

CONTENTS

Preface page xv
Acknowledgments xviii

1 Constitutionalism and Democracy 1
 An Institutional Problem of Structural Nature

 1.1 The Democratic Objection is Still There 5

 1.2 Of History and Ideas 8

 1.3 Three Clarifications 12

2 The Law As Conversation among Equals 16

 2.1 Immigrants in the “Promised Land” 16

 2.2 Six Basic Elements of a Conversation among
 Equals 21

 2.3 “Constitutional Moments” As Collective
 Conversation 25

 2.4 Autonomy, Self-Government, Rights, and Democracy
 in the Conversation of Equals 29

 2.5 Autonomy and Self-Government 29

 2.6 Rights and Democracy 30

3 “Democratic Dissonance” 32
 Elitism Translated into Institutions

 3.1 Three Great Jurists from the Age of Revolutions:
 Madison, Alberdi, and Bello 32

 3.2 Madison 33

 3.3 Alberdi 35

viii	CONTENTS
3.4	Bello 36
3.5	Elitist Discourse in an Exclusive Framework: Constitutions Conceived for Another Time 38
3.6	Political Sociology 39
3.7	Elitism Translated into Principles and Institutions 40
3.8	Assumptions, Principles, Institutions 41
3.9	What Has Stayed the Same and What Changed in Constitutional Terms: The “Fact of Democracy” 45
3.10	“Democratic Dissonance” and the Tight-Fitting Suit of Constitutionalism 48
4	A Constitution Marked by a “Discomfort with Democracy” 51
4.1	Madison and “Factions” 51
4.2	Direct Democracy 53
4.3	Motivations 54
4.4	Violations of Rights 54
4.5	Majorities and Minorities: The Construction of a Counter-Majoritarian Constitution 55
4.6	A Constitution Made to Protect Minorities 57
4.7	Exactly Which of the Minorities Warrant Protection? 59
4.8	So What to Do About Majority Factions? (Another) Counter-Majoritarian Response 61
5	Motivations and Institutions 66 “If Men Were Angels”
5.1	How Far Off Were the Radical Republicans? 69

CONTENTS

ix

5.2	Egoism As “Fuel” for and the “Endogenous Product” of the Institutional System	71
5.3	No System Is “Neutral”	75
5.4	The Economic Preconditions of Political Self-Government	77
6	The Structural Difficulties of Representation	82
6.1	The Bristol Debates	82
6.2	Do We Need to “Filter” the Citizen Voice?	87
6.3	The Problems of the Predominant Model: Isolation, “Capture,” Ignorance	90
6.4	From “Virtual” Representation to Representation As “Mirror”: Representation and “Presence”	91
6.5	The Structural Difficulty of Representation	94
7	The Rise and Fall of Popular Control	98
7.1	Citizens and Representatives	98
7.2	On Institutions Sensitive to Popular Will in Radical English Thought	100
7.3	Instructions, Rotation in Positions, Annual Elections: Different Forms of “Popular” Control	102
7.4	The Gradual Elimination of “Popular” Controls	104
8	The Periodic Vote, or “Electoral Extortion”	108
8.1	Regular Voting As the Only Bridge Standing between Citizens and Representatives	108
8.2	“Electoral Extortion”	109
8.3	Elections from the Representative’s Point of View: Voting and Interpreting the Vote	115
8.4	From the Agora to the Dark Booth: The Absence of Dialogue	118
8.5	“Paper Stones”	119

8.6	Irrational Voters or Dysfunctional System?	120
9	Checks and Balances	124
	Combining “Institutional Means and Personal Motives”	
9.1	The Key to Modern Constitutionalism: “Checks and Balances”	124
9.2	Institutionally Channeling “Civil War”	127
9.3	Erroneous Antidemocratic Logic	129
10	Presidentialism	136
	Busting the Checks and Balances	
10.1	Creating the Leviathan	139
10.2	A Poorly Designed Institutional System	140
10.3	The Problem with the Pact	141
10.4	An “Unbalanced” System of “Checks and Balances”: The “Alberdian Error”	143
10.5	The Political Left and Presidentialism	146
11	Rights	149
	Citizenship As Repository of Rights	
11.1	Natural and Self-Evident Rights: Rights As “Planets”	151
11.2	Bentham and the Idea of “Natural Rights” As “Nonsense upon Stilts”	155
11.3	Rights versus Democracy	158
11.4	Rights As “Trump Cards” against Majorities	160
11.5	Rights and the “Sphere of the Undecidable”	162
12	Social Rights and the “Engine Room”	166
12.1	The “Exorbitant” Mexican Constitution of 1917	166

