

Introduction

Is there any way of delivering mankind from the menace of war?

Albert Einstein (1932)¹

In the spring of 1915, the American educator Fannie Fern Andrews embarked on a trip to The Hague to attend a meeting of international scholars and political activists to draft a programme for peace. The meeting, although “almost within hearing distance of the guns in Belgium”, was attended by thirty delegates, both men and women, from ten belligerent and neutral countries.² Among the participants were well-known figures, such as Norwegian internationalist Christian Lous Lange, British feminist Chrystal Macmillan, and German pacifist lawyer Walther Schücking. Over the course of three days, they hammered out a set of policies which they called the ‘minimum-programme’ – envisioning a liberal international order on the basis of inter-governmental institutions, free trade, and self-determination.³

The group became known as the Central Organisation for a Durable Peace (CODP) and soon counted hundreds of members from more than two dozen countries.⁴ Andrews was elected their corresponding secretary. Her job was to edit a series of studies, a “scientific basis for the principles of the minimum programme”, written by an

¹ Albert Einstein to Sigmund Freud, 30 July 1932, in International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (ed.), *Why War?* (Paris, 1932).

² Fannie Fern Andrews, *Memory Pages of My Life* (Boston, 1948), p. 112.

³ Manifesto, Central Organisation for a Durable Peace April 1915, CODP Collected Records, Box 1.

⁴ Among the CODP members were professors, such as British political scientist Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson and Swiss jurist André Mercier, politicians, such as former Dutch prime minister Theo Heemskerk and German social democrat Eduard Bernstein, and a range of internationalist authors and activists, including Jane Addams, Albert Einstein, Henri La Fontaine, and Elisabeth Rotten. Liste des Membres, 7–10 April 1915, CODP Collected Records, Box 1.

international group of academics and policy experts.⁵ Within little more than a year, members of the CODP were working on thirty-five research projects on subjects such as disarmament, secret treaties, colonial reform, free trade, and the democratic control of foreign policy.⁶ Andrews herself wrote a study on the freedom of the seas which was subsequently published as a book.⁷ These publications rapidly formed a body of literature distinct from law, history, and economics. By 1919, Andrews had prepared a “course in foreign relations”, one of the first introductions to the new field.⁸

Andrews did not, of course, single-handedly create International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline. Yet her case reflects a number of important characteristics of this history. Educated at Radcliffe and Harvard, she became a school reformer and a leading advocate of international education in the years leading up to the First World War.⁹ She travelled widely and built an extensive network of scholars, politicians, and philanthropists. Her publications included teaching guides for schools as well as articles in government bulletins. During the 1919 Peace Conference, she was part of Woodrow Wilson’s delegation to Paris as one of only a few women.¹⁰ In 1923, her fieldwork on the League of Nations mandate system earned her a doctorate from Harvard. A few years later, she published an acclaimed book called *The Holy Land under Mandate* (1931).¹¹ Meanwhile, she lobbied for an international education bureau, essentially an early version of UNESCO, which became a lifelong occupation. In short, her goal was peace by education.

⁵ ‘Liste Provisoire Des Rapporteurs Du Congres International D’études A Berne’, 14–18 December 1915, Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, Box 112; CODP to Arthur Watts, 30 September 1915, CODP Collected Records, Box 1.

⁶ Fannie Fern Andrews, ‘The Central Organisation for a Durable Peace’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 66 (1916), p. 20.

⁷ Fannie Fern Andrews, *The Freedom of the Seas: The Immunity of Private Property at Sea in Time of War* (The Hague, 1917).

⁸ Fannie Fern Andrews, *A Course in Foreign Relations: Prepared for the Army Educational Committee* (Paris, 1919).

⁹ Valeska Huber, Tamson Pietsch, and Katharina Rietzler, ‘Women’s International Thought and the New Professions, 1900–1940’, *Modern Intellectual History* 18:1 (2021), pp. 121–45.

