

LAW AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN CHINA

The Role of Law in Corporate Governance and Market Growth

Applying a novel theoretical approach, Tamar Groswald Ozery combines law and political economy to deconstruct the role of law in China's market development since 1978. The book examines how economic and administrative powers within China's Party-state system have been legally and politically configured throughout China's growth process. Using a vast range of primary sources, Ozery illuminates how the law acts as a mediating institution that translates and gives shape to the relations between politics and economics. Using the evolution of public firms and corporate governance as a case study, Ozery illustrates the complex relationships between law, politics, and economic development, and sheds new light on the possible varieties of growth-supporting governance institutions in firms. By studying China's distinct market experience through the lens of law and political economy, Ozery offers a significant contribution to development studies, comparative corporate governance, and interdisciplinary discussions about China as a growth model.

Tamar Groswald Ozery is an assistant professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Previously, she was a Grotius Fellow (Michigan Law), a Research & Teaching Fellow (Harvard Law), and the editor of the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance. Her published scholarly works focus on Chinese corporate governance, cross-border investments, and party-state market relations. She is a frequent commentator on China's legal system, political economy, and global economic integration, and has testified before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Prior to academia, she spearheaded the China department of a leading Israeli law firm.

ASCL STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE LAW

ASCL Studies in Comparative Law publishes monographs and collections that broaden theoretical and practical knowledge of the world's many legal systems. Published under the direction of the American Society of Comparative Law, the *ASCL Studies* examine legal problems in a comparative light to advance legal science, develop technical insights, and promote greater cooperation across jurisdictional and cultural boundaries. This book series serves legal practitioners and those seeking to improve law and justice by publishing in-depth comparative studies of specific legal problems in every area of law.

The series has two general editors. David Gerber is Distinguished Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Program in International and Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. He is past President of the American Society of Comparative Law. Mortimer Sellers is Regents Professor of the University System of Maryland and Director of the Baltimore Center for International and Comparative Law. He is past President of the Internationale Vereinigung für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie.

Series Editors

David Gerber *Chicago-Kent College of Law*

Mortimer Sellers *University of Baltimore*

Editorial Board

Richard Albert *University of Texas*

David Clark *Willamette University*

Helge Dedek *McGill University*

James Feinerman *Georgetown University*

Richard Kay *University of Connecticut*

Maximo Langer *University of California Los Angeles*

Ralf Michaels *Duke University*

Fernanda Nicola *American University*

Jacqueline Ross *University of Illinois*

Kim Lane Scheppele *Princeton University*

Franz Werro *Georgetown University*

External Advisory Board

Josef Drexl *University of Munich*

Diego Fernandez Arroyo *Institut d'etudes politiques de Paris*

Hongjun Gao *Tsinghua University*

Michele Graziadei *University of Turin*

Ko Hasegawa *University of Hokkaido*

Hisashi Harata *University of Tokyo*

Andreas Heinemann *University of Zurich*

Christophe Jamin *Institut d'etudes politiques de Paris*

Yong-Sun Kang *Yonsei University*

Claudia Lima Marques *Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul*

Bertil Emrah *Oder Koc University*

Amr Shalakany *American University of Cairo*

Law and Political Economy in China

THE ROLE OF LAW IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND MARKET GROWTH

TAMAR GROSWALD OZERY

Hebrew University of Jerusalem



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge University Press & Assessment
978-1-009-15824-4 — Law and Political Economy in China
Tamar Groswald Ozery
Frontmatter
[More Information](#)



Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India
103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467

Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment, a department of the University of Cambridge.

We share the University's mission to contribute to society through the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009158244

DOI: 10.1017/9781009158251

© Tamar Groswald Ozery 2023

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment.

