

1

Introduction: An Inconvenient Truth

1.1 AIR POLLUTION KILLS: PARTICULATES MATTER!

Difficulty breathing, weight gain, reduced productivity, clouded judgement, suppressed performance at work or school, or a depressed mood – we typically attribute these symptoms to sleep deprivation, poor nutrition, or family stress, but many of us might be surprised to learn that another major explanation is literally in the air we breathe.

Dirty air is more prevalent than one might think. According to the 2018 report *State of Global Air*, more than 95 percent of the world's population resides in areas that fail to comply with the air pollution safety standards set by the World Health Organization (Health Effects Institute 2018). From Los Angeles to Kampala, from Delhi to Beijing, air pollution destroys our health and shortens our lives to a far greater degree than violence, diseases such as AIDS and malaria, and smoking (Lelieveld et al. 2020).

Air pollution is a silent and invisible mass murderer that claims around seven million lives – one out of every eight deaths each year – making it the deadliest environmental health hazard (WHO 2018). The rapid decline in air quality has been one of the most pressing yet understudied challenges facing humanity in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa in recent decades. Children and the elderly are particularly vulnerable to the adverse health effects of air pollution, and researchers have estimated that dirty air is responsible for one in five infant deaths in sub-Saharan Africa (Heft-Neal et al. 2018). Worse still, breathing dangerously polluted air, especially particulate matter (PM) that is linked to respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, increases the probability of succumbing to COVID-19, and such an effect is particularly pronounced among the socially disadvantaged (Wu et al. 2020; Austin et al. 2020; Persico and Johnson 2020). Given its nexus with climate change, air pollution is unarguably one of the most significant threats to human survival and well-being in the twenty-first century.

1.2 CONTAINING THE INVISIBLE KILLER: VARIATION IN SUCCESS

Having recognized the gravity of the problem, leaders worldwide are waging war on air pollution. For instance, in the United States, public outcry over a series of

pollution accidents – most notably in Donora, Pennsylvania – and a better understanding of the causes of air pollution contributed to the passing of the first federal legislation related to air pollution, the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, at the behest of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Increasing public awareness and concern over air pollution, strengthened by the publication of Rachel Carson’s seminal book, *Silent Spring*, in 1962, prompted the US Congress to enact the Clean Air Act of 1963. The 1963 act sought to “improve, strengthen, and accelerate programs for the prevention and abatement of air pollution” and laid the foundation for the Air Quality Act of 1967, the Clean Air Act of 1970, and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 and 1990. In Mexico, 324 days of dangerously high ozone levels in Mexico City in 1995 marked the initiation of a five-year National Environmental Program (1996–2000) to clean up air pollution. The Mexican government also passed a tax incentive program to encourage the purchasing of pollution control equipment. Older cars were gradually phased out between 2000 and 2006. In China, the 11th (2006–10) and 12th (2011–15) five-year plans (FYPs) reflect a similar resolve to mitigate air pollution. Further signals that the country is determined to fight air pollution include former president Hu Jintao’s vision of “scientific development” (2003) and “harmonious society” (2004), the 18th Party Congress’s vision of a “beautiful China” through the construction of “ecological civilization” (2012), and Premier Li Keqiang’s declaration of a “war on air pollution” at the annual meeting of the parliament (2014).

Despite these high-powered national directives to protect the environment, the degree of success varies greatly, even in the same location across time. When and why does environmental policy implementation fail? This is a two-part question. First, why has pollution sometimes continued to be a problem – a crisis, even – despite the national/federal governments’ efforts to make the attainment of high environmental standards a top priority? This question embodies both natural and social sciences dimensions. So far, social and political scientists have written prolifically on why some countries, particularly those with a strong political will in the capital and some of the world’s most comprehensive environmental regulations, may still fail to contain pollution in localities. For instance, in the United States, environmental policies can be diluted due to the lobbying of industry interest groups, political inaction, and lukewarm support from voters (Heyes and Dijkstra 2001; Oates and Portney 2003; List and Sturm 2006; Crenson 1971). In Mexico, short-tenure terms and the decades-long ban on reelection are viewed as impediments to the development of long-term municipal environmental plans and programs (OECD 2013).¹ Low priority on the legislative agenda and lobbying are other causes (Ramos García 2011; Jáuregui Nolen, Tello Medina, and Pilar Rivas García 2012). In China, existing studies have pointed to the marginal status of environmental policies compared to economic ones, short-sighted environmental planning, ineffective environmental monitoring, and local protectionism to explain sloppy

