Introduction

On 22 June 1940, Marshal Philippe Pétain's newly constituted French government signed an armistice with Hitler's Germany. At the same time, a relatively unknown brigadier general named Charles André Joseph Marie de Gaulle fled to London. De Gaulle became the leader of the Free French movement, which resolved to continue fighting against the Axis powers in the name of France. It pursued this battle symbolically and, eventually, militarily. Three decades later, British Members of Parliament would historicise this moment, and the man at its centre. British Prime Minister Edward Heath would describe de Gaulle's 'unconquerable determination to restore France' as 'one of the few sure and certain things' in 1940. Liberal Party Leader Jeremy Thorpe would recount a story in which Britain's wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill supposedly greeted de Gaulle with the prophetic words, 'here comes the Constable of France'.[1] In these commemorations, de Gaulle was the undisputed guardian of French honour and the personification of the Franco-British alliance. However, in 1940, and throughout the Second World War, neither de Gaulle's position nor the status of the Franco-British relationship was ever this straightforward.

The launch of the Free French movement in London substantially altered the Franco-British relationship.[2] It pitted one representative of France and French interests against another. On the one side, Britain and the Free French offered guarantees of Allied victory and the restoration of France to its 'rightful' place on the world stage. On the other side, Pétain's Vichy government promised French renewal, both moral and material, in a Europe led by Germany. In these arguments over the

[1] *Hansard* HC Deb vol. 806 col. 211, 214 (10 November 1970) https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1970-11-10/debates/d6157654-c7db-4ee2-8a85-43a74d416295/GeneralDeGaulle(Tributes).

[2] Because the Vichy government and the Free French claimed to represent France after the Franco-German armistice, the term 'Franco-British relationship' should be understood as several relationships.

future of France, each side worked hard to demonstrate the legitimacy of its claims. The French Empire became the main arena in which these claims were fought.

Imperial holdings were central to Vichy and Free French assertions of power, legitimacy and sovereignty. De Gaulle's authority over Afrique équatoriale française (French Equatorial Africa [AEF]), consolidated in the 'three glorious days' of August 1940, gave his cause greater material and moral credibility. It was from there that he grandly promised British Prime Minister Winston Churchill the loyalty of fourteen million French citizens and toasted the health and longevity of the Franco-British alliance.[3] However, the Vichy government retained control over strategically important territories, including French North and West Africa, French Indochina and the Middle East Levantine Mandates of Syria and Lebanon. Vichy would not hesitate to defend its imperial possessions when faced with British and Free French incursions.

As Pétain and de Gaulle fought to determine who spoke for France and its empire, they also argued over how the Franco-British relationship fitted into this equation. The legitimacy of the Free French movement was rooted in the idea of Franco-British solidarity. By contrast, the Vichy government drew on deeply ingrained historic images of Franco-British rivalry in order to shore up its own credibility and condemn British and Free French threats to its imperial sovereignty.

This book tracks the evolution of the Franco-British relationship between 1940 and 1945. It does this not by counting military victories or losses, but by examining the rhetoric that British, Vichy and Free French actors deployed to legitimise their roles inside or outside of the conflict. The French colonial empire played a decisive role in these debates and in the wider Franco-British relationship. It was the location where British, Vichy and Free French interests intersected, militarily and rhetorically.

The conflicts that erupted over French colonial territory between 1940 and 1945 are central to understanding British, Vichy and Free French policy-making throughout the war. More importantly, the rhetoric that was used to justify or condemn policies of imperial conflict was an integral part of the policy-making process. British, Vichy and Free French policy-makers deployed rhetoric as a strategic policy-making tool in its own right. Imperial considerations shaped French and

[3] Eric Jennings rightly points out de Gaulle's penchant for exaggeration. AEF and mandated Cameroon counted 8,881 'Europeans' and 6,124,391 Africans. Eric T. Jennings, *Free French Africa in World War II: The African Resistance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 45.