¹⁰ ‘Activities of Members’, *Leadership in a Democracy: Journal of the National Institute of the Social Sciences* 6 (1920), pp. 112–13.

¹¹ Fannie Fern Andrews, *The Holy Land under Mandate*, 2 vols. (New York, 1931). See Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, Box 163, Volume 56.

This dual motive, in education and in politics, became a key factor in the formation of IR during the first half of the twentieth century. The founders of the discipline took on a range of non-academic jobs alongside their role as teachers and researchers. They advised governments, drafted treaties, ran for parliament, managed international organisations, and campaigned outside official political institutions as pacifists and feminists. Andrews assisted the US government in preparing the peace terms at the end of the First World War.¹² Alfred Zimmern, one of the first professors of IR, was voted “the ideal Prime Minister” by a British magazine in 1921.¹³ The founder of Germany’s first IR research institute, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, represented his government at the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Hague and at the League of Nations Assembly in Geneva.¹⁴ The French jurist René Cassin tried to “instruct the governments” in pursuit of a just world order.¹⁵ By assuming the job and the rhetoric of statesmen, IR scholars blurred the boundaries between academia and diplomacy. On the one hand, they were committed to the “disinterested pursuit of objective truth”, while, on the other hand, mingling with politicians or running for office themselves.¹⁶ They were “scholarly partisans”, as Andrews put it.¹⁷

To understand the formation of IR as an academic discipline, this book traces a range of international actors – professors, politicians, diplomats, journalists, activists, and philanthropists – who promoted the study of war and peace within the context of a dramatically changing international order. They were the architects of IR, both as founders of academic institutions and as designers of new foreign policy instruments. Their history began immediately after the outbreak of the First World War when experts such as Andrews started to write and to teach on international affairs. By the end of the war, the

¹² Colonel House to Fannie Fern Andrews, 17 January 1918, and response, 23 January 1918, Fannie Fern Andrews Papers, Box 113.

¹³ Newspaper clipping, *The London Magazine*, reprinted in *The Times*, 19 February 1921, Alfred Zimmern Papers, Box 179.

¹⁴ Rainer Nicolaysen, ‘Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy (1874–1936): Jurist – Friedensforscher – Künstler’, *Rabels Zeitschrift* 75 (2011), p. 24.

¹⁵ Jean-Michel Guieu, *Le rameau et le glaive: Les militants français pour la Société des Nations* (Paris, 2008), p. 16.

¹⁶ International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC), *The State and Economic Life* (Paris, 1934), p. xiii.

¹⁷ Andrews, *The Holy Land under Mandate*, p. vi.

pioneers of IR had sketched out most of the topics that would shape interwar IR scholarship. But it was from 1919 that the discipline took shape in an institutional form, both at universities and at non-academic venues. Supported by government and private funds from across Europe and the United States, these institutions provided a transnational platform for teaching, research, and policy work. By the end of the 1920s, IR scholars had established university degrees, academic journals, and conferences. At the same time, they tried to influence foreign policy by drafting and circulating documents that fed into international treaties. As quasi-diplomats, they continued to comment on and interact with major political events during the 1930s, and shaped the debates about ‘collective security’ and ‘peaceful change’. Eventually, their project was undermined by the spread of violent nationalism and aggressive foreign policy during the second half of the 1930s, as well as by the repression of liberal scholarship. The first era of IR came to an end in June 1940 when German troops seized Paris, one of the centres of the IR community, and forced any remaining scholars into exile.

