

## Introduction

*Nathan Gilbert, Margaret Graver, and Sean McConnell*

'I am tormented, my dearest brother, I am tormented that there is no *res publica*, no judgments at law, and that this time of my life, which ought to be blossoming in senatorial authority, is either batted about by courtroom work or sustained by my studies at home.'<sup>1</sup> So wrote Cicero to his brother Quintus in 54 BCE, lamenting his diminished status. He who had once exercised the highest authority in the Roman state had now been sidelined by the power politics of Caesar and Pompey, excluded from influencing the major events of his time.<sup>2</sup> Henceforth he would have to devote his intellectual energies either to forensic oratory or to 'studies at home' – by which he means the work of composition, for he had recently completed his long treatise *De oratore*, and was already planning an even longer work. Reading and writing about philosophy and rhetorical theory was to sustain him emotionally throughout his life: It would be a 'respite from troubles', as he writes later in *De officiis* (2.2–6).

But in fact philosophy was much more than a respite for Cicero. In the retrospective on his philosophical career that he circulated after Caesar's assassination in 44, he speaks of those studies also as a form of political action (*Div.* 2.7):

Once that had happened to my *res publica*, then, having been disbarred from my former duties, I began to renew these studies, so that chiefly I might alleviate my mind from these troubles and so that I might benefit my fellow citizens, in whatever way I could. For it was in books that I stated

<sup>1</sup> *QFr.* 3.5.4 = 25 SB: *angor, mi suavissime frater, angor nullam esse rem publicam, nulla iudicia, nostrumque hoc tempus aetatis, quod in illa auctoritate senatoria florere debebat, aut forensi labore iactari aut domesticis litteris sustentari.*

<sup>2</sup> For biographical and historical discussion of Cicero's political career, including his consulship in 63 BCE and his subsequent exile and return, see further Stockton (1971), Rawson (1975), Mitchell (1991), and Tempest (2011).

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my position; it was in books that I addressed the public assembly; it was philosophy, I thought, that in my case took the place of a governing role in the state.<sup>3</sup>

Writing on philosophical topics had become for him an alternative way to state a position (*sententiam*), as he might have done in the Senate, and a substitute for addressing the popular assembly. It was indeed the means by which he could govern, and in that, he thought, lay much of its value.

To be sure, Cicero's account of his political marginalization is somewhat exaggerated, for his public voice continued to matter, and some of his speeches had significant impact.<sup>4</sup> It is true, however, that the works referred to in *De divinatione* represent for him a means of engaging in public life and not merely a diversion from it. As Yelena Baraz has well observed, he 'comes to the conclusion that embedding philosophy in the Roman cultural fabric will serve the current needs of the state and the elite'.<sup>5</sup> Not every Roman might have agreed, but Cicero makes the point repeatedly and emphatically: Not only is philosophy a legitimate pursuit for statesmen, but it is also a way to provide substantive benefits to the wider community.<sup>6</sup> The subjects chosen for his first series of treatises make clear his intentions, for *De oratore* and *De re publica*, both composed before the civil war between Pompey and Caesar, together make a powerful case for a civic order maintained by the properly educated orator, the intelligent leader, and the well-designed constitution. The same is true of *De legibus*, also begun (though perhaps not finished) during the decade of the 50s.<sup>7</sup> The works written after Caesar emerged victorious in 46 cover a wider range of topics, as Cicero embarked on an ambitious project to bring Greek philosophy to Rome in a systematic fashion, but there, too, the aim is not merely to indulge in contemplative intellectual pursuits but

<sup>3</sup> *quod cum accidisset nostrae rei publicae, tum pristinis orbatu muneribus haec studia renovare coepimus, ut et animus molestiis hac potissimum re levaretur et prodessemus civibus nostris, qua re cumque possemus. in libris enim sententiam dicebamus, contionabamur, philosophiam nobis pro rei publicae procuratore substitutam putabamus.*

<sup>4</sup> The speeches *Pro Marcello* and *Pro Ligario*, both performed before Caesar in 46 BCE, are a case in point: see further Volk's chapter in this volume.

