
Introduction

Social rights have become a central component of the modern constitution. The vast majority of constitutions globally contain at least one social (or economic) right.¹ And the general trend is towards more of these rights. In 2016, for instance, 51 constitutions had more social and economic rights than they did in 2000, whereas only four had less.² Where social rights are not expressly protected in constitutions (e.g., in older constitutional documents), it is commonplace for courts to read social rights into general constitutional provisions like the rights to life and human dignity.³

Despite this global pattern of greater protection of social rights constitutionally, the role of the courts in enforcing these rights against government actors remains unresolved. Jurists and politicians have long engaged in a conversation regarding the judicial enforcement of social rights. This conversation has come to pass in a series of waves.⁴ In its

¹ Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl and Evan Rosevear concluded in a 2014 study that 90 per cent of 195 constitutions then in force contained at least one 'economic and social right', with rights to education, health care and social security (the rights which, as I note later, I am including under the category of 'social rights') being especially prevalent: Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl and Evan Rosevear, 'Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions' (2014) 62 *American Journal of Comparative Law* 1043, 1053. See also Evan Rosevear, Ran Hirschl and Courtney Jung, 'Justiciable and Aspirational Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions' in Katharine G. Young (ed.), *The Future of Economic and Social Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 37–65.

² Rosevear et al., 'Justiciable and Aspirational', p. 46.

³ For example, see the social rights protected under the right to dignity in Israel's Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty: Aeyal Gross, 'The Right to Health in Israel between Solidarity and Neoliberalism' in Colleen M. Flood and Aeyal Gross (eds.), *The Right to Health at the Public/Private Divide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 165. See also relevant cases from the German Constitutional Court and the Indian Supreme Court: *Hartz IV*, 125 BVerfGE 172; *Olga Tellis and Others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation* [1985] 2 Supp SCR 51.

⁴ For this terminology of 'waves', see Richard Stacey, 'Dynamic Regulatory Constitutionalism: Taking Legislation Seriously in the Judicial Enforcement of Economic

‘first wave’, the conversation centred on justiciability – that is, whether social rights are enforceable by the courts. That wave reached its peak during the late 1980s to early 1990s when the new democracies of the ‘Global South’ and the former Soviet Union sought to decide whether to include express, and enforceable, social rights provisions in their constitutions. Now in its ‘second wave’, the conversation’s focus is different. Many new democracies, after intense debate, opted for the inclusion of express and enforceable social rights provisions in their constitutions.⁵ Consequently, most jurists and politicians, with the passage of time, have come to accept that social rights are indeed justiciable. And the conversation now centres on the question of how the courts should enforce social rights.

Given the prevalence of constitutionalised and justiciable social rights globally, this question demands an answer. And the urgency of answering it intensifies with the corresponding proliferation – or as some scholars have described it, the ‘explosion’ – of social rights litigation.⁶

In this book, I address the above question using a concept that has received much attention recently – in academic circles and the media. That concept is public trust in government or what I call ‘political trust’. In broad terms, this book examines social rights law from the perspective of political trust.⁷ It uses the concept as an analytical lens for this area of law, addressing, among other things, what it means to trust one’s government with respect to social rights, how trust functions in the context of social rights and what we can reasonably expect the impact of different modes of social rights adjudication to be on the public’s trust in government actors. My principal objective in this book, however, is more

and Social Rights’ (2017) 31 *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy* 85, 85–86.

⁵ Rosevear et al., ‘Justiciable and Aspirational’, p. 62. See also Adam Chilton and Mila Versteeg, *How Constitutional Rights Matter* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 172–173, 176.

