

The Informal Regulation of Criminal Markets in Latin America

This book explains how states informally regulate drug markets in Latin America. It shows how and why state actors, specifically police and politicians, confront, negotiate with or protect drug dealers to extract illicit rents or prevent criminal violence. The book highlights how, in countries with weak institutions, police act as interlocutors between criminals and politicians. It shows that whether and how politicians control their police forces explains the prevalence of different informal regulatory arrangements to control drug markets. Using detailed case studies built on 180 interviews in four cities in Argentina and Brazil, the book reconstructs how these informal regulatory arrangements emerged and changed over time.

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The Informal Regulation of Criminal Markets in Latin America

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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge University Press & Assessment
978-1-009-17072-7 — The Informal Regulation of Criminal Markets in Latin America
Hernán Flom
Frontmatter
[More Information](#)

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
314-321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India
103 Penang Road, #05-06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467

Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment,
a department of the University of Cambridge.

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education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009170727

DOI: 10.1017/9781009170710

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First published 2022

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-1-009-17072-7 Hardback

Additional resources for this publication at www.cambridge.org/9781108488822

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Acknowledgments

The road to publishing this book was anything but straightforward. It had multiple stops, detours and restarts along a six-year trip back and forth between the United States and Argentina. A journey that long guarantees that there are many people to thank along the way, but I think it makes sense to start with the person whose contribution was the longest and greatest. Belén Fernández Milmanda (Bel Mil), the most amazing partner I could ask for, provided the essential support that made this book happen. She read through every chapter, proposal and key emails; was both a sharp critic and staunch supporter; and gave me the resources, time and encouragement I needed to finish this book. For everything, thank you for being (in) my life.

This book began as my doctoral dissertation at Berkeley.¹ For their unwavering support and sharp insights throughout, I thank Alison Post, Leonardo Arriola, Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, as well as my doctoral colleagues, with a special shout out to the Argentine Mafia, Tomás Bril, Eugenia Giraudy, Andrés Schipani and Rodrigo Zarazaga. Between 2013 and 2015, I carried out fieldwork in Argentina and Brazil. My special thanks to all those who generously gave up their time for the

¹ Later, portions of this book were originally published as “State Regulation of Organized Crime: Politicians, Police, and Drug Trafficking in Argentina,” *Latin American Politics and Society* 61 (3), Fall 2019: 104–28; and as “Controlling Bureaucracies in Weak Institutional Contexts: The Politics of Police Autonomy,” *Governance* 33 (3), Jul 2020: 639–56. Parts of the chapters on Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo are derived from an article, “The Politics of Police Violence: Political Competition and Police Killings in Brazil,” published in *Journal of Urban Affairs*, Feb 15, 2022, copyright The Urban Affairs Association, available online: www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/07352166.2021.2018935.

interviews that constitute the primary evidence material for this book. I acknowledge the funding by the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) and the Institute for International Studies at Berkeley, which made such fieldwork possible.

Large portions of the dissertation which made up the basis for this book were written in the computer labs at the Harvard Department of Government and benefited from the brilliant insights of all members of the Harvard and MIT Latin American Working Groups.

The book began to take autonomous form during my stay at the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame between August 2016 and May 2017. I thank all Kellogg professors and staff for setting up a wonderful community to live and work as well as my cohort fellows for their sharp and enthusiastic comments in the early stages of this process. It was undoubtedly enriched by a fantastic seminar I organized with Guillermo Trejo, one of the most astute minds and kindest people in this field. For their companionship, suggestions and support throughout, I specially thank the members of that seminar: Juan Albarracín, Stefanie da Souza, Leslie MacColman, Camilo Nieto-Matiz and Lucía Tiscornia.

After Kellogg, I returned to Argentina to work in the National Ministry of Security. While being in a policymaking role forced me to shelve the manuscript for most of this time, the experience I gained working directly with police officers was invaluable. It allowed me to put many of my hypotheses to the test, and to see the personal stories of many people with whom I had brief but deep interactions while writing the book. For this opportunity, I thank Alberto Föhri, Patricia Bullrich and the late Juan Carlos Pugliese. For being an exceptional team to work with, thanks to Flavia Carbonari, Pia Ferreyra, Gonzalo García, Evelyn Garrote, Ale Gricman, Juan Jalif, Federico Manolio, Marcelo Reidman, Santiago Rodríguez Melgarejo and Federico Tassara.