<sup>5</sup> Baraz (2012: 2–3).

<sup>6</sup> The theme is particularly prominent in the prefaces to the philosophical works: e.g. *De or.* 1.1–4; *Rep.* 1.7–13, 3.4–7; *Leg.* 1.5–13; *Acad.* 1.2, 1.11–12; *Fin.* 1.2–3, 1.10–12; *Tusc.* 1.1–6, 2.1–9, 4.1–7; *Nat. D.* 1.6–9; *Div.* 2.1, 2.6–7. Cicero also explores this subject in certain letters and speeches. For critical discussion of Cicero's efforts to define a legitimate place for philosophy in Roman culture see further Hall (1996), Zetzel (2003), Connolly (2007: esp. 89–130), Gildenhard (2007: esp. 8–63), Baraz (2012: esp. 13–43), and McConnell (2014: esp. 33–61).

<sup>7</sup> The absence of *De legibus* from the list of philosophical and rhetorical works provided in *Div.* 2.1–4 is a point of interest; see further Zetzel's chapter in this volume. *De amicitia*, *De gloria*, and *De officiis* were composed after *De divinatione*.

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to educate potential leaders in the next generation and to persuade them to take up the duties of citizenship.<sup>8</sup> Writing for his son Marcus in *De officiis*, he praises the philosophers who have been his models and teachers (*Off.* 1.156):

For there is no subject relevant to the laws, the customs and the education of our state that they have failed to address: indeed, they seem to donate their scholarly retreat (*otium*) to our affairs (*negotium*). In this way, it is those who have dedicated themselves to learning and the study of philosophy who, more than any others, have donated their intelligence and good sense to the benefit of humanity.<sup>9</sup>

Like them, he means for his own scholarly retreat, his *otium*, to be an even greater public service than other educated men might provide.

But if philosophical writing is to provide civic benefits, it must be able to persuade others to adopt at least some philosophical principles or habits of mind. It must therefore succeed rhetorically as well as theoretically. The old way of thinking that pits philosophy and rhetoric against each other is not Cicero's: For him, from his earliest to his latest works, it is the combination of eloquence (*eloquentia*) with wisdom (*sapientia*) that most benefits those with whom we share social and political bonds. Speaking of his own oratorical abilities, he gives credit not to the technical training of his rhetoric teachers, but to his education in Academic philosophy.<sup>10</sup> And he has little time for philosophers who pay no attention to rhetoric (*Off.* 1.156):

It is better to speak at length, provided one does so wisely, than to think, however penetratingly, without eloquence. For thought turns in on itself, but eloquence embraces those to whom we are joined by social life.<sup>11</sup> (trans. E. M. Atkins, slightly modified)

For him, philosophy and oratory must work hand in hand for philosophy to be effective in practical affairs. The two are not by any means the same science: Philosophy seeks to determine what is true and right in public

<sup>8</sup> Cf. e.g. *Rep.* 1.10–13; *Leg.* 1.5; *Acad.* 1.11; *Fin.* 1.11–12; *Nat. D.* 1.7–8; *Off.* 1.69–73, 1.153–60. For detailed discussion of the prefaces, see further in particular Baraz (2012). On Cicero's framing of the choice between the practical and the contemplative modes of life, see further Lévy (2012b).

<sup>9</sup> *nec enim locus ullus est praetermissus ab iis, qui ad leges, qui ad mores, qui ad disciplinam rei publicae pertineret, ut otium suum ad nostrum negotium contulisse videantur. ita illi ipsi doctrinae studiis et sapientiae dediti ad hominum utilitatem suam intelligentiam prudentiamque potissimum conferunt.*

<sup>10</sup> *Orator 12: et fateor me oratorem, si modo sim aut etiam quicumque sim, non ex rhetorum officinis, sed ex Academiae spatiis exstitisse.* Cicero is perhaps thinking of his Academic teacher Philo of Larissa, who taught both rhetoric and philosophy (*Tusc.* 2.9).

