

## Index

- ad hoc taxes, in inverted soft budget constraint phenomenon, 193
- administrative achievement projects. *See zhengji gongcheng*
- administrative subcontract model, 13–14, 22
- allocation of control rights, 58–59
- delegation and separation of rights, 60
- for environmental regulation, 66–67, 80, 98
- for goal setting, 66, 68–70
- for incentive provision, 67, 70–75
- for inspection, 66–70
- principal–agent relationship and, 78–80
- in subcontracting model, 67
- formal authority for, 58–59
- informal authority for, 58–59
- over goal setting, 59
- over incentive provisions, 59–60
- over inspections, 59
- Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign, 291–92, 295
- Anti-Rightist Campaign, 289
- appraisal mechanisms, collusion and, 150–62
- information controls in, 152–57
- jiancha yanshou*, 150
- manipulation of inspection mechanisms, 156–57
- for Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau, 152
- in research settings, 151–52
- sudden attack strategies, 154–55
- arbitrary power
- in bureaucratic state, 46–47, 306
- campaign-style mobilization and, 91–93
- of supreme leaders, 9
- asymmetric formation, 11
- attention mechanisms, 170
- authoritarianism. *See also* totalitarian systems
- regional decentralization, 311
- authority. *See also* charismatic authority
- in control rights theory, 58–59
- in village elections, relationships between, 257–59, 267
- in Weberian bureaucracy, 34–35
- legal-bureaucratic, 34–35
- obedience to, 34
- patrimonial, 34–35, 38
- traditional, 35
- authority relationships, collusion and, 133–34
- Bao Village, elections in, 245–47
- behavioral flexibility, in collusion, 140
- biantong* (flexible adaptation), 16, 49
- collusion and, 135–36
- Boulevard Village, elections in, 244–45
- bounded rationality, 11
- bureaucracy. *See also specific topics*
- impersonal, 147–50
- Merton's critique of, 236
- bureaucratic bargaining
- commitment as element of, 112
- conceptual approach to, 129

- bureaucratic bargaining (cont.)  
 credibility in, 112  
 deadlines in, 111–12  
 distribution of information in, 111  
 in environmental regulation  
   formal authority-based strategies,  
     124–29  
   informal strategies, 124–29  
   mobilization mode, 122–24  
 by municipal environmental protection  
   bureau, 107–9, 112–29  
 by Provincial Environmental Protection  
   Bureau, 107–9, 112–29  
 quasi-exit options in, 124–29  
 routine mode, 122–24  
 formal authority-based, 114–15, 118–19  
 informal bargaining compared to,  
   120–21  
   signaling in, 114–15  
 in government settings, 110–11  
 informal, 115–16, 119  
   activation of, 127–28  
   advantages of, 115–16  
   formal bargaining compared to,  
     120–21  
   social relations in, 115  
 mobilization mode in  
   in bargaining model, 113–14, 118  
   in environmental regulation, 122–24  
 model of, 107–21  
   agent choice of strategic responses,  
     117–21  
   analytical concepts in, 109–12  
   economic, 110  
   game-theoretic, 110–11  
   institutional context for, 107–9  
   mobilizational mode of  
     implementation, 113–14, 118  
 quasi-exit options in, as strategy, 116–18,  
   120  
   collective inaction in, 116–17  
   distortion in, 116–17  
   mechanisms of, 116–17  
   sabotage in, 116–17  
 routine mode in  
   in bargaining model, 113–14  
   for environmental regulation, 122–24  
 scope of, 106  
 sequential game of, 112–13  
 theoretical approach to, 105–7  
 bureaucratic logic  
   of “muddling through” behavioral model,  
     167–69  
   allocation of attention mechanisms, 170  
   logic of coalition building, 168  
   logic of incentive provision, 168–69  
   logic of meeting targets, 167–68  
   in village elections, 252–54, 261, 266–67  
   incentive designs, 253  
   upward accountability in, 253  
 bureaucratic monarchy, in China  
   Confucianism and, 39–40  
   historical legacy of, 38–41  
   informal ties in, 40  
   legitimacy of, 39  
   organizational rules in, 48  
   patron–client relationships in, 40  
   tensions within, 39–40  
   top-down implementation of, 40  
   upward accountability system in, 40  
   Weberian bureaucracy and, 38–40  
 bureaucratic power, 46–47  
 bureaucratic state, in China, 31, 41–52. *See*  
   also bureaucratic bargaining; control  
   rights theory; Weberian bureaucracy  
*cengceng jia*, 53–54  
 charismatic authority of, 42–46, 48–49  
   challenges of, 50–51  
 Chinese Communist Party in, 41  
 collusion in  
   institutionalization of, 133  
   as organizational phenomenon,  
     132–33  
   through strategic alliances, 132–33  
 critiques of, 48  
 delegation in, 33  
 departmentalism in, 48  
 discretion in, 33  
 expansion of, 44  
 factionalism in, 48  
 hierarchical structure of, 47  
 information symmetries in, 33  
 legitimacy of, 42–46  
 Mao Zedong and, 48  
   attack on bureaucratic state, 41  
   mass movement and, 50  
 organizational basis of, 8–11  
 party-state mode of domination, 42–51  
   transition from bureaucratic monarchy,  
     51  
 power in  
   arbitrary, 46–47, 306

