Introduction

When Monika Maron published *Flight of Ashes* in 1981, she shocked readers with stark images of Bitterfeld, one of Europe's most polluted cities in the heart of the East German Chemical Triangle. Considered the first book about environmental degradation in East Germany (German Democratic Republic, GDR), Maron had to publish the novel abroad in West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany, FRG). Maron exposed the environmental devastation of Soviet-style economies: "And these fumes could serve as road signs. Please go straight ahead to the ammonia, then turn left at the nitric acid. When you feel a stabbing pain in your throat and bronchial tubes, turn around and call a doctor, that was sulfur dioxide."[1] Maron's work not only graphically portrays the pollution but also illustrates the GDR's unique position between eastern and western Europe during the Cold War. A West German press published the novel for a West German audience, revealing the conditions in Bitterfeld as well as conveying the uncomfortable feeling of constant secret police, or Stasi, surveillance. Moreover, East Germans clamored to have copies of the book smuggled into the GDR, underscoring the connection between the two Germanys.[2] East German environmental issues stemmed from a distinctive domestic situation. Nevertheless, they had impacts on environments, pollution, politics, and social movements beyond the GDR's borders, just as the GDR was influenced by forces abroad.

The GDR was the product of the Cold War in Europe, but from the beginning, the small central European state held practical and symbolic meaning disproportionate to its size. The communist dictatorship, founded amid heightening US–Soviet tensions in 1949, was hived off from West Germany and incorporated into the Soviet sphere of influence.

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[1] Monika Maron, *Flight of Ashes*, trans. David Newton Marinelli (New York: Readers International, 1986), 8.
[2] Robert Havemann Gesellschaft (RHG) OWK 07, "Bücherliste Teil 2," undated.

With German lands east of the Oder–Neisse Line ceded to Poland after the
World War II, the GDR was a strange fragment in the east tied to the
"other Germany" through national and historical connections.[3] Within
the Soviet bloc, the GDR was also the most industrialized state outside of
the Soviet Union and proudly proclaimed the largest per capita income of
all communist states in the Cold War.[4] The ruling Socialist Unity Party
(SED) touted the GDR as a "display window" of socialism to the west and
a model for other Soviet bloc states, establishing the country as an import-
ant pivot between east and west in central Europe.[5] The GDR's accom-
plishments, however, came at the expense of the physical environment,
public health, and quality of life as pollution from East German industries,
such as chemicals, plastics, and coalmining, wrecked the air, water, and
soil.

Saving Nature argues that the GDR's engagement with nature reconfig-
ures our understanding of environmentalism in postwar Europe, situating
it behind and across the Iron Curtain. The GDR was inevitably entangled
with environments, pollution, movements, economies, policies, and dip-
lomacy that transcended its seemingly impenetrable borders. Despite
obvious environmental failures later in the GDR's existence, the commun-
ist dictatorship embraced environmental protection at home and abroad in
the 1960s and 1970s. The SED contended that only capitalism exploited
both people and nature.[6] Over time, the degradation became a security risk

[3] Christoph Kleßmann, "Introduction," in *The Divided Past: Rewriting Post-War German History*, ed.
Christoph Kleßmann (New York: Berghahn, 2001), 1. Frank Bösch, "Introduction," in *History
Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s*, ed. Frank Bösch, trans. Jennifer
Walcoff Neuheiser (New York: Berghahn Books, 2018), 1–2.

[4] Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1997), 82.

[5] Hermann Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: Die DDR im internationalen System, 1949–1989*
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 188. For a discussion of central Europe during the Cold War, see
Yuliya Komska, *The Icon Curtain: The Cold War's Quiet Border* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 2015), 12–13; Michael Kraus et al., "The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989,"
Journal of Cold War Studies 19, no. 2 (Spring 2017), 169. For more on central European borders and
nationality in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see James E. Bjork, *Neither German nor
Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland* (Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press, 2008); David Blackbourn and James Retallack, eds., *Localism,
Landscape, and the Ambiguities of Place: German-Speaking Central Europe, 1860–1930* (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2016); Brendan Karch, *Nation and Loyalty in a German-Polish
Borderland: Upper Silesia, 1848–1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Caitlin
Murdock, *Changing Places: Society, Culture, and Territory in the Saxon-Bohemian Borderlands,
1870–1946* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2010); Tara Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls:
National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900–1948* (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2008).