<sup>11</sup> *eloqui copiose, modo prudenter, melius est quam vel acutissime sine eloquentia cogitare, quod cogitatio in se ipsa vertitur, eloquentia complectitur eos quibuscum communitate iuncti sumus.*

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life – or at least, what is plausible, for as an Academic skeptic, Cicero is cautious about every form of dogmatism – while rhetoric discovers the available means of persuading others. But both are necessary, for without the means of persuasion, the philosopher will be like Socrates or the Stoic Publius Rutilius Rufus, in the right and yet ineffectual.<sup>12</sup>

In the third book of *De oratore*, completed in 55 BCE, the character Crassus addresses long-standing concerns about the conflict between oratory and philosophy.<sup>13</sup> Through Crassus, Cicero offers an alternative account of the relationship in which philosophical and oratorical practice are in harmony. He praises the old system of education in which right action and right speech were taught by the same person, and he expresses admiration for orators who have also studied philosophy. He then criticizes Socrates for declining to pursue public affairs and oratory along with wisdom. Apparently thinking of Plato's presentation of Socrates in the *Gorgias*, he objects in particular to the division of philosophy and oratory into two separate systematic disciplines. This division, subsequently maintained by the Hellenistic schools in the period after Aristotle, has damaging practical implications, for the perfect orator requires training in philosophy, and philosophy is now detached from practical pursuits such as the law, where it has a natural home. Through this critical engagement with Socrates and the Greek philosophical tradition that follows him, Cicero promotes to his Roman readers a mode of doing philosophy that fits readily with the practical pressures and expectations of Roman political culture.<sup>14</sup> Circumstances permitting, he would choose for himself to be the philosophically informed orator of *De oratore*, a statesman directly active in public affairs.<sup>15</sup> Failing that, he will do his best to deploy the resources of the philosophical tradition to promote positive systemic change in the Roman body politic.

The ten essays presented in this volume study Cicero's philosophical project in detail, from different angles, as manifested in many forms

<sup>12</sup> Socrates is developed as a negative example by the speaker Antonius in *De or.* 1.231–3. For Publius Rutilius Rufus, see *De or.* 1.227–30.

<sup>13</sup> The most relevant passage is *De or.* 3.56–73. Leeman, Pinkster, and Wisse (1996: 223–65) provide a detailed commentary. For a range of critical discussion, including the question of how much Cicero is reproducing views developed by Philo of Larissa and other figures in the Academic tradition, see DiLorenzo (1978), Vickers (1988: 163–7), Reinhardt (2000), Wisse (2002a: 361–4; 2002b), and McConnell (2019: 355–8). See also Zetzel's chapter in this volume.

<sup>14</sup> It seems that Cicero saw the key Greek exponent of this kind of practical philosophy to be Demetrius of Phalerum (*Leg.* 2.66, 3.14; *Off.* 1.1).

<sup>15</sup> This ambition is apparent also in *Brutus* and *Orator*; see further Narducci (2002a, 2002b). On Cicero's self-interested motivations in defending and promoting oratory in *De oratore*, see in particular Fantham (2004: 49–77).