¹ Tenure refers to the period when someone holds an official position.

environmental policy implementation by local leaders (Sinkule and Ortolano 1995; Shapiro 2001; Economy 2004).

However, the question of *when* has mostly been ignored. While theories may account for the *static* existence of pollution or the effect of ad hoc implementation campaigns on pollution reduction, they do not explain the systematic *temporal* variation in environmental policy implementation. Instead, nearly all existing works assume that after controlling for institutional factors and exogenous shocks like top-down campaigns, environmental policy implementation is constant over time. One possible explanation for this gap is the lack of comprehensive and fine-grained air pollution data that would reveal the variation in the effectiveness of policy implementation over time.

To address these shortcomings and fill this important gap, I utilize advanced pollution data that have only recently become available to uncover how local political incentives shape the implementation of air pollution control policies in a systematic way over time. Using this data, I illuminate the role of local political incentives in forging systematic local regulatory waves, as the top local politicians or political leaders prioritize different policies across their tenure to augment their chances of career advancement or reelection.²

I theorize that local political tenures influence regulatory activities systematically. Strategizing local leaders or politicians are incentivized to cater to the policy preferences of their superiors (in autocracies) or constituencies (in democracies), giving rise to changing policy prioritization and, by extension, regulatory stringency during their tenure, creating what I call a “political regulation wave.”³ For an air pollutant without binding reduction targets that determine career advancement, top local leaders or politicians are incentivized to gradually order laxer regulation of pollution to promote employment, social stability, and (reported) economic growth; thereby what I call a “political pollution wave” is generated. For an air pollutant with binding reduction targets, local politicians or leaders are incentivized to promote a stricter, more Weberian regulatory pattern.

However, the effectiveness of regulation efforts, and, by extension, the pattern in actual pollution levels would also vary based on the variability of the sources of the pollutant and the complexity of its formation. When the sources are limited and easy to target, and the formation process is relatively simple, the level of regulatory ambiguity is low; more consistent regulation leads to an observably more consistent level of pollution; thereby what I call a “political environmental protection wave” is generated. When the pollutant has many sources spanning several sectors and its

² I thank the late Mathew McCubbins for suggesting that the phenomenon should be referred to as a “wave” rather than “cycle.” A policy wave is similar to a policy cycle in that a wave has ebbs and flows, and a cycle has booms and busts. However, a cycle implies completeness, but a wave does not. A “wave” rather than a “cycle” better captures the phenomenon, which will become clearer later in the book.

³ Politicians are, by definition, elected. I refer to their counterparts in authoritarian countries appointed by superiors rather than elected by voters as “political leaders.”

formation processes are complex, regulation becomes ambiguous; the political pollution waves may persist.

Using observational data, remote sensing, box modeling, pollution transport matrices, official policies and internal documents, field interviews, and online ethnography, I find supporting evidence regarding sulfur dioxide (SO₂) and fine particulate matter (PM_{2.5}) pollution control in China.⁴ I show that while dirty economic growth may explain *why* pollution exists, regulatory relief (or pressure) ordered by career-minded local leaders explains the systematic variation in air quality *over time*. The political regulation wave can deliver social benefits, but it may also impose insurmountable social costs. This book raises new questions about local governance and political accountability in autocracies and democracies alike.