[6] Umweltbibliothek Großhennersdorf (UBG) 80–113, Klaus Kluge in *Mensch und Umwelt: Aus dem
Protokoll eines Kolloquiums des Kulturbundes der DDR* (Berlin: Kulturbund der DDR, 1975), 51.

when regulation failed to reduce the pollution. Frustrated with official inaction, various structures and groups in the Protestant Church, which was the only semi-independent institution in the GDR, unmasked the weaknesses of communist responses. East German contact with media, information, and activists outside of the GDR – especially in the FRG and the People's Republic of Poland – further added to the SED's sense of fear and situates the pollution crisis in a larger context. Shared physical environments and concerns on the part of both states and individuals ensured the GDR's responses had implications beyond its borders.[7] Pollution, policy, and activism intimately tied the GDR to its neighbors and them to the GDR, transforming the small state into a crucial focal point in central Europe.

The Environment in Democracy and Dictatorship

With the collapse of communism in 1989–1990, environmental degradation in the GDR shocked audiences around the world, and the FRG shouldered the burden of cleaning it up. Because the West (now unified) German government successfully took up that task, scholarship often assumes that environmentalism was only possible in the "democratic west," reflective of lingering Cold War triumphalism.[8] The rights to assembly and press, much less the expectation of privacy, so common to democracies, were not guaranteed in communist states. Nevertheless, opportunities for responding to environmental degradation existed both in democracy and under dictatorship.[9] Environmentalism under communism stemmed from multiple sources, including the party and state's official channels, and ultimately posed a challenge to the SED's legitimacy. East Germans engaged in environmental activities for numerous reasons, including supporting the official conservation and anti-pollution measures, which stresses that the environment was not explicitly an oppositional issue. It became an effective

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[7] Astrid M. Eckert, *West Germany and the Iron Curtain: Environment, Economy, and Culture in the Borderland* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019) examines environmental and economic connections and disconnects along the German–German border. Frank Uekötter, "Entangled Ecologies: Outlines of a Green History of Two or More Germanys," in *History Shared and Divided*, ed. Bosch, 147–190. Uekötter sketches parallels and disconnects in East and West German approaches to the environment from the 1970s to the present.

[8] Katherine Pence and Paul Betts, "Introduction," in *Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics*, eds. Katherine Pence and Paul Betts (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 4.

[9] Raymond Dominick, "Capitalism, Communism, and Environmental Protection: Lessons from the German Experience," *Environmental History* 3, no. 3 (July 1998), 326.

weapon against the SED and the state when they fell short of expectations.[10] The resonance of the environment across various sectors of East German society helps explain its role in the collapse of communism in 1989. Though environmentalism in Soviet-style communism presented a distinct set of domestic and systemic considerations, it sheds light on how such movements gained a foothold and developed *outside* of a democracy.[11]

Green politics in the democratic FRG provide the standard against which others are measured, reinforcing a narrative of (West) Germany as the "greenest nation."[12] While the FRG hesitated to regulate polluters in the 1960s and 1970s, many West Germans embraced environmental protection, reflecting a transition away from conservation and toward a more expansive understanding of ecological interconnectedness.[13] Activists organized citizens' initiatives (*Bürgeinitiative*), staged demonstrations, and occupied construction sites for airport runways, nuclear power plants, and other projects.[14] These efforts were not always successful and even turned violent at times, as in the occupation of a planned nuclear reactor at Brokdorf in 1976, but activists succeeded in shaping public opinion and pressuring the government into better regulation.[15] In this democracy, the state, market economy, and citizen represented at least relatively independent entities in conversation with one another. Ultimately, the green movement changed democracy in the FRG, introducing new topics and broadening the scope of legitimate politics to include environmental, peace, and other concerns.[16]

In contrast, environmentalism in the GDR illuminates how a communist dictatorship both supported and constrained responses to pollution. The one-party state controlled or attempted to control all aspects of the economy, politics, and society to take care of its citizens, the workers in a workers' state.[17]

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[10] Christian Möller, *Umwelt und Herrschaft in der DDR: Politik, Protest und die Grenzen der Partizipation in der Diktatur* (Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020).

