

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

What legal principles govern the external exercise of the public power of states within common law legal systems? *Foreign Relations Law* tackles three fundamental issues: the distribution of the foreign relations power between the organs of government; the impact of the foreign relations power on individual rights; and the treatment of the foreign state within the municipal legal system. Focusing on the four Anglo-Commonwealth states (the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand), Campbell McLachlan examines the interaction between public international law and national law, and demonstrates that the prime function of foreign relations law is not to exclude foreign affairs from legal regulation, but to allocate jurisdiction and determine applicable law in cases involving the external exercise of the public power of states: between the organs of the state, among the national legal systems of different states, and between the national and the international legal systems.

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Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-89985-7 - Foreign Relations Law
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University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521899857

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First published 2014

Printed in the United Kingdom by CPI Group Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

McLachlan, Campbell, author.

Foreign relations law / Campbell McLachlan

pages cm

ISBN 978-0-521-89985-7 (hardback)

1. International law. 2. International relations. I. Title.

KZ3410.M425 2014

342'.0412-dc23

2014007710

ISBN 978-0-521-89985-7 Hardback

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CONTENTS – SUMMARY

<i>Preface</i>	<i>page</i> xv
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xxiii
<i>Table of cases</i>	xxv
<i>Table of treaties</i>	1
<i>Table of legislation</i>	lix
<i>List of abbreviations</i>	lxxii
I SOURCES	1
1 Function	3
2 Development	31
3 The interaction of international and municipal law	77
II THE FOREIGN RELATIONS POWER	111
4 The executive	113
5 Parliament	149
6 The judiciary	219
III FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE INDIVIDUAL	259
7 Civil claims against the state	261
8 Human rights claims	295
9 Diplomatic protection	347
IV THE FOREIGN STATE	375
10 Personality and representation	377
11 The claimant state	419
12 The defendant state	477
<i>Bibliography</i>	547
<i>Index</i>	573

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CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>	<i>page</i> xv
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xxiii
<i>Table of cases</i>	xxv
<i>Table of treaties</i>	1
<i>Table of legislation</i>	lix
<i>List of abbreviations</i>	lxxii

I SOURCES 1

1 Function	3
A The function of law in foreign relations	3
1 Contesting the law's exclusion	3
2 The allocative function of foreign relations law	7
3 The foreign relations law of the Anglo-Commonwealth states	10
4 The exclusionary doctrines and their reappraisal	14
5 Foreign relations law at the interface of international and municipal law	18
B The scope and structure of this study	21
1 Sources	22
2 The foreign relations power	24
3 Foreign relations and the individual	27
4 The foreign state	29
2 Development	31
A Introduction	31
B The development of common law thought on foreign relations	33
1 Locke – the federative function of the executive	33
2 Blackstone and Mansfield – the prerogative and international law	42
3 Dicey – a Victorian exclusionary <i>acquis</i>	49
4 Mann – private rights and the containment of public law	59

C A Commonwealth foreign relations law	64
1 From imperial to autonomous foreign relations power	65
2 The Australian Constitution – distribution of foreign relations powers	69
3 The interaction of international law and municipal law	77
A Introduction	77
1 Transmission or reception?	79
2 Constitutional functions	80
3 Interpretation and application distinguished	82
4 The application of general international law as a question of allocation	85
B The allocative function of public international law in foreign relations	91
1 Inter-state relations referred exclusively to the plane of international law	92
2 The allocation of jurisdiction between states by public international law	94
3 Statehood	96
4 The allocation of state responsibility	96
5 The application of rules of international public order to choice of law	98
C International law within a constitutional allocation of functions	100
1 Parliamentary control of the criminal law	101
2 Judicial control of executive regulation	105
D Conclusion	109
II THE FOREIGN RELATIONS POWER	111
4 The executive	113
A The exercise of the foreign relations power within the constitution	113
B Foreign affairs as executive policy	115
C Limitations	121
1 Legislation	121
2 Judicial review	123
3 Public international law	124
D Specific applications	126
1 Treaty-making	126
2 Deployment of armed forces	129

Contents

xi

E	The allocation of foreign relations powers between the United Kingdom and the European Union	141
1	The principle of conferral	144
2	EU external competence	145
3	The intergovernmental common foreign and security policy	146
5	Parliament	149
A	Introduction	149
1	The point of departure: the exclusion of Parliament's role	152
2	Parliament's foreign affairs role in political philosophy	153
B	The treaty power: review or approval?	161
1	Australia	162
2	New Zealand	167
3	Canada	171
4	United Kingdom	174
5	Comparison of Commonwealth constitutional responses	178
C	Supervision of the executive	181
1	Functions of foreign affairs select committees	182
2	Limits of parliamentary powers of executive accountability	185
D	Prescriptive jurisdiction in the external exercise of public power	190
1	Principles of construction and public international law	193
2	Real and substantial territorial connection	198
3	Nationality	203
4	Specific powers conferred by international law – universal jurisdiction	207
5	Conclusion on prescriptive jurisdiction	217
6	The judiciary	219
A	Introduction: the allocation of functions between the judiciary and the executive	219
B	Jurisdiction and the function of justiciability	223
1	Allocation to the executive: policy or law?	225
2	Allocation to the plane of public international law	232
C	Stay of proceedings for executive abuse of enforcement jurisdiction	236
D	Evidence	239
1	The executive certificate and acts of recognition	240
2	Public interest immunity and foreign state evidence	248

III FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE INDIVIDUAL	259
7 Civil claims against the state	261
A Introduction: the plea of act of state	261
B The state's act at home against its own national	263
C The state's act at home against a foreign national	264
D The state's act abroad against its own national	266
E The state's act abroad against a foreign national	276
1 The slavery suppression cases	278
2 The colonial acquisition cases	281
3 Torts committed by Crown servants abroad	285
4 Claims impleading inter-state relations	289
5 Armed conflict	291
8 Human rights claims	295
A Habeas corpus	295
1 Application to foreign nationals	297
2 Application externally to control in fact	298
B Human rights: the Anglo-Commonwealth context	305
C The scope of application: general principles	309
1 Textual provisions	311
2 The fallacy of reference to the doctrine of jurisdiction	315
3 The adoption of a disaggregated approach	326
D The external exercise of state power: specific instances	332
1 Effective control over an area	332
2 State agent authority and control	334
E Conclusion	345
9 Diplomatic protection	347
A Introduction	347
1 The contemporary allocative function of diplomatic protection	347
2 The extent of the common law duty to protect	353
B The development of public law duties	358
1 United Kingdom	358
2 South Africa	363
3 Australia	364
4 Canada	366
C The implications of protection	371

<i>Contents</i>	xiii
IV THE FOREIGN STATE	375
10 Personality and representation	377
A Introduction	377
1 The foreign state in the municipal legal system	377
2 Executive recognition and judicial application of law	379
B The legal personality of the foreign state in Anglo-Commonwealth law	380
1 The functions of recognition in municipal law	380
2 Implications of the change in recognition policy	382
3 The legal character of the executive certificate as to recognition	386
C The foreign state's claim of direct right or interest	391
1 Where the state is recognised by executive certificate	391
2 Where the executive certifies that the entity is not recognised as a state	393
3 Where there is no, or no clear, executive certificate	397
D The vindication of private rights and interests in unrecognised states	402
1 Precedent for avoidance of the consequences of non-recognition	402
2 Statutory reform as to the status of foreign corporations	406
3 The emergence of a new common law principle protecting private rights	408
E The representation of the state: the competence of governments	412
1 Where no question arises as to effective control	412
2 Where exceptionally the executive does certify recognition	413
3 Where effective governmental control is in doubt	414
11 The claimant state	419
A Introduction	419
1 The function of rules on the enforcement of foreign state claims	419
2 The limits of enforcement jurisdiction in international law	422
3 The connection with the conduct of foreign relations	424
4 The essential distinction between sovereign and private law claims	427
B The admissibility of specific types of foreign state claims	434
1 Restitution of state assets	434
2 Cultural heritage	441
3 Securities and environmental regulatory recoveries	447

xiv	<i>Contents</i>	
	4 Tax recoveries	452
	5 Penal claims and the recovery of the proceeds of crime	459
	6 Protection of state secrets	466
	C State seizure of private property	470
	D Conclusions	474
12	The defendant state	477
	A Introduction	477
	1 Adjudication of foreign state conduct in the municipal court	477
	2 Implications from the principle of domestic jurisdiction	480
	3 The allocative function of rules on the claims against foreign states	484
	B Judicial jurisdiction and foreign state immunity: general principles	488
	1 Sources of state immunity law in Anglo-Commonwealth states	488
	2 The functions of rules of state immunity	494
	3 The relationship with the exercise of judicial jurisdiction	499
	4 The exercise of sovereign or governmental authority	502
	5 The identity of the state	505
	C The allocation of jurisdiction over foreign states for specific types of act	508
	1 The foreign state's commercial or private acts in the forum	509
	2 The foreign state's commercial acts in private international law	511
	3 The exercise of the foreign state's sovereign power at home	513
	4 The exercise of the foreign state's sovereign power in the forum	517
	D Applicable law and the foreign act of state	523
	1 Foreign governmental acts in private international law	526
	2 Intergovernmental acts in public international law	539
	<i>Bibliography</i>	547
	<i>Index</i>	573

PREFACE

[E]very international dispute is of a political character, if by that is meant that it is of importance to the State in question. Thus viewed, the proposition that some legal questions are political is an understatement of what is believed to be the true position. The State is a political institution, and all questions which affect it as a whole, in particular in its relations with other States, are therefore political . . . [but] it is equally easy to show that all international disputes are, irrespective of their gravity, disputes of a legal character in the sense that, so long as the rule of law is recognised, they are capable of an answer by the application of legal rules.

Hersch Lauterpacht, *The Function of Law in the International Community* (1933)

I don't think intellectuals do very well talking about the need for the world to be democratic, or the need for human rights to be better respected worldwide. It's not that the statement falls short of the desirable, but it contributes very little to either achieving its goal or adding to the rigour of the conversation. I think the way to defend and advance large abstractions in the generations to come will be to defend and protect institutions and law and rules and practices that incarnate our best attempt at those large abstractions.

Tony Judt, *Thinking the Twentieth Century* (2012)

Why, in the early twenty-first century, write a book about the principles of Anglo-Commonwealth law applicable to the foreign relations of the state? After all, the developments of the late twentieth century might seem, at first glance, to have increasingly marginalised the significance of the state in international affairs. In economic terms, the forces of globalisation have served to make national borders highly porous. The architecture of international economic law, in which the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand – the states whose legal systems are the object of the present study – are all committed participants, has developed to such an extent that it is now possible to assert that the real issues are not determined by the old tension between national sovereignty and international norms, but rather by the resolution of conflicting values and interests within the international legal system.¹ In this matrix, states jostle for position alongside multinational corporations as the holders of the levers of both economic power

¹ Howse 2010.

and legal rights and duties. All four states are, in any event, now part of wider economic unions that place common objectives above national interest.

