1 Introduction

What we call Kant's *Opus postumum* is, in the simplest terms, a pile of 527 handwritten pages of drafts toward a work that the philosopher did not live to complete. Kant chiefly worked on the project between 1796 and 1801, although the earliest related pages date to 1786, the year in which he published the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, and the latest to 1803, the year before his death. He grouped the pages into twelve fascicles (in German, *Konvolute*), enclosed in folded sheets, on two of which he wrote further notes. The fascicle wrappers are numbered in another hand. This will have occurred at some point during the famously circuitous journey of the manuscript as it passed from Kant's descendants via Königsberg librarian Rudolf Reicke to Pastor Albrecht Krause, whose family owned it when it was published in the Academy edition of Kant's works in 1936–8.[1] During this journey, many pages were apparently shuffled within and between the fascicles. Artur Buchenau and Gerhard Lehmann, who edited the 1936–8 Academy edition (after Erich Adickes resigned due to editorial disagreements), took the questionable decision to publish Kant's manuscript in the order that they found the pages in the fascicles. The combination of the dense and repetitive character of Kant's drafts with the nonchronological ordering of the existing Academy edition makes the *Opus postumum* a challenging text to read, to say the least.

Given the state of the text, it is no surprise that there are heated debates over many basic questions of interpretation. Perhaps the most fundamental questions are methodological. Should the drafts be treated as a 'work,' or as a disconnected series of sketches, or as something in between? If a work or an effort toward one, is it 'critical' or 'postcritical': does it primarily adhere to, modify, or even abandon the major doctrines of the three *Critiques*? Should the *Opus postumum* be taken seriously at all, or, following a view notoriously expressed by Kuno Fischer, should it be dismissed as a product of the older Kant's senility? Basic questions about the content of the drafts are just as controversial: what is the problem, or what are the problems, with which Kant is concerned?

A key issue facing any interpretation of the *Opus postumum* is whether it takes the drafts to contain a unified project. Is Kant consistently attempting to resolve a single problem? If so, which? The subject matter of the drafts ranges from the classification of physical properties and types of forces, to attempts to prove the existence of a universally distributed 'ether,' to the so-called

[1] The story is told by Adickes (1920: 1–35), Stark (1993: 54–9, 100–29), Förster (in Kant [1993]: xvi–xxiii), and Basile (2013: 459–98). The manuscript reached its current home in the Berlin Staatsbibliothek in 1999.

Selbstsetzungslehre, according to which the thinking subject posits itself in space and time, to innumerable definitions of 'physics' and 'transcendental philosophy,' to a system of the ideas of God, world, and man-in-the-world. And this list of themes barely scratches the surface: we also find reflections on organisms, machines, the matter of light, teleology, freedom, Spinoza, the Persian prophet Zoroaster, the rights or duties of God, the categorical imperative, and innumerable other subjects. How can we reconcile any single aim that might unify the project with the great diversity of topics, dilemmas, and solutions that Kant explores?

This Element proposes some answers to these large questions. Very little is uncontroversial in *Opus postumum* scholarship, but one minimal point on which interpreters agree is that Kant seeks to connect the general a priori foundations of natural science, which he outlined in the three *Critiques* and the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, with the specific results of empirical physics. Kant calls this the problem of the 'transition' (*Übergang*). His standard formulation for his task in the late project is the "transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics." The present Element aims to explain this formulation. I make my case in two steps. First, Sections 2, 3, and 4 address central methodological issues facing the reader of the drafts. Second, the long Section 5 examines the philosophical developments in what I claim is a crucial phase of Kant's struggle with the transition problem.

Throughout, and particularly in the first step, I make extensive reference to the history of *Opus postumum* scholarship. I do so because the unfinished and messy state of Kant's drafts exacerbates a feature of all historical philosophical texts: we cannot read them in isolation from the interpretations and debates that have sedimented around them over the centuries. I give particular attention to the German-language literature, which contains insights and debates that are sometimes unjustly overlooked by Anglophone scholars. The existing scholarship is invaluable for making sense of the chaotic text. But it has also imposed certain interpretative tendencies that need to be identified, and in some cases loosened, if we want to gain a more faithful understanding of Kant's drafts.

