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Kevin Kenny, ed., *Ireland and the British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Jill C. Bender, 'Ireland and Empire', in *The Princeton History of Modern Ireland*, eds. Richard Bourke and Ian McBride (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 343–60; Timothy McMahon, Michael de Nie, and Paul Townsend, eds., *Ireland in an Imperial World: Citizenship, Opportunism, and Subversion* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Stephen Howe, *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[27] J. G. A. Pocock, 'The Union in British History', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Sixth Series, 10 (2000): 196.

Catholics, as originally conceived by William Pitt, meant that the
political union 'from the start, was riven with ambiguity and disap-
pointed expectations'.[28] Many contemporaries, including some
nationalists, viewed the Union as either incomplete or a complete
failure. For British policymakers, the political rationale and strategy
of the Union needed constant care, which necessitated wholesale
changes in governing practice.[29] It is a curious fact that Ireland has
received relatively little attention from historians examining the pivotal
'decade of reform', roughly between the passage of Catholic
Emancipation in 1829 and the fall of Melbourne's second Whig minis-
try in 1841. Rather than its occupying a tertiary role in the minds of
British policymakers, however, this book suggests that Ireland was
central to the shaping of British political culture. This proved true for
at least two reasons. First, the hope that Catholic Emancipation would
operate as a panacea for Ireland's ills, a way to fulfil the implicit
promises of Pitt and Castlereagh from a generation earlier, and provide
legitimacy to the Union by allowing the majority of Ireland's popula-
tion to have political representation from their own tribe, proved
illusory.[30] It did not help matters that the British government diluted
the power of Irish Catholics by disenfranchising them as part of the
political price of achieving Emancipation.[31] Instead, Emancipation
merely emboldened Daniel O'Connell to seek the repeal of the
Union, opening new difficulties under the umbrella phrase: 'the Irish
question'.[32] However, the erasure of religious disabilities was not sim-
ply an Irish matter – it was a fundamental, irrevocable rewriting of
Britishness, the end of the *ancien régime* of 'old society' that had been
defined by its three characteristics, 'Anglican . . . aristocratic . . . [and]
monarchical', and thus it destabilised the political system and threw

---

[28] Alvin Jackson, *The Two Unions: Ireland, Scotland, and the Survival of the United Kingdom, 1707–2007* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 187. Jackson offers a stimulating comparative narrative of the two unions that ponders the enduring success of the Union between Great Britain and Ireland and challenges the teleologic tendencies of some Irish historiography, which focuses heavily on the revolutionary period.

[29] Hoppen, *Governing Hibernia*.

[30] On the implicit promises of Pitt at the time of the Union, see Thomas Bartlett, *The Fall and Rise of the Irish Nation: The Catholic Question, 1690–1830* (Savage, MD: Barnes & Noble, 1992), ch. 12. On Catholic Emancipation, see Wendy Hinde, *Catholic Emancipation: A Shake to Men's Minds* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Brian Jenkins, *Era of Emancipation: British Government of Ireland, 1812–1830* (Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1988).

[31] Fergus O'Ferrall, *Catholic Emancipation: Daniel O'Connell and the Birth of Irish Democracy 1820–30* (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1985), 249–55.

[32] Oliver MacDonagh, *The Emancipist: Daniel O'Connell 1830–47* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), ch. 4; Angus Macintyre, *The Liberator: Daniel O'Connell and the Irish Party, 1830–1847* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1965), ch. 4.