Moreover, in the broader landscape of public international law, arguably the most significant developments of the close of the twentieth century have all concerned not states but individuals. It is the human rights of individuals, as well as their criminal responsibilities, that have seen the most dramatic shift in the preoccupations of international law. A new breed of international courts and tribunals may preserve a formal priority for national adjudication (whether through the exhaustion of local remedies or complementarity), but in practice have shifted much attention to the remedies on the international plane that were not there before. It is these courts that have variously placed former heads of state in the dock, or vindicated the claims of citizens against their own states, whose decisions command attention – not merely that of international lawyers, but also increasingly that of national politicians and the public.

Is not, then, a renewed focus on the determination, particularly within municipal legal systems, of issues concerning relations between states more than a little anachronistic? The very notion of ‘foreign relations’ implicitly seems to treat everything outside the home state as somehow ‘foreign’ to domestic concerns. There is, to be sure, a strand in the contemporary debate about the relationship between international law and national legal systems that would seek to treat international law as ‘foreign’. Certainly, much of the heat in this debate has been because it has exposed to view ‘deep anxieties’² about the proper locus of control over law-making.

The instinctive reaction of the international lawyer is to dismiss such concerns as parochial. But for present purposes the more significant point is that the battle lines for the new debate about the place of international law within municipal legal systems have more often been drawn around the place of international human rights norms within domestic law. These issues serve to pit the individual against the state. The individual need not be a citizen. He or she may well be a foreign national, claiming either at the border as a refugee or would-be migrant, or within the territory. But such cases do not directly implead a foreign state and do not appear, at least at first sight, to provoke questions of foreign relations. The map of this terrain may be unfamiliar to Anglo-Commonwealth national judges, but such cases fall squarely within a traditional and accepted function of the judicial branch of government within Anglo-Commonwealth legal systems, namely the protection of the rights of the private individual against the state. It is only much more recently that they have been perceived as necessarily requiring re-examination of the traditional common law view of the exercise of the foreign relations power.

² Charlesworth, Chiam, Hovell & Williams 2003.

Nor has the contemporary debate about the relationship between international law and national law been confined to Anglo-Commonwealth countries. On the contrary, it has received renewed global scholarly attention. In this, the work of scholars reflects the greatly increased volume of national court decisions on matters of international law. But the preoccupations of national courts are not self-induced. The courts themselves mirror the extent of adoption of international treaties by national legislatures, reflecting the ever increasing range and depth of the concerns of public international law as a source of legal rights and duties that reach deep into what were once exclusively domestic domains, taking it far beyond its traditional role as a law of inter-state relations. Here, too, the tendency of the global debate (as often also the first reflex reaction of the courts) has been to sidestep, and thus not to address, the reserved domain of foreign relations issues, seen as 'political' and not legal.³ All too often, when such concerns do surface, as arguments of state immunity, or lack of jurisdiction or non-justiciability, they are perceived as residual and somewhat anachronistic concerns that serve only to impede the full achievement of the dominion of the new positive mandate of international law.

Why, then, revisit the legal principles governing the foreign relations of the state as a specific concern of a set of municipal legal systems? To this question, I advance three answers: personal, doctrinal and historical.

I owe my own interest in the topic to my legal education and to my earliest professional experiences three decades ago, first at the Commonwealth Secretariat and then in legal practice. Law, as it was taught at Victoria when I studied there in the 1980s, was decidedly not seen in hermetically sealed compartments. On the contrary, public law and public international law, as taught by Quentin-Baxter and Keith, were seen as intimately related disciplines, even if only the first glimmerings of a renewed acceptance of this were discernible in the courts.⁴ So, too, my first introduction to private international law, under Anthony Angelo, emphasised its comparative dimension⁵ and the often contestable interface between private and public law claims.

My earliest forays into multilateralism were seen through the prism of the pursuit of a new role for the Commonwealth, as a modern post-imperial grouping of states, with a common legal inheritance. Following an earlier academic interest,⁶ I spent 1985 working at the Legal Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat in London. At that stage, the role of municipal courts was very much on the agenda. Commonwealth states were attempting to find new cooperative ways to extend access to their courts for claims of a governmental character. New Zealand had signally failed to recover through the English courts

³ Nollkaemper 2011.

⁴ *Ashby v Minister of Immigration* [1981] 1 NZLR 222, (1981) 85 ILR 203.

⁵ McLachlan 2008a. ⁶ McLachlan 1984.

a Maori store-house panel put up for auction at Sotheby's in London.⁷ Its failure led to an initiative for a Commonwealth scheme in 1985 – my first experience of a multilateral negotiation, with all its attendant perils. At about the same time the British Government brought suit in the Australian and New Zealand courts to seek to prevent publication of *Spycatcher*, the memoirs of a British spy,⁸ decisions that led to much debate about the extent to which the other national courts could be used to prosecute claims of this kind.⁹ A subsequent Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, in the initial establishment of which I was closely involved, began by focusing on the role of national judges in the implementation of human rights standards.¹⁰

When I joined the London firm of Herbert Smith, my interest in the position of foreign states generally in municipal law took centre stage. Claims involving sovereign states formed an important element in the practice of the firm, in particular in the practice that I came to have working with Lawrence Collins (now Lord Collins of Mapesbury). But the topic of foreign relations was also a major topic of intellectual interest and discussion. The practice group had been headed by F. A. Mann, who continued to work in the firm as a consultant on a daily basis until his death in 2001. I had the pleasure (if that is the right expression, given the forthright manner in which he would dissect my clumsily expressed views) of many discussions with Dr Mann. I owe an immeasurable intellectual debt to Lawrence Collins and to Mann. Indeed, the first idea for this book, which was conceived in 2003 and has therefore been a decade in the making, was as a sort of sequel to Mann's ground-breaking *Foreign Affairs in English Courts*, published in 1986, which still stands as the first real attempt to conceptualise English law in this field.