- bureaucratic, 46–47
  - monopoly of, 47–48
  - of state government, 306–7
- principal–agent relationships in, 33, 54
- tensions between government and, 305–8
- upward accountability in, 48
- Weberian bureaucracy and, 32–33
  - incentives in, 33
- yalixing tizhi*, 53–54
- campaign-style mobilization (CSM), of
  - institutional mechanisms, 20–21
- arbitrary power and, 91–93
- bureaucratic routines compared to, 84–91
  - soulstealer episode and, 85–87
  - transaction cost theory and, 89–90
  - Weberian bureaucracy, 87–88
- characteristics of, 99–100
- charismatic authority in, 91–98
  - in Chinese Communist Party, 95–96
  - routinization of, 94–100
- by Chinese Communist Party, 83
  - charismatic authority in, 95–96
- conceptual approach to, 81
- during Cultural Revolution, 83, 93
- deviations in, 21
- flexibility in, 21
- during Great Leap Forward, 82–83, 93
- institutional bases of, 95–98
- under Mao Zedong, 82–83, 90
- mechanisms of, 91–98
  - in bureaucratic party-state, 94–100
  - in personnel management practices, 96–97
  - reproduction of, 90–91
- modes of governance and, 98–99
  - loose-coupling systems, 99
  - tight-coupling systems, 99
- in People's Republic era, 82–83, 90
- during Qing dynasty, 93
  - soulstealer episode, 82, 85–87, 91–93
- revolutionary indoctrination polity and, 83
- risk-averse dispositions for, 88–89
- social stability maintenance and, 83
- upward accountability system and, 92
- you hong you zhuan*, 96
- CCP. *See* Chinese Communist Party
- cengceng jiama* (downward acceleration of implementation pressures), 53–54
- centralization, of governance, 1–2, 6–12
- Cultural Revolution and, 10–11
- effective governance from, 8
- establishment of, 6–8
  - institutional mechanisms in, 7–8
  - at organizational level, 7
  - scale of governance, 6–7
  - transaction costs, 7
- institutional mechanisms and
  - in China, 7–8
  - loose-coupling systems, 13–15, 21–23
  - tight-coupling systems, 14, 21–23
  - variable-coupling systems in, through
    - polymaking, 13–15, 21–23
- in official ideology, 11–12
  - during Cultural Revolution, 12
- planned economies through, 7
- political education as factor in, 11–12
  - Confucian culture, 12
- tension as result of, 8
  - through limitations of bureaucratic organization, 11
  - loss of initiative, 8
  - through top-down policy implementation, 10–11
- CEPBs. *See* county-level environmental protection bureaus
- certification of tasks, in environmental regulation, 75
- Chandler, Alfred, 7
- charismatic authority, 34–35, 39–40
  - of bureaucratic state, 42–46, 48–49
  - challenges of, 50–51
  - in campaign-style mobilization, 91–98
  - in Chinese Communist Party, 95–96
  - routinization of, 94–100
  - of Mao Zedong, 42–43
- Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 4
  - bureaucratic state and, 41
  - campaign-style mobilization by, 83
  - charismatic authority in, 95–96
- coalition building, logic of, 168
- Coleman, James, 9
- collective action
  - Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign, 291–92, 295
  - Chinese body politic and, 275–77
  - positive incentives, 276
  - work unit-ownership system, 276
- collective inaction and, 293–96
  - in market economies, 293–94
  - over labor relations, 294–95

