> Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language at 40

Saul Kripke's *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* is one of the most celebrated and important books in philosophy of language and mind of the past forty years. It generated an avalanche of responses from the moment it was published and has revolutionized the way in which we think about meaning, intentionality, and the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It introduced a series of questions that had never been raised before concerning, most prominently, the normativity of meaning and the prospects for a reductionist account of meaning. This volume of new essays reassesses the continuing influence of Kripke's book and demonstrates that many of the issues first raised by Kripke, both exegetical and philosophical, remain as thought-provoking and as relevant as they were when he first introduced them.

Claudine Verheggen is Professor of Philosophy at York University, Toronto. She is the coauthor (with Robert Myers) of *Donald Davidson's Triangulation Argument: A Philosophical Inquiry* (2016) and the editor of *Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action* (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

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Edited by Claudine Verheggen York University, Toronto





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In memory of Barry Stroud

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