Mann wrote in his preface to that work that it could not be treated as more than a 'sensible opening gambit', given that the law in the field 'displays much confusion of thought and lack of precision'. My hunch was that another attempt, in the light of several further years of case law, might be worthwhile. Mann had argued as long ago as 1943¹¹ that foreign affairs were as capable of regulation by national law and adjudication by national courts as other questions, and that 'national courts should as far as possible resist the tendency of replacing it by the idea of political expediency'.¹² I wished to examine the extent to which subsequent developments in case law and statute, then only beginning,¹³ might bear

⁷ *Attorney General of New Zealand v Ortiz* [1984] AC 1, (1982) 78 ILR 591 (CA).

⁸ *Attorney General (UK) v Wellington Newspapers Ltd* [1988] 1 NZLR 129 (CA); *Attorney General v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd* (1987) 10 NSWLR 86, affd (1988) 165 CLR 30.

⁹ McLachlan 1990.

¹⁰ Commonwealth 'The Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms' (1988) 14 CLB 1196.

¹¹ Mann 1943b, repr. in Mann 1973, 391. ¹² *Ibid.*, 418.

¹³ *R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 3)* [2000] 1 AC 147, (1999) 119 ILR 135 (HL); *Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 & 5)* [2002] UKHL 19, [2002] 2 AC 883, 125 ILR 602; *Thomas v Baptiste* [2000] 2 AC 1, (1999) 123 ILR 508 (PC).

out Mann's argument and enable the construction of the resulting set of principles into a coherent whole.

Not only did this seem to be a much needed exercise in itself, in view of the relative absence of other doctrinal work in the field.¹⁴ It was also prompted by my desire to see whether a distinctively Anglo-Commonwealth approach to foreign relations law could be articulated, which might provide an alternative within the common law family to the highly developed body of US foreign relations law. The latter had been shaped by a set of deliberately different decisions taken by the framers of the United States Constitution. Increasingly, in the latter half of the twentieth century, both case law and academic writing bore the imprint of the United States' own imperial position. Whatever else might be said about that (and of course much has and should be said about it), it serves to reduce the potential relevance of US foreign relations law as a model to guide the development of principle in other countries. So a distinctively Anglo-Commonwealth foreign relations law might provide an alternative account.

But what I could not have fully foreseen when I first conceived this project was the extent to which a welter of new problems presented to the courts in the last decade would serve to return foreign relations issues to centre stage in Anglo-Commonwealth countries. In this sense, the project has taken on a highly contemporary salience and urgency. It has been argued with some cogency by Kent Roach that a substantial amount of this new litigation amounts to 'substitute justice' provided by Anglo-Commonwealth courts at the behest of plaintiffs who have been unable to obtain relief against the United States in its own courts for claims of human rights abuses in the so-called 'war on terror' post the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001.¹⁵

Whatever the proximate cause, one of the effects of this new-style foreign relations litigation has been to collapse the separation between the two strands of reception of international law within the domestic legal system. Indeed, such litigation has often served to expose apparently profound conflict between what might be called statist concerns – jurisdiction, immunity, the prerogative of the Crown in foreign affairs – and the new agenda of human rights protection. Both sides of these arguments have sought support from principles of public international law. The effect has been to drive competing international law principles (such as jurisdiction and human rights obligations) into apparent conflict. The courts have had to look afresh at some too easy assumptions about the principles of law governing foreign relations that they previously took for granted. In

¹⁴ 'Foreign Relations Law' in *Halsbury's Laws of England* (4th edn, C Parry & JG Collier (eds), Butterworths, London, 1977) vol 18 (now revised as 'International Relations Law' in *Halsbury* 2010) was an important exception, but focused mainly on the substantive rules of public international law. The nature of *Halsbury* does not, in any event, provide a framework for the re-evaluation of traditional doctrine.

¹⁵ Roach 2013.

undertaking these tasks, the judiciary has faced a set of problems that had been largely unanticipated, and therefore under-theorised. Anglo-Commonwealth courts have not always reached uniform conclusions in their resolution of these issues. Nevertheless, the decisions of the last decade show a remarkable persistence of the common law both as a prime source of underlying principle and as a legal community for the sharing of ideas. So, if this work is found to be at all useful, it may be judged on the extent to which it begins to supply a principled and coherent framework for the many issues that the courts have, of necessity, had to work out ad hoc as claims have been presented to them.

I am conscious of the fact that individual human rights claims involving foreign relations issues, however important they now are as a subject of foreign relations law, have a tendency to pit the individual against the state and in the process to vilify the state. Such litigation often casts the state, whether home or foreign, as the perpetrator of abuses. Pleas based on foreign relations interests can, in this context, appear as attempts to avoid substantive engagement and redress. From the opposite perspective of the foreign ministry legal adviser, opening a second domestic front for the adjudication of international law issues can be a substantial and unwelcome distraction from the implementation of foreign policy. The international affairs of states are, to be sure, shaped by public international law, but this operates on the international plane, and directly between states. What good reasons of principle justify the elaboration of a further sphere of foreign relations law within the municipal polity?