- collective action (cont.)  
 in quasi-exit options, 116–17  
 state policies influenced by, 295  
 state socialism and, 294  
 comparative perspectives for, 296–99  
 concentration of state power as factor for,  
 296–97  
 conceptual approach to, 274–75  
 costs and benefits of, 276–77  
 critical mass, 280  
 Cultural Revolution and, 284–85, 298  
 by formal organizations, 297  
 in France, 278–80, 296  
 Great Leap Forward Campaign, 285  
 in Large Numbers phenomenon,  
 281–82  
 historical development of, 274–75  
 during Hundred Flowers period, 283,  
 287–89, 297–98  
 Anti-Rightist Campaign, 289  
 Chinese Communist Party during,  
 287–89  
 rectification campaigns, 287  
 state responses during, 289  
 individual behaviors and, 277–78  
 institutional arrangements and, 279–87  
 institutional logic of, 277–79  
 institutionalized, 285–89  
 Large Numbers phenomenon, 281–84,  
 299  
 in Great Leap Forward Campaign,  
 281–82  
 mass mobilization in, 281–82  
 role of interest groups, 282  
 under Mao Zedong, 284–85, 289  
 in market economies, 277, 279–80  
 collective inaction and, 293–94  
 May Fourth movement, 298  
 in media, 288, 290–92  
 monopoly of state power, 284–85,  
 288–89  
 non-institutionalized, 286, 289–93  
 opportunities for, 284–87  
 organizational failures with, 284–85  
 resource mobilization approach, 276  
 state socialism and, 279, 292–93  
 collective inaction, 294  
 through student demonstrations, from  
 1986–1987, 289–93  
 pro-democracy movements, 292–93  
 in totalitarian systems, 285  
 in United Kingdom, 278–80  
 in USA, poor people's movement as, 280  
 collective debt, by local governments  
 financing of, 225–26  
 mobilization responses to, 220–26  
 payment schedules for, 232  
 problem solving for, 227–35  
 from road construction, 211, 213–26  
 sources of, 223–24  
 collective inaction, 293–96  
 in market economies, 293–94  
 over labor relations, 294–95  
 in quasi-exit options, 116–17  
 state policies influenced by, 295  
 state socialism and, 294  
 collusion  
 analytical framework for, 133–36  
 authority relationships and, 133–34  
*biantong* and, 135–36  
 in Chinese bureaucratic state  
 institutionalization of, 133  
 as organizational phenomenon,  
 132–33  
 scope of, 133–36  
 through strategic alliances, 132–33  
 conceptual approach to, 131–32  
 control rights theory and, 63  
 definition of, 133–34  
 differential modes of association and, 148  
 within environmental regulation context,  
 134, 155–56, 159  
 Municipal Environmental Protection  
 Bureau, 152  
 in game-theoretic model, 134  
 in illicit resource transfers, 149–50  
 within informal institutions, 157–60  
 in Chinese bureaucratic state, 133  
 through social relations, 158–60  
 with inspection and appraisal  
 mechanisms, 150–62  
 bureaucratic power and, 151–52  
 information controls in, 152–57  
*jiancha yanshou*, 150  
 manipulation of, 156–57  
 for Municipal Environmental  
 Protection Bureau, 152  
 sudden attack strategies, 154–55  
 institutional logic and, 137–50,  
 304  
 through institutionalized practices,  
 160–62

- among large corporations, 135
- among local governments, 135
- between local governments, bureaucratic state and, 212
- within organizations, 136
  - in Chinese bureaucratic state, 132–33
  - implementation of collusive strategies in, 133–42
  - information controls in, 152–57
  - patron–client relationships in, 147–50
- paradoxes of, 137–50
  - flexibility in implementation of collusion, 137–42
  - for goal displacement, 143–46
  - in impersonal bureaucracy, 147–50
  - for intensity of incentives, 143–46
  - in patron–client relationships, 147–50
  - for uniformity of policy making, 137–42
- in policy making, 133–36
  - for family-planning, 145–46
  - joint responsibility policy, 146
  - legitimacy through, 141–42
  - policy violations, 156
  - uniformity of, 137–42
- selective intervention and, 140–41
- through shared experiences, 160–62
- through shared meanings, 160–62
- through social relations, 149
  - within informal institutions, 158–60
- Weberian bureaucracy and, 157–58
- commitment, in bureaucratic bargaining, 112
- Communist revolution, 42
- competition, among election candidates, in village elections, 257–58, 270–71
- concentration of state power, collective action influenced by, 296–97
- Confucianism
  - bureaucratic monarchy and, 39–40
  - centralization of governance and, 12
- control rights theory, 55–64. *See also* environmental regulation
  - allocation of control rights, 58–59
  - delegation and separation of rights, 60
  - formal authority for, 58–59
  - informal authority for, 58–59
  - over goal setting, 59
  - over incentive provisions, 59–60
  - over inspections, 59
  - conceptual approach to, 53–54
- framework for, 62
- incomplete contracts, 57–60
  - in industrial organizations, 57–58
  - property rights and, 57–58
- modes of governance and, 55–57, 61–64
  - collusion in, 63
  - federalism mode, 62
  - in loose-coupling systems, 61–64
  - subcontracting mode, 61, 63–64
  - in tight-coupling systems, 61–63
- principal–supervisor–agent relationship, 55–56
  - employment relationship mode, 58
  - in hierarchical structures, 56
- property rights and, 57–60
  - incomplete contracts and, 57–58
- corporations, collusion among, 135
- county-level environmental protection bureaus (CEPBs), 108
  - logic of coalition building, 168
  - in “muddling through” behavioral model, 168, 172–88
- credibility, in bureaucratic bargaining, 112
- credit, for local governments
  - through informal social relations, 222–24
  - through suppliers, 225
- critical mass, 280
- CSM. *See* campaign-style mobilization
- Cultural Revolution, 1
  - bureaucratic state during, 50
  - campaign-style mobilization during, 83, 93
  - centralization of governance and, 10–12
  - collective action and, 284–85, 298
  - institutional mechanisms during, 18
  - official ideology of, ritualization of, 18
  - political ideology during, 12
- daode zhiguo* (governance by morality), 17–18
- deadlines, in bureaucratic bargaining, 111–12
- decentralization, of governance, 1–2
  - regional decentralized authoritarianism, 311
- decollectivization era, 10
- delegation
  - in Chinese bureaucracy, 33
  - separation of rights and, in control rights theory, 60
- democratic governance, Weberian bureaucracy in, 36–37