Studying air pollution control provides a fascinating opportunity to understand the effect of political tenure on policy implementation. First, air pollution is the only type of pollution that researchers can measure systematically on a large geographic scale by using satellite instruments. Official sources of data can be sporadic and dubious, though they also provide important information about how local politicians or political leaders want to be perceived by their voters or superiors. Second, unlike other types of pollution (e.g., water pollution), for which there could be a significant time lag between the polluting activities and when their negative externalities manifest, air pollution happens concomitantly with emissions activities and stops when such events come to a halt. Third, but not least, studying air pollution carries tremendous normative significance. It is a driving cause of unnatural mortality and morbidity in places where most of the world's population lives.

This book examines China as the primary case study because, although it has some of the world's worst air pollution, its local patterns and causes are still not well understood. This pressing issue led Premier Li Keqiang to promise at a meeting in March 2017 that he would “reward heavily” anyone who could tackle the causes of smog (People's Daily 2017).

Now that everyone is already well-fed and hopes to live well. That would require quality not only for eating and drinking but also for breathing. I have expressed several times at the executive meetings of the State Council. If there is a research team that can thoroughly uncover the formation mechanism and the hazards of smog and put forward more effective countermeasures, we are willing to reward heavily from the premier's reserve fund! This is a top priority for people's livelihood. We will not hesitate to spend money, and we must study the matter thoroughly! Premier Li Keqiang, State Council meeting in March 2017

⁴ The data sources used in this book for PM_{2.5} are van Donkelaar et al. (2015) and van Donkelaar et al. (2019) with reference to the datasets located at “Surface PM_{2.5},” Atmospheric Composition Analysis Group, Washington University in St. Louis, <https://sites.wustl.edu/acag/datasets/surface-pm2-5/>. The data source used in this book for SO₂ is Krotkov, Li, and Leonard (2015).

1.3 *Existing Explanations for Pollution Patterns and Their Limitations* 5

Furthermore, much less is known about the effect of political tenures on public goods provision in authoritarian regimes.⁵ With the use of high-quality and newly available data, studying the temporal patterns of local air pollution in China from a political science perspective can reveal new and interesting trends of policy implementation in an authoritarian context. Finally, the core argument centers on how changes in incentives alter political behavior as it pertains to environmental policy implementation. This makes China an excellent testing ground because there were changes in policy prioritization for two major and particularly harmful air pollutants in 2005 and 2012.

While the main empirical case is about air pollution regulation in China, the theory developed in this book can be applied to other countries and policy domains under scope conditions. Similar patterns are likely observed in contexts with the following attributes:

1. Local politicians or leaders can exercise discretion in policymaking and implementation within their jurisdiction.
2. They are incentivized to prioritize different policies at different times while in office.
3. The implementation of the policy involves a high level of conflict and a low level of ambiguity.

I will elaborate on those points in Chapter 2. In the last chapter, I provide evidence of systematic patterns of pollution in Mexico's municipalities, tracking the tenures of state governors who possess significant power over the regulation of polluters. Future research could apply the theoretical framework in this book to study more empirical cases in a broad range of geographies and policy areas other than environmental governance.

1.3 EXISTING EXPLANATIONS FOR POLLUTION PATTERNS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS

Problems of implementation have been at the core of political science and public policy research for at least the past three decades. Implementation problems are amplified not only by the number of actors and the relationships between them but also by the actors' decisions and veto points (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981). These issues are further complicated by the degree

⁵ Air quality is a public good. Among the works that assess the impact of local political tenures on policies, scholars have found that career incentives induce increases in county-level government spending (Guo 2009), higher reported provincial GDP statistics (Wallace 2014), lower incidence of coal mine accidents (Nie, Jiang, and Wang 2013), and higher county-level website volume that underlines economic achievements (Pan 2019) toward the end of the local leaders' tenures in China. This paper contributes to the literature by, instead, looking at environmental outcomes and arguably more objective measures of economic growth.

of ambiguity of the policy goals, the degree of conflicts of interest, and the coping behavior of street-level bureaucrats (Matland 1995; Lipsky 1980).