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over his long and eventful career. Each takes up a particular issue within Cicero's writings, from *De oratore*, Cicero's earliest contribution to political philosophy, to *De officiis*, his last. The long, now fragmentary treatise *De re publica* is especially featured, for this was the work that established Cicero's reputation as a philosopher, and it retained a prominent place in his political thinking throughout the 40s, as he continued to dwell on its central themes and models and to adapt its central arguments in light of the changed political reality after the civil war.<sup>16</sup> The coordinated series of philosophical works composed in 45 and 44 also figures large in this volume, for the interaction of philosophy and rhetoric is essential to the understanding of those works. One of the political speeches, *Pro Marcello*, makes an appearance here as well, illustrating Cicero's readiness to draw upon philosophical concepts in making a highly specific political argument. Finally, Cicero's extensive correspondence with friends, colleagues, and family members comes into this volume at many points, grounding these studies in the particularities of the political moment at every stage of his career. The volume thus showcases the importance of a cross-generic approach to the study of Cicero's philosophy.<sup>17</sup> Not only do the letters and speeches provide insight into the particular pressures Cicero faced, but they themselves are often the forum for philosophical argument, persuasion, and reflection.

It is a central contention of this book that a proper assessment of Cicero's philosophy must stress not only its practical focus but also the importance of his rhetorical training. In keeping with the dominant trend in recent scholarship, the authors of these essays are strongly interested in how Cicero's philosophical endeavors are bound up with the social and political crises of the late Republic and with his deep concerns about the practicability of philosophical and political theory.<sup>18</sup> Our emphasis, however, is on the particular. Where others have sought to spell out Cicero's overarching political vision (see, for instance, Joy Connolly's argument in *The State of Speech*) or his attempt to provide a comprehensive philosophical rationale for republicanism (see especially Malcolm Schofield's *Cicero: Political Philosophy*), these essays concentrate rather on how he brings the

<sup>16</sup> Zarecki (2014) illustrates this with a particular focus on Cicero's model of the ideal statesman.

<sup>17</sup> The importance and benefits of making use of evidence across Cicero's written works has been increasingly emphasized; see Steel (2005) for a now classic example.

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, Connolly (2007), Gildenhard (2007), Nicgorski (2012, 2016), Baraz (2012), J. W. Atkins (2013), McConnell (2014), Zarecki (2014), Straumann (2016), and Schofield (2021). Gildenhard (2007: 51 n. 84) highlights the tendency in older scholarship to see Cicero's philosophical endeavors as largely separate from practical politics.

resources of philosophy to bear on specific issues or problems. The problems treated range from the abstract (What exactly is a republic, and what is the nature of the commonality among its citizens? What is the nature of persuasion, and what means of persuasion are legitimate for philosophers to use?) to the practical and concrete: What kind of person should lead the *res publica*, and is Caesar that kind of person? Under what circumstances can a just society go to war? But in every case, the contributors here proceed by close examination of specific portions of Cicero's output, in single works or through an analysis of material from different periods of his life. In a rhetorician of Cicero's calibre, a pointed remark, a suggestive *exemplum*, a repeated phrase, even a single word may carry a significance that opens up a whole dimension of his thought. These essays strive to identify and explicate those telling details.

The one methodological principle to which any Cicero scholar must adhere is that no single thesis, however persuasive, can apply to every twist and turn in the career of this extraordinarily versatile writer. To be sure, there is much to be said for the view of Alain Michel, that Cicero's works consistently exhibit the successful union of philosophy with the rhetorical modes of persuasion that he learned as a young man and employed and tested in Rome's law-courts, Senate, and public assemblies.<sup>19</sup> After all, Cicero himself states explicitly that some key components of his rhetorical training had their roots in the philosophical tradition. Notable examples are the general question or *thesis* and the practice of balanced *in utramque partem* argument, which he associates with the Academic and Peripatetic schools.<sup>20</sup> These techniques immediately link philosophy with rhetoric at the level of inquisitive and persuasive method.<sup>21</sup> But a consistent reliance on Michel's assumption will lead to some less than convincing interpretations of the evidence in particular cases. Rather than pressing Cicero into the mould of his rhetorical training, the essays in this volume follow his persuasive strategies wherever they go. While heart-stirring oratory may be effective in persuasion, a dispassionate syllogistic analysis may be designed for persuasion as well, and even more subtle techniques, like the choice of

<sup>19</sup> See especially Michel (1960). The work is perceptively criticized in Clarke (1961). For discussion of the nature of rhetorical education in Cicero's youth, see further Corbeill (2002). For details on the intellectual background to his rhetorical works, see Wisse (2002a).