[11] For scholarship on green movements in a democracy, namely the FRG (and France), see Dolores Augustine, *Taking on Technocracy: Nuclear Power in Germany, 1945 to the Present* (New York: Berghahn Press, 2018); Stephen Milder, *Greening Democracy: The Anti-Nuclear Movement and Political Environmentalism in West Germany and Beyond, 1968–1983* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Andrew S. Tompkins, *Better Active than Radioactive! Anti-Nuclear Protest in 1970s France and West Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[12] Frank Uekötter, *The Greenest Nation? A New History of German Environmentalism* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014).

[13] Jens Ivo Engels, *Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik: Ideenwelt und politische Verhaltensstile in Naturschutz und Umweltbewegung, 1950–1980* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006), 307.

[14] Augustine, *Taking on Technocracy*, 98.   [15] Milder, *Greening Democracy*, 6–7.

[16] Uekötter, *The Greenest Nation?*, 2–3, 91.

[17] Konrad H. Jarausch, "Care and Coercion: The GDR as Welfare Dictatorship," in *Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR,* ed. Konrad H. Jarausch (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 47–49.

In this totalizing constellation, the state was both regulator and polluter.[18] It was not an independent actor apart from economic agents, nor was it accountable to an electorate in any real way. The GDR strictly controlled the dissemination of information, the formation of associations, the ability to publicly protest, and access to environmental data. Questions of degradation and public health were carefully managed and framed to put the SED in the best possible light, often at the expense of experts and activists who held contradictory evidence. These restrictions created a set of dynamics unlike those in a liberal democratic society. Any environmental issue was not only politically charged but a challenge to the SED and its legitimacy. Focusing on repression in the GDR does not diminish the police violence that environmental movements in the FRG or other democracies faced but underscores differences in how the two systems reacted to environmental problems.[19] The environment – and responses to its treatment – exposes the complex relationship between state, economy, society, and nature in a dictatorship.

The rise of environmentalism in the GDR illustrates the constant struggle between economy and ecology in the twentieth century from a different perspective than in western democracies.[20] Tensions between materialism, production, and quality of life posed challenges for states around the world after the World War II. In the postwar period, eastern and western European economies competed for superiority, changing dramatically over the course of the Cold War. Increased rates of production, consumption, and globalization reflected that rivalry, though these developments occurred unevenly. Communist economies, in particular, remained committed to heavy industry and reluctant to transition from

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[18] I argue that the SED never reached its ambitions of totally controlling all aspects of life in the dictatorship, and use the term "totalizing" in recognition of the ambition but do not agree with the scholarship that labeled the GDR "totalitarian." See, for example, Sigrid Meuschel, *Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft: Zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der DDR, 1945–1989* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992).

[19] Milder, *Greening Democracy*, 138–141. Augustine, *Taking on Technocracy*, 150–151.

[20] Both environmental histories of Germany, such as Uekötter's *The Greenest Nation?* and David Blackbourn's *The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), and environmental histories of communism, such as Paul Josephson's "War on Nature as Part of the Cold War: The Strategic and Ideological Roots of Environmental Degradation in the Soviet Union," in *Environmental Histories of the Cold War*, eds. J. R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), tend to write off environmental efforts under communism. For more on modernity, materialism, and the GDR, see Pence and Betts, "Introduction," 11–21. Thomas Fleischman's *Communist Pigs: An Animal History of the East Germany's Rise and Fall* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2020) further reminds us that capitalist and communist economies were intimately connected, especially from the 1970s onward, and not discrete entities.

coal to oil, even as planners devoted more attention to consumer goods.[21] Nevertheless, population growth and skyrocketing consumption forced capitalist and communist states and citizens alike to reconsider their relationship with natural resources and the impact that their habits had on the environment.[22] These conversations flourished in international venues such as the 1972 Environmental Conference in Stockholm as well as in local parish meetings and in living rooms.[23] In confronting the toll that natural resource extraction and consumption took on the environment, East Germans were at the center of global discourses from the late 1960s through the 1980s.

Officials and activists on both sides of the Iron Curtain embraced local and global trends during the Cold War. They recognized the challenges that inaction had caused, and therefore the importance of taking concrete steps to change the future. The Cold War added urgency to environmental questions as technology and consumption became battlegrounds between competing superpowers. These challenges extended beyond the United States and the Soviet Union to their blocs, and even to nonaligned countries.[24] East German environmental consciousness responded to a specific set of domestic and international impulses, but the issues raised there resonated across political and economic structures. Still, interactions were not always smooth. Activists and officials unintentionally and at times willfully interpreted information differently for cultural or political purposes.[25] Borders and limitations on interactions mattered, particularly for dictatorships and citizens of them, but neither environmental policy nor protest evolved in a vacuum.