Did the architects of IR fail? Or, put more generally, was an academic discipline able to solve the problem of war? Andrews and her colleagues were convinced that their work improved international understanding and, as a result, led to peace. They believed that international affairs could (and should) be subject to scientific examination and to public discourse. In this respect, their approach broke with nineteenth-century ‘old diplomacy’ which limited foreign policy to a small, male elite. Their hopes to open up the domain of international affairs coincided with a more general spread of democracy in the wake of the First World War. Some therefore saw IR as a “child of democracy”.¹⁸ If international affairs were put in the hands of the people, so they argued, education and public debate would be essential. In Alfred Zimmern’s words, the idea was to apply the “scientific method . . . to the art of government”.¹⁹ Evidently, the first half of the twentieth century was not the most hospitable environment for this exercise, as

¹⁸ “[*ein Kind der Demokratie*]”, Hans Simons and Paul Marc, ‘Vorwort’, in Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy (ed.), *Diplomatie* (Berlin, 1927), p. v.

¹⁹ Alfred Zimmern, *Learning and Leadership: A Study of the Needs and Possibilities of International Intellectual Cooperation* (Oxford, 1928), p. 62.

historians have amply shown.²⁰ Whether it was *a priori* doomed, however, is a different question.

What, then, inspired the development of IR as an academic discipline? And how do its origins inform current debates in the field? The short, and perhaps obvious, answer is that the subject has always been underpinned by political opinion, and thus clashed with the standards of scientific objectivity. The longer answer emerges by examining the archival record of historical actors – their correspondence, lecture notes, diaries, memoranda, government reports, budget tables, university syllabi, conference proceedings, propaganda leaflets, speeches, and newspaper articles. The primary sources considered in this book provide a new perspective on the underlying motivations and the intellectual programme of the emerging discipline. They offer raw, unfiltered insights into the minds of IR scholars that defy sweeping generalisations. They also demonstrate the personal and financial effort that went into this experiment and, ultimately, indicate reasons for its failures. Most importantly, these documents reflect a sense of the intellectual struggle and the political uncertainty that shaped the inter-war period. Perhaps they raise more questions than they can answer, but one conclusion seems clear enough: The architects of IR did not only interpret the world at an academic level, they wanted to change it in practice.

Writing the History of a Discipline

There is a simple story about the origins of IR as an academic discipline. In the aftermath of the First World War, so that story goes, a group of so-called ‘idealist’ thinkers founded a number of professorships and research centres in Britain and the United States. Among the most famous were the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics

²⁰ Patrick O. Cohrs, *The Unfinished Peace after World War I: America, Britain and the Stabilisation of Europe, 1919–1932* (Cambridge, 2006); Robert Gerwarth (ed.), *Twisted Paths: Europe 1914–1945* (Oxford, 2007); Sally Marks, *The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918–1933*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke, 2003); Richard Overy, *The Origins of the Second World War*, 4th ed. (London, 2014); Adam Tooze, *The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of Global Order* (New York, 2014); Zara Steiner, *The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919–1933* (Oxford, 2005); and Zara Steiner, *The Triumph of the Dark: European International History, 1933–1939* (Oxford, 2011).

at Aberystwyth, Wales, the British (later Royal) Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House, London, and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Their idea was to underpin the newly established League of Nations with an intellectual programme based on international law and cooperation. The ‘idealists’ believed that morality came before power and that the League of Nations would preserve peace. When the project of peaceful cooperation failed in the 1930s, a generation of self-described ‘realist’ scholars argued that the founders of IR had erred, and that the global order was actually shaped by military power and national self-interest. This story, popularised by E. H. Carr and other ‘realists’, has continued to dominate disciplinary memory for most of the twentieth century and it is still standard textbook material today.²¹

The alleged dichotomy between two schools of thought – often called the ‘first great debate’²² – had a profound impact on the field. It allowed post-war scholars to denounce (or forget) an entire generation of their predecessors, the “metaphysicians of Geneva”, as Carr called them.²³ By simplifying previous scholarship, the ‘realists’ downplayed the diversity of interwar IR, its intellectual nuances, and its range of actors, including women and authors outside the anglophone world. The Second World War apparently disqualified anyone associated with interwar centres for IR research. Authors such as Ernst Jäckh, Philip Noel-Baker, and William Rappard disappeared from the scene. This coincided with a continental shift from Europe to the United States. By the 1950s, IR theory was firmly in the hands of US-based scholars, such as John H. Herz, George F. Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr. They re-invented their field in opposition to what they perceived as a utopian mix of science and democracy.²⁴ That perception was not entirely flawed but was simplified enough to reject a whole group of scholars.