<sup>20</sup> See e.g. *De or.* 3.80, 3.107; *Orat.* 46; *Acad.* 1.46; *Fin.* 5.10; *Nat. D.* 1.11–12; *Tusc.* 1.8, 2.9, 5.11; *Div.* 2.150. On the *thesis*, see further Clarke (1951) and Reinhardt (2000; 2003: 3–17). Many scholars associate the method particularly with the school of Philo of Larissa, the head of the skeptical New Academy (on which see further Brittain (2001: 255–342)).

<sup>21</sup> On which see further Gaines (2002). Gildenhard (2011) analyses Cicero's speeches with an eye to philosophy and persuasive technique.

characters in a dialogue or the selective matching of arguments to different contexts, may work to persuade readers at multiple levels. This highly flexible approach allows for subtle insights into the sophisticated rhetorical and persuasive strategies that Cicero employs in his philosophical writing.

It is a consistent assumption of these essays that Cicero maintains the intellectual stance of the skeptical Academic throughout his philosophical career.<sup>22</sup> Although he is clearly sympathetic to some elements of Stoic doctrine as well as to certain claims he associates with the Old Academy or the Peripatetic tradition, he presents himself as a free thinker rather than as firm adherent to any set of doctrines.<sup>23</sup> In writing about philosophy, his regular practice is to assess a range of arguments so as to determine what is plausible (*probabile*) or close to the truth (*veri simile*) and what therefore is most worthy of assent.<sup>24</sup> However, as circumstances change so too do his judgments, and this is reflected also in the figures and texts he appeals to and the ways in which he chooses to present that material for persuasive effect. At times, the view that Cicero finds most plausible is a Stoic view, and this is the case especially often in the ethical writings, where Stoic views on the emotions, on honor, and on justice have left their mark. Yet even there, the way in which he asserts these views is different from what

<sup>22</sup> This reading of Cicero's philosophical stance is now widely shared; see, for example, Woolf (2015). For the older debate about Cicero's philosophical allegiance and whether he was at one time an adherent of Antiochus and the dogmatic Old Academy, see Glucker (1988), Steinmetz (1989), Görler (1995), and Lévy (2017). The technical epistemological aspects of Cicero's Academic skepticism have been the subject of detailed study. There is excellent discussion in Brittain (2006, 2016), with comprehensive references to earlier literature; see also Thorsrud (2012), Woolf (2015: 10–33), and Wynne (2019: 35–46). There is some debate about whether Cicero is a mitigated skeptic in the fashion of Philo, prepared to give firm assent to certain propositions, or a radical skeptic in the fashion of Carneades and Clitomachus, continuing to express uncertainty about the ultimate truth throughout proceedings, or whether he flitted between the two positions at different times. A good starting point for exploring this debate is Brittain (2016).

<sup>23</sup> See e.g. *Acad.* 2.8–9; *Tusc.* 5.33; *Nat. D.* 1.10–11; *Div.* 2.150; *Off.* 1.6. He also encourages his Roman audience to undertake the same process of open-minded inquiry so as to reach their own reasoned judgments on the matters in question (which may of course accord with those put forward by Cicero). This is most obvious in *De officiis* when Cicero says to his son that he should freely make his own judgments about the content of his philosophical works (*Off.* 1.2), and it is a common gambit on the part of Cicero across his oeuvre. J. W. Atkins (2013: 14–46) demonstrates how Cicero creates this dynamic with his audience in *De re publica*; Brittain (2016) highlights it in *Academica and De finibus*; and Wynne (2019) shows it to be in play again in *De natura deorum* and *De divinatione*.