British narratives of the conflict. Having and holding imperial territory was central to Vichy and Free French claims of authority. Focussing on the rhetoric of imperial clashes places these political actors within a wider setting that includes symbolic understandings of nation, citizenship, national self-image and imperialism. It demonstrates that imperial holdings were valued as more than material and strategic resources. They were formidable symbols of power, prestige and national legitimacy. Their worth transcended the narrow spheres of high politics and military strategy.

Methodology

The focus of this study is the role of the rhetoric of Franco-British relations. This topic remains under-explored in the history of relations between France and Britain and in particular in the history of the British and French Empires. This unique rhetorical approach, which has not yet been deployed, reveals dynamics within and around the policy-making process that conventional approaches and perspectives do not. It demonstrates that the process of formulating and implementing official policies was far more complicated than a weighing of military strategies against available resources. And it delivers new insights into the complex nature of Franco-British relations during the Second World War.

There remains a strong tendency in scholarship to view Franco-British relations after the Armistice as unremittingly hostile.[4] Eleanor Gates, for instance, has described the events that followed the armistice as 'divorce on a grand scale'.[5] Another consequence of viewing Franco-British relations through a binary lens of either cooperation or rivalry is that June 1940 became the moment that British policy-makers abandoned the Entente in favour of a 'special relationship' with the United States.[6]

[4] See, for instance, Michael Dockrill, *British Establishment Perspectives on France, 1936–1940* (Basingstoke, 1999). Eleanor Gates, *End of the Affair: The Collapse of the Franco-British Alliance, 1939–1940* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981). Warren Tute, *The Reluctant Enemies: The Story of the Last War between Britain and France 1940–1942* (London: Collins, 1990). Nicholas Atkin, *The Forgotten French: Exiles in the British Isles 1940–1944* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). Simon Berthon, *Allies at War: Churchill v Roosevelt v De Gaulle* (London: Thistle Publishing, 2013). Colin Smith, *England's Last War against France: Fighting Vichy 1940–1942* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2009).

[5] Gates, *End of the Affair*, xiv.

[6] See, for instance, David Reynolds, '1940: Fulcrum of the Twentieth Century?', *International Affairs*, 66, 2 (April 1990). Philip Bell, 'Entente Broken and Renewed: Britain and France, 1940–1945', in *Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation*, eds. Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (London: Routledge, 2000): 223–243.

These accounts treat policy-making primarily as a realist practice – a weighing up of material costs and benefits. The problem with this perspective is two-fold. First, it narrows Franco-British relations to notions of inherent rivalry. Second, it reduces the practice of policy-making to the single-minded pursuit of material assets and military victories. The result is interpretations that do not pay sufficient attention to the symbolic value of wartime operations. This makes it impossible to appreciate the complex range of factors, tangible and intangible, that impacted the policy-making process.

Beginning in the 1990s, some historians began to deploy a more nuanced approach to understand French and British wartime experiences. One significant outcome of this trend was a reassessment of Franco-British relations during the interwar period, leading up to France's withdrawal from the conflict. Talbot Imlay, for instance, has argued for a broader multinational and multifactorial perspective. Scholars should ask how well both Britain and France met the test of war and envisaged the unfolding conflict.[7] At the same time, imperial historians have widened geographical understandings of the conflict and challenged narrower metropolitan views.[8] Martin Thomas, Richard Toye and Aviel Roshwald have reassessed France and Britain's wartime relationship from an imperial perspective. Eric Jennings and Julian Jackson have emphasised the importance of empire in supporting the Free French movement. Other scholars have reconsidered how France and Britain experienced war,