First published 2023

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

A Cataloging-in-Publication data record for this book is available from the Library of Congress

ISBN 978-1-009-15824-4 Hardback

Cambridge University Press & Assessment has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Cambridge University Press & Assessment
978-1-009-15824-4 — Law and Political Economy in China
Tamar Groswald Ozery
Frontmatter
[More Information](#)

*In memory of my grandmother, Raya (Raisa) Barhovich Skutel (1915–2011),
who had seen many types of regimes in her lifetime and survived them all.*

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	page xiii
<i>List of Tables</i>	xv
<i>Preface</i>	xvii
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xxi
<i>About the Book</i>	xxiii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xxv
Introduction	1
PART I ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF LAW	9
1 The Traditional Framework	11
2 Law and Political Economy: A New Paradigm	16
Notes on Methodology	23
1 Dataset	24
2 Analysis	25
Goals and Caveats	26
PART II CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT TRAJECTORY AND THE ROLE(S) OF LAW	29
The Making of a Five-Year Plan	29
Classification of China's Development Trajectory	34
3 Early Reform Era (December 1978–1991)	37
Era Overview: The Two Functions of Law Are Unveiled	38
Summary Reflections	47

4	Legal Modernization Era (1992–2009)	49
	Era Overview: A “Socialist Market Economy” is Configured through Law	50
	1 The Use of Law to Structure the Market	53
	2 The Use of Law to Build Party-State Capacity	65
	Summary Reflections	72
5	Legalized Politicization Era (from 2010 to Present)	73
	Era Overview: Political–Economic Equilibrium Shifts Focus – The Party Steps In	73
	1 Reinforcing State Capacities in the Market	79
	2 Pathways for Party Agency in the Market	93
	Summary Reflections	98
	Concluding Part II	100
	PART III LAW AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN CORPORATE CHINA	103
6	Corporate Governance under Market Experimentation	107
	The Emergence of Firms and the Capital Market	107
	1 The Rise of the Large (Public) Firm	107
	2 The Formation of the Capital Market	120
7	Corporate Governance under State Capitalism	126
	A Turn toward Law and Legal Institutions: Convergence with Corporate Capitalism?	129
	1 Shareholder Empowering Regulatory Action	132
	“Chinese-Style” State Capitalism and Its Consequences for Public Shareholders	137
	1 The State as an Ultimate Controller	137
	2 The Party-State’s Financial and Capital Market Control	149
	Law and Political Economy Configurations of Conventional Governance Mechanisms	151
	1 Internal Governance Mechanisms	152
	2 External Monitoring Institutions	179

<i>Contents</i>		<i>xi</i>
8	Legally Politicized Corporate Governance	205
	Levers of CCP Political Governance in Firms	206
	1 The CCP's Intra-Firm Governance Capacities: Personnel Management and Party Committees	206
	2 The CCP's External Corporate Governance Capacity: Monitoring and Accountability through Disciplinary and Enforcement Functions	217
	Summary Reflections	226
9	Legally Politicized Corporate Governance as a Functional Alternative	227
	Potential Implications: Firm and Market Levels	230
	Conclusions	234
	<i>Appendix – Methodology and Data Selection</i>	<i>237</i>
	<i>Index</i>	<i>241</i>

Figures

0.1 Total market capitalization, compared	<i>page</i> 3
0.2 Number of listed companies, compared	4
2.1 Market rulemaking activism vs. GDP growth	19
2.2 Market rulemaking activism vs. rise in public firms	19
3.1 Newly issued and rev'd market LegReg during the Early Reform Era	47
4.1 Newly issued and rev'd market LegReg during the Legal Modernization Era	51
5.1 M&A rules by era classification	83
5.2 Newly issued and rev'd market LegReg (annual) per era	85
5.3 Market LegReg NPC vs. State Council	86
5.4 Number of issued CCP and St. Council joint guidance per year	94
5.5 CCP and St. Council joint guidance annual avg. by era	95
5.6 Market rules (% and No.) issued by the CCP, St. Council, NPC, per era	101
7.1 NPC economic laws to total GDP	128
8.1 Corporate group corruption pyramid	225

Tables

A.1 Total market rules (excl' tertiary), per era	<i>page</i> 240
A.2 Total tertiary market rules, per era	240

Preface

August 2009, a young foreign lawyer steps out of the gates of the Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport. Although she has been a student of China and of Mandarin Chinese for several years, it is her first visit to China as an adult, not to mention an adult on duty. She is nervous.