<sup>24</sup> The dialogue form in particular helps in this regard; see further Schofield (2008). In determining this, Cicero often employs the method of arguing against the position of an opponent in order to reach a conclusion that is *probabile* or *veri simile* (e.g. *De or.* 3.67; *Acad.* 1.16–17, 2.15; *Fin.* 2.2; *Nat. D.* 1.11; *Div.* 2.150; *Tusc.* 1.8, 5.11), in addition to balanced *in utramque partem* argument and other more positive modes of inquiry. This is an adversarial method that Cicero aligns very closely with the skeptical New Academy; he explicitly attributes it to the Academic skeptics Arcesilaus and Carneades (*De or.* 3.67; *Fin.* 2.2; *Nat. D.* 1.11; *Tusc.* 5.11). On Cicero's Latin terminology and its links to the epistemological position of the New Academy, see in particular Glucker (1995, 2012).

we would find in a committed adherent of Stoic ethics; it is plausibilism, not dogmatism. *Power and Persuasion* includes one essay that is specifically on this issue (Roskam), and all our contributors are cognizant of its importance as it plays out in different contexts.

In accordance with the aims of the volume, the essays are grouped under two main headings: 'Part I: Techniques and Tactics of Ciceronian Philosophy', on how Cicero understands the nature and methods of philosophy and the relationship between philosophical content and literary genre; and 'Part II: Political Philosophy and Ethics', on how he brings philosophy to bear on theoretical and practical questions pertaining to the Roman *res publica*. Readers will find, however, that the ten essays are interrelated in ways that sometimes span these categories, either because they treat related issues or because they explore the same Ciceronian work from different angles.

Part I begins with a foundational essay by Raphael Woolf, 'Cicero on Rhetoric and Dialectic'. In a wide-ranging discussion, Woolf explores Cicero's position on good philosophical method and in particular on allowable methods of persuasion in a philosophical context. There is potential conflict between the aims of philosophy, which seeks to promote critical reflection on the part of the reader or hearer, and those of rhetoric, which seeks to persuade an audience and to secure emotional commitment. Woolf highlights how Cicero in practice reconciles the two disciplines and how both inform his entire philosophical project. The essay gives much attention to the ways in which Cicero is prepared to utilize specific emotive rhetorical techniques, such as the use of concrete examples rather than carefully reasoned arguments, when communicating philosophical ideas and seeking to instil ethical and political commitments in the minds of his audience.

The next chapter, 'Cicero's Platonic Dialogues' by James Zetzel, examines Cicero's ideas about the place of philosophy in Roman public life and in particular its relationship to statesmanship and oratory, with regard to the three philosophical dialogues of the 50s: *De oratore*, *De re publica*, and *De legibus*. Zetzel's specific concern is with the attitude of these works to Plato and to Hellenistic learning and with their construction of the interrelated histories of philosophy, rhetoric, and politics. He detects a substantial change of attitude in *De legibus*, where Cicero's philosophical approach to the problems besetting the Roman *res publica* perhaps reflect his concerns in the decade of the 40s, when he may have continued work on the dialogue and again left it unfinished.

Immediately following Zetzel, two chapters consider Cicero's Academic skepticism and distinctive modes of persuasive technique. Georgina



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White's contribution, '*Mos dialogorum: Scepticism and Fiction in Cicero's Academica*', explores the relationship between philosophical content and literary genre. White works closely with the letters Cicero wrote to Atticus while composing the *Academica*, including his remark in the dedicatory epistle that the vivid and dramatically convincing conversation presented in the dialogue is, in fact, fictitious. She argues that this signal to question the credibility of the dialogue is related to the epistemological debate in the text and that literary features of the dialogue add force to Cicero's skeptical arguments against the claims of the Stoics and Antiochus. Geert Roskam follows with a paper on the temporal dimension of Cicero's Academic skepticism. His title, '*Nos in diem vivimus: Cicero's Approach in the Tusculan Disputations*', points out the key words in book 5 of the *Tusculan Disputation* by which Cicero emblemizes his philosophical approach: 'we live from day to day' (*Tusc.* 5.33). Here as elsewhere, the distinctively Ciceronian mode of doing philosophy is one that continuously reassesses its conclusions as circumstances change and new specifics demand attention, recognizing that an argument may work for some people but not others, or in some situations but not others. In brief, it is a basic principle of Cicero's stance that it never claims to give a final answer but is always sensitive to context-specific variables.