- Deng Xiaoping, 99  
 collective action under, 290–92  
 departmentalism, in bureaucratic state, 48  
 differential modes of association  
 collusion and, 148  
 rural logic and, 254–55  
 discretion, in Chinese bureaucracy, 33  
 distortion, in quasi-exit options, 116–17  
 domination. *See* authority; party-state mode of domination  
 downward acceleration of implementation pressures. *See cengceng jiana*
- economic development, 2  
 collective action and, through economic reform, 286–87  
 economic model for bureaucratic bargaining, 110  
 effective governance, from centralization of governance, 8  
 elections. *See* village elections  
 Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB), 2.  
*See also* Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau; Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau  
 county-level environmental protection bureaus, 108  
 logic of coalition building, 168  
 Ministry of Environmental Protection, 64–75  
 environmental regulation, control rights for, 64–80. *See also* bureaucratic bargaining; “muddling through”; Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau; Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau  
 allocation of control rights, 66–67, 80, 98  
 for goal setting, 66, 68–70  
 for incentive provision, 67, 70–75  
 for inspection, 66–70  
 in principal–agent relationship, 78–80  
 in subcontracting model, 67  
 authority for action in  
 for principal as authority, 64–69  
 for supervisor-as-subcontractor, 70–75, 77–80  
 chemical oxygen reduction levels, 72  
 collusion and, 155–56, 159  
 Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau, 152  
 Environmental Protection Bureau, 2  
 Ministry of Environmental Protection, 64–75  
 five-year plan cycle, 172–88  
 performance evaluations in, 184–88  
 policy outcomes from, 70  
 principal authority for action, 64–69  
 principal–agent relationship in, 75–80  
 allocation of control rights in, 78–80  
 inspection rights and, 77  
 negotiation of goals, 76  
 policy implementation process, 76  
 sulfur dioxide reduction levels, 73  
 EPB. *See* Environmental Protection Bureau  
 extra-budgetary resource-seeking behavior, 192
- factionalism, in bureaucratic state, 48  
 family-planning policies, collusion and, 145–46  
 federalism, as mode of governance, 62  
 Fei Xiaotong, 148  
 fishing projects, in inverted soft budget constraint phenomenon, 194  
 flexible adaptation. *See biantong*  
 formal authority-based bureaucratic bargaining, 114–15, 118–19  
 informal bargaining compared to, 120–21  
 signaling in, 114–15  
 France, collective action in, 278–80, 296
- game-theoretic models  
 for bureaucratic bargaining, 110–11  
 for collusion, 134  
*gangwei zerenzhi*. *See* position responsibility system
- goal setting  
 allocation of control rights for, 59  
 for environmental regulation, 66, 68–70  
 in environmental regulation  
 allocation of control rights, 66, 68–70  
 principal–agent relationship and, 76  
 governance, in China. *See also* centralization; decentralization; institutional mechanisms; local governments; *specific topics*  
 arbitrary power of supreme leader and, 9  
 conceptual framework for, 4  
*daode zhiguo*, 17–18  
 definition of, 2–3