[21] Eli Rubin, *Synthetic Socialism: Plastics and Dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 11.

[22] Eli Rubin and Scott Moranda, "Introduction," in *Ecologies of Socialisms: Germany, Nature, and the Left in History, Politics, and Culture*, eds. Sabine Moedersheim, Scott Moranda, and Eli Rubin (New York: Peter Lang Press, 2019), 3–4.

[23] BArch DC 20-I/3/948, "Vertrauliche Ministerratssache: Beschluß über eine Erklärung der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zur Stockholmer Umweltkonferenz vom 13. März 1972." RHG TH 02/01, "Woanders Gelesen – *Horizont* Nr. 8/1988, 'Brundtland Bericht: Umwelt und Entwicklung'."

[24] J. R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger, "Introduction: The Big Picture," in *Environmental Histories of the Cold War*, eds. McNeill and Unger, 16. Simo Laakkonen, Viktor Pal, and Richard Tucker, "The Cold War and Environmental History: Complementary Fields," *Cold War History* 16, no. 4 (Fall 2016), 377–394.

[25] Andrew S. Tompkins, "Grassroots Transnationalism(s): Franco-German Opposition to Nuclear Energy in the 1970s," *Contemporary European History* 25, no. 1 (February 2016), 118.

The Environment in the GDR

Since the GDR's inception, the Soviet model of intensive industrial production resulted in extensive pollution that plagued the regime, deteriorating the environment and its citizens' health. The Soviet Union compelled its satellite states to specialize in certain economic sectors in order to compete with western European countries.[26] Coal, steel, and the chemical industry featured prominently in the GDR's economy, which quickly became the strongest in the bloc (aside from the Soviet Union itself).[27] The state's scarce natural resources were imbued with national significance for a better future, though Soviet directives and geographic limitations forced the GDR to rely on antiquated technologies and noxious energy sources.[28] The GDR's primary energy source, lignite, released high levels of particulate matter that polluted the air and led to staggering rates of respiratory illness.[29] Additionally, the presence of sulfur in the coal precipitated acid rain when burned, killing forests in the GDR as well as in neighboring countries.[30] This emphasis on heavy industry resulted in the extreme pollution and public health crisis of towns like Bitterfeld. In a system in which the state was both the polluter and the regulator, the responsibility of balancing political realities, economic needs, and nature conservation weighed heavily on the SED.

Party and state officials quickly recognized that pollution had social and cultural consequences that complicated their pursuit of unchecked economic growth. In a dictatorship, social and cultural matters were inherently political, and as a workers' state, the GDR felt obligated to shape and control them in the workers' interest.[31] Starting in the 1950s, the SED established environmental associations in its tightly controlled mass social organization, the Cultural League, as a sign of the party and state's commitment to nature. In particular, the Cultural League's Friends of Nature and *Heimat* – later reinvented as the Society for Nature and the Environment – carried out these objectives.[32] The SED drew on German

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[26] André Steiner, *The Plans that Failed: An Economic History of the GDR* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 71.

[27] Ibid., 12. [28] Maier, *Dissolution*, 82.

[29] RHG Th 02/08, "PSEUDOKRUPP – Krankheitsverlauf und Therapie," undated.

[30] *Waldsterben* or "dying of the forests" did not come into common usage until roughly 1980, and then primarily in the West German context as a plank in the Green Party's platform. Into the late 1980s, East German officials denied that Waldsterben existed in the GDR. Uekötter, *The Greenest Nation?*, 113ff. BArch 5/5829, "Informacja o stanie środowiska naturalnego na terenach Dolnego Śląska, a w tym głównie w rejonach graniczących bezpośrednio z NRD i CSRS," March 1–3, 1988.

[31] Jarausch, "Care and Coercion," 59–60.

[32] Alon Confino, *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871–1918* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 125–126.

traditions of popular engagement with nature that dated back to the nineteenth century.[33] It encouraged conservation, landscape preservation, and hiking among other activities as a means of embracing Heimat, a German concept linking a sense of national identity to nature. Officials specifically sought to cultivate an East German Heimat that would bolster the fledgling socialist nation.[34] They relied on these traditions to publicize that they were confronting environmental degradation. Together, these measures raised East Germans' awareness of the natural world and signaled that the state prioritized its wellbeing.