For the past three months, the lawyer and her team have worked tirelessly on a share purchase agreement (SPA) for the acquisition of shares in a Joint Venture (JV) that went awry. She was sent by her client, an American developer and supplier of AgroTech equipment, to make sure that the finalized deal actually goes through and that the JV's CEO, who is also the owner of the domestic Chinese partner in the JV and the JV's sole distributor in China, steps down. Luckily, she is accompanied by a mediator, a native of her country who joined the trip to help in the share purchase negotiations. The two locate their prearranged taxi among the bustling crowd of drivers angling for passengers.

On their way to the hotel, the lawyer cannot take her eyes from the windows. For six years she has been studying China from afar, yet nothing prepared her for the spectacular modern highways and skyscrapers she is now seeing. The trip is more than just a work visit for her; she is relocating to Shanghai for the next few years. Eager to catch every sight and code in her memory the name of every road in the place she will now be calling home, she is mesmerized with admiration and excitement. The mediator, amused, spits out "don't let that fool you." The banter falls on deaf ears.

Late afternoon, the lawyer and the mediator are set to meet with the Chinese partner at the firm's offices. The lawyer is only there to collect signatures on some ancillary documents and make sure the company chops are moved to the mediator's possession. Days and nights of remote negotiations and many rounds of revisions from both sides preceded this visit and the SPA has already been finalized and approved by both parties. "The meeting should be quick and smooth," she is reassured by the mediator.

But the Chinese partner, the CEO, is stalling. In fact, he completely ghosted them. For the next two weeks meetings are postponed repeatedly, and finalizing the

deal is halted for no apparent reason. After some time, the lawyer and the mediator decide to show up unannounced at the firm's offices in an attempt to understand the situation. Surprisingly, they find the space half empty with occasional employees wandering about and no management on site. Even more alarming, the floor sign that used to greet clients and visitors with the JV's company name is nowhere to be seen. Instead, a name of a local distributor, the Chinese partner in the JV, decorates the building.

A few days later, the JV's head administrator (also its legal representative) agrees to meet with the lawyer and shed some light on the matter. The head administrator is seasoned in dealing with foreign investors. She was nominated by the American partner as his representative on that ground. Hopefully, the lawyer thinks to herself, she will be candid and have the client's best interests in mind. Reading between the lines (as the head administrator was not very generous with details), it seems that the Chinese partner was insulted by the SPA final draft. Apparently, a contingency provision in the SPA deliverables section stated that prior to his departure, the CEO should fulfill his duty and collect account receivables that were due to the JV under his management. Attesting her personal observation, the head administrator opined that in this moment of exchanging the final draft "the CEO lost his trust in his partners," and "his main objective changed to regain his honor."

Puzzled in disbelief that she now encountered what she always thought was an urban tale about Chinese "saving face" culture, the lawyer was alarmed. "The SPA has been finalized, the purchase price is already highly above value, an escrow account is standing to receive the sums!," she cried. The seasoned mediator, however, quickly responded "this means that he is now asking for more money."

After some days, when the lawyer was able to get ahold of the Chinese partner's legal team, she was told that the delay was due to "bureaucratic hurdles" as the CEO had received word that the purchase agreement would not be approved by the local authorities. Supposedly the escrow mechanism "is not looked upon favorably" when a foreign party acquires the shares of a Chinese partner. Once negotiations resumed, the CEO's legal team pushed for what they argued was a customary solution: In case the authorities would not approve the transaction, the sums will be released from escrow into the local partner's account, but he will be kept as a "passive nominee shareholder." This mechanism, per the legal team, was a common one designed to enable the execution of the SPA: a contractual arrangement that will de-facto transform the JV into a wholly foreign owned firm, while maintaining its current registration status. The local "partner" will forgo his voting rights, dividend rights, and any other rights in the company.