[7] Talbot Imlay, *Facing the Second World War: Strategy, Politics and Economics in Britain and France 1938–1940* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 5. See also, Stanley Hoffman, *Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s* (New York: The Viking Press, 1974). Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Chapter 5. Martin Thomas, *Britain, France and Appeasement: Anglo-French Relations in the Popular Front Era* (London: Berg, 1997). Peter Jackson, *France and the Nazi Menace: Intelligence and Policy Making 1933–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[8] See, for instance, Ashley Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006). Martin Thomas, *The French Empire at War: 1940–45* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998). Eric T. Jennings, *Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain's National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940–1944* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). Eric T. Jennings, *Free French Africa in World War II: The African Resistance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015). Martin Thomas and Richard Toye, *Arguing about Empire: Imperial Rhetoric in Britain and France, 1882–1956* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), Chapters 5–6. Martin Thomas, *Fight or Flight: Britain, France and their Roads from Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), Chapter 2. Aviel Roshwald, *Estranged Bedfellows: Britain and France in the Middle East during the Second World War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa 1945–1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

how those experiences have been remembered and how this past has been integrated into more contemporary policy-making.[9] This has led to a growing interest in understanding how individuals and groups build their legitimacy, and therefore their power and influence, using a combination of legal, rhetorical and material techniques.[10]

In this book, the evolution of the Franco-British wartime relationship will be assessed through a series of imperial 'crisis points'. When combined with the rhetorical methodology that is central to this work, these case studies illustrate the importance of empire as a material and symbolic asset. Episodes include the British bombardment of the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir (1940), British and Free French clashes with Vichy forces at Dakar (1940), British-Free French operations to capture Syria and Lebanon (1941), the British-American 'Torch' invasions of North Africa (1942) and British-Free French tensions in the Levant in 1943 and 1945. This book asks how British and Free French decision-makers prepared to defend controversial policies of imperial confrontation. And it argues that rhetoric, broadly defined as the persuasive language of policy-making, played a central role in the conception, implementation and justification of

[9] Stanley Hoffmann, 'The Trauma of 1940: A Disaster and Its Traces', in *The French Defeat of 1940: Reassessments*, ed. Joel Blatt (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1998), 354–371. Olivier Wierviorka, *La Mémoire Désunie: Le Souvenir Politique des Années Sombres, de la Libération à nos Jours* (Paris: Le Seuil, 2010). Robert Frank, 'The Second World War through French and British Eyes', in *Britain and France in Two World Wars: Truth, Myth and Memory*, eds. Robert Tombs and Emile Chabal (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 179–191. R. Gerald Hughes, *The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy Since 1945* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014). Hugo Frey, 'Rebuilding France: Gaullist Historiography, the Rise-Fall Myth and French Identity, 1945–58', in *Writing National Histories: Western Europe since 1800*, eds. Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan and Kevin Passmore (London: Routledge, 1999), 205–216. Jon Cowans, 'Visions of the Postwar: The Politics of Memory and Expectation in 1940s France', *History and Memory* 10, no. 2 (1998): 68–101. Richard Toye, 'The Churchill Syndrome: Reputational Entrepreneurship and the Rhetoric of Foreign Policy since 1945', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 10, no. 3 (2008): 364–378.

[10] On constructing the legitimacy of the Free French, see Julian Jackson, *A Certain Idea of France: The Life of Charles de Gaulle* (London: Penguin, 2019), Chapter 8 'Inventing Gaullism'. Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, *René Cassin and Human Rights: From the Great War to the Universal Declaration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). On Vichy legitimacy, see Yves Durand, 'Collaboration French-Style: A European Perspective', in *France at War: Vichy France and the Historians*, eds. Leonard V. Smith, Laura Lee Downes, Sarah Fishman, Robert Zaretsky and Ioannis Sinanoglou (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 61–76. Peter Jackson and Simon Kitson, 'The Paradoxes of Vichy Foreign Policy, 1940–1942', in *Hitler and His Allies in World War II*, ed. Jonathan R. Adelman (London: Routledge, 2007), 79–115. Simon Kitson, *The Hunt for Nazi Spies: Fighting Espionage in Vichy France* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). For a reassessment of the impact of Churchill's wartime rhetoric, see Richard Toye, *The Roar of the Lion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

these policies. In other words, it is impossible to truly understand France and Britain's wartime relationship without examining how policy decisions and their outcomes were being defended, condemned, debated and avoided in public spaces.