⁶ Daniel M. Brinks and Varun Gauri, ‘The Law’s Majestic Equality? The Distributive Impact of Judicializing Social and Economic Rights’ (2014) 12 *Perspectives on Politics* 375, 376. See also Octávio Luiz Motta Ferraz, ‘The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health Inequities?’ (2009) 11 *Health and Human Rights* 33; Chilton and Versteeg, *How Constitutional Rights Matter*, p. 198. In 2009, for example, Malcolm Langford noted that ‘[i]f we were to speculate on the total number of decisions that have invoked constitutional and international [social] rights, a figure of at least one to two hundred thousand would be in order’: Malcolm Langford, ‘Domestic Adjudication and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Socio-Legal Review’ (2009) 6 *International Journal on Human Rights* 91, 91.

⁷ By ‘social rights law’, I mean the law pertaining to constitutional social rights, including their judicial enforcement.

precise: that objective is to advance a normative argument regarding the judicial enforcement of constitutional social rights. I propose that the courts, when they are enforcing these rights against government actors, should focus their analysis on political trust. They should aim, I suggest, to promote the trustworthiness of government actors – specifically vis-à-vis their provision of social goods and services to the public. And following on from this, I employ political trust as the basis for a new legal framework for judicially enforcing social rights.

1.1 Political Trust and Public Cooperation

As a starting point, we may ask: why political trust? That is, why should we examine social rights law from the perspective of political trust? And why should political trust provide the basis for a legal framework for judicially enforcing social rights? Owing to the complex and multi-layered nature of these two questions, answering them will be an ongoing process in the book. I will begin, however, by considering the relationship between political trust and public cooperation which provides, I submit, a central reason why political trust is of significance to social rights law.

Dating back at least 50 years, scholars across disciplines have stressed the importance of public trust in government to well-functioning democracies. They have theorised about the consequences of political trust, arguing that it is tied to such valuable ends as social stability, economic welfare and effective governance.⁸ This tie is explained as follows. When the public has greater trust in government, it is more likely to regard government actions as legitimate and to cooperate with them, tolerating the political regime and voluntarily complying with laws and government demands. Such cooperation is critical because it allows the state to focus

⁸ See Christina Boswell, *Manufacturing Political Trust: Targets and Performance Measurement in Public Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Russell J. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Pippa Norris, 'Conclusion: The Growth of Critical Citizens and Its Consequences' in Pippa Norris (ed.), *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 257–272; Bo Rothstein, *Just Institutions Matter* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). In addition to the instrumental value of political trust, it has also been argued that political trust is intrinsically valuable: see Matthew Harding, 'Trust and Fiduciary Law' (2013) 33 *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 81; Colleen Murphy, *A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

its limited resources for coercion on the relatively few disobedient.⁹ As Russell Dalton has said, ‘democracy functions with minimal coercive force because of the legitimacy of the system and the voluntary compliance of the public. Declining feelings of political trust and political support can undermine this relationship and therefore the workings of democracy’.¹⁰ As voluntary compliance with laws and government demands becomes the norm in a democracy, public cooperation translates into social stability.¹¹

The link between political trust and public cooperation finds significant support in empirical research. Tom Tyler, for instance, has consistently demonstrated that individuals’ trust in authority figures increases their cooperation with those figures. Based on data collected in a series of interviews, Tyler has convincingly shown that trust increases individuals’ willingness to accept authority decisions, their feelings of obligation to obey organisational rules and laws and their performance evaluations of those in positions of authority.¹² These findings have been replicated across a range of contexts and groups.¹³ Similarly, Dalton, using the 1995–98 World Values Survey, has shown a positive correlation between levels of political support (a concept closely tied to political trust) and people’s willingness to obey the law.¹⁴ Building on a categorisation developed by David Easton, Dalton divided political support into four categories: institutional support (support for the institutions of governance), authority support (support for those who control the institutions), support for democratic values, and community support (support for the nation or the political system in broad terms). Dalton found that all four categories correlate in a positive direction with willingness to obey the

⁹ Russell Hardin, ‘Trust in Government’ in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi (eds.), *Trust and Governance* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998), p. 10.