CONTENTS

xi

- 12.2 The Mexican Constitution of 1917: A “Conservative Moment” in the Revolutionary Movement 167
- 12.3 The Animal Stirs: From the Fourteenth Amendment to “Social Authoritarianism” in Latin America 172
- 12.4 The “New Latin American Constitutionalism”: Constitutionalism That Was Already Old at Birth 176
- 12.5 Rights versus “Engine Room” 177
- 12.6 Rights As Bribes? Another Take on Rights versus Democracy 179
- 13 Judicial Review 183
 - “It Seems Something of an Insult”
 - 13.1 The “Democratic Objection” and Hamilton’s Defense of the Judiciary 183
 - 13.2 The Most Famous Court Case in History: *Marbury v. Madison* 187
 - 13.3 Judicial Review and Democracy: Failed Arguments 190
 - 13.4 The “Interpretative Gap” Argument 193
 - 13.5 Law Goes Global: International Courts 197
- 14 Constitutional Interpretation 202
 - When the “Interpretative Gap” Widens
 - 14.1 What Interpretation Is Not 204
 - 14.2 The Multiplicity of Interpretative Theories 205
 - 14.3 Look to the Past or Think in the Present? 210
 - 14.4 Looking to Past or Present for Often Opposite Results 213

14.5	Radicalizing the Critique of Constitutional Interpretation	216
14.6	Constitutional Interpretation in a Community of Equals (or “from How to Who?”)	223
15	Constitution Making	232
	Speaking with One Voice in Multicultural Societies	
15.1	Ulysses and the Constitution	232
15.2	Constitutions That Speak with One Voice in Multicultural Societies	234
15.3	A Plebiscite for Everything Aggravates the Problem: The “Hourglass”	240
15.4	Inclusive Constituent Assemblies	242
16	The Birth of Dialogical Constitutionalism	246
16.1	The <i>Grootboom</i> Case in South Africa	247
16.2	The “Notwithstanding Clause” in Canada	250
16.3	The Spaces for Dialogue Expand: “Public Hearings,” “Prior Consultation,” and “Meaningful Engagement”	252
16.4	The Potential of the Incipient Dialogical Constitutionalism	255
17	Why We Care About Dialogue	258
17.1	The Debate Over Abortion in Argentina	258
17.2	Why We Are Interested in Dialogue	260
17.3	What Kind of Dialogue Are We Talking About, When We Talk About Dialogue?	263
17.4	“Real-Life” Constitutional Dialogue	266
18	“Democratic Erosion”	270
18.1	An Autobiographical Note	270

CONTENTS

xiii

18.2	“Democratic Erosion”: A Previously Unidentified Species?	273
18.3	Too Slow a Death: From the Crisis of Rights to the Crisis of Democracy	275
18.4	Repairing a Ship at Sea: Restoring Democratic Controls	278
18.5	“The Final Stop”: Congress As the Best Democracy Can Do?	283
18.6	Between Mill’s “Best Judge” and Aristotle’s “Wise Crowd”	286
19	The New Deliberative Assemblies	290
19.1	The “Pots and Pans Revolution”	290
19.2	The Era of Assemblies: A Short Initial Balance Sheet	297
19.3	The Problem of “Capture”: When the Past Holds Back the Present, and the Old Will Not Let in the New	305
20	Conclusion	308
	For a Conversation among Equals	
20.1	The Different Pieces of “Institutional Decoupling”	311
20.2	What to Do?	315
20.3	Three Themes and Three Cases	318
20.4	Final Objections	321
20.5	So Then ...	325
	<i>Bibliography</i>	327
	<i>Index</i>	338