Only by viewing Franco-British relations through a rhetorical and imperial lens is it possible to fully grasp the complexities of this relationship. Britain, Vichy and Free France each used rhetoric to persuade local and global audiences that its position within the conflict was just, moral and would be ultimately victorious. The precise words and images that they used to do this offered up distinct notions of what it meant to be French and how war could and should be fought.

Using rhetoric as an analytical tool to assess Franco-British relations has two fundamental benefits. First, rhetorical analyses deliver a more nuanced understanding of the factors that drove Franco-British wartime policies. Second, this approach shows that policy-makers' perceptions of public opinion also influenced how policies were conceived and presented. In the past, rhetorical approaches have been criticised for their lack of specificity. Martin Thomas and Richard Toye have pointed out a tendency, particularly in social histories, to take a much broader view towards linguistic approaches. Concepts such as rhetoric and discourse get subsumed into 'a somewhat amorphous "imperial discourse"'.[11] Analysing British, Vichy and Free French rhetoric during moments of imperial tension provides a fuller picture of the dynamics of these rivalries and the role that persuasive language played in attempting to prop up imperial, and by extension global power, in a wartime and post-war environment.[12]

Rhetoric also frequently gets lumped in with scholarship on Second World War propaganda, of which there is a great deal.[13] This approach tends to present propaganda as at best partially untrue and at worst a series of patent lies – a one-way stream of information used by governments to make a group of people think or act in a particular way. Categorising all

[11] Thomas and Toye, *Arguing about Empire*, 7.
[12] Ibid., 6–7.
[13] See, for instance, Roger Austin, 'Propaganda and Public Opinion in Vichy France: The Department of Hérault, 1940–44', *European Studies Review* 13 (1983), 455–482. Tim Brooks, *British Propaganda to France, 1940–1944: Machinery, Method and Message* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007). Kay Chadwick, 'Our Enemy's Enemy: Selling Britain to Occupied France on the BBC French Service', *Media History* 21, no. 4 (2015): 426–442. Hélène Eck, *La Guerre des ondes. Histoire des radios de langues françaises pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1985). Michael Stenton, *Radio London and Resistance in Occupied Europe: British Political Warfare 1939–1943* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Robert J. Young, *Marketing Marianne: French Propaganda in America, 1900–1940* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press: 2003).

wartime discourse under the umbrella of propaganda ignores the value of rhetoric as a recognised policy-making tool. This book defines rhetoric more narrowly, as the official responses that emerged from British, Vichy and Free French decision-making establishments during episodes of imperial tension. The result is a more nuanced understanding of French and British policy-making. Throughout the book, rhetoric and discourse will be treated as synonyms using this definition.

Rhetoric is defined here not only as official public speech but also as a 'social phenomenon'.[14] The term 'official' refers to the statements, press releases and speeches that were delivered by acting representatives of the British and Vichy governments as well as Charles de Gaulle's Free French movement. This is not to say that the Free French movement was, in practice, a legal French government. It simply illustrates that both Vichy and the Free French conveyed itself as the legitimate or official representative of France and French interests.[15] Defining rhetoric in this way allows us to consider how high-level decision-makers viewed their own world (including their perceptions of public opinion) and how rhetoric as a dynamic concept was crucial in the shaping and changing of public and official mindsets. It also addresses one of the primary weaknesses of broader, less well-defined approaches to discourse. Namely, that they ignore the structures of power and authority that are present in any kind of communication. These structures contribute substantially to the power or persuasiveness found in language by, for instance, giving one individual or group's words more validity than another.

Taken this way, rhetoric becomes a legitimate power building tool in its own right. Pierre Bourdieu reminds us that power often manifests itself in symbolic form, rather than through constant and 'overt physical force'.[16] British and Free French officials built their legitimacy and exercised their authority using rhetoric. Images of Franco-British cooperation were a way to discredit the Vichy government and legitimise the Free French movement. Competing British, Free French and Vichy discourses showcased each actor's divergent expectations surrounding the outcome of the war and what the post-war world would look like. Rhetorical analyses show that foreign policy was not made in a vacuum. Its conceptualisation, implementation and justification were products of debates that spanned policy-making and public spheres. The language used to justify these

[14] Richard Toye, *Rhetoric: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 4.
[15] For the legal arguments and organisational structures used to assert the authority of the Free French, see Winter and Prost, *René Cassin*, Chapter 6.
[16] Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, 23.

policies shows how normative concepts such as morality, ethics, national honour and historical memory shaped the policy-making process.