In the environmental realm, existing works have posited three principal arguments. First, local politicians or leaders sacrifice the environment on the altar of the economy to please their constituencies or political superiors. The center's goals or expectations for the environment are at least sometimes sidelined by local leaders who perceive economic growth to be more critical, visible, and measurable. Second, short-sighted environmental planning is carried out to support growth and other policy goals whose effects can manifest swiftly enough for the leaders to claim credit and impress their superiors or voters. Last but not least, owing to information asymmetry where local leaders or politicians have the upper hand, local leaders can and do weaken environmental enforcement and monitoring without alerting the center or upsetting their constituencies. The following three subsections elaborate on these three points, first generally and then more specifically as they play out in China.

1.3.1 *The Economy, Stupid!*

Scholars have theorized and documented the impact of electoral and partisan incentives on economic policymaking extensively (Key 1966; Tufte 1978; Nordhaus 1975). The overarching claim is that, given voters' propensity to support candidates who are expected to deliver greater economic well-being, incumbents seeking reelection harbor powerful incentives to improve voters' economic fortunes, or at least signal or feign such capability. This results in cycles of economic expansion and contraction that follow electoral cycles to win votes from myopic voters. Office holders seeking reelection usually prefer policies that are more targetable and timeable, manipulable, and attributable to themselves, as well as palpable to voters (Franzese 2002). That means that income growth and visible infrastructure projects bode well for electoral success (Tufte 1978; Achen and Bartels 2016), but they often require processes that generate copious amounts of pollution. In authoritarian regimes, the desire for promotion may induce similar incentives to boost the economy. For instance, scholars have argued that the ability to grow the local economy and generate revenue sits at the core of local cadre evaluation, a criterion that inadvertently leads to tremendous amounts of pollution (Landry 2008; L.-A. Zhou 2007; Jia 2012; Kahn and Zheng 2016).

The existing literature assumes that economic growth translates directly into pollution, so pollution is a multiple of economic outputs. Two implications ensue, depending on whether tenure length is fixed. If the terms are fixed, and peak growth can be timed accurately, peaks and troughs in pollution are likely the results of economic growth. On the other hand, if the tenure duration is flexible, efforts to promote economic growth should be continuously strong, leading to pollution levels that stay constant during tenure. I question this assumption and

1.3 *Existing Explanations for Pollution Patterns and Their Limitations*

7

contend that development does not constitute the only pathway to pollution and that political regulation, rather than growth, could explain systematic pollution patterns.

1.3.2 *Unsustainable Environmental Planning*

The second stream of literature centers on environmental planning. Unsustainable environmental planning is the most prevalent when tenures are brief and incumbents can get away with short-sighted environmental performance upon leaving office. This is an example of a long-standing stream of literature on the time horizon of leadership and policy implementation (Olson 1993; Ferraz and Finan 2011).

In China, having a short tenure has been particularly at odds with sustainable, long-term environmental planning. Under pressure to demonstrate performance, local cadres are not incentivized to focus on the long-term welfare of their localities, nor to take on the difficult task of pursuing a sustainable and environmentally friendly path, since the effects of such policies only manifest in the long run (Zhou et al. 2013; Eaton and Kostka 2014). During the policy implementation phase, local cadres who want to demonstrate their competency for promotion usually take on highly visible projects to showcase economic prosperity, such as massive construction of infrastructure and housing, which are also deliverable during their short tenures (Cai 2004; Wu et al. 2013).

Existing works assume that if environmental planning is unsustainable during a limited time horizon, it is always so. However, whether it is possible that environmental planning is sustainable at some points in time and unsustainable at others remains an open question.

1.3.3 *Police Patrols Undermined*

Finally, environmental enforcement and monitoring – the “police patrol” approach – are crucial for ensuring compliance with environmental policies. In China, poor environmental policy implementation has often been seen as a consequence of weak capacity. The lack of funding creates perverse incentives for local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs), the main bodies in charge of implementing environmental policies, to allow industries to keep polluting because the pollution levies would indirectly contribute to the local EPBs’ budget.⁶ Furthermore, a lack of capacity is often driven by a shortage of staff (Schwartz 2003).

