

Patchwork States

Patchwork States argues that the subnational politics of conflict and competition in South Asian countries have roots in the history of uneven state formation under colonial rule. Colonial India contained a complex landscape of different governance arrangements and state-society relations. After independence, postcolonial governments revised colonial governance institutions, but only with partial success. The book argues that contemporary India and Pakistan can be usefully understood as patchwork states, with enduring differences in state capacity and state-society relations within their national territories. The complex nature of territorial governance in these countries shapes patterns of political violence, including riots and rebellions, as well as variations in electoral competition and development across the political geography of the Indian subcontinent. By bridging past and present, this book can transform our understanding of both the legacies of colonial rule and the historical roots of violent politics, in South Asia and beyond.

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The Historical Roots of Subnational Conflict and Competition in South Asia

ADNAN NASEEMULLAH

King's College London



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Preface

This book has its roots, rather incongruously, in a statement by then-President George W. Bush, in 2007, explaining why the American War in Afghanistan was still raging six years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent US invasion. Bush said, “Taliban and al Qaeda fighters do hide in remote regions of Pakistan. This is wild country; this is wilder than the Wild West.”¹

At the time I heard Bush’s statement, I was conducting dissertation fieldwork in the Pakistani metropolis of Lahore, interviewing manufacturers and visiting their textile mills and factories in the plains of central Punjab. This bustling, industrial landscape was just 360 miles – and yet a world – away from the tribal agencies Bush was discussing. Those regions were quickly becoming the epicenter of Pakistan’s deadliest insurgency, which lasted over a decade. Bush’s statement piqued my interest as a fledgling student of comparative politics. By drawing parallels between the “wildness” of Pakistan’s remote regions and America’s Wild West, he was highlighting territories within a sovereign state that may not be governed in a sovereign manner. And as with the early American state, the Pakistani state is strong in some regions like central Punjab, yet its presence or strength varies from place to place.

An important difference between America and Pakistan implicit in Bush’s comparison is that the American West had been “won”: indigenous communities were subjugated, ghettoized, and eliminated; bandits and outlaws no longer operated with impunity; and territories were formed into states under the writ of democratically elected federal, regional, and municipal governments. In the case of Pakistan’s Northwest, British colonizers had gained control over the “frontier” territories between the upper Indus Valley and the borders of Afghanistan around the same time as the United States’ victory in the Mexican War. Yet until a constitutional amendment in 2018, they were

¹ Address to the American Enterprise Institute, February 15, 2007.

governed exceptionally as a set of tribal agencies, in which the footprint of the Pakistani state was light and tribal leadership held significant independent authority. The variation in states' monopoly of violence across their territories, as these two cases show, is not a universal outcome. Instead, processes of state formation are historically specific, and central authority is established in some geographic cases more successfully than others.

Any actual comparison between the two cases would not be particularly welcome in a discipline that sees both the United States and Pakistan as exceptional, though for different reasons. Yet I could not shake the idea that embedded within that comparison was a deeper lesson of how states were built, for what purposes, and with what outcomes. The inquiries that arose from these questions have taken me in lots of different directions over the last decade: to interviews with Pakistani bureaucrats who worked at the very edges of the state's authority; to archival research as a way of uncovering, systematizing, and analyzing the variations in colonial rule; and to data on contemporary subnational variation in areas as distinct as riots and rebellions in India and the effective number of parties in Pakistan. This book represents a culmination of these disparate investigations into how the South Asian state was constructed in the past and with what consequences for the politics of conflict and competition in the present.

Through the course of this research and its eventual integration into the present volume, I have come to appreciate both the benefits and the drawbacks to social science's evolving approaches to history and its legacies. At seminars in college and graduate school, I had gained a deep respect for the comparative-historical tradition that had brought political scientists, sociologists, and historians together in conversation over the deep relationships between violence and the state. Through collaboration and argumentation, they formulated many of the key theories, concepts, and approaches at the core of state-building and discussions of political order. The implicit Euro-centrism of elements of the tradition and its intellectual debts to modernization theory limited its applicability, however, for those of us who wished to study developing countries on their own terms. This limitation is particularly acute when studying variations in the strength of the state not across countries but within them.

In the last couple of decades, a new approach to historical legacies has gained traction, one inspired by institutional analysis and causal inference. A key advantage of this approach is greater attention to comparability among cases and the strategic use of fine-grained data to demonstrate long-term impacts of historical phenomena. But its focus on precisely identifying the effects of historical institutions, especially through the search for natural experiments, also has disadvantages. By choosing exactly comparable cases and finely curating data to increase analytical leverage, we miss out on the complex but legible – and analytically important – *diversities* of institutional form. Such a focus also occludes institutional origins and the (many) cases in which institutional cases

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are “assigned” in quite deliberate fashion rather than randomly or exogenously. Finally, the application of as-if randomization logics and subsequent path dependence has weaker purchase for understanding the landscapes of political violence than other, more constant social processes, like development.

