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Does philosophy have limits? Yes and no.

No, because nothing is ‘out of bounds’ for philosophy. There is nothing philosophy is forbidden to question, doubt, and explore. Philosophy seeks to understand and explain all of reality without remainder: as Aristotle said, its scope is nothing less than ‘being’, that is, everything that is. In that sense, there can be no limits to philosophy.

But also yes, because no philosophy has ever existed without an author. All philosophy proceeds from a human mind, with its own situation and way of reasoning, a mind with limitations to what it can learn, experience, and conceive. Philosophy has limits, therefore, because it is done by beings who have limits, in other words, who are finite. The ‘limits of philosophy’ are drawn by the finitude of the human condition.

This book takes ‘finitude’, and the limits set by finitude, to be the keystone of Paul Ricœur’s philosophy. In all his writings Ricœur shows a rigorous concern not to transgress the boundaries of what is possible for human thought as finite. But at the same time, he pushes philosophy to its outermost limits in order to peek, as through a glass darkly, at what lies beyond. How is this possible? Because, as Hegel famously remarked, to know a limit as a limit is already to have gone beyond it.¹ One cannot

¹ ‘Something is already transcended by the very fact of being determined as a limitation. For a determinateness, a limit, is determined as limitation only in opposition to its other in general, that is, in opposition to that which is without its limitation; the other of a limitation is precisely the beyond with respect to it’ (G. W. F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, ed. and trans. George Di Giovanni [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010], 106); translation modified: ‘daß etwas als Schranke bestimmt ist, darüber bereits hinausgegangen ist. Denn eine Bestimmtheit, Grenze ist als Schranke nur bestimmt im Gegensatz
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describe a boundary line without referring in some way to both sides of it. For example, the outline of France shows one side of the outline of Spain: thus to remain within the limits of France means knowing something, however little, of the shape of Spain. Similarly, for Ricœur, to know the limits of human reason means to have a shadowy (apophatic) outline of whatever is on the other side of them.

This book situates Ricœur’s concept of finitude in the wider context of twentieth-century French philosophy, showing both that Ricœur is asking the same questions others were asking and that his answers are strikingly unique. What it means to be finite and human was arguably the dominant question of twentieth-century thought as a whole. From Bergson’s analysis of free will, Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of embodiment, Sartre’s ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, and de Beauvoir’s seminal explorations of gender, to Lacan’s investigations of the unconscious, Henry’s phenomenology of life, Arendt’s politically inflected anthropology, Kristeva’s insights concerning the ‘other’, and Foucault’s histories of sexuality, power and discipline – in these and countless other works, the ‘human condition’ is the focus of enquiry.

To this Ricœur is no exception. He gave the name ‘philosophical anthropology’ to his work, which he considered an ‘urgent task for contemporary philosophy’.1 As Brian Gregor says, Ricœur ‘wrote on many topics and problems, but the concern that unites them all is the question of philosophical anthropology: what does it mean to be a human being?’2

But unlike his twentieth-century contemporaries, Ricœur did not think it possible to isolate anthropology from other questions, such as those concerning universal truth, God, evil, and the origin of the world. ‘Far from constituting the first question philosophy can raise’, Ricœur claims in Kantian fashion, ‘the question “what is man?” comes at the end of a series of prior questions’.3

gegen sein Anderes überhaupt als gegen sein Unbeschränktes; das Andere einer Schranke ist eben das Hinaus über dieselbe’ (G. W. F. Hegel, Die Wissenschaft der Logic, vol. 1, Werke 5 [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970], 145). Of course, this is precisely what Heidegger denies, and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

3 Ricœur, Philosophical Anthropology, 195. ‘La question qu’est-ce que l’homme?, loin de constituer la première question que la philosophie puisse se poser, vient à la fin d’une série de questions préalables’ (Ricœur, Anthropologie philosophique, 306).
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To be sure, Ricœur often wrote philosophy that aimed to describe the human condition in abstraction from metaphysical concerns, but as we shall see, he never saw his methodological bracketing either as entirely pure or as providing a self-sufficient picture of what it means to be human. As Pamela Sue Anderson notes, Ricœur’s ‘philosophy of the will reveals that, for him, a comprehensive philosophical anthropology is inevitably tied to theological reflection’. Ricœur argued that there is no metaphysically neutral point of view from which humanity can be studied, and that even though we may temporarily bracket out wider issues to narrow our focus, our philosophy is always coloured by our implied position concerning the big questions about truth, God, evil, and creation, and our understanding of the human condition is not complete without addressing them.

