

Cambridge Elements

Elements in Epistemology
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DEFINING KNOWLEDGE

Method and Metaphysics

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Defining Knowledge

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Elements in Epistemology

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Abstract: Post-Gettier epistemology is increasingly modalised epistemology – proposing and debating modally explicable conditionals with suitably epistemic content (an approach initially inspired by Robert Nozick’s 1981 account of knowledge), as needing to be added to ‘true belief’ in order to define or understand knowing’s nature. This Element asks whether such modalised attempts – construed as responding to what the author calls Knowing’s Further Features question (bequeathed to us by the *Meno* and the *Theaetetus*) – can succeed. The answer is that they cannot. Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on definition reinforce that result. Still, in appreciating this, we might gain insight into knowing’s essence. We might find that knowledge is, essentially, nothing more than true belief.

Keywords: Nozick on knowledge, Aristotle on definition, Socrates on knowledge, knowledge as true belief, defining knowledge

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