¹⁰ Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices*, p. 159. Some writers have described this benefit of trust as reduced ‘transaction costs’ for governments: Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices*, p. 159; Eva-Maria Trüdinger and Uwe Bollow, ‘Evaluations of Welfare State Reforms in Germany: Political Trust Makes a (Big) Difference’ in Sonja Zmerli and Marc Hooghe (eds.), *Political Trust: Why Context Matters* (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2011), p. 189.

¹¹ Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices*, p. 165.

¹² For a summary, see Tom R. Tyler and Peter Degoey, ‘Trust in Organizational Authorities: The Influence of Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions’ in Roderick M. Kramer and Tom R. Tyler (eds.), *Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996), p. 336.

¹³ Tom R. Tyler and Yuen J. Huo, *Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002).

¹⁴ Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices*, pp. 165–166.

law, with institutional and community support having the strongest correlation. Lastly, Sofie Marien and Marc Hooghe, in a study much like that of Dalton but using the European Values Survey 1999–2001, obtained similar findings to those of Dalton.¹⁵ They found that respondents with higher levels of political trust, specifically trust in political institutions, were significantly less likely to have permissive attitudes towards law-breaking (the inverse of the ‘willingness-to-obey-the-law’ measure that Dalton used in his study)¹⁶ than those with lower levels of political trust. Marien and Hooghe found that this relationship held even controlling for variables like the respondents’ age, gender, education level and religious practice.¹⁷

This link between political trust and public cooperation is significant for social rights law owing to two inter-related reasons. First, public cooperation manifests itself as public willingness to pay taxes – a source of revenue that is critical to financing the state’s fulfilment of social rights.¹⁸ Social rights reflect constitutional entitlements to social goods and services that one needs to lead a decent life, with the state having a corresponding obligation to provide the public with those goods and services.¹⁹ The state’s provision of these goods and services, however, depends on resources which the public itself provides. The public pays taxes to the state and, using the revenue collected from those taxes, the

¹⁵ Sofie Marien and Marc Hooghe, ‘Does Political Trust Matter? An Empirical Investigation into the Relation between Political Trust and Support for Compliance’ (2011) 50 *European Journal of Political Research* 267.

¹⁶ Dalton used the same type of survey items but used those items to create what he calls a ‘willingness-to-obey-the-law index’: Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices*, p. 166.

¹⁷ For further empirical support, see Martin Lindstrom, ‘Social Capital, Political Trust and Purchase of Illegal Liquor: A Population-Based Study in Southern Sweden’ (2008) 86 *Health Policy* 266; Norris, ‘Conclusion’.

¹⁸ Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., ‘How Do Trust and Confidence Affect the Governing of America?’ in Sue Llewellyn, Stephen Brookes and Ann Mahon (eds.), *Trust and Confidence in Government and Public Services* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 21; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘Introduction: The Decline of Confidence in Government’ in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow and David C. King (eds.), *Why People Do Not Trust Government* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 4; Bo Rothstein, Marcus Samanni and Jan Teorell, ‘Explaining the Welfare State: Power Resources vs. the Quality of Government’ (2012) 4 *European Political Science Review* 1, 10–11; Stefan Svallfors, ‘Introduction’ in Stefan Svallfors (ed.), *The Political Sociology of the Welfare State: Institutions, Social Cleavages and Orientations* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 1–29.

¹⁹ Cécile Fabre, *Social Rights under the Constitution: Government and the Decent Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 7; Jeff King, *Judging Social Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 17.

state administers social programmes. Public taxes are therefore a prerequisite to state-provided social goods and services. In the words of Eric Uslaner, '[t]axes are the economic glue of social programs, the source of government's ability to transfer resources – and, indeed, to function at all'.²⁰ And for this reason, it has been argued that the 'future of the welfare state is likely to hinge on the ability for nation states to levy taxes ... on their populations'.²¹