After my government tenure ended, I joined my wife in Hartford, Connecticut, in early 2020, where this book's revision began in earnest, just as the world was turning upside down due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The possibility of secure employment at Trinity College undoubtedly allowed this book to materialize, and for that I especially thank Stefanie Chambers, Sonia Cardenas and the wonderful staff. For their advice, companionship and support, thanks to all members of the Political Science Department. I also appreciate the assistance provided by the College's Research Completion Grant. As I neared the final drafts, I was lucky enough to find kind souls who not only were willing to revise the manuscript but also offered brilliant suggestions to improve it. Many

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thanks to Desmond Arias, Marcelo Bergman, Eduardo Moncada, Brian Palmer-Rubin and Lucía Tiscornia.

As the 2020 winter neared, I finally sent out the manuscript. I sincerely thank Sara Doskow for her championing of this project as well as for sending it to two amazing reviewers, whose suggestions I hope to have done justice to in this final version. Thanks to Jacyne Fauconier-Herry for shouldering on the project and everyone at Cambridge University Press for their assistance and guidance throughout the production of this book. Thanks to Rudy Leon for her masterful work at indexing this volume.

None of this would be possible without the support, encouragement and love of my family. Whether in Argentina or the United States, I am grateful for every moment we spend together and for having you in my life. Thanks to the Fernández Milmandas (César, Mariela, Pablo, Sebastián and Guady) for the family we've built. To my parents, Marta and Jorge, thank you for always having my back and helping me find the path forward as well. I'm blessed to have had you as parents and mentors.

As if her academic and personal support was not enough, Belén also gave me the most wonderful gift a person could get. Our daughter, Elena, was born in November 2020, just as I sent out the manuscript for review. While her direct contribution is perhaps harder to pinpoint, since she has yet to read a single chapter (or read at all), seeing her smile each morning is the best reward possible for the work this project involved. I love you both more than words can say. This book is for you.

Abbreviations

Brazil

ADA	Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends, Rio de Janeiro)
BOPE	Batalhão de Operações Especiais (Special Operations Battalion, Rio de Janeiro)
BPM	Batalhão da Polícia Militar (Military Police Battalion)
CIED	Centro Integrado de Educação (Integrated Education Center, Rio de Janeiro)
CPI	Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito (Parliamentary Inquiry Commission)
CV	Comando Vermelho (Red Command, Rio de Janeiro)
DEIC	Departamento Estadual de Investigações Criminais (State Department of Criminal Investigations)
DENARC	Departamento Estadual de Prevenção e Repressão ao Narcotráfico (State Department of Prevention and Repression of Narcotics, São Paulo)
DHPP	Delegacia Estadual de Homicídios e de Proteção à Pessoas (State Division of Homicides and Personal Protection, São Paulo)
GPAE	Grupos de Policiamento de Áreas Especiais (Police Groups for Special Areas, Rio de Janeiro)
ISP	Instituto de Segurança Pública (Institute of Public Security)
PCC	Primeiro Comando da Capital (First Command of the Capital, São Paulo)
PCERJ	Polícia Civil do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Civil Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro)
PDS	Partido Democrático Social (Social Democratic Party)

PDT	Partido Democrático Trabalhista (Democratic Workers' Party)
PMDB	Partido do Movimento Democrático do Brasil (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party)
PMERJ	Polícia Militar do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro)
PSB	Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party)
PSDB	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democratic Party)
PT	Partido Trabalhista (Workers' Party)
ROTA	Rondas Ostensivas Tobias de Aguiar (Tobias de Aguiar Ostensive Rounds, São Paulo)
SESEG	Secretaria de Segurança (Security Secretary, State of Rio de Janeiro)
SSP-SP	Secretaria de Segurança Pública (Secretary of Public Security, São Paulo)
TC	Terceiro Comando (Third Command, Rio de Janeiro)
UPP	Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Police Pacification Unit, Rio de Janeiro)

Argentina

ALIANZA	Alianza para el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación (Alliance for Work, Justice and Education)
AMIA	Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (Argentine–Jewish Mutual Aid Society, Buenos Aires)
CEVARESO	Centro Varelenso de Rehabilitación Social (Varela Center for Social Rehabilitation, Florencio Varela, Buenos Aires)
DSV	Double Simultaneous Vote (also Ley de Lemas, Santa Fe)
FPCS	Frente Progresista Cívico y Social (Progressive Civic and Social Front, Santa Fe)
FPV	Frente para la Victoria (Front for Victory), also PJ (Partido Justicialista)
FR	Frente Renovador (Renovation Front, Buenos Aires)
FREPASO	Frente País Solidario (Front for a Country in Solidarity)
GBA	Greater Buenos Aires
PJ	Partido Justicialista (Justicialist Party), also Peronist Party, Peronism
PS	Partido Socialista (Socialist Party, Santa Fe)
UCR	Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union)