The process of formulating official policies was far more complicated than a weighing of military strategies against available resources. In Britain, for example, policy discussions took place within the War Cabinet. But the policy-making circle could also expand to include members of the Whitehall bureaucracy and the armed forces who contributed to the discussions and brought professional opinions to the process. Policy-makers not only consulted experts on the ground, they also weighed likely public responses to the policy choices under review. These considerations were integrated into their policy justifications. Decision-makers anticipated how each operation was likely to affect the standing of the government (and, often, of the minister concerned) in the eyes of key domestic and foreign interest groups. Pure material capabilities played an important role in determining whether an operation was actually feasible. But even if manpower and weaponry were readily available, intangible factors, such as a likely public backlash in response to unnecessary civilian deaths, still had a real impact on the final policy decision.

Studying how official British, Vichy and Free French rhetoric was conceived and communicated provides insights into this relationship between policy-making and public opinion, or what policy-makers believed to be public opinion.[17] The link between policy-making and the public sphere is complex, changeable and difficult to measure. Despite these challenges, the concept of wartime public opinion has featured heavily in histories of the Second World War. Beginning in the 1980s, historical studies debunked myths that equated British public opinion with the 'Dunkirk Spirit' mentality. Historians have challenged consensus-based myths like this because they lump all of the war years together and fail to recognise shifts in both behaviour and popular opinion between 1939 and 1945.[18] Regional studies also point to a less

[17] For the challenges of measuring public opinion and its impact on policy-making, see Daniel Hucker, 'International History and the Study of Public Opinion: Towards Methodological Clarity', *The International History Review* 34, no. 4 (2012): 775–794.

[18] See, for instance, Agnus Calder, *The Myth of the Blitz* (London: Pimlico, 1991). David Reynolds, Warren F. Kimball and A. O. Chubarian, eds., *Allies at War: The Soviet, American, and British Experience, 1949–1945* (London: Macmillan, 1994), 250. Richard Toye, *The Roar of the Lion: The Untold Story of Churchill's World War II Speeches* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Alan Allport, *Britain at Bay: The Epic Story of the Second World War: 1938–1941* (London: Profile Books, 2020). See also, for issues of misreporting due to feelings of guilt, M. A. Doherty, *Nazi Wireless Propaganda: Lord Haw-Haw and British Public Opinion in the Second World War* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd., 2000), 119–120.

homogenous reaction to the war across Britain. David Thoms argues that the Home Office failed to establish criteria to define and measure morale. Far from, the 'spirit of the blitz', German air raids on Plymouth between November 1940 and April 1941 'appear to have brought the city close to the breaking point'.[19]

On the French side, scholars have mobilised a variety of Vichy, Free French and British sources to measure public opinion in France during the occupation.[20] Prefects' reports have shed light on French opinion in the occupied and unoccupied zones. They have demonstrated that by the autumn of 1940, public opinion across France was both anti-German and pro-British.[21] The issue of collaboration has also played an important role in understanding public attitudes and actions during this period. Robert Paxton's *Vichy France Old Guard and New Order* has been followed by studies that seek to explore in more nuance how individuals and policy-makers made choices in Vichy and occupied France.[22]

[19] David Thoms, 'The Blitz, Civilian Morale and Regionalism, 1940–1942', in *War Culture: Social Change and Changing Experience in World War Two*, eds. Pat Kirkham and David Thoms (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1995), 4, 6.