Given the above-described link between political trust and public cooperation, writers have argued that the public's willingness to pay taxes, as a form of public cooperation, depends on the public's trust in government.²² The public, it has been suggested, is less likely to pay taxes if it does not trust its government. This jeopardises the state's ability to provide the public with social goods and services. At the same time, the public's unwillingness to pay taxes, it has also been suggested, can generate a vicious, self-perpetuating circle: if the state cannot provide social goods and services to the public owing to the public's unwillingness to pay taxes, this will lead the public to become even less trusting of its government – and thus, even less willing to pay taxes.²³ And '[s]uch a cumulative downward spiral', as Joseph S. Nye, Jr. has claimed, tying the concept of political trust to social stability, 'could [ultimately] erode support for democracy as a form of governance'.²⁴

The relationship between political trust and public willingness to pay taxes (or public tax compliance) similarly finds support in empirical research. John Scholz and Mark Lubell, for instance, have shown a positive relationship between political trust and public tax compliance using a US Internal Revenue Service survey which asked a sample of taxpayers in New York about tax compliance and civic values.²⁵ In an

²⁰ Eric M. Uslaner, 'Tax Evasion, Trust, and the Strong Arm of the Law' in Nicolas Hayoz and Simon Hug (eds.), *Tax Evasion, Trust and State Capacities* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007), p. 19.

²¹ Nathalie Morel and Joakim Palme, 'Financing the Welfare State and the Politics of Taxation' in Brent Greve (ed.), *The Routledge Handbook of the Welfare State* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 407.

²² Norris, 'Conclusion', p. 264.

²³ Nye, Jr., 'Introduction', p. 4; Eric M. Uslaner, 'Corruption, the Inequality Trap and Trust in Government' in Zmerli and Hooghe, *Political Trust*, pp. 141–142.

²⁴ Nye, Jr., 'Introduction', p. 4.

²⁵ John T. Scholz and Mark Lubell, 'Trust and Taxpaying: Testing the Heuristic Approach to Collective Action' (1998) 42 *American Journal of Political Science* 398. See also John T. Scholz, 'Trust, Taxes, and Compliance' in Braithwaite and Levi, *Trust and Governance*; John T. Scholz and Neil Pinney, 'Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of

analysis of that survey data combined with in-person interviews, Scholz and Lubell found that trust in government significantly increased the likelihood of respondents' tax compliance. This relationship persisted even after they controlled for the influence of self-interested fear of getting caught and an internalised sense of duty to pay taxes. Based on their results, Scholz and Lubell concluded that 'trust in government . . . significantly influence[s] tax compliance'.²⁶ Additionally, Steven Sheffrin and Robert Triest, in a study analysing the same survey data as Scholz and Lubell, found that respondents' attitudes towards government, including a belief that tax money is wasted by government, was the best predictor of underreporting income and overstating deductions.²⁷ Such attitudes were even a better predictor than the probability of detection and whether fellow members of the public paid their fair share.²⁸

Secondly, in addition to public willingness to pay taxes, public cooperation manifests itself as overall public support for governmental social policies. Accordingly, writers have argued that the public's support for its government's social policies likewise depends on its trust in government: if the public does not trust its government, it will not support the policies that its government develops and implements, including social policies that fulfil social rights.²⁹ It has been suggested that trust functions as a cognitive heuristic that the public relies on when forming opinions about

Citizenship Behavior' (1995) 39 *American Journal of Political Science* 490. While tax compliance was self-reported in the study and thus not directly measured (a point which Scholz and Lubell acknowledge (402)), as Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices*, p. 169 and Uslaner, 'Tax Evasion, Trust', p. 22, emphasise, it is difficult to objectively measure compliance with government regulations.

²⁶ Scholz and Lubell, 'Trust and Taxpaying', 412.

²⁷ Steven M. Sheffrin and Robert K. Triest, 'Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance' in Joel Slemrod (ed.), *Why People Pay Taxes* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), pp. 193–222.