This book represents an attempt to deploy comparative-historical insights as well as archival research and contemporary data in a more encompassing manner to tell the story of state formation and its variably violent consequences in South Asia. In this effort, an investigation of the origins of different institutions of colonial governance is a key starting point. In common with others writing on the territorially uneven nature of state-building within national boundaries, I explore the political motivations and anxieties that led British colonizers to establish distinctly different forms of governance across the directly ruled provinces, princely states, and political agencies across the subcontinent between the mid-1700s and mid-1800s. I then explore how independent governments after 1947 attempted to revise the fragmented array of governance forms through postcolonial state-building. These efforts were not entirely successful, yielding persistent variations in governance, but decolonization represented a key critical juncture that is often elided by scholars of colonial legacies. Legacies of these differences in state capacity and state–society relations shape patterns of political violence, especially in relation to the sovereignty of the state, in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

Patchwork States contributes to two important, though very different, sets of intellectual debates. The first involves how we analyze the politics of South Asian countries. Much of the scholarship on India has been conducted in the very long shadows of the decline of Congress and the attendant fragmentation of political authority. The purported singularity of purpose among the leaders of the independence struggle has been replaced by increased demands among different communities and heightened competition among politicians for resources and political authority, understood through the idiom of clientelism, and implicated in Hindu–Muslim riots. South Asian comparative analysis has, meanwhile, highlighted stark differences between democratic India and autocratic/hybrid Pakistan (and Bangladesh).

What much of this scholarship has ignored is the complex character of the state itself, as structures different from and indeed prior to the formation of regimes and the character of political competition. State structures vary within national boundaries, but as importantly, they are common in their variation to all three countries. As a result, political competition and violence in all three countries occur across uneven landscapes of state authority, of which India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are all a part. This book argues that these uneven landscapes can shape patterns of violence, as well as the character of political competition and development trajectories, in all three countries.

The second set of debates involves the relationship among state-building, colonial rule, and political order. Try as we might to escape them, we find ourselves trapped by the intellectual structures of modernization, which

privilege questions of national success and failure and invites us to find sources for these differences. Colonialism looms large as a potential explanation for the relative poverty and instability of many developing countries; this is, of course, not an inaccurate assessment! But in the search for systematic cross-national explanations, we tend to treat colonialism – especially in its nonsettler forms – as a perverse but singular institutional treatment.

In South Asia and beyond, however, colonialism represented an *internally complex* system of domination and subjugation, one which needs to be studied on its own terms if we are to understand its true impact. This book represents such an investigation in the subcontinent to understand subnational variation in political violence and other outcomes. But it suggests other factors that are relevant to understanding impacts of colonialism far beyond South Asia: the different motivations of imperial powers in different territories under their domination, and the extent to which postcolonial state-builders were able to revise or erase the concrete institutional legacies of colonial or imperial rule. Applying these questions in comparative perspective can help us understand a broad array of phenomena, from East Asian developmental states to Southeast Asian protection pacts to “ethnic management” and spheres of influence in the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China to the internally divided American empire in the western hemisphere.

* * *

As with any project that has come together slowly over the course of a decade, there is an immense number of people that deserve enormous thanks, without whom this book would not have been written. Part of the length of time over which it has been written means that I will, inevitably, leave out people whose thoughts and assistance in shaping the book should be recognized. I apologize for any such oversight at the outset.

In the conduct of this research, staff at the Asian and African Studies Reading Room at the British Library as well as those at the National Archives and the Central Secretariat Library in New Delhi have been invaluable. I have benefited greatly from presenting various aspects through various stages to audiences, including at the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for the Advanced Study of India, Brown University’s Watson Institute, the Institute for Defence and Security Analysis in New Delhi, Ashoka University, the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London, the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Sussex, and meetings of the American Political Science Association, and the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics.

For expertly shepherding this book from a draft manuscript to publication, I am immensely grateful to my editor, Sara Doskow. Two excellent reviews from anonymous reviewers provided key feedback and comments. Other key individuals at Cambridge University Press whose efforts have been essential include Jadyne Fauconier-Herry, John Haslam, Rachel Blaifeder and Claire Sissen. For expert copyediting, typesetting and other aspects of production,

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I dedicate this book to the memory of my grandmother, Freda Mollie Barger, and my grandfather, Muhammad Ziaullah. My grandfather passed away when I was a small child, but his career as a government servant involved an intimate experience with colonial rule and its ongoing legacies. I knew my grandmother very well, however. She graduated from university and was conscripted into work in the India Office in London during the Blitz, experiencing three of the last years of colonial rule as a minor, unwilling functionary of the imperial project at the metropole. Her subsequent life and career were nothing short of astonishing. She has always been a source of inspiration, and this book would not have been possible without her encouragement and support.

Abbreviations

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Database
AIML	All-India Muslim League
ANP	Awami National Party
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BNP	Bangladesh National Party
CAA	Citizenship Amendment Act
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPI-M	Communist Party of India-Marxist
CRPF	Central Reserve Police Force (India)
EIC	East India Company
ENP	effective number of parties
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Area (Pakistan)
INC	Indian National Congress
IOR	India Office Records
KMT	Kuomintang (Chinese nationalists)
KP	Kyber Pakhtunkhwa
MQM	Muttahida (Mohajir) Quami Movement
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
OBC	Other Backward Classes
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PML-Q	Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf

PTL	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Labbaik
SCV	Sovereignty-challenging violence
SNV	Sovereignty-neutral violence
UP	United Provinces (of Agra and Awadh) or Uttar Pradesh
UPA	United Progressive Alliance