Looked at as a matter of the history of ideas, it may be said that the foundations of the modern liberal constitutional state, at least in England, were laid on the notion of a strict separation between the domestic and the foreign affairs of the state. Only the former could legitimately be the subject of municipal legal regulation. John Locke was explicit about this. He considered that ‘the *Laws* that concern *Subjects* one amongst another, being to direct their actions, may well enough *precede* them. But what is to be done in reference to *Foreigners*, depend[s] much upon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests’.¹⁶ The conclusion that he drew from this is that the conduct of foreign affairs, which he termed the exercise of the federative power, ‘must necessarily be left to the *Prudence* and *Wisdom* of those whose hands it is in, to be managed for the publick good’. The early work of the common law jurists served only to emphasise this exclusion of foreign affairs from the new constitutional polity at home. Blackstone, giving full vent to his royalist tendencies, wrote in 1783: ‘In the king, therefore, as in a centre, all the rays of his people are united, and form by that union a consistency, splendour, and power, that make him feared and respected by foreign potentates’.¹⁷ Dicey, writing in the newer language of constitutional government a century later, nevertheless continued to assert that

¹⁶ Locke 1690, II, [147]. ¹⁷ Blackstone 1783, Bk I, 252.

the transfer of real power from the monarch to the Cabinet: 'leaves in the hands of the Premier and his colleagues, large powers which can be exercised and constantly are exercised free from Parliamentary control. This is especially the case in all foreign affairs.'¹⁸ The judges, especially those who, like Lord Eldon LC, also served in the Cabinet, enthusiastically pursued the consequences of this separation for the scope of judicial power. 'What right have I, as the King's Judge', asked Lord Eldon rhetorically in a decision still cited as a foundational authority on the municipal effect of the non-recognition of a foreign state, 'to interfere upon the subject of a contract with a country which he does not recognise.'¹⁹

But the world of the early twenty-first century is not that of the early nineteenth century. Rules and practices created as servants of the exigencies of Britain's expanding empire need to be re-evaluated in order to see whether the principles that underlie those rules remain relevant today. In any event, as will be seen, the law reports provide ample empirical evidence for the proposition that issues of foreign relations cannot be excluded from domestic concern. The contracting scope of state immunity and the growing cross-border commercial and regulatory agendas of states have brought the foreign state into national courts to an unprecedented extent. The actions of the home state abroad have been subjected to review as never before as a result of the new range of remedies afforded to individuals under human rights legislation. Meanwhile the growing impact of law made in multilateral fora on the domestic statute book has led all the Anglo-Commonwealth states to review the role of Parliament in foreign affairs, particularly as regards the treaty-making process.

The purpose of this book, then, is to put this separation of the foreign and the domestic legal spheres to the test and to argue that the exercise of the external public power of the state is properly subject to legal regulation and cannot be cast beyond the pale in a nebulous zone of executive discretion and non-law. It is necessary to emphasise immediately, since this proposition forms the basis for much of the analysis that is to follow, that this is not to say that all issues of foreign relations should therefore be treated as properly the subject of litigation before the municipal courts of the forum. On the contrary, my argument is that the main function of foreign relations law, properly conceived, is allocative. That is to say, it serves to determine which court, national or international, domestic or foreign, has jurisdiction over a legal claim; which law applies to that claim; and which of the three branches of constitutional government is empowered to determine a foreign relations question. Whether this structure for analysing the many different problems of foreign relations law is found convincing and useful, the reader will have to decide on consideration of the whole work. The important point to stress at this stage is the fundamental point that foreign relations is properly

¹⁸ Dicey 1886, 393. ¹⁹ *Jones v Garcia del Rio* (1823) T & R 297, 299, 37 ER 1113.

the subject of principled legal analysis. It does not sit in some extra-legal no-man's-land.

This means, too, that foreign relations law sits in a positive account of the enduring purpose of the modern constitutional state. Tony Judt concludes his magisterial history of Europe since 1945 not (as might have been expected) with the view that the emergence of the European Union had led to the withering away of the nation state, but rather with the opposite opinion, that '[d]istinctive nations and states had not vanished.'²⁰ Judt contends that this is all the more remarkable given the extent to which the state had been discredited earlier in the twentieth century and the subsequent assault on the primacy of the state as a result of globalisation. He points out:

The illusion that we live in a post-national or post-state world comes from paying altogether all too much attention to 'globalized' economic processes . . . and assuming that similarly transnational developments must be at work in every other sphere of human life.²¹

Judt contends that the nation state retains today as much as it ever did the two prime functions of the early modern state, namely its right to wage war externally and its right to maintain order internally. The question in each case for the modern constitutional state is the extent to which and the manner in which each of these powers is to be contained by the rule of law. Anglo-Commonwealth countries remain committed in a deep sense to the idea of a liberal constitutional state operating within the rule of law both within their respective national legal systems and as participants in the international legal system. The present work exposes to view some of the cases that have put that commitment to the test. No doubt in some instances, the system, as any human system, may be found wanting. If this work has a larger positive significance, it will be because the solutions found in the Anglo-Commonwealth states may serve as useful guidance more generally by demonstrating that the state strengthens rather than weakens its essential functions in the field of foreign relations by subjecting them to law.

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1 January 2014

²⁰ Judt 2005, 798. ²¹ *Ibid.*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book has been a long time in the making. I therefore wish to thank first my publishers Cambridge University Press, and in particular my commissioning editor Finola O’Sullivan, who from the outset had faith in the potential value of the project and maintained that faith throughout the book’s long gestation. The institution that more than any other was responsible for helping me to turn an idea into reality is the New Zealand Law Foundation. The award of the Foundation’s International Research Fellowship in December 2010 enabled me to begin work in earnest in 2011, spending time on sabbatical in Oxford. The Foundation also funded invaluable research assistance in Wellington. It is a precious institution, stimulating and supporting a wonderful array of original legal research. The other institution that helped nurture the project is All Souls College, Oxford, which awarded me a Visiting Fellowship in 2011. The college of (among others) Blackstone and Dicey, it provides a remarkable environment for a sustained piece of research. I benefited greatly from the hospitality and the academic engagement of the fellowship there.