²⁸ For further empirical support, see Ho Fai Chan, Mohammed Wangsit Supriyadi and Benno Torgler, 'Trust and Tax Morale' in Eric M. Uslaner (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 497–534; Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices*; Christoph Kogler et al., 'Perceptions of Trust and Power Are Associated with Tax Compliance: A Cross-cultural Study' (2023) 11 *Economic and Political Studies* 365; Margaret Levi and Audrey Sacks, 'Legitimizing Beliefs: Sources and Indicators' (2009) 3 *Regulation & Governance* 311; Kristina Murphy, 'The Role of Trust in Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax Avoiders' (2004) 28 *Law and Human Behavior* 187.

²⁹ See Jonas Edlund, 'Trust in the Capability of the Welfare State and General Welfare State Support: Sweden 1997–2002' (2006) 49 *Acta Sociologica* 395.

social policies.³⁰ Faced with the complex institutional arrangements of the welfare state and the uncertain consequences of social policies, the public turns to trust: '[o]ther things equal, if people perceive the architect of policies as untrustworthy, they will reject its policies; if they consider it trustworthy, they will be more inclined to embrace them'.³¹ And if the public does not support governmental policies, those policies are not likely to succeed. In particular, political trust is necessary to grant governments the flexibility they need to effectively carry out their policies. The more the public trusts its government, the more likely the public will grant what Margaret Levi has termed 'contingent consent'.³² That is, the public is more likely to support a governmental policy, or at least to tolerate that policy, even if the likely outcome of that policy is perceived to be personally unfavourable to the individual.³³ For example, a public who trusts its government is more likely to agree to a tax increase in support of a policy or to a proposed reform of that policy. For this reason, it is said that aside from its relevance as an influence on the public's provision of critical resources in the form of tax money, political trust is furthermore, as a heuristic linked to public support for social policies, in and of itself 'a critical resource for government'.³⁴

The above-noted claim that political trust can impact the public's support for its government's social policies is likewise backed by empirics. Virginia Chanley and colleagues have offered convincing evidence here.³⁵ Using US survey data specifically, their study examined the relationship between public trust in government and what they refer to as 'policy mood' (a measure reflecting 'the extent of public support for increased government spending and activity across a range of domestic

³⁰ Marc J. Hetherington, *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Thomas J. Rudolph, 'Political Trust, Ideology, and Public Support for Tax Cuts' (2009) 73 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 144, 144–145; Trüdinger and Bollow, 'Evaluations of Welfare State', p. 191. For a summary, see Thomas J. Rudolph, 'Political Trust as a Heuristic' in Sonja Zmerli and Tom van der Meer (eds.), *Handbook on Political Trust* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017), pp. 197–211.

³¹ Hetherington, *Why Trust Matters*, p. 51.

³² Margaret Levi, *Consent, Dissent and Patriotism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

³³ Oscar W. Gabriel and Eva-Maria Trüdinger, 'Embellishing Welfare State Reforms? Political Trust and the Support for Welfare State Reforms in Germany' (2011) 20 *German Politics* 273, 275.

³⁴ Trüdinger and Bollow, 'Evaluations of Welfare State', p. 189.

³⁵ Virginia A. Chanley, Thomas J. Rudolph and Wendy M. Rahn, 'The Origins and Consequences of Public Trust in Government' (2000) 64 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 239.

policy areas, including education, health care, welfare, aid to cities, and the environment’).³⁶ They found a positive correlation: greater trust in government correlated with greater policy mood. Chanley and colleagues have concluded that their findings are ‘consistent with theoretical expectations concerning the importance of trust in government for public willingness to commit public resources for policy ends’.³⁷ A study conducted by Stefan Svallfors using Swedish survey data yielded similar findings to those of Chanley and colleagues.³⁸ In fact, contrary to what one may expect, Sven Steinmo has persuasively argued that the difference in the size of the welfare state in Sweden as compared with that of the United States is attributable to a difference in political trust, rather than a difference in citizen want for government spending.³⁹ In interviews he conducted with citizens of Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, Steinmo found that the vast majority – including Americans – said they would agree to an increase in their taxes if they ‘could be guaranteed that increased government spending would be efficiently and effectively used to address society’s problems’.⁴⁰ He found, however, that American respondents were especially likely to follow up their responses saying that they did ‘not believe that revenue from higher taxes would be used efficiently or effectively and therefore they would not approve tax increases’.⁴¹ In parallel, Eva-Maria Trüdinger and Uwe Bollow have demonstrated a positive relationship between political trust and support for welfare state reforms.⁴² In their interviews with over 1,800 Germans, respondents were asked to report the level of trust they had in various political institutions or actors, and to evaluate the

