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WHEN GOVERNMENTS LOBBY GOVERNMENTS

*The Institutional Origins
of Intergovernmental Persuasion
in America*

Youlang Zhang
Renmin University of China



Cambridge University Press & Assessment
978-1-009-10838-6 — When Governments Lobby Governments
Youlang Zhang
Frontmatter
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Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom
One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA
477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia
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Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment,
a department of the University of Cambridge.

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www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009108386

DOI: 10.1017/9781009104180

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First published 2022

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-1-009-10838-6 Paperback
ISSN 2515-4303 (online)
ISSN 2515-429X (print)

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When Governments Lobby Governments

The Institutional Origins of Intergovernmental Persuasion in America

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DOI: 10.1017/9781009104180
First published online: December 2022

Youlang Zhang
Renmin University of China

Author for correspondence: Youlang Zhang, zhangyoulang@ruc.edu.cn

Abstract: Why are some subnational governments more likely to lobby the national government than others? Extant research in social sciences has widely discussed lobbying dynamics in the private sector. However, governments lobby governments too. In the United States, lobbying is a popular strategy for state and local governments to obtain resources from and influence policies in the federal government. Nevertheless, extant research offers limited theoretical analysis or empirical evidence on this phenomenon. This Element provides a comprehensive study of intergovernmental lobbying activities in the United States and, in particular, an institutional analysis of the lobbying decisions of state and local governments. The study findings contribute to public administration, public policy, and political science literature by offering theoretical and empirical insights into the institutional factors that might influence subnational policymaking, fiscal resource management, intergovernmental relations, and democratic representation.

Keywords: lobbying, institution, intergovernmental relations, public finance, bureaucratic politics

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ISBNs: 9781009108386 (PB), 9781009104180 (OC)
ISSNs: 2515-4303 (online), 2515-429X (print)

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