Ricœur’s willingness to explore what lies beyond the human places him in stark contrast to Martin Heidegger, whose concept of finitude was and still is the most influential in both philosophy and theology and because of that will be the primary point of comparison to Ricœur. Heidegger denies that it is meaningful to speak of anything beyond the limits of human finitude. For Heidegger, finitude is a standalone category without an opposite. Ricœur, on the other hand, wrestles continually with two ‘opposites’ or non-finites and how they interact with finitude – the infinite (or God, or transcendence) and non-being (or evil). Where Heideggerian finitude is total immanence and therefore nothing but finitude, Ricœurian finitude is dialectically related to an infinitude that enables an openness to transcendence. Similarly, where Heidegger rejects the idea that ‘fallenness’ leads to any concept of a primordial unfallen state, Ricœur uses the productive faculty of the imagination to offer a picture of innocent finitude prior to its invasion by the corruption of evil.

In summary, we may say that Ricœur sees human finitude as created. This has implications for more than finitude itself. If finitude is created, then there is a creator (the infinite). If the creator is good, then created finitude is good, which means that evil cannot belong to it by nature. Therefore if finitude is created, it is framed between two things that are not itself, one positive and one negative, one conventionally called God and the other evil.

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Does the category of ‘creation’ not turn Ricœur’s thought into theology? No, because Ricœur never invokes the authority of a revealed tradition as a substitute for argument, nor does he claim that God, creation, or evil can be grasped by philosophy as determinate concepts. In Ricœur’s own language, they are symbols: ideas drawn from outside philosophy that cannot be exhaustively explained within philosophy, but that shed light on aspects of the human condition that philosophy can meaningfully talk about.

Paul Ricœur’s Life and Work

Why read or write about Paul Ricœur? Simply because he is universally recognised as one of the twentieth century’s leading philosophers of religion. His philosophy of finitude is among the most important resources available for contemporary discussions. A chorus of voices have recently named Ricœur one of the ‘most influential’, ‘greatest’, ‘most important’, and ‘foremost’ philosophers of the twentieth century, not only in philosophy but across the humanities disciplines. In the case of theology and philosophy of religion, David Ford considers Ricœur (with Bonhoeffer) the greatest Christian thinker of the last hundred years; Boyd Blundell names Ricœur (with Barth) as a ‘major power’ behind a North American ‘proxy war’ between rival theological schools of thought; Jürgen Werbick calls him ‘one of the contemporary...
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philosophers who has had the greatest influence on theology;’¹³ and Dan Stiver calls Ricoeur’s philosophy ‘one of the best conversation partners for contemporary Christian theology’.¹⁴ Finally, Anthony Thiselton writes that ‘Ricoeur will have a lasting impact on the future of Christian theology.’¹⁵

Ricoeur’s wide-reaching influence and importance lies not only in the quality of each of his works, but in the seventy-year span over which they were written, bringing continuity to an otherwise torn and fragmented century. How many other authors have published material from both before World War II and after 9/11?¹⁶ Paul Ricoeur’s life was deeply intertwined with the tumultuous history of France in the twentieth century, and the sufferings that come with being finite were imprinted deeply on his experience.¹⁷ Born in 1913, he lost both his parents before his third birthday – his mother from illness and his father in the trenches of World War I. He and his sister were raised by their grandmother and their aunt.

A soldier in World War II, he was captured by the German army and sent to a prisoner-of-war camp in 1940 where he spent the next five years until the end of the war. He was deeply enmeshed in the affairs of 1968 and, while attempting the role of mediator between his institution and its revolutionary students, suffered minor physical assault from a student with a waste-paper basket lid.¹⁸ Following this, he resigned from teaching in France for a number of years and took up positions at Louvain and the University of Chicago. In his personal life, he experienced both the stability of a happy marriage which lasted sixty-three years until the death of his wife Simone in 1998, and the tragic rupture caused by the suicide of one of his five children.¹⁹ Ricoeur continued writing and publishing into

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¹⁴ Dan R. Stiver, Ricoeur and Theology (London: T & T Clark, 2012), 146.

¹⁵ Anthony C. Thiselton, Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 228.