Accordingly, Section 2 critically surveys the history of *Opus postumum* scholarship since the beginning of the twentieth century. My survey identifies a break in the literature around 1970. Earlier scholars had systematizing ambitions: they made grand claims about the governing concern of Kant's late project, incorporating all the phases of the drafts into their argument. In doing so, however, they tended to impose their own philosophical interests onto the drafts. After 1970, following the work of Burkhard Tuschling, interpreters became more attentive to the historical development of the drafts and generally restricted their claims to particular problems and phases in Kant's project.

I argue that it is worth attempting to rehabilitate the systematizing ambitions of the early twentieth-century scholarship, while maintaining the historical and textual sensitivity of more recent work.

Section 3 engages further with the existing literature by challenging an assumption common to recent interpretations. Over the last fifty years, it has become standard to read the *Opus postumum* as Kant's effort to solve problems left over from his earlier works. This interpretative orthodoxy revolves around the question of the 'gap' in Kant's previous philosophy that the late project is said to attempt to fill. After examining Kant's notions of 'gap' and 'transition,' I argue that the recent debate arises from an ambiguity in the term 'gap' (*Lücke*). The term can denote either a failing or, more neutrally, a separation. On my reading, it is this second, neutral sense of 'gap' that is at stake in the drafts. Kant's new transition-science aims to bridge the separation between the distinct domains of the metaphysical foundations of natural science and physics. This means, I contend, that the 'gap problem' as it is usually understood can be profitably set aside, allowing us to focus more closely on the immanent development of Kant's transition project.

Section 4 goes on to make a more general methodological proposal: that we should distinguish between the stable form of the transition project and its shifting content. The form of the project is expressed in Kant's consistent formulation of his problem: the "transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics." However, all three elements of this formulation – the metaphysical foundations, physics, and the transition between them – are repeatedly rethought. The meanings of these terms shift under the pressure of the difficulties that Kant faces, and as a result of his efforts to address these difficulties in the project. My proposed approach to the transition problem aims to do justice both to the dynamic, exploratory character of Kant's drafts and to his intention to produce a 'work' that would solve the various problems at stake in the transition to physics.

The second main step of my discussion, Section 5, turns to what I claim is a key moment in Kant's attempts to solve the transition problem. In light of the previous section's depiction of the form of the problem, I suggest that we should tackle the relatively neglected question of the *arrival point* of the transition, namely, physics. I thus advocate a renewed focus on a specific phase of the drafts, fascicles X/XI of August 1799 to April 1800, in which Kant reflects intensely on the meaning of physics.[2] Commentators have typically

[2] I divide the *Opus postumum* into five chronological periods: 'Preparatory work and *Oktaventwurf*' (1786–96), 'Elementary system' (July 1797–May 1799), 'Ether proofs' (May 1799–August 1799), 'Fascicles X/XI' (August 1799–April 1800), and 'Fascicles VII/I' (April 1800–February 1803). For more on these phases and their dates, see Appendix, section A.2.

assumed that 'physics' in the *Opus postumum* can be understood in an everyday sense: as an empirical science that observes and experiments upon physical phenomena. That may be the case in the early phases of the drafts. However, in fascicles X/XI, Kant explores conceiving of physics in unfamiliar and much broader new ways. He distinguishes between various types of systems of physics, and he stretches the notion of physics in the directions of psychology and cosmology, such that it newly encompasses the forces of the perceiving subject and the idea of the totality of appearances. By rethinking physics in this way, I argue, Kant attempts to resolve the transition problem by determining how empirical physics can itself be systematic. He makes various attempts to distinguish the fixed, a priori elements of physics from its ever-increasing and unforeseeable empirical results.

It may be helpful to indicate, in a preliminary manner, what I consider to be the philosophical stakes of this phase of Kant's late project. As mentioned, I shall argue that the *Opus postumum* is best read not as an attempt to resolve problems left over from the critical works, but as a substantially new endeavor. But this does not mean, of course, that the drafts are independent of the critical philosophy. Which aspects of Kant's earlier thought, then, are most relevant to these late reflections on physics? One interpretative option would be to turn to the debate in the current literature over whether, and how, Kant justifies the necessity of particular, empirical laws of nature, as distinct from general transcendental laws.[3] However, although I believe that further consideration of the *Opus postumum* and its transition problem could enrich this debate, I do not think that the debate provides the most helpful lens through which to see what is at stake in Kant's late project. Kant is not expressly concerned with whether particular laws of nature can be known as necessary or merely as Humean regularities. In my view, it is more illuminating to understand Kant to be grappling in the *Opus postumum* with the implications and difficulties of his own conception of science.