- efficiency of, 307–8  
   history of, 307–8  
 future challenges for, 312–16  
 institutional logic of, 302–5  
   changes in, 309–12  
   collusion and, 304  
   continuity of, 309–12  
   patterned practices for, 305  
   subcontracting mode, 303  
   theories of middle range, 302–4  
   through village elections, 304  
 institutional response mechanisms in, 4–5  
   in centralization of governments, 7–8  
 methodological approach to, 3–6  
 organizational basis of, 310  
   bureaucracy and, 8–11  
   *junxianzhi*, 9  
   Leninism as foundations for, 9–10  
 People's Communes, 10  
 Qin dynasty, 308  
 Qing dynasty, 308  
 regional decentralized authoritarianism,  
   311  
 stability of, 307–8  
   history of, 307–8  
   values and ideologies for, 311  
 governance by morality. *See daode zhiguo*  
 Great Famine of 1959–1962, 1  
 Great Leap Forward, 1, 43  
   campaign-style mobilization during,  
     82–83, 93  
   centralization of governance and, 10–11  
   collective action and, 285  
   in Large Numbers phenomenon,  
     281–82  
 Huang, Ray, 308  
 Hundred Flowers period, collective action  
   during, 283, 287–89, 297–98  
   Anti-Rightist Campaign, 289  
   Chinese Communist Party during,  
     287–89  
   rectification campaigns, 287  
   state responses during, 289  
 Hungli (Emperor), 82, 85–87  
 Huntington, Samuel, 1, 24, 301  
 ideology, political  
   centralization of governance in,  
     11–12  
   during Cultural Revolution, 12  
   *daode zhiguo* and, 17–18  
   symbolic value of ideology, 19  
   through top-down directives, 18–19  
   centralization of governance through,  
     11–12  
   during Cultural Revolution, 12  
   during Mao era, 12  
 illicit resource transfers, in collusion,  
   149–50  
 impersonal bureaucracy, 147–50  
 incentives  
   allocation of control rights for, 59–60  
   in environmental regulation, 67, 70–75  
   bureaucratic logic and, 253  
   in Chinese bureaucracy, 33  
   for collective action, 276  
   in environmental regulation, allocation of  
     control rights for, 67, 70–75  
   in inverted soft budget constraint  
     phenomenon, 193–94, 196–200  
   in principal–agent model, 197–98  
   promotion mechanisms, 198  
   relative evaluation criteria for, 199  
   in “muddling through” behavioral model,  
     168–69  
   paradoxes of collusion and, 143–46  
 incomplete contracts, in control rights  
   theory, 57–60  
   in industrial organizations, 57–58  
   property rights and, 57–58  
 informal bureaucratic bargaining, 115–16,  
   119  
   activation of, 127–28  
   advantages of, 115–16  
   formal bargaining compared to, 120–21  
   social relations in, 115  
 informal institutions, collusion within,  
   157–60  
   in Chinese bureaucratic state, 133  
   through social relations, 158–60  
 informal social ties, in bureaucratic  
   monarchy, 40  
   in local governments, 222–24  
 information  
   distribution of, in bureaucratic  
     bargaining, 111  
   within organizations, collusion through,  
     152–57  
   symmetries, in Chinese bureaucracy, 33  
   inspection and appraisal. *See jiancha*  
   *yanshou*

- inspection mechanisms  
 allocation of control rights for, 59  
 in environmental regulation, 66–70  
 collusion and, 150–62  
 information controls in,  
 152–57  
*jiancha yanshou*, 150  
 manipulation of inspection  
 mechanisms, 156–57  
 for Municipal Environmental  
 Protection Bureau, 152  
 in research settings, 151–52  
 sudden attack strategies, 154–55  
 in environmental regulation  
 allocation of control rights for,  
 66–70  
 principal–agent relationship and, 77
- institutional logic  
 of collective action, 277–79  
 of collusion, 137–50  
 definition of, 2–3  
 of governance in China, 302–5  
 changes in, 309–12  
 collusion and, 304  
 continuity of, 309–12  
 patterned practices for, 305  
 subcontracting mode, 303  
 theories of middle range, 302–4
- institutional mechanisms  
 administrative subcontract model, 13–14,  
 22  
*biantong* and, 16  
 campaign-style mobilization of, 20–21  
 deviations in, 21  
 flexibility in, 21  
 in centralized governments  
 in China, 7–8  
 loose-coupling systems, 13–15, 21–23  
 tight-coupling systems, 14, 21–23  
 variable-coupling in, through policy-  
 making, 13–15, 21–23  
 in China, 4–5  
 in centralized governments, 7–8  
 consequences of, 23–24  
 for formal institutions, complementarity  
 of, 15–17  
 through collusive behavior, 17  
 fragmented authoritarian model, 13–14  
 for informal institutions,  
 complementarity of, 15–17  
 through collusive behavior, 17  
 official ideology and, ritualization of, as  
 compliance, 17–20  
 patron–client relationships, 16  
 substantive power and, 21–23  
 symbolic power and, 21–23  
 institutionalized collective action,  
 285–89  
 inverted soft budget constraint phenomenon  
 (ISBC phenomenon), 195–203  
 activities in, 200–3  
 analytical scheme of, 196  
 conceptual approach to, 195–96  
 fishing projects in, 194  
 incentive mechanisms in, 193–94,  
 196–200  
 in principal–agent model, 197–98  
 promotion mechanisms, 198  
 relative evaluation criteria for, 199  
 long-term implications of, 203–4  
 macro-institutional conditions, 200–3  
 position responsibility system, failure  
 of, 202–3  
 top-down institutional constraints,  
 200–2  
 upward accountability, 202  
 microbehaviors, 196–200  
 soft budget constraint syndrome and,  
 192–95  
 comparisons between, 193–95  
*zhengji gongcheng*, 195
- jiancha yanshou* (inspection and appraisal),  
 150. *See also* appraisal mechanisms;  
 inspection mechanisms
- junxianzhi* (territorially-based prefecture/  
 county institutions), 9
- Kuhn, Philip A., 1, 24, 38, 301
- Landes, David S., 1, 24, 301
- Large Numbers phenomenon, 281–84, 299  
 bureaucrats in, 282–83  
 in Great Leap Forward Campaign,  
 281–82  
 mass mobilization in, 281–82  
 resource transfers in, 281–82  
 role of interest groups, 282
- legal-bureaucratic authority, 34–35  
 legal/political commission. *See zheng-fa-wei*  
 legitimacy  
 of bureaucratic monarchy, 39