Additionally, police patrols can also fail when the regulatory bureaucracy experiences capture. Regulatory enforcement can often fall short when the regulators tasked with enforcement have conflicting interests. When those interests are so deep that they prevent any serious enforcement – what is often called “regulatory capture” – it can seem as if the regulations were never written in the first place.

⁶ A levy is a fee paid for emissions that exceed legal concentration standards (Article 18, Environmental Protection Law). If a firm fails to pay its levy according to the officially stipulated timeline, it is required to pay a fine in addition to the levy.

This was particularly evident in the Chinese context, where the interest to promote economic development had been at odds with the desire to protect the environment. The local EPBs were, until very recently, both administratively and financially dependent on the local government. The EPBs at each level were under the dual jurisdiction of the level immediately above them in the environmental protection system (*tiao*, or vertical) and the local government of the same administrative level (*kuai*, or horizontal) (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Mertha 2005). The dependence of local EPBs on local governments has been documented extensively in the environmental realm (Sinkule and Ortolano 1995; Ma and Ortolano 2000; van Rooij 2003). As a result, the local EPB answered to the local leadership's policy prioritization, which preferred stability and growth over the environment until 2010, around which time the status of environmental protection became significantly augmented.

Monitoring has proved very difficult at the local level due to a variety of ambiguities regarding policy means. In China, local EPBs and governments can juke the stats by tampering with pollution monitors or exploiting loopholes in the measurement requirement. However, while the existing literature assumes police patrol effectiveness is a constant, is it *always* undermined? If not, what is the pattern?⁷

1.4 TOWARD A GENERALIZABLE THEORY

The existing literature, as rich and informative as it is, makes one major assumption – after controlling for institutional factors and macro trends, air quality should be consistent over time. Is that true? If not, what does the air quality pattern actually look like? I find that there is systematic variation in the levels of pollution over time, independent of weather, climate, and seasonal factors, and that such variation is explained by the political calendars of career-minded local leaders. Hence, this book may both ask and answer the question: *what explains the systematic variation in air quality over time?*

This book takes a different view than the existing literature regarding the factors that explain reported changes in air quality. Extant works focus either on the manipulation of air quality data by subnational officials or on the effect of ad hoc, top-down implementation campaigns on actual air quality. For instance, many existing works about China focus on the manipulation of air quality statistics, such as with regard to the annual number of “blue sky days” – days when the recorded air pollution index (API) scores 100 or less.⁸ Researchers have found evidence indicative

⁷ Here, I mean the effectiveness of police patrols after taking into account the supplemental effects of fire alarms. See McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) for a comparison between police patrol versus fire alarm oversight.

⁸ The API system ranks air quality on a 1–500 scale (excellent: 0–50; good: 51–100; slightly polluted: 101–50; lightly polluted: 151–200; moderately polluted: 201–50; moderately-to-heavily polluted: 251–300; heavily polluted: 301 and above), where an index value of 100 or less indicates attainment of a blue sky day, as per the Chinese National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The Blue Sky campaign was first initiated by the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) when reports

of manipulation at the municipal level to achieve the Blue Sky Day policy goal, and suspicious data reporting most likely occurs on days when the deviation of the reported statistic from the real reading is least detectable (Andrews 2008a; Ghanem and Zhang 2014). Nevertheless, is reaching Blue Sky Day goals really what some authors call “effortless perfection” that required merely data manipulation? Have there been actual efforts on the ground that led to *real* changes in air quality?

The few works in this line of research study the effects of ad hoc, campaign-style regulation to reach specific goals, such as having blue skies during special events (e.g., Olympic Blue, the APEC Blue, the Parade Blue) and achieving quick air quality results while under intense scrutiny (e.g., heavy-handed regulation during China’s recent War on Air Pollution). These events are usually exploited as exogenous shocks to study changes in air pollution and their subsequent health effects (Wang et al. 2009; Lin et al. 2017; Meng et al. 2015; Cermak and Knutti 2009).