According to Kant, all sciences are inherently *systematic*. The first *Critique* asserts that "systematic unity is that which first makes everyday cognition into science" (A832/B860).[4] A system is "the unity of manifold cognitions under an idea." Such an idea is the "rational concept of the form of a whole" that should determine a priori "the extent [*Umfang*] of the manifold as well as the places of the

[3] Briefly put, three sources of the necessity of (certain) particular laws have been argued for: the best system of all laws (defended by Buchdahl and Kitcher), derivation from the categories (Friedman), or the essences or natures of things (Watkins and Kreines). For an overview of this debate, see Messina 2017. Recent interventions include McNulty 2015, Breitenbach 2018, and Engelhard 2018.

[4] For the referencing conventions used in this Element, see the References section.

parts with respect to each other" (A832/B860, cf. A645/B673).[5] On the interpretation that I shall defend, the *Opus postumum* contains Kant's own, generally overlooked, attempts to address the question of how empirical physics can be systematic. Kant's criterion of systematicity evidently requires some aspects of empirical physics to be known in advance of experience. But, in practice, what does it mean for the manifold and interrelation of the objects of physics to be determined a priori? In the terms that Kant often uses, as we shall see, this is the question of how far the results of empirical physics can be *anticipated* prior to experience, and whether such anticipation is material or merely formal.

As almost every commentator on the *Opus postumum* has pointed out, Kant does not first address this issue in this text. It is treated in different ways in the *Metaphysical Foundations* and the *Critique of Judgment*. However, the transition project differs from the main body of the *Metaphysical Foundations* in that Kant is no longer concerned with matter in general but with the *specific properties* of matter (see Sections 4.2 and 5.4 below). And it differs from the third *Critique* in that Kant's focus is not the systematicity of nature for the sake of reflecting judgment, but the systematicity of *physics*. This, as we shall see, requires 'bridging' concepts other than the principle of purposiveness.[6]

Following the extended discussion of Kant's exploration of physics in Section 5, I return in the conclusion (Section 6) to a broader question. The problem at stake in the *Opus postumum*, on my account, may seem similar to the problem that early logical positivists sought to solve with the notion of the 'constitutive' or 'relativized' a priori. In both cases, at issue is how to reconcile the unforeseeable developments of an empirical science with a certain conception of a priori conditions. I will claim, however, that Kant's solution to the problem contrasts instructively with that of his later followers and critics.

Although this Element situates itself throughout in the history of existing interpretations, the best way to engage with Kant's final project is, of course, simply to read it. To help with this, the book ends with an Appendix, "How to read the *Opus postumum*."

2 A Sketch of the Reception History

This section provides an overview of the broad tendencies in the history of scholarship on the *Opus postumum*. In my view, a fundamental methodological break takes place around 1970. By returning to the early twentieth-century

[5] For discussion of Kant's conception of systematicity prior to the *Opus postumum*, see Zöller 2001 and Sturm 2009: 131–82.

[6] This is, of course, a quick treatment of questions that have been heavily debated in the literature. I agree with Förster (2000: 5–11) and Emundts (2004: 59–66) when they insist on significant differences between the aims of the *Opus postumum* and the *Critique of Judgment*.

interpretations, I intend to propose which aspects of these readings are worth rehabilitating and which should be avoided. This will set the scene for my discussion, in Section 3, of the 'gap problem,' which has been central to debates in the literature since 1970.

The major early twentieth-century interpretations had clear systematizing intentions. This is evident in the first significant study of the *Opus postumum*, Adickes' 855-page book, published a decade and a half before the Academy edition (Adickes 1920). Adickes splits Kant's project into a "predominantly natural-scientific and natural-philosophical part" and a "metaphysical–epistemological part." In line with his later conclusions in *Kant als Naturforscher* (1924–5), Adickes portrays Kant as a feeble natural philosopher but an insightful metaphysician. The metaphysical innovations developed in the *Opus postumum* are, according to Adickes (1920: 849, 239), Kant's realist account of things in themselves, presented "for once completely consistently, from a strict transcendental-philosophical (epistemological) standpoint," and his doctrine of "double affection," according to which the I or self is affected both "through things in themselves and through appearances."