- of bureaucratic state, 42–46
- of Weberian bureaucracy, 33–34, 36
- Leninism, governance in China influenced by, 9–10
- local collective enterprises, 221–22
- local governments, bureaucratic state and in case studies, 213–26
  - “Paved Road to Every Village” project, 214–20
- collective debt and
  - financing of, 225–26
  - mobilization responses to, 220–26
  - problem solving for, 227–35
  - from road construction, 211, 213–26
- collusion with, 212
- credit for, through informal social relations, 222–24
- disadvantages of, 235–39
  - for state-initiated social engineering disasters, 235
- implementation of state policies by, 212–13, 235–36
- from local collective enterprises, 221–22
- problem solving, social institutions for, 226–35
- road construction and, 209–13
  - collective debt from, 211, 213–26
  - under “Paved Road to Every Village” project, 210–11, 214–20
  - Weber, E., on, 210–11
- Sloping Land Conservation Program (SLCP), 216, 228–30
- logic. *See* bureaucratic logic; institutional logic; multiple logics; rural logic
- loose-coupling systems
  - campaign-style mobilization and, 99
  - in institutional mechanisms, 13–15, 21–23
  - modes of governance in, 61–64
- Mao Zedong, 12, 14–15, 31, 311
  - bureaucratic state and, 48
  - mass movement and, 50
  - campaign-style mobilization under, 82–83, 90
  - charismatic authority of, 42–43
  - collective action under, 284–85, 289
  - Great Leap Forward, 1, 43
    - centralization of governance and, 10–11
  - village elections under, 242
- market economies, collective action in, 277, 279–80
  - collective inaction and, 293–94
  - economic reforms as part of, 286–87
- mass movement, 50
- May Fourth movement, 298
- MEP. *See* Ministry of Environmental Protection
- MEPB. *See* Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau
- Merton, Robert, 236
- Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), 64–75
- modes of governance
  - campaign-style mobilization and, 98–99
  - loose-coupling systems, 99
  - in control rights theory, 55–57, 61–64
  - collusion in, 63
  - federalism mode, 62
  - in loose-coupling systems, 61–64
  - subcontracting mode, 61, 63–64
  - in tight-coupling systems, 61–63
- monarchy. *See* bureaucratic monarchy
- monopoly of state power, 284–85, 288–89
- “muddling through,” as behavioral model, 165–72
  - bureaucratic logics of, 167–69
    - allocation of attention mechanisms, 170
    - logic of coalition building, 168
    - logic of incentive provision, 168–69
    - logic of meeting targets, 167–68
    - short-term goals of, 170
  - conceptual approach to, 164–66
  - development of, 165
  - empirical implications for, 169–72
  - for environmental regulation, 172–88
    - for county-level environmental protection bureaus, 168, 172–88
    - five-year plan cycle, 172–88
    - for municipal environmental protection bureaus, 168, 172–88
    - performance evaluations in, 184–88
  - microbehaviors in, 189–90
  - policy implementation and, 171–72
- multiple logics. *See also* bureaucratic logic; village elections
  - bureaucratic logic, 252–54, 261, 266–67
  - in institutional changes, 248–56
  - endogenous processes for, 249, 271–73
  - macro-level configurations, 248–49