The environment became a front in the Cold War for the East German leadership, which competed with the capitalist west to "outperform" in terms of conservation and consciousness.[35] For both domestic and diplomatic purposes, the GDR claimed to be at the forefront of the global debate over the dangers of economic growth, consumption, and their impact on the planet.[36] The GDR consequently vied for prestige abroad and popular support at home through its awareness of environmental concerns.[37] In the 1968 version of the constitution, the SED declared citizens' right and responsibility to a clean environment, claiming a commitment to providing for workers' cultural and spiritual wellbeing in a workers' state.[38] The SED further declared "socialist environmentalism" an essential component of East German society at the VIII Party Congress in 1972 and subsequently established the Ministry for Environmental Protection and Water Management (MUW).[39]

Over the course of the 1970s, the state built up a cohort of scientists and experts to specialize in environmental research and to implement

[33] Thomas M. Lekan, *Imagining the Nation in Nature: Landscape Preservation and German Identity, 1885–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); John Alexander Williams, *Turning to Nature in Germany: Hiking, Nudism and Conservation, 1900–1940* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Jan Palmowski, *Inventing a Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday Life in the GDR, 1945–1990* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[34] Palmowski, *Inventing a Socialist Nation*.

[35] McNeill and Unger, eds., *Environmental Histories of the Cold War*; Astrid Mignon Kirchhof and J. R. McNeill, eds., *Nature and the Iron Curtain: Environmental Policy and Social Movements in Communist and Capitalist Countries, 1945–1990* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2019).

[36] Joachim Radkau, *The Age of Ecology: A Global History*, trans. Patrick Camiller (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014), 92.

[37] Laakkonen, Pal, and Tucker, "The Cold War and Environmental History".

[38] Artikel 15, Absatz 2, Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1968. Konrad H. Jarausch, "Introduction," in *Dictatorship as Experience*, ed. Jarausch, 6.

[39] BArch DK 5/4454, "Entwurf: Prognostische Grundlagen über die Entwicklung von Hauptrichtungen des Umweltschutzes," November 1973, Zeitweilige Arbeitsgruppe "Zur Entwicklung des Umweltschutzes."

regulation in the newly formed ministry. In the Academy of Sciences, experts theorized about the importance of the environment to socialism, generating an entire body of literature on the subject.[40] Universities introduced new fields of study relating to ecology, biology, and environmental protection, and the graduates of those programs entered into state-run research institutes or the MUW. Scientists recorded pollution levels, invented new technologies, and proposed and applied solutions, such as installing filters in smokestacks, ameliorating chemical spills into waterways, and recycling water more efficiently. At the ministry, they also addressed petitions (*Eingaben*) from frustrated citizens who sought relief from a range of environmental problems.[41] Scientists and experts, moreover, often took part in party-sponsored clubs to disseminate appropriate information to the public.[42] A generation of experts, then, became caught between furthering environmental protection within the party and state apparatuses, on the one hand, and being required, from 1982, to maintain secrecy regarding all environmental data, on the other.

The SED's stance on environmentalism created a conundrum; the party raised environmental expectations without committing the resources necessary to execute them. The GDR and socialist states more generally considered themselves immune to environmental issues because they worked in the name of the people without profit motive. The SED believed this position provided them a moral high ground in contrast to capitalist countries. Still, socialist solutions put forward through policy and mass social engagement did not dramatically improve environmental conditions. In the second half of the GDR's existence, pollution levels plateaued, and in some instances, worsened without investment in new technologies or structural change.[43] More and more, the GDR turned inward, restricting access to data for domestic and international audiences, which tacitly admitted the SED's failure. East Germans operated on the principle – underdelivered by

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[40] Horst Paucke and Adolf Bauer, *Umweltprobleme: Herausforderung der Menschheit* (Dietz Verlag: Berlin, 1979). Umweltbibliothek Großhennersdorf (UBG) 80–113, Klaus Kluge in *Mensch und Umwelt: Aus dem Protokoll eines Kolloquiums des Kulturbundes der DDR* (Berlin: Kulturbund der DDR, 1975).