²¹ Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, 6th ed. (Oxford, 2016); Milja Kurki and Colin Wight, ‘International Relations and Social Science’, in Tim Dunne et al. (eds.), *International Relations Theories*, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 2013), pp. 14–35.

²² Rainer Baumann et al. (eds.), *International Relations: The Great Debates* (Cheltenham, 2011), esp. Vol. 1. For a critical evaluation, see Brian C. Schmidt, *International Relations and the First Great Debate* (London, 2012).

²³ E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939* (London, 1939), p. 30.

²⁴ Nicolas Guilhot, *After the Enlightenment: Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 2017), pp. 12–14.

With few exceptions, subsequent generations of IR scholars reiterated this story.²⁵ If concerned with disciplinary history at all, they briskly discarded earlier works as “blind and sentimental”.²⁶ This turned into a habit of renunciation, allowing young theoreticians to conveniently sideline their old rivals. As new theoretical trends gained attention over the following decades, the discipline came to be divided into schools of thought – liberalism, realism, constructivism, Marxism, functionalism, and their various offshoots. By the end of the Cold War, the image of IR as a succession of theories or ‘great debates’ had been deeply engrained in disciplinary identity. What is more, this self-image suggested that IR was an Anglo-American enterprise pioneered by white men.²⁷ Textbooks have continued to spread clichés about the early study of IR, especially that it was dominated by ‘utopian liberalism’, and that the essential ideas were formulated by Anglo-American men, notably by Woodrow Wilson himself.²⁸ They have also ignored

²⁵ See, for example, Frederick S. Dunn, ‘The Scope of International Relations’, *World Politics* 1:1 (1948), pp. 142–6; John H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, *World Politics* 2:2 (1950), pp. 157–80; Ernst B. Haas, ‘Types of Collective Security: An Analysis of Operational Concepts’, *American Political Science Review* 49:1 (1955), pp. 40–62; P. A. Reynolds, *An Introduction to International Relations* (New York, 1971), pp. 4–5; Hedley Bull, ‘The Theory of International Politics, 1919–1969’, in Brian Porter (ed.), *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919–1969* (Oxford, 1972), p. 31; Alan Sked, ‘The Study of International Relations: A Historian’s View’, *Millennium* 16:2 (1987), pp. 251–62. For an exception, see Kenneth W. Thompson, ‘Idealism and Realism: Beyond the Great Debate’, *British Journal of International Studies* 3 (1977), pp. 199–209.

²⁶ Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, p. 159.

²⁷ Stanley Hoffmann, ‘An American Social Science: International Relations’, *Daedalus* 106:3 (1977), pp. 41–60; Ekkehart Krippendorff, ‘The Dominance of American Approaches in International Relations’, *Millennium* 16:2 (1987), pp. 207–14; Christopher Hill, ‘The Study of International Relations in the United Kingdom’, *Millennium* 16:2 (1987), pp. 301–8; Hugh C. Dyer and Leon Mangasarian (eds.), *The Study of International Relations: The State of the Art* (London, 1989); Helen Louise Turton, *International Relations and American Dominance: A Diverse Discipline* (Abingdon, 2017); Ole Wæver, ‘The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations’, *International Organization* 52:4 (1998), pp. 687–727.