The final chapter in this section addresses Cicero's working methods and the creative and original ways he engages his Greek source material. In 'Cicero the Philosopher at Work: The Genesis and Execution of *De officiis* 3', Nathan Gilbert focuses on *De officiis* and Cicero's use of Stoic sources, in particular Panaetius and Posidonius, as well as on his critical engagement with Epicurean ethics, which amounts to a final word on his long-standing quarrel with the Garden. The latter topic is approached through analysis of Cicero's philosophical debates with some of his Roman Epicurean correspondents, especially Gaius Cassius Longinus, Caesar's assassin. The paper seeks to reorient and reassess old questions over Cicero's originality in *De officiis* and makes the case that here, as elsewhere, Cicero is engaging both with long-standing debates in Hellenistic ethics as well as with his contemporaries.

Following on these five studies of the nature and method of Ciceronian philosophy, the chapters in the second part grapple with issues relating more directly to the right exercise of power within the Roman sphere. Part II opens with two chapters on Cicero's major work of political philosophy, *De re publica*. In '*Turis consensu Revisited*', Malcolm Schofield examines the famous claim in book 1 that a *res publica* is *res populi*, the business or the interest of the people, with a people being defined as 'a collection of a

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great number of human beings, joined in partnership through agreement or unanimity of law or justice or right (*iuris consensu*) and through sharing in advantage (*utilitatis communione*). Schofield shows how the second phrase of the definition is essential to understanding Cicero's concerns about consent, the limits of power, and ultimately the preservation of the *res publica*. The next chapter, 'The Psychology of Honor in Cicero's *De re publica*' by Margaret Graver, examines Cicero's contention that honor can be a legitimate motive for political leaders and an important element in the education of citizens. Graver argues that the account given in *De re publica* of how honor motivates a person, both ordinarily and in the normative case, is fundamentally more similar to the views on honor put forward by the Hellenistic Stoics than it is to the tripartite model of psyche used by Plato in his *Republic*. But Cicero's own experience in politics has also given stimulus to his reflections; and conversely, the philosophical position on honor that he develops in his writing becomes part of his self-representation as a public figure.

We then move from the motivations of the individual statesman to the proper exercise of power in the collective. With his essay on the justice of war and imperial expansion, Jed Atkins considers how the state as a whole may be motivated in international relations, and in particular how *gloria* may serve as a motive for war. Atkins reconstructs Cicero's account of just war theory in *De re publica* and *De officiis* and explores the potential for coherence between his Stoic-influenced account of justice and his apparent commendation of wars undertaken for the sake of glory. The Ciceronian principle treated in Graver's paper thus finds an application at the very origins of the just war tradition.

The final two chapters shift attention to Cicero's thoughts on political action in light of the regime of Caesar. Katharina Volk's essay, 'Towards a Definition of *Sapientia*: Philosophy in Cicero's *Pro Marcello*', considers how that speech deploys the terms *sapientia*, *virtus*, and *gloria* – all core concepts of Greco-Roman moral philosophy – within a political argument. Through a close reading of the speech, Volk shows how Cicero's dynamic use of philosophical language indicates a congenial way for the elite to speak about sensitive topics while also appealing to Caesar's own values and intellectual acumen to motivate him toward a virtuous course of action, namely the restoration of the *res publica*. Following Volk is an essay by Sean McConnell on Cicero's *De senectute*. 'Old Men in Cicero's Political Philosophy' shows how this work takes up some key features of *De re publica*, adapting them to the different political circumstances of early 44 and adding new arguments in which old men are best equipped