Many friends and colleagues have willingly contributed their reactions as my ideas have developed, enriching my own thinking with their own deep experience. These include Dapo Akande, Alan Boyle, Joel Colon-Rios, Lawrence Collins, James Crawford, Treasa Dunworth, Claudia Geiringer, Guy Goodwin-Gill, Amelia Keene, Ken Keith, Ben Kingsbury, Patrick Kinsch, Karen Knop, Harold Koh, Vaughan Lowe, Iain Macleod, Bill Mansfield, Paul McHugh, Geoff McLay, Geoffrey Palmer, Kent Roach, Rabinder Singh and Jeremy Waldron.

I wish to mention three people in particular who have helped me bring this project to fruition. Colin Warbrick (Emeritus Professor, University of Birmingham) generously read and commented on much of the manuscript. Colin has written illuminatingly on many of the topics covered in this book over the course of his distinguished career. It has been an immeasurable assistance to me to have the benefit of his insightful comments and encouragement. At home in the Law School at Victoria University of Wellington, I owe a special debt to Rayner Thwaites – a remarkable young public law scholar. Despite the many calls on his time (not least his own fine new book on the liberty of the

non-citizen¹) he has always been willing to listen and to read as my thoughts developed, constantly helping me to distil the essence of what I wished to say. Also at Victoria, I wish to thank Maria Hook. With the assistance of the Law Foundation, I was able to retain Maria as Research Fellow in the Law School to help me on the project. I cannot imagine how I could have completed a work of this scale without her scholarly preparation of research materials and meticulous editing of my drafts. Her work has been exemplary. She has a very promising academic career ahead of her.

Finally, I wish to thank my family: my wife Rhona and my children Ishbel, Duncan, Sandy, Hector and Lachie. They have never complained about the countless hours that I have spent in my study at the top of the house and have always encouraged me to carry through the project to its present completion. It could not have been done without their love and support.

All responsibility for the views expressed (and for any errors) is mine alone.

The law is stated as at 1 November 2013.

¹ Thwaites 2014a.

TABLE OF CASES

This table contains an alphabetical listing of all cases cited in the text. References are to (i) the neutral citation (where adopted); (ii) the relevant official reports series (or best alternative, where the case is not officially reported); and (iii) the *International Law Reports*.

A v Secretary of State for the Home Department ('Belmarsh Prison') [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68, 137 ILR 1; reversing [2002] EWCA Civ 1502, [2004] QB 335	3.15, 7.41
Re A B & Co [1900] 1 QB 541 (CA)	5.130
Abdelrazik v Canada 2009 FC 580, [2010] 1 FCR 267	3.89
Ablyazov v JSC BTA Bank [2011] EWCA Civ 1588	11.51
Agassi v Robinson (Inspector of Taxes) [2006] UKHL 23, [2006] 1 WLR 1380	5.124
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Preliminary Objections) [2007] ICJ Rep 582; (Merits) [2010] ICJ Rep 639	9.04, 12.109
Ahmed v H M Treasury [2010] UKSC 2, [2010] 2 AC 534, 149 ILR 641; reversing [2008] EWCA Civ 1187, [2010] 2 AC 534	1.20, 3.66, 3.82–4, 3.86, 3.90, 3.92, 3.96, 7.41, 12.166
Ahmed v The Queen [2011] EWCA Crim 184	6.57
Airbus Industrie GIE v Patel [1999] 1 AC 119 (HL)	6.103
Air Canada v Attorney General of British Columbia [1986] 2 SCR 539	4.32
AK Investment CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC 7, [2012] 1 WLR 1804	12.141
Al-Adsani v Kuwait (1996) 107 ILR 536 (Engl CA)	12.102
Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (App No 35763/97, 21 November 2001) 34 EHRR 11, 123 ILR 24 (ECtHR GC)	12.52, 12.86, 12.102
Alcom v Republic of Columbia [1984] AC 580, (1984) 74 ILR 170 (HL)	12.43
Aleksic v Canada (Attorney General) (2002) 215 DLR (4th) 720 (Ont)	4.54, 7.75