The foreign lawyer vehemently opposed such a deal. Her consultations with local counsels confirmed her understanding. Since the CEO will still be registered as a shareholder in a JV, he will be entitled to shareholders' governance rights under the PRC Company law. An attempt to enforce the proposed contractual arrangement in the future will de-facto require a court to ignore the provisions of the law. The

chances for such a contract to be enforced are slim to none. Yet the client was eager to close one way or another. As a publicly listed company, enduring a conflict with a sole distributor in China would not be accepted well by the shareholders.

After several long months of further negotiations, the SPA finally went through, and the transaction was consummated with the appropriate authority approvals. In this process, the purchase price of the local partner's shares increased 30 percent above what has been agreed upon, and not due to any value increase in the firm. In fact, during that period, the company ceased operations almost entirely. The JV was practically held hostage and lost much of its distribution channels and clients to local competitors.

—

A serendipitous epilogue to the case came two years later. The foreign lawyer coincidentally ran into the (former) head administrator of the JV and the full complexity of the episode was unveiled. Apparently, the CEO has befriended a local official in Shanghai and confided with him about selling his shares in the JV. The official (an administrator at either SAIC, local COFTEC, or SAFE), getting in the weeds of the negotiation process, told the CEO that the deliverables under the SPA requiring him to collect payments before his departure would embarrass the CEO with his local clients and sub-distributors. Instead, the official apparently offered, the transaction could be renegotiated on the basis of expected “bureaucratic hurdles” by the authorities. This would give the CEO more leverage to improve his departure terms and save face.

What the local official had gained from such friendly advice was left untold (and is likely unknown) to this day.

—

Today, the (former) Chinese partner works with several suppliers. He has since expanded his distribution network and supplies AgroTech equipment to former JV clients and others across China.

The (former) American partner continues its global operations, including the wholesale distribution of its products in China. It had since established a special advisory board for the Asian market.

[**The story is based on the author's personal experience. Identifying details have been altered.**]

Acknowledgments

I owe a great deal of gratitude to a long list of friends, family members, and mentors who provided guidance and support throughout the course of writing and producing this book.

First and foremost, my gratitude and admiration are due to my doctoral dissertation committee. My academic mentor, Nicholas Howson, whose wisdom and experience drew me to start my academic journey at the University of Michigan Law School. Nico read my work in and out. His sharp commentary and intellectual rigor pushed me forward to question existing boundaries and develop my own vision. My development as a legal sinologist would not have been the same without the knowledge I absorbed from Nico and his scholarship. I owe wholehearted thanks to Vic Khanna, whose teaching planted the seeds of my interest in bridging development theories with corporate law, and whose guidance helped me find my way in the labyrinth of academia. Curtis Milhaupt, of Stanford Law School, provided kind guidance in critical junctures. His scholarship had a profound impact on this book and on my development as a scholar.

I am also thankful to Theresa Kaiser-Jarvis, former Assistant Dean for International Affairs at the University of Michigan Law School, a friend and mentor, who supported every step of my research with undefeatable positivity. Also at Michigan, I extend my utmost thanks to the wonderful team at the Lieberthal-Rogel Center for Chinese Studies, particularly to Mary Gallagher and Yuen Yuen Ang, for welcoming me to the Center's intellectual life, providing me with an immensely collegial community of China scholars with whom to share my research. The interdisciplinary nature of this book benefited much from my discussions and exposures to the Center's activities and its scholars.