³⁶ Ibid, p. 245.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 253.

³⁸ Stefan Svallfors, ‘Political Trust and Support for the Welfare State: Unpacking a Supposed Relationship’ in Bo Rothstein and Sven Steinmo (eds.), *Restructuring the Welfare State: Political Institutions and Policy Change* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), pp. 184–205.

³⁹ Sven Steinmo, *Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993). See also Sven H. Steinmo, ‘American Exceptionalism Reconsidered: Culture or Institutions?’ in Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson (eds.), *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 106–131. For a more recent, but relevant, consideration of this area, see Sven H. Steinmo (ed.), *The Leap of Faith: The Fiscal Foundations of Successful Government in Europe and America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

⁴⁰ Steinmo, *Taxation and Democracy*, p. 199.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 199.

⁴² Trüdinger and Bollow, ‘Evaluations of Welfare State’.

direction of recent reforms on health care, pension and family policy. Trüdinger and Bollow ‘found significant effects of political trust’: the more respondents trusted government, the more likely they were to agree with the reforms.⁴³

The public tax compliance and social policy support that follow from political trust are especially important today given present circumstances that make the public funding and delivery of social goods and services ever-more challenging. In 2001, Paul Pierson wrote that the welfare state in affluent democracies faces a context of ‘permanent austerity’.⁴⁴ By this he meant that owing to a set of circumstances that have generated much fiscal stress for countries – including changes in the global economy, a slowdown in economic growth, aging populations and reduced fertility rates – it is increasingly difficult for governments to finance previously made commitments to social goods and services. Contrary to then-popular beliefs, Pierson prophesied that given persistent public support for the welfare state, the result of these pressures would not be the welfare state’s dismantling, but, rather, moderate cost-cutting efforts by governments. For him, ‘neither the alternatives of standing pat or dismantling are likely to prove viable in most countries’; instead, ‘we should expect strong pressures to move towards more centrist – and therefore more incremental – responses’ with ‘[t]hose seeking to generate significant cost reductions while modernizing particular aspects of social provision ... [holding] the balance of political power’.⁴⁵

Over the past 20 years, we have witnessed the sort of cost-cutting efforts that Pierson prophesied – in both affluent and developing democracies alike.⁴⁶ In fact, owing to the 2008 global financial and economic crisis, the COVID-19 public health crisis and the follow-on cost-of-living

⁴³ Ibid. For further empirical support, see Eun Young Nam and Myungsook Woo, ‘Who Is Willing to Pay More Taxes for Welfare? Focusing on the Effects of Diverse Types of Trust in South Korea and Taiwan’ (2015) 44 *Development and Society* 319. For a relatively recent summary, see Jack Citrin and Laura Stoker, ‘Political Trust in a Cynical Age’ (2018) 21 *Annual Review of Political Science* 49, 61–62.

⁴⁴ Paul Pierson, ‘Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies’ in Paul Pierson (ed.), *The New Politics of the Welfare State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 417.

⁴⁶ James Connelly, ‘Conclusion: Remaining the Welfare State?’ in James Connelly and Jack Hayward (eds.), *The Withering of the Welfare State: Regression* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 208–216; Staffan Kumlin, ‘Overloaded or Undermined? European Welfare States in the Face of Performance Dissatisfaction’ in Svallfors, *The Political Sociology of the Welfare State*, pp. 80–116.