In re Al-Fin Corporation's Patent [1970] Ch 160, (1969) 52 ILR 68	10.13, 10.77
Al-Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence [2010] EWCA Civ 758, [2011] QB 773	3.91, 7.05, 7.35–8, 7.42, 7.43, 7.44
Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (App No 27021/08, 7 July 2011) 147 ILR 107 (ECtHR GC)	3.91, 8.99, 8.114, 8.120, 8.122
Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37, 219 CLR 562	3.15
Al-Koronky v Time-Life Entertainment Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1123, [2006] CP Rep 47	12.141
Al-Rawi v Security Service [2011] UKSC 34, [2012] 1 AC 531	6.93, 6.104
Al-Saadoon v United Kingdom (Admissibility) (App No 61498/08, 30 June 2009) 49 EHRR SE11; (Merits) (2 March 2010) 51 EHRR 9, 147 ILR 1	8.76, 8.97, 8.114, 8.115, 8.119
Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (App No 55721/07, 7 July 2011) 147 ILR 181 (ECtHR GC)	1.01, 8.37, 8.85, 8.97, 8.101, 8.103, 8.105, 8.106, 8.127, 8.128, 8.130
A Ltd v B Bank [1997] I L Pr 586, (1996) 111 ILR 590 (CA)	12.146
Amchem Products Inc v British Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) [1993] SCR 897	5.139
Amin v Brown [2005] EWHC 1670, 132 ILR 656	6.68
AM Luther Co v Sagor [1921] 3 KB 532, (1920) 1 ILR 47 (CA); reversing [1921] 1 KB 456, (1920) 1 ILR 47	6.66, 10.50, 10.52, 10.58, 10.64–7, 11.134, 12.135, 12.148, 12.149, 12.159
Amnesty International Canada v Canada (Minister of National Defence) 2008 FCA 401, [2009] 4 FCR 149 (Can), affirming 2008 FC 336, [2008] 4 FCR 546	8.91, 8.123
Amodu Tijani v Secretary of Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 399 (PC)	7.61
Anderson, ex p (1861) 3 El & El 487, 121 ER 525	8.10
The Annette [1919] P 105, (1919) 1 ILR 43	10.30
Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim (No 3) [1991] 2 AC 114, (1991) 85 ILR 1 (HL)	10.08, 10.74
The Arantzazu Mendi [1939] AC 256, (1939) 9 ILR 60 (HL); affirming [1939] P 37 (CA); affirming [1938] P 233	1.37, 2.22, 6.60, 10.35, 10.50, 10.90
Arar v Syrian Arab Republic (2005) 127 CRR 2d 252 (Ont)	12.102

Table of cases

xxvii

Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, (2005) 146 ILR 1	8.68, 8.96
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) [2002] ICJ Rep 3, (2002) 128 ILR 1	5.166, 5.169, 5.178, 5.186, 12.30
Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222, (1981) 85 ILR 203	xvii
Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd v Anglo-Persian Oil Co Ltd [1916] 1 KB 822 (CA)	6.89
A/S Tallinna Laevauhisus v Estonian State Steamship Line ('The Vapper') (1947) 80 LI L Rep 99, 13 ILR 12 (CA)	12.140
Attorney General v DeKeyser's Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508 (HL)	4.25
Attorney General v Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA)	7.62
Attorney General v Tomline (1880) 14 Ch D 58	9.28
Attorney General for Canada v Attorney General for Ontario [1937] AC 326, (1937) 8 ILR 41 (PC)	1.35, 2.102, 2.116, 3.11, 4.39, 5.09, 5.84, 5.93
Attorney General of Canada v R J Reynolds Tobacco Holdings Inc 268 F 3d 103 (2d Cir 2001)	11.94
Attorney General for Canada v Schulze (1901) 9 SLT 4 (Court of Sess)	11.86
Attorney General for the Commonwealth v Tse Chu-Fai [1998] HCA 25, (1998) 193 CLR 128, 114 ILR 383	6.75–6, 6.87
Attorney General for England and Wales v R [2007] 2 NZLR 347 (CA)	12.127
Attorney General for England and Wales v R (the 'Bravo Two Zero' case) [2003] UKPC 22, [2004] 2 NZLR 577; affirming [2002] 2 NZLR 91 (CA)	1.51, 11.123–6
Attorney General for Fiji v Robert Jones House Ltd [1989] 2 NZLR 69, (1988) 80 ILR 1	10.17, 10.83–4, 10.94
Attorney General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC)	11.56
Attorney General (Israel) v Eichmann (1962) 36 ILR 5 (SC Israel)	3.74
Attorney General of New Zealand v Ortiz [1984] AC 1, (1982) 78 ILR 591 (CA)	xviii, 2.86, 11.04, 11.08, 11.24, 11.25, 11.31, 11.60–5, 11.67
Attorney General (UK) v Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 30; affirming (1987) 10 NSWLR 86	xviii, 6.74, 11.12, 11.15, 11.17, 11.27–8, 11.33, 11.70, 11.118–22, 11.124, 11.126, 11.127, 11.141

Attorney General (UK) v Wellington Newspapers Ltd [1988] 1 NZLR 129 (CA)	xviii, 6.61, 6.74, 11.16, 11.118–22, 11.124, 11.126, 11.127, 11.141
Attorney General of Zambia v Meer Care & Desai et al [2008] EWCA Civ 1007; reversing [2007] EWHC 952	11.53
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v PT Garuda Indonesia (No 9) [2013] FCA 323, 212 FCR 406 (Aust)	3.35
Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America) [2004] ICJ Rep 12, (2004) 134 ILR 95	9.15
Avowal Administrative Attorneys Ltd v District Court at North Shore [2008] 1 NZLR 675	11.93
AY Bank Ltd v Bosnia and Herzegovina [2006] EWHC 830, [2006] 2 All ER (Comm) 463, 149 ILR 614	12.185
Ayres v Evans (1981) 39 ALR 129 (FC)	11.95
Baker v Canada [1999] 2 SCR 817, (1999) 148 ILR 594	5.32
Banca Carige SpA v Banco Nacional de Cuba [2001] 1 WLR 2039, (2001) 124 ILR 550	12.30
Banco de Vizcaya v Don Alfonso de Borbon y Austria [1935] 1 KB 140, (1934) 7 ILR 158	11.50
Banković v Belgium (App No 52207/99, 12 December 2001) 44 EHRR SE5, 123 ILR 94 (ECtHR GC)	8.33, 8.37, 8.41, 8.56, 8.63–4, 8.76, 8.79, 8.86, 8.91, 8.105, 8.130
Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v Slatford [1953] 1 QB 248 (CA); reversing [1953] 1 QB 248, (1951) 18 ILR 171	11.130, 11.131, 11.137, 11.140
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co Ltd (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, (1970) 46 ILR 178	9.07, 12.165
Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477, 55 ILR 11	4.17, 4.27, 4.29
Baxter v RMC Group plc [2003] 1 NZLR 304	7.65
Behrami v France; Saramati v France (Admissibility) (App Nos 71412/01 & 78166/01, 2 May 2007) 45 EHRR SE10, 133 ILR 1 (ECtHR GC)	8.33, 8.110, 8.121
Bennett v H M Advocate 1995 SLT 510 (HCJAC)	6.56
Ben Nevis (Holdings) Ltd v Commissioners for HM Revenue & Customs [2013] EWCA Civ 578, [2013] STC 1579	11.94
Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC 786, 145 ILR 529	7.66–9, 7.75, 7.86
Blackburn v Attorney General [1971] 1 WLR 1037, (1971) 52 ILR 414 (CA)	4.86, 6.42
Blackburne v Thompson (1812) 15 East 81, 104 ER 775	6.67