[20] See, for instance, Roger Austin, 'Propaganda and Public Opinion in Vichy France: The Department of Hérault, 1940–44', *European Studies Review* 13 (1983), 455–482. Pierre Laborie, *L'Opinion Française Sous Vichy* (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 1990). Julian Jackson, *France: The Dark Years, 1940–1944* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), Chapters 11 and 12. Kay Chadwick, 'Radio Propaganda and Public Opinion under Endgame Vichy: The Impact of Philippe Henriot', *French History* 25, no. 2 (2011): 232–252.

[21] Jackson, *The Dark Years*, 274. Pierre Laborie, *Résistants Vichyssois et Autres: L'Évolution de L'Opinion et des Comportements dans le Lot de 1939 a 1944* (Paris: Editions du C.N.R.S., 1980).

[22] See, for instance, Philippe Burrin, *Living with Defeat: France under the German Occupation, 1940–1944* (New York: Hodder Education, 1997). Yves Durand, 'Collaboration French-Style: A European Perspective', in *France at War: Vichy and the Historians*, eds. Sarah Fishman, Ioannis Sinanoglou, and Laura L. Downs (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 63. John Hellman, 'Communitarians, Non-Conformists, and the Search for a "New Man" in Vichy France', in *France at War: Vichy and the Historians*, eds. Sarah Fishman, Ioannis Sinanoglou, and Laura L. Downs (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 94. Francine Muel-Dreyfus, *Vichy and the Eternal Feminine: A Contribution to a Political Sociology of Gender*, trans. Kathleen A. Johnson (London: Duke University Press, 2001). Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940–1944* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). Ronald Rosbottom, *When Paris Went Dark: The City of Light Under German Occupation, 1940–1944* (London: John Murray, 2014). John F. Sweets, *Choices in Vichy France: The French under Nazi Occupation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Laborie, *L'Opinion Française*, 328. See also Philip Nord, *France's New Deal : From the Thirties to the Postwar Era* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010) for administrative continuity between the interwar and post-war years.

It is widely recognised that public opinion, although notoriously difficult to define and measure, does exert influence on the policy-making process.[23] Political scientists such as Ralph Negrine have argued that public opinion should be understood as a combination of individual experiences and the social frameworks in which those experiences took place. Individuals tend to interpret issues in a way that 'draws on past, personal, and other experiences'.[24] Trying to understand and influence public opinion, then, means that policy-makers have to consider what they *think* will appeal to their target audience. They have to acknowledge that not all topics will be of equal interest.[25] Public interest in a topic can fluctuate over time, becoming both stronger and weaker. Policy-makers must be aware of these shifts.[26] This book integrates a range of source materials in order to understand how high-level British, Vichy and Free French decision-makers were attempting to influence and were being influenced by public opinion. Together, they paint a picture of what decision-makers *believed* public opinion to be and how those beliefs shaped the policy-making process.

French and British wartime policy was made with at least one eye on the press and public. In other words, public opinion mattered to high-level decision-makers on both sides of the Channel. More importantly, public opinion or decision-makers' *perceptions* of public opinion had a tangible impact on final policy and policy justifications. The press was a platform for official British, Free French and Vichy rhetoric. But it was also viewed as a barometer for public opinion, which is why press analyses play such an important role in this book.[27] British papers throughout the war printed official policy explanations, but they also critiqued British, Vichy and Free French wartime policies. Although censorship made the Vichy press largely a government mouthpiece, Vichy officials would continue to monitor the British press to gain clues about British

[23] Hucker, 'International History', 779.
[24] Ralph Negrine, *The Communication of Politics* (London: SAGE Publications, 1996), 128. See also G. Lang and K. Lang, *The Battle for Public Opinion: The President, the Press, and the Polls during Watergate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). R. Neuman, M. Just and A. Crigler, *Common Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
[25] Pierre Laborie, '1940–1944: Double Think in France', in *France at War: Vichy and the Historians*, eds. Sarah Fishman, Ioannis Sinanoglou and Laura L. Downs (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 183. Soroka, 'Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy', 29.
[26] Bryan D. Jones, *Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 125.
[27] There is consensus that by the interwar period, newspapers were the most common way of sourcing national and international news and thus were integral in 'opinion formation'. Hucker, 'International History', 781.