Adickes is here responding to the earlier interpretation of Hans Vaihinger, who claimed that the problem of double affection was an aporia running through Kant's philosophy. Vaihinger contends that only in the final fascicles of the *Opus postumum* does Kant adequately address the problem of double affection. He is said to do so by conceiving of things in themselves as "fictions," which, conveniently enough, coheres with Vaihinger's own philosophy of the 'as if' (Vaihinger 1911: 721–33, see Basile 2013: 34–41). Adickes follows Vaihinger in viewing the problem of double affection as "the key to Kant's epistemology" (see Adickes 1929). But he has an opposed interpretation of Kant's solution: he claims that Kant has a realist rather than a fictionalist conception of things in themselves. Adickes develops this point in his interpretation of the *Opus postumum* and, particularly, with regard to what he calls the "new deduction" in fascicles X/XI (August 1799–April 1800).[7] He dedicates over 100 pages to the topic, although he ultimately considers Kant's efforts to result in failure (Adickes 1920: 235–362). This new deduction, Adickes claims, is where Kant attempts to show how the empirical self is affected by complexes of forces, in a way that is distinct from how things in themselves affect the self in itself.[8] The subject's *self*-affection is central to this new deduction (Adickes 1920: 248–79). In Adickes' view, Kant's more successful theory of self-affection then appears in the final fascicles VII/I.

[7] On my divisions of the phases of the drafts, see footnote 2 and Appendix, section A.2.
[8] Adickes 1920: 237–40; for discussions, see Stang 2013: 792–8 and Basile 2019: 3641–5.

The details of this debate over so-called double affection, which rarely interests scholars today, need not detain us further.[9] Relevant for our purposes is how Vaihinger and Adickes divide up Kant's late drafts in order to justify their conceptions of the philosophical project therein. Adickes' distinction between the natural-scientific and metaphysical halves of Kant's manuscript is a modification of Vaihinger's more radical reading. Vaihinger (1891: 734) claims that the *Opus postumum* contains two entirely separate works: a "special natural-philosophical" work and a "general transcendental-philosophical" one.[10] Everything prior to April 1800 is said to belong to the first work; the writings after this date, namely, fascicles VII/I, belong to the second. In Vaihinger's eyes, only the second work is philosophically significant. Although his chronological division suggests that fascicles X/XI are part of the first 'work,' Vaihinger's discussion of double affection almost exclusively cites these fascicles, suggesting they should be placed in the second 'work' (see Basile 2019: 3639 n.5). Despite their disagreements, then, both Vaihinger and Adickes see fascicles X/XI as the pivotal moment in Kant's final project; and both consider the ideas developed there to culminate in the 'properly philosophical' fascicles VII/I.

The question of the so-called new deduction in fascicles X/XI is crucial for two further early systematizing interpretations, those of Herman J. de Vleeschauwer and Gerhard Lehmann. De Vleeschauwer (1937: 569) considers fascicles X/XI to pursue a transcendental deduction of "the forces and elementary properties of matter." This is at the heart of "the third edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*" that he contends can be found in the *Opus postumum*, particularly the new theory of experience that appears in Kant's doctrine of self-positing (*Selbstsetzungslehre*) (de Vleeschauwer 1937: 565, 579–80). While deeply influenced by Adickes' interpretation, de Vleeschauwer shifts the so-called new deduction away from Adickes' concern with double affection and the realist interpretation of things in themselves to instead stress what he sees as Kant's new proximity to Fichte.

Lehmann's interpretation has more distance from the questions posed by Vaihinger and Adickes, but he too continues to call fascicles X/XI a "new deduction," indeed, a deduction of the categories (Lehmann 1969: 317).[11] Lehmann (1969: 278–84) calls the new deduction the "fundamental philosophical

[9] For further discussion of this topic in the *Opus postumum*, however, see Hall 2015: 154–206 and Basile 2019. Stang (2015) seeks to revive the issue more systematically; he explicitly avoids referring to Kant's late drafts.

[10] On this point Vaihinger follows Krause, whose book he is here reviewing.