- multiple logics. (cont.)  
 microbehaviors, 248–49  
 Organic Law of Village Committees, 241  
 rural logic, 254–56, 266  
 state logic, 250–52
- Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau (MEPB), 64–75  
 bureaucratic bargaining by, 107–9, 112–29  
 collusion and, 152  
 reduction accomplishments, 186–87  
 structural location of, 65
- National People's Congress, 42  
 New Culture Movement, 42  
 non-institutionalized collective action, 286, 289–93
- obedience, to authority, 34
- one-shoulder policy (*yijiantiao*), 257–58, 265–67
- Organic Law of Village Committees, 241  
 village elections under, 252, 258–61, 265
- paradoxes of collusion  
 flexibility in implementation of collusion, 137–42  
 for goal displacement, 143–46  
 in impersonal bureaucracy, 147–50  
 for intensity of incentives, 143–46  
 paradoxes of, 137–50  
 in patron–client relationships, 147–50  
 for uniformity of policy making, 137–42
- party-state mode of domination, 42–51  
 transition from bureaucratic monarchy, 51
- patrimonial authority, 34–35, 38
- patron–client relationships  
 in bureaucratic monarchy, 40  
 collusion and, 147–50  
 in institutional mechanisms, 16
- “Paved Road to Every Village” project (PREV project), 210–11, 214–20
- People's Communes, 10
- People's Republic of China  
 campaign-style mobilization in, 82–83, 90  
 centralization of governance in, 1–2  
 decentralization of governance in, 1–2  
 establishment of, 42–43  
 legal-rational authority of, 42–43  
 National People's Congress, 42  
 political education in, 12  
 political ideology of, 12
- PEPB. *See* Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau
- planned economies, through centralization of governance, 7
- polycymaking  
 collective inaction as influence on, 295  
 through collusion, 133–36  
 for family-planning, 145–46  
 joint responsibility policy, 146  
 legitimacy through, 141–42  
 policy violations and, 156  
 uniformity of policy, 137–42  
 by local governments, through implementation of state policies, 212–13, 235–36  
 in “muddling through” behavioral model, 171–72
- political crime ideology, 97
- political education, centralization of governance and, 11–12  
 Confucian culture, 12
- political ideology. *See* ideology
- poor people's movement, in USA, 280
- position responsibility system (*gangwei zerenzhi*), 202–3
- power. *See also* arbitrary power  
 in bureaucratic states  
 arbitrary power, 46–47, 306  
 bureaucratic power, 46–47  
 monopoly of, 47–48  
 of institutional mechanisms  
 substantive power, 21–23  
 symbolic power, 21–23
- pressure-centered government. *See yalixing tizhi*
- PREV project. *See* “Paved Road to Every Village” project
- Principal–agent relationship  
 in environmental regulation, 75–80  
 allocation of control rights in, 78–80  
 inspection rights and, 77  
 negotiation of goals, 76  
 policy implementation process, 76  
 in inverted soft budget constraint phenomenon, 197–98

- problems in, 11
  - in Chinese bureaucracy, 33, 54
- principal-supervisor-agent relationship, 55–56
  - employment relationship mode, 58
  - in hierarchical structures, 56
- problem solving, in local governments, by social institutions, 226–35
  - for debts, 227–35
- procedural fairness, for village elections, 265–67
- pro-democracy movements, 292–93
- promotion mechanisms, in ISBC
  - phenomenon, 198
- property rights, control rights theory and, 57–60
  - incomplete contracts and, 57–58
  - for use of assets, 58
- Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau (PEPB), 64–75
  - bureaucratic bargaining by, 107–9, 112–29
- Qin dynasty, 87
  - governance structures during, 308
- Qing dynasty, 42, 46
  - campaign-style mobilization during, 93
  - soulstealer episode, 82, 85–87, 91–93
  - governance structures during, 308
- quasi-exit options, in bureaucratic bargaining, 116–18, 120
  - collective inaction in, 116–17
  - distortion in, 116–17
  - mechanisms of, 116–17
  - sabotage in, 116–17
- rectification campaigns, as collective action, 287
- “red and expert” principle. *See you hong you zhuan*
- regional decentralized authoritarianism, 311
- Religion in China* (Weber), 33
- resource mobilization approach, to collective action, 276
- resource transfers
  - collusion and, 149–50
  - illicit, 149–50
  - in Large Numbers phenomenon, 281–82
- resource-intensive projects, in ISBC
  - phenomenon, 199
- revolutionary indoctrination polity, 83
- road construction, local governments and, 209–13
  - collective debt from, 211, 213–26
  - under “Paved Road to Every Village” project, 210–11, 214–20
- Weber, E., on, 210–11
- rural logic, differential modes of association, 254–55
- SBC syndrome. *See* soft budget constraint syndrome
- Scale and Scope* (Chandler), 7
- self-critiques. *See zuijizhao*
- sequential game of bureaucratic bargaining, 112–13
- shared experiences, collusion through, 160–62
- signaling, in formal authority-based bureaucratic bargaining, 114–15
- Skinner, G. William, 301, 316
- Sloping Land Conservation Program (SLCP), 216
- social relations
  - collusion through, 149
  - within informal institutions, 158–60
  - in informal bureaucratic bargaining, 115
- social stability maintenance, 83
- soft budget constraint syndrome (SBC syndrome), 191–92
  - extra-budgetary resource-seeking behavior, 192
- inverted soft budget constraint phenomenon and, 192–95
  - comparisons between, 193–95
- in local governments, 192
- Soviet context for, 191–92
- soulstealer episode, during Qing dynasty, 82, 85–87, 91–93
- state socialism, collective action and, 279, 292–93
  - collective inaction, 294
- state-initiated social engineering disasters, 235
- subcontract models. *See also* administrative subcontract model
  - for governance in China, 303
  - institutional logic and, 303