Departing from these works, this book dives into explaining the *systematic* variation in *actual* and reported air quality *over time* after controlling for the effects of top-down campaigns. In both democracies and autocracies, local leaders or politicians face incentives to deliver achievements when considered for reelection or promotion. These achievements could be related to economic development, public infrastructure, revenue generation, social stability, clean air, among others. Some of these goals can be contradictory (e.g., economy and employment vs. environment), which requires strategically prioritizing some goals over the others for career gains. Based on new research, I argue that local political tenure can be a crucial determinant of air quality. Taking a step back, the following chapter will elaborate on the scope conditions of the general theory of the political regulation wave, which could be applied to study how the political tenure influences air quality.

1.5 METHODS OF INQUIRY

In recent decades, two quasi-natural experiments emerged in China in 2006 and 2013, respectively. The country experienced a shift in policy prioritization – from the economy and stability to ecology and the environment. This delivered a unique opportunity to test my theory of the political regulation wave. I pursue a mixed-methods approach that integrates qualitative and quantitative inquiries organically. My qualitative methods of investigation include: (1) field interviews, (2) online ethnography, and (3) research on news articles, reports, and public and internal policy documents. My quantitative approaches consist of: (1) remote sensing, (2) box modeling, and (3) regression analysis based on data from prefectural yearbooks, online government databases, and satellite-derived statistics. This research is approved by the institutional review board at Stanford University (IRB-33872).

on air quality were first released in 1998 (Andrews 2008b). Other cities have since followed suit, and have tied the evaluation of performance in promoting blue sky days with cadre promotion.

1.5.1 *Qualitative Research*

I draw qualitative information from more than 100 semistructured interviews over nine months of fieldwork in five provinces (the coastal provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, and Zhejiang as well as the inland province of Sichuan) and Beijing, three years of online ethnographic research, and very elaborate and extensive research on central and local news articles, reports, and internal policy documents in Chinese.⁹ My research assistants and I built the top prefectural leadership dataset based on information from prefectural yearbooks housed at local libraries and archives and online government databases. I explain each approach in more detail below.

Field Interviews

I employed a snowball sampling technique to conduct in-person interviews with officials who worked for the local government and the EPBs, chief officials and engineers in central environmental planning, factory managers, university professors who teach environmental science and policy, and leading scholars and experts on political promotion in China. On average, an interview trip at the interviewees' workplace lasted three hours. About half of the interviewees went overboard in aiding my research by making themselves available for follow-up in-person meetings and phone calls. All interviews were conducted in confidentiality, and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. To further ensure confidentiality, interviews conducted with multiple individuals working at the same workplace are assigned one shared interview number.¹⁰

Online Ethnography

To double-check the information from interviewees, I also employed an online ethnographic approach. Extant works that utilize the online ethnographic approach follow online forums (Yang 2003; Han 2015). Instead, I opted for a more private setting that likely had a much higher concentration of insiders – small- to medium-sized and invitation-only WeChat groups.¹¹ Each of these WeChat groups comprised anywhere between 100 and 500 members, including local officials in charge of environmental work, university scholars, central officials and advisors, and industrial leaders. Each member must use their real name and work affiliation or risk removal from the group, so the probability of fake posts is very low. It arguably

⁹ I chose both inland and coastal provinces at different development levels to obtain a balanced slate of opinions. I did fieldwork in provinces where I had established contact with local officials and scholars who were willing to host me during the visits.

¹⁰ The coding of the interviews is based on the month of the interview, the year of the interview, the location of the interview, and the number of the interview in that location and in that month of that year, in that order. Follow-up interviews share the same interview number as the initial interview.

¹¹ WeChat is the most popular instant messaging app in China, with an estimated active user base of five hundred million.