²⁸ Jackson and Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, pp. 32–4; Kurki and Wight, ‘International Relations and Social Science’, pp. 16–17. For a critique, see Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson, ‘The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919’, *Millennium* 39:3 (2011), pp. 735–58.

the origins of IR before 1919 by claiming that the field came about “after the end of the First World War” or even later.²⁹

It was not until the second half of the 1980s that IR scholars began to reconsider the history of their field.³⁰ The revisionist turn was inspired by a feeling that the ‘realists’ had constructed a disciplinary identity that suited their own approach, especially in the context of Cold War power politics, and that they had wrongly portrayed inter-war scholars as naïve believers in the League of Nations. By re-reading the original publications, the revisionists argued that Carr had grossly overstated the alleged dichotomy between ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’.³¹ Did the ‘first great debate’ really happen? Did IR evolve in the form of waves or ‘great debates’? By raising these questions, revisionists such as Lucian M. Ashworth have shaken up the basis of their own discipline.³²

²⁹ William A. Callahan, ‘International Relations: An Introduction’, *YouTube Channel of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)*, (20 October 2014) [accessed 21 March 2017]. See also Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘A Historiographer’s View: Rewriting the History of International Thought’, in Andreas Gofas et al. (eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of International Relations* (London, 2018), p. 531; Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, and John Baylis, ‘Introduction’, in Smith et al. (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics*, 6th ed. (Oxford, 2014), p. 3; Peter Wilson, ‘The Myth of the “First Great Debate”’, *Review of International Studies* 24:5 (1998), p. 8.

³⁰ William C. Olson and A. J. R. Groom, *International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation* (London, 1991); Steve Smith, ‘The Forty Years’ Detour: The Resurgence of Normative Theory in International Relations’, *Millennium* 21:3 (1992), pp. 489–506; David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years “Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed* (Oxford, 1995); Brian C. Schmidt, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations* (New York, 1998); Lucian M. Ashworth, *A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International Relations* (New York, 2014); Andreas Gofas, Inanna Hamati-Ataya, and Nicholas Onuf (eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of International Relations* (London, 2018).

³¹ Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Where Are the Idealists in Inter-war IR?’, *Review of International Studies* 32:2 (2006), pp. 291–308.

³² Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? A Revisionist History of International Relations’, *International Relations* 16:1 (2002), pp. 33–51; Aysen Dilek Lekon, *The Interplay of Realism and Idealism in the Thought of Lionel Curtis: A Critique of the Conception of the “First Debate” in International Relations*, PhD thesis (LSE, London, 2003); Wilson, ‘The Myth of the “First Great Debate”’, pp. 1–16; Roger Coate and Craig Murphy, ‘A Critical Science of Global Relations’, *International Interactions* 12:2 (1985), p. 111; Steve Smith, ‘Paradigm Dominance in International

Recent literature has paid ever more attention to disciplinary history, resulting in a range of alternative accounts. David Long and Brian C. Schmidt have argued that the “dual themes of imperialism and internationalism” shaped the beginnings of the discipline during the early twentieth century.³³ Robert Vitalis has provided a similar argument about the origins of IR in the United States in the form of ‘imperial relations’ and ‘race development’.³⁴ It is true, as archival records show, that university courses on the “relation of race ... to social, political and economic conditions” were not uncommon during the 1910s and 1920s.³⁵ But there was more to it. To reflect the disciplinary diversity Cameron G. Thies has proposed to organise IR history in terms of a “multiplicity of discourses” running alongside each other.³⁶ Andreas Osiander has claimed that the alleged ‘idealist–realist’ divide was actually a disagreement about the philosophy of history and the notion of “directional historical process”.³⁷ Peter Wilson has shown that, given the diversity within the respective schools, there were also internal ‘utopian–utopian’ and ‘realist–realist’ debates.³⁸ Most recently, Jo-Anne Pemberton has presented a

Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science’, *Millennium* 16:2 (1987), pp. 189–206.

³³ David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Introduction’, in Long and Schmidt (eds.), *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations* (New York, 2005), p. 1. Imperialism and the reform of empire had an influence on IR via the *Round Table* movement and its leading figures Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr. See Alexander C. May, *The Round Table 1910–66*, DPhil thesis (Oxford, 1995).