Table of cases

xxix

Blad's Case (1673) 3 Swans 603, 36 ER 991; (1674) 3 Swans 604, 36 ER 992	12.170–2
Blain, ex p; in re Sawers (1879) LR 12 Ch D 522 (CA)	1.36, 2.62, 2.68, 5.124, 5.127
Blunden v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 73, (2004) 218 CLR 330	7.32
Re Bolton, ex p Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514	8.01
Boumediene v Bush 553 US 723 (2008), 137 ILR 605	8.04, 8.07, 8.08, 8.18, 8.20
Bouzari v Iran (2004) 71 OR (3d) 675, 128 ILR 586 (Ont CA)	12.47, 12.102
Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356 (HL)	7.40
Briggs v Baptiste [2000] 2 AC 40, (1999) 123 ILR 536 (PC)	3.15
British Arab Commercial Bank plc v National Transitional Council of the State of Libya [2011] EWHC 2274, 147 ILR 667	1.37, 6.66, 10.85, 10.86, 10.93
British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moçambique [1893] AC 602 (HL)	2.49, 2.63, 2.70, 2.73, 2.74, 12.151, 12.152, 12.153
Brokaw v Seatrain UK Ltd [1971] 2 QB 476 (CA)	11.91
Brownhall v Canada (2007) 87 OR (3d) 130	7.75
Buck v Attorney General [1965] Ch 745, (1965) 42 ILR 11 (CA)	9.18, 12.51, 12.138
Bumper Development Corp v Comr of Police of the Metropolis [1991] 1 WLR 1362 (CA)	11.67
Burmah Oil Company Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75, (1964) 41 ILR 10 (HL)	7.17–19, 7.39, 7.76, 7.85
Burns v R [2002] EWCA Crim 1324	6.57
Buron v Denman (1848) 2 Ex 167, 154 ER 450	2.55, 2.56, 2.57, 2.60, 7.42, 7.45, 7.50–5, 7.70, 7.73, 7.79, 7.82, 9.02
Burt v Governor-General [1992] 3 NZLR 672 (CA)	6.28
Buttes Gas & Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1982] AC 888, (1981) 64 ILR 331 (HL); reversing [1981] 1 QB 223 (CA)	6.15, 6.95, 12.22, 12.141, 12.169, 12.173–7, 12.177, 12.182
Buvot v Barbuit (1736) Tal 281, 25 ER 777	2.40
Caglar v Billingham (Inspector of Taxes) [1996] STC (SCD) 150, (1996) 108 ILR 510	10.48, 10.76
Cail v Papayanni ('The Amalia') (1863) 1 Moore PCCNS 471, 15 ER 778 (PC)	5.124
Calder v Attorney General [1973] SCR 313, (1973) 73 ILR 56	7.62
Calvin's Case (1608) 7 Co Rep 1a, 77 ER 377	9.19, 9.23, 9.25
Camdex International Ltd v Bank of Zambia [1997] CLC 714	11.91

Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204, 98 ER 1045	2.56, 7.48, 7.61
Canada (Attorney General) v Almalki 2011 FCA 199, [2012] 2 FCR 594 (Can); partly reversing 2010 FC 1106, 377 FTR 186	6.107, 6.108
Canada (Attorney General) v Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in relation to Maher Arar 2007 FC 766, [2008] 3 FCR 248	6.107
Canada (Attorney General) v Khawaja 2007 FC 490, [2008] 1 FCR 547	6.107
Re Canada Labour Code [1992] 2 SCR 50, (1992) 94 ILR 264	12.74
Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr 2010 FCA 199, [2012] 1 FCR 396	9.67
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853, (1966) 43 ILR 23 (HL)	6.73, 6.87, 10.44, 10.68–71, 10.72, 10.76, 10.78
Carr v Francis Times & Co [1902] AC 176 (HL)	12.154–5, 12.156
Celiberti de Casariego v Uruguay (Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/13/D/56/79, 29 July 1981) 68 ILR 41	8.102
Certain questions of mutual assistance in criminal matters (Djibouti v France) [2008] ICJ Rep 177, (2008) 148 ILR 1	3.58, 9.03, 12.55, 12.109
Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] AC 763 (HL)	4.50, 6.18, 6.19–23
The Charkieh (1873) LR 4 A & E 59	10.33, 12.124
Chen Li Hung v Ting Lei Miao [2000] 1 HKLRD 252 (CFA)	10.78, 10.79, 10.81
China Navigation Co Ltd v Attorney General [1932] 2 KB 197 (CA)	4.47, 4.48, 4.49, 9.27, 9.29, 9