¹⁶ See, for example, Ricoeur’s first article, ‘L’appel de l’action. Réflexions d’un étudiant protestant’, Terre nouvelle 2 (June 1935); and at the other end, his last book, Parcours de la reconnaissance (Paris: Stock, 2004).

¹⁷ As Alison Scott-Baumann writes, Ricoeur’s ‘personal and academic life was marked indelibly by major events of the twentieth century’ (Alison Scott-Baumann, Ricoeur and the Negation of Happiness [London: Bloomsbury, 2013], ix).


his nineties, and after he died in 2005 the notes found on his desk were published posthumously.\textsuperscript{20} The astounding longevity of Ricœur’s career is matched only by the breadth of topics he considered. These develop our understanding of what it means to be finite human beings in numerous directions. Stiver writes that Ricœur ‘made significant intersections not only with quite varied areas in philosophy but also with religion, literature, psychoanalysis, and sociology’, not to mention history, linguistic, politics, and theology.\textsuperscript{21} Within philosophy the number of topics to which he contributed is almost uncountable. Arrien makes a start: ‘the will, the symbol, evil, truth, history, imagination, metaphor, narrative, language, time, the self, etc.’\textsuperscript{22} We might add: interpretation, the unconscious, memory, justice, ideology, the sacred, the other – and the list is still far from comprehensive. But I also agree with Arrien that ‘there is nonetheless a centre … to this seeming plurality of fields of investigation: namely, “the human” who discovers “themselves”’.\textsuperscript{23} As noted above, philosophical anthropology is his focus.

In terms of religion, Ricœur’s grandparents were of Huguenot descent and raised him a devout Protestant, a tradition for which he says ‘reading the Bible was central’.\textsuperscript{24} His wife, a childhood friend, was from the same confessional background.\textsuperscript{25} Being Protestant in a Catholic country was not always easy for Ricœur, but with the rising tide of atheism he found he had more in common with his Catholic friends, especially the philosophical ones, than with anyone else, and it is evident that they drew much support from one another.\textsuperscript{26} Ricœur never seems to have radically

doubted his faith. At the end of his life he speaks of his faith as ‘a chance transformed into a destiny by continuous choice’.  He means by this both: (1) that due to the family he was born into, he did not choose his Protestant Christian upbringing; and (2) that he nonetheless remains responsible for his continual personal choice to remain a Christian, a responsibility which is discharged by providing ‘plausible arguments, that is, ones worthy of being pleaded in a discussion with good-faith protagonists, who are in the same situation as me, incapable of rendering fully rational the roots of their convictions’.  

RICŒUR’S PHILOSOPHICAL MENTORS

Of course, Ricœur’s philosophy did not emerge in a vacuum. He was deeply influenced both by prevailing schools of thought and by individual philosophers. He became the thinker he was through dialogue with certain key mentors, two of whom stand out in significance during the early stages of his career: the French Catholic philosopher Gabriel Marcel and the German existentialist Karl Jaspers, who has already been mentioned. These two philosophers will appear in dialogue with Ricœur throughout this book, and they deserve a brief introduction.

In 1934, shortly after finishing his Master’s thesis, the twenty-one-year-old Ricœur was introduced to the famous ‘Friday evenings’ of philosophical discussion which took place at the home of a high school philosophy teacher, musician, playwright, and recent Catholic convert Gabriel Marcel. Fifteen years his senior, Marcel rapidly became both mentor and close friend to Ricœur, who promptly devoured everything Marcel had published. Although Ricœur claims he ‘never submitted to the intellectual constraints of being [Marcel’s] disciple’, nonetheless during his captivity in a German prisoner-of-war camp, he wrote often...
to Marcel using the address ‘Cher Maître’, implicitly labelling himself Marcel’s student. In one of these letters Ricœur also writes that, outside his own family, Marcel is the person he most longs to see, telling him: ‘you have been a principal source of spiritual inspiration for me’.

But who was Gabriel Marcel? Born in 1889 in Paris, Marcel’s childhood was characterised by much travel due to his father’s profession. He was fluent in both English and German and wrote his Master’s thesis on a comparison of the philosophies of Coleridge and Schelling. During World War I Marcel worked for the Red Cross and was tasked with informing the families of soldiers who were found dead or missing, a task that he admits deeply affected his philosophy, impressing on him the mortality and fragility of being human. Although Marcel loved to write plays, these were not received with great acclaim by the general public. His philosophical writings, on the other hand, became caught up in a renewal movement that shook the academic world, even though the name of that movement, ‘existentialism’, was never much to Marcel’s taste, nor were many of the tenets that came to be associated with it.