[41] Stadtarchiv Halle A. 40 Nummer 19, Band 1, "Konzeption zur Entwicklung der Umweltbedingungen in der Stadt Halle bis 1990," 1987 and Nr. 41, Bd. 5, "Zuarbeiten der Abteilung Umweltschutz und Wasserwirtschaft, 1973/74."

[42] Evangelisches Zentralarchiv (EZA) 101/633, Dr. Sabine Rackow, "Stellungnahme zur Vorlage des Johann-Gerhard-Institutes zum Thema 'Christ und Umweltverschmutzung'," February 4–5, 1972. BArch DK 5/1982, "Bericht über Probleme des Geheimnisschutzes bei Informationen zum Umweltschutz," October 25, 1982.

[43] *Umweltbericht der DDR: Information zur Analyse der Umweltbedingungen in der DDR und zu weiteren Maßnahmen* (West Berlin: Institut für Umweltschutz, 1990), 7.

their own government – that an active citizen and good socialist should both know the importance of the environment and demand its protection.

In response to degradation, and taking seriously the state's environmental imperative, a second strain of environmentalism unfolded in the Protestant Church. The Church presented an alternative to the socialist interpretation, shaping ordinary East Germans' understanding of nature.[44] Through institutions, such as the Ecclesiastical Research Center in Wittenberg and parish-based groups, engaged individuals took part in protecting and saving God's creation. Clergy attended the World Council of Churches' conventions on science and technology, while supporting activists in the parishes and taking up the state's offer to join party or state environmental organizations. East Germans engaged in both Church and official organizations and became "dual participants," breaking down traditional divisions between the two sets of actors.[45] Moreover, parish-based groups sprang up all over the country from the Baltic Sea to the Erzgebirge to the Thuringian Forest, decentering a Berlin-based narrative of opposition and dissent.[46] Activists organized workshops, seminars, tree planting campaigns, and bicycle demonstrations.[47] They further recorded their impressions in Church-sponsored publications and self-published underground, or "samizdat," newsletters and pamphlets.[48] Religious organizations supported East Germans' awareness of pollution

[44] Mary Fulbrook, *The People's State: East German Society from Hitler to Honecker* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 251.
[45] BArch DO 4/800, Hans-Peter Gensichen, "Eine neue Phase des Umweltengagements in den Kirchen," *Die Zeichen der Zeit* 7/88, Heinz Blauer, ed., Berlin (Ost), Evangelische Verlagsanstalt. BArch DO 4/801, "Zu den staatlichen, gesellschaftlichen und kirchlichen Aktivitäten zur Realisierung einer sachlichen und sachbezogenen Zusammenarbeit beim Schutz und der Erhaltung von Natur und Umwelt seit dem 20.8.84," April 24, 1985.
[46] RHG Ki 18/02, "Die Karteibroschüre der kirchlichen Umweltgruppen in der DDR: Stand vom November 1988." East Berlin was a hotspot of opposition, and much of the scholarship has noted that fact, but environmental activism is exceptional in that it resonated in so many parts of the GDR, both in and beyond East Berlin: Gareth Dale, *Popular Protest in East Germany, 1945–1989* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 125–131; Carlo Jordan and Hans Michael Kloth, eds., *Arche Nova: Opposition in der DDR, "Das Grün-ökologische Netzwerk Arche," 1988–90* (Berlin: BasisDruck, 1995); Wolfgang Rüddenklau, ed., *Störenfried: DDR-Opposition 1986–1989, mit Texten aus den "Umweltblättern"* (Berlin: BasisDruck, 1992).
[47] Uwe Zuppke, "Aus der Tätigkeit des Zentrums für Umweltgestaltung," in *Umweltschutz in der DDR: Analysen und Zeitzeugenberichte, Band 3: Beruflicher, ehrenamtlicher und freiwilliger Umweltschutz*, eds. Hermann Behrens and Jens Hoffmann (Munich: Oekom, 2008), 73.
[48] Mary Fulbrook, "Putting the People Back in: The Contentious State of GDR History," *German History* 24, no. 4 (October 2006), 613; Dale, *Popular Protest*, 124–125; Nathan Stoltzfus, "Public Space and the Dynamics of Environmental Action: Green Protest in the GDR," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 43 (2003), 399; Dieter Rink, "Environmental Policy and the Environmental Movement in East Germany," *Capitalism, Nature, and Socialism* 13, no. 3 (September 2002), 79–81.