I am deeply indebted to mentors and colleagues at Harvard Law School, where I spent three years producing this book, particularly to the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance and to the East Asian Legal Studies Program, which provided institutional support during my time there as a research and teaching Fellow. While at Harvard, I greatly benefited from thought-provoking discussions with foremost leaders and thinkers of corporate law in the United States and

from esteemed China law experts. For sharing their time, observations, and insights with me, I extend my gratitude to Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and Mark Roe. My deep gratitude to Mark extends also for giving me the opportunity to take part in joining him at teaching his Comparative Corporate Governance course. Mark's own work and his feedback had a great deal of influence on this book. I owe my utmost thanks to William Alford, the Director of the East Asian Legal Studies Program. I have been influenced and inspired by Bill's intellectual contributions to China studies for many years. I am humbled and fortunate to have benefited from his charitable spirit and keen interest in my work.

The final steps in writing this book were accomplished during the first year of my tenure as an Assistant Professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. There, I thank the Department of Asian Studies department and particularly my colleagues at the China section for their support, feedback, and curiosity toward my work. I am grateful to Barak Medina at the Faculty of Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and to Assaf Hamdani, at Buchman Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, for their continuous guidance and support on my path. I also thank the anonymous reviewers of this book and the ASCL Series editor who provided suggestions and constructive criticism that improved the manuscript.

Immeasurable appreciation is owed to my partner, Shamir Ozery, for his friendship, his love, and his endless support in the journey of writing and producing this book; my parents, Ida and Shlomo Groswald, for their counsel and unconditional love; and my children, Negev and Gefen, for giving me the opportunity to practice patience and forbearance, skills much needed in writing a book.

T.G.O
Jerusalem, Israel
July 2022

About the Book

This book examines the evolution in the role of formal law through four decades of market reforms in China. It employs two layers of analysis: the market development macro layer and the corporate governance and capital market micro layer. The macro layer, Part II, establishes the analytical framework of the book. It shows how the law translates and secures political-economic power dynamics within the Party-state system. By examining the evolving functions of law through the different eras of market reform, the analysis shows how formal law supports the Party-state's efforts to strike a delicate balance between its own needs for macro control, the interests of various hierarchies within the Party-state, and those of market participants, thereby configuring China's unique socialist market economy. The micro layer, Part III in the book, implements the framework. It digs deep into the development of corporate governance and the Chinese capital market and considers how law and political economic determinants entwine in shaping the business environment in which public firms operate.

Drawing from a chronological study of an extensive archive of laws, regulations, policies and normative opinions issued by organs of the Chinese Party-state since economic reforms began in 1978 until the present, the book sheds a new comparative light on a long-standing debate about the role of law in economic development and about the possible varieties of growth-supporting governance mechanisms.

Through its interdisciplinary approach, connecting deep knowledge about China's political economy, law and development theories, and corporate governance practices, the book aspires to produce novel insights about the relationship between law, economic development, and politics in contemporary China.

**A note about the cover: The front face of the coin portrays the mythical ancient creature Xiezhi (解豸), a symbol of traditional Chinese law that represents righteousness. Xiezhi is believed to possess a divine ability to sense and fight corruption.

Abbreviations

AMC	Asset Management Companies
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CAC	Cyberspace Administration of China
CBIRC	China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission
CBRC	China Banking Regulatory Commission
CCDI	Central Commission of Discipline Inspection
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
COFTEC	Commission of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
CRES	Commission for Restructuring the Economic System
CSRC	China Securities Regulatory Commission
JV	Joint Venture
M&A	Mergers and Acquisitions
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NIE	New Institutional Economics
NPC	National People's Congress
NPCsc	National People's Congress Standing Committee
PBoC	People's Bank of China
PRC	People's Republic of China
RMB	Renminbi (the Chinese currency, also known as Yuan)
SAIC	State Administration for Industry and Commerce
SAFE	State Administration of Foreign Exchange
SAMR	State Administration for Market Regulation
SASAC	State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission
SERC	State Economic Reform Commission
SME	Small Medium Enterprise
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
SPC	Supreme People's Court
TVE	Township and Village Enterprise
WFOE	Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise
WTO	World Trade Organization