After an upbringing of vague agnosticism, Marcel converted to Catholicism in his forties as a result of his personal philosophical journey and the influence of various devout Christian friends. Because of the faith commitments shared by Marcel and Ricœur, and the personal friendship they enjoyed over and above any mutual philosophical interest, I am convinced that Marcel was the single strongest influence on Ricœur during this early period of his career.

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32 This was published fifty years later as Gabriel Marcel, Coleridge et Schelling (Paris: Aubier, 1971).


It was Marcel who first introduced Ricœur to the writings of Karl Jaspers. Although Ricœur only met Jaspers personally twice, the writings of this German philosopher became another great influence on Ricœur in this early period.

Born in 1883 in Oldenburg, Germany, Jaspers arrived late to the professional practice of philosophy. He had been fascinated by philosophical ideas since a teenager, but was put off from formally studying philosophy by what he felt was the arid, scientific style of philosophising that was predominant in the universities, a style that ignored the existential situation of being human. Instead, he studied medicine and began work as a psychiatrist, ending up as a professor of psychology. His psychology department was closely connected to philosophy, and Jaspers found there to be a certain freedom of movement between the two disciplines. At the same time, he became aware of the possibility of another way of doing philosophy than the type of philosophy he had been previously deterred by. This may explain why, in 1922, after seven years teaching psychology at the University of Heidelberg, he was appointed to the chair of philosophy. To begin with, he felt ill-prepared for the post. For the next ten years he published little, and instead embarked on a decade-long reading project, seeking to acquire familiarity with the works of great philosophers throughout history. This eventually led to the 1932 publication of his first properly philosophical work. He gave it the straightforward title *Philosophy*, which he meant ‘in the sense of a testimony to philosophy, to practical philosophizing’.

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subsequently wrote many philosophical works, he later confessed that Philosophy remained the one ‘closest to my heart’.\footnote{Jaspers, ‘Epilogue 1955’, 5. ‘das liebste meiner Bücher’ (Jaspers, ‘Nachwort (1955)’, xv).} Jaspers openly opposed the Nazi regime right from the start, a stance which cost him his professorship in 1937 and his publishing rights in 1938.\footnote{Jaspers, ‘Philosophical Autobiography’, 62. One contributing reason for Jaspers’s trenchant opposition to Nazism could have been that his wife was Jewish.} It also strained his friendship with Heidegger to breaking point.\footnote{Jaspers, ‘Philosophical Autobiography’, 75/8.} After the war he was reinstated as a professor by the Allied forces and continued to have a prolific and successful career, even though ironically his fame and influence only dwindled in comparison to that of Heidegger.\footnote{Sarah Bakewell, \textit{At the Existentialist Café: Freedom, Being, and Apricot Cocktails} (London: Vintage, 2016), 193.}

Jaspers’s 900-page \textit{Philosophie} was Ricœur’s constant literary companion during the five years of his wartime captivity. Together with a fellow prisoner of war, Mikel Dufrenne, he carefully read and reflected on it and other of Jaspers’s works. This period of intense study bore fruit after the war with the publication of a joint work expounding, interpreting, and critically evaluating Jaspers’s philosophy for a French audience.\footnote{Mikel Dufrenne and Paul Ricœur, \textit{Karl Jaspers et la philosophie de l’existence} (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1947).} An indelible mark had been left on this young philosopher, and although in later decades his references to Jaspers diminished somewhat, Alan Olson argues that ‘the influence of Jaspers is a rather constant factor and cannot be confined merely to the earlier Ricœur as some of his followers tend to assume’.\footnote{Alan Olson, \textit{Transcendence and Hermeneutics: An Interpretation of the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers} (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 156.} Thereafter, my references to Jaspers are conspicuous by their absence.

\textbf{METHOD AND SCOPE OF THIS BOOK}

This book restricts itself to Ricœur’s writings prior to his turn to hermeneutics in the 1960s. I will occasionally reference Ricœur’s later writings when he returns to earlier themes or reflects on his earlier work, but overall I have aimed to present Ricœur’s philosophical anthropology prior to his engagement with structuralism, psychoanalysis, hermeneutics, and narrative. Such a limitation has the advantage of showing elements in Ricœur’s concept of ‘symbols’ that are omitted when symbols are taken up too early in his career.