³⁴ Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, 2015); Robert Vitalis, ‘The Noble American Science of Imperial Relations and Its Laws of Race Development’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 52:4 (2010), 909–38. See also John M. Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010* (Cambridge, 2012); Mark Mazower, ‘An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the Mid-twentieth Century’, *International Affairs* 82:3 (2006), pp. 553–66; Vineet Thakur and Peter Vale, *South Africa, Race and the Making of International Relations* (London, 2020).

³⁵ W. G. Wilson (Harvard and Radcliffe: Bureau of International Research) to David J. Thompson, 7 June 1926, James T. Shotwell Papers, Box 136 (a), (b).

³⁶ Cameron G. Thies, ‘Progress, History and Identity in International Relations Theory: The Case of the Idealist-Realist Debate’, *European Journal of International Relations* 8:2 (2002), p. 147.

³⁷ Andreas Osiander, ‘Rereading Early Twentieth-Century IR Theory: Idealism Revisited’, *International Studies Quarterly* 42 (1998), p. 418.

³⁸ Wilson, ‘The Myth of the “First Great Debate”’, p. 7.

staggering three-volume history of IR which meanders through the world of the League but does little to identify any substantial patterns or arguments.³⁹ The list of re-examinations goes on, and so does the debate over ‘canonical’ thinkers.⁴⁰ Never has IR history been more popular, Nicolas Guilhot noted in 2019.⁴¹ In fact, there have been so many revisions over the last three decades that the revisionists themselves are in need of orientation.⁴² Even the exercise of writing IR history in itself has become subject to debate.⁴³

Regardless of their respective interpretations, most authors maintain that the founders of IR were primarily concerned with theory, not with the practice of international politics. Schmidt, for example, has cautioned against ‘contextualism’, the idea that current affairs shape IR scholarship.⁴⁴ Instead, he insists, disciplinary history should seek to reconstruct conversations among scholars in academic environments.⁴⁵ This focus on theoretical reconstructions is not surprising, given that the vast majority of the revisionist literature has come from

³⁹ Jo-Anne Pemberton, *The Story of International Relations: Cold-Blooded Idealists* (Cham, 2020).

⁴⁰ David Armitage, ‘The Fifty Years’ Rift: Intellectual History and International Relations’, *Modern Intellectual History* 1:1 (2004), pp. 97–109; William Bain and Terry Nardin, ‘International Relations and Intellectual History’, *International Relations* 31:3 (2017); Duncan Bell, *Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme* (Oxford, 2008); Robert M. A. Crawford, *Idealism and Realism in International Relations: Beyond the Discipline* (London, 2000); Jo-Anne Pemberton, *The Story of International Relations, Part One* (Cham, 2020); Or Rosenboim, ‘Threads and Boundaries: Rethinking the Intellectual History of International Relations’, in Brian C. Schmidt and Nicolas Guilhot (eds.), *Historiographical Investigations in International Relations* (Cham, 2019), pp. 97–125.

⁴¹ Nicolas Guilhot, ‘Introduction’, in Brian C. Schmidt and Nicolas Guilhot (eds.), *Historiographical Investigations in International Relations* (Cham, 2019), p. 2.

⁴² Peter Wilson, ‘Where Are We Now in the Debate about the First Great Debate?’, in Brian C. Schmidt (ed.), *International Relations and the First Great Debate* (New York, 2012).

⁴³ Peter Marcus Kristensen, ‘Discipline Admonished: On International Relations Fragmentation and the Disciplinary Politics of Stocktaking’, *European Journal of International Relations* 22:2 (2016), pp. 243–67.

⁴⁴ Brian C. Schmidt, ‘On the History and Historiography of IR’, in Walter Carlsnaes, et al. (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations* (London, 2002), pp. 11–13.

⁴⁵ Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Internalism versus Externalism in the Disciplinary History of International Relations’, in Brian C. Schmidt and Nicolas Guilhot (eds.), *Historiographical Investigations in International Relations* (Cham, 2019), p. 129.