- subcontract models. (cont.)
    - for modes of governance, 61, 63–64
  - subcontracting model, for environmental regulation, allocation of control rights for, 67
  - sudden attack strategies, for collusion, 154–55
  - supervisor-as-subcontractor model, in environmental regulation, 70–75, 77–80
  - territorially based prefecture/county institutions. *See junxianzhi*
  - tight-coupling systems
    - institutional mechanisms and, 14, 21–23
    - modes of governance and, 61–63, 99
  - Tilly, Charles, 2–3, 274
  - top-down institutional constraints, in ISBC phenomenon, 200–2
  - top-down policies
    - in bureaucratic monarchy, 40
    - in centralization of governance, 10–11
  - totalitarian systems. *See also* concentration of state power; monopoly of state power
    - collective action in, 285
  - transaction costs
    - of campaign-style mobilization, 89–90
    - in centralization of governance, 7
  - United Kingdom (UK), collective action in, 278–80
  - United States (USA), poor people's movement in, 280
  - upward accountability system
    - bureaucratic logic and, 253
    - in bureaucratic monarchy, 40
    - in bureaucratic state, 48
    - campaign-style mobilization and, 92
  - upward countability, in ISBC phenomenon, 202
  - urbanization, 2
  - USA *See* United States
  - variable-coupling systems, institutional mechanisms and, 13–15, 21–23
  - village elections, multiple logics in, 249–56
    - authority relationships, 257–59, 267
    - bureaucratic logic, 252–54, 261, 266–67
    - changes over time, 257–71
    - competition among candidates, 257–58, 270–71
    - contentious elections, 263–65
    - extent of participation in, 257–58
    - institutional logic, 304
    - manipulated elections, 260–63
    - under Mao Zedong, 242
    - one-shoulder policy, 257–58, 265–67
    - under Organic Law, 252, 258–61, 265
    - patterns in, 257–60, 262–63, 270–71
    - political context for, 257–60
    - rural logic, 254–56, 266
    - state logic, 250–52
  - Wang Ya'nan, 16–17
  - Weber, Eugen, 209, 240
    - on road construction, 210–11
  - Weber, Max, 9, 31, 33. *See also* Weberian bureaucracy
  - Weberian bureaucracy, 32–38
    - authority in, 34–35
    - charismatic, 34–35
    - legal-bureaucratic, 34–35
    - obedience to, 34
    - patrimonial, 34–35, 38
    - traditional, 35
  - bureaucratic monarchy and, 38–40
  - campaign-style mobilization and, 87–88
  - Chinese bureaucracy and, 32–33
    - delegation in, 33
    - discretion in, 33
    - incentives in, 33
    - information symmetries in, 33
    - principal–agent relationships in, 33
  - in Religion in China*, 33
  - collusion and, 157–58
  - in contemporary social sciences, introduction of, 33
  - in democratic governance, 36–37
  - institutional analysis of, 36
  - institutional framework for, 33–35
  - legitimacy of, 33–34, 36
  - locus of, 36–38
  - organizational analysis of, 36
- Wen Jiabao, 265
- work unit-ownership system, 276

*Index*

351

- Xi Jinping, 51, 96, 273  
 collective action under, 286–87
- Xinhai Revolution, 42
- Xinhua Banyuetan*, 288
- yalixing tizhi* (pressure-centered government), 53–54
- yanguan* (criticism official), 43–44
- yijiantiao*. *See* one-shoulder policy
- you hong you zhuan* (“red and expert” principle), 96
- zheng-fa-wei* (legal/political commission), 96
- zhengji gongcheng* (administrative achievement projects), 195
- Zhou, Feizhou, 14–15, 82–83
- Zhou, Li-an, 13–14, 198
- Zhou, Ziyang, 295
- zuijizhao* (self-critiques), 43–44