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THE EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PARADOX

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Abstract: By pooling together exhaustive analyses of certain philosophical paradoxes, we can prove a series of fascinating results regarding philosophical progress, agreement on substantive philosophical claims, knockdown arguments in philosophy, the wisdom of philosophical belief (quite rare, because the knockdown arguments show that we philosophers have been wildly wrong about language, logic, truth, or ordinary empirical matters), the epistemic status of metaphysics, and the power of philosophy to refute common sense. As examples, the author examines the Sorites paradox, the Liar paradox, and the Problem of the Many – although many other paradoxes can do the trick too.

Keywords: paradox, metaphysics, wisdom, philosophical progress, common sense

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Contents

1	Introduction	1
2	Our Six Topics	4
3	How to Analyze a Philosophical Problem: The Sorites	6
4	Each Disjunct Is Philosophically Counterintuitive	8
5	A Doxastically Distressing Disjunction: The Sorites	19
6	How Semantic Complexity Does and Does Not Matter	22
7	A Doxastically Distressing Disjunction: The Liar	28
8	A Doxastically Distressing Disjunction: The Problem of the Many	33
9	Knockdown Arguments and Philosophical Agreement	39
10	Metaphysical Bullshit	47
11	Philosophical Progress and Philosophical Refutations of Common Sense	50
12	The Philosophical Significance of Philosophical Counterintuitiveness	53
13	The Three Doxastic Responses to the Doxastically Distressing Disjunctions	57
14	The Inconsistency Response	60
15	The Confident Response	61
16	The Cautious Response	65
	References	69