[11] When citing Lehmann in this Element I refer to the 1969 collection of his essays. Those I cite are: "Ganzheitsbegriff und Weltidee in Kants *Opus postumum*" (1936; Lehmann 1969: 247–71), "Das philosophische Grundproblem in Kants Nachlaßwerk" (1937; Lehmann 1969: 272–88), "Kants Nachlaßwerk und die *Kritik der Urteilskraft*" (1939; Lehmann 1969: 295–373), and "Zur Frage der Spätentwicklung Kants" (1963; Lehmann 1969: 393–408).

problem" of the *Opus postumum*. Admitting that it is less easy to succinctly sum up than the "old deduction," Lehmann characterizes the central point of the new deduction in various ways.[12] Many of the topics that Lehmann highlights do indeed seem to be novel concerns for Kant; we shall return to them in Section 5. But at no point does Lehmann justify understanding the alleged new deduction as a deduction: the relationship to the "old deduction," and what is deduced and how, remains obscure. Neither does Lehmann clarify how his conception of the new deduction relates to a central theme of his interpretation, the relationship between the *Opus postumum* and the third *Critique*.[13]

There is evidently a motley series of doctrines contained under the title of the 'new deduction' in these early interpretations. As Hansgeorg Hoppe (1969: 114) and Vittorio Mathieu (1989: 137) later rightly state, the drafts in question bear little resemblance to any kind of a deduction. The indeterminate notion of a 'new deduction' appears to function as a means for Adickes, de Vleeschauwer, and Lehmann to impose their own interests onto the drafts. Nevertheless, despite their limitations, these early interpretations are notable for two reasons: they attempt *systematizing interpretations* of the overall project of Kant's late drafts and they place *fascicles X/XI* at the centre of their readings.

Both of these tendencies dwindle in the scholarship from 1970 onwards. An important stimulus for the new approach is the work of Burkhard Tuschling. According to Tuschling (1971: 11–12), a systematically oriented interpretation is "impossible." He offers three reasons for this. First, we should not conflate passages from different phases without considering whether Kant might not be giving different meanings to the same phrases. Tuschling's example, key to his book, is that in the late drafts the clause "metaphysical foundations of natural science" does not refer to Kant's 1786 work. Second, we should avoid discussing the drafts in an order determined by external principles; he notes that Lehmann criticizes Adickes for this in the introduction to the Academy edition (22:771–2). Third, we should not interpret certain phases of the drafts without considering the phases that precede them, in the way that Adickes, de Vleeschauwer, and Lehmann treat the final fascicles X/XI, VII, and I. Tuschling (1971: 13) advocates instead a "historical" interpretation. By this he means, on the one hand, describing the development of Kant's train of

[12] Namely, that it should justify: the principle of the unity of experience; the claim that perceptions belong to the system of moving forces and vice versa; the concepts of the appearance of the appearance, sensible space, the material anticipation of experience, and the act-correspondence of the object; the objectification of the concrete self-constitution of the subject; the reaction theory of perceptions and moving forces and the identification of two steps of appearance (Lehmann 1969: 258, 259, 280, 283–4, 365).

[13] Lehmann (1969: 405) does draw a connection between the concepts of organism, system, and totality, but in my view the issue remains underdetermined.

thought in all its complexity, and, on the other, contextualizing this description in relation to Kant's earlier writings and those of his contemporaries.

No one would deny that we should avoid the errors that Tuschling identifies, or that his "historical" approach can usefully guard against them. However, it is less clear that the problems he diagnoses afflict all possible systematizing interpretations and render them futile. Nor is it obvious that a historical sensitivity to the internal development of the drafts and to their context is incompatible with the attempt to read the *Opus postumum* systematically. Nevertheless, subsequent studies have tended to follow Tuschling in eschewing overarching accounts of the project of the drafts. Eckart Förster's book, still the most important English-language work on Kant's late drafts, takes its methodological lead from Heinz Heimsoeth, who recommended that scholars produce a series of focused investigations into delimited issues in the *Opus postumum* (Förster 2000: x; see also Edwards 1991: 96 n.9). This is indeed the approach of the major studies published since 1970, all of which treat only particular problems in specific phases of the drafts.[14]

The restricted scope of the studies of the past fifty years is evident in their textual basis. Tuschling (1971) and Dina Emundts (2004) address only the drafts prior to August 1799; that is, their books do not reach fascicles X/XI. Jeffrey Edwards (2000, see also 2004: 162 n.14) skips fascicles X/XI to focus on the ether proofs and fascicle I either side of them. Although Förster (2000) endeavors to cover all the phases of the drafts, he considers Kant's innovations to be found in two phases: the ether proofs of May to August 1799 and the *Selbstsetzungslehre*, which is usually located in fascicle VII of April to December 1800. Förster (2000: 101–16, particularly 106–7) discusses fascicles X/XI only insofar as they shed light on the *Selbstsetzungslehre*. He thus disregards the specific investigations that Kant pursues in fascicles X/XI.

The scholarship that has appeared in the wake of Tuschling's work is more rigorous and careful than the early twentieth-century interpretations, but it also lacks the earlier scholarship's systematizing ambitions; it is less willing to try to encompass all phases of the drafts and determine the overarching problem with which Kant is grappling.[15] The present Element is motivated by a sense that the time is ripe to attempt this once more. Such a synoptic interpretation would

[14] Tuschling 1971, Friedman 1992, Emundts 2004, Edwards 2008, Hall 2014, and Thorndike 2018.

[15] There are three notable exceptions to my survey of the tendencies in twentieth-century *Opus postumum* scholarship. First, Vittorio Mathieu, who, in his Italian-language study of 1958 and a revised and condensed German version in 1989, goes further than other scholars of the postwar period in the direction of a systematizing interpretation of the *Opus postumum*. He stands at the crossroads of the 'old' and 'new' approaches in the scholarship, combining close reading of passages and a sensitivity to the developmental character of the drafts with claims about Kant's overall intentions. I will regularly return to his book in what follows, including his methodological proposals (Appendix, section A.1). However, his attempt to speculatively reconstruct Kant's final 'work' seems to me over-ambitious (Mathieu 1989: 79–83; see Section 5.9). Second,

rehabilitate something of the ambition of early scholarship, as well as its textual basis, by placing fascicles X/XI back at the heart of Kant's transition project. Like the early twentieth-century readers of the *Opus postumum*, I consider fascicles X/XI to contain Kant's most intriguing and productive reflections: perhaps the final concerted intellectual effort of a great philosopher. However, any rehabilitation of a systematizing approach must take into account the results of the scholarship since 1970 and emulate its rigorous attention to the historical development of Kant's text. We should avoid the tendency of early interpreters to appropriate the drafts for their own philosophical interests, whether double affection, Fichtean idealism, or organized nature. I aim here to avoid imposing external concerns onto Kant's final project. Instead, we shall follow as closely as possible the train of thought in the drafts: the repetitions, variations, and transformations of Kant's claims as he grapples with the problem, which the next section will examine more closely, of the 'transition.'

It is not a coincidence that the scholarship since 1970, which takes a more piecemeal approach to the drafts and pays little attention to fascicles X/XI, is primarily concerned with the question of the 'gap': the failing in his previous philosophy that Kant is said to rectify in the *Opus postumum*. This is because the problem of the gap, to which we turn next, provides an alternative way to make sense of the drafts, in place of the systematizing claims of earlier interpreters. That is, one can provide a coherent interpretation, despite attending only to particular periods and delimited issues in the drafts, *if* one assumes that Kant is primarily concerned with rectifying a problem in his earlier works. The question of the gap and its filling has thus become an anchoring point for recent interpretations. The next section will advocate abandoning this methodological orthodoxy of recent *Opus postumum* scholarship.

3 'Gap' or Transition Problem?

3.1 The Question of the Gap

Scholarship on the *Opus postumum* in the last fifty years has been particularly stimulated by Kant's comments about his final project in two letters of 1798. To Christian Garve on September 21, 1798, Kant writes that the task he is working

Hansgeorg Hoppe (1969, 1991), who focuses on fascicles X/XI to interpret the *Opus postumum* as a theory of physics. I critically discuss Hoppe's interpretation in Section 5.8, including a debate between Hoppe and Mathieu. Finally, Karin Gloy (1976), who seeks to systematically reconstruct Kant's philosophy of nature according to its sources, extent, and limits on the basis of the first *Critique*, the *Metaphysical Foundations*, and the *Opus postumum*. Insofar as it is concerned with the *Opus postumum*, Gloy's study, which does not refer to Tuschling's book, shares with the early twentieth-century scholarship both a systematizing orientation and a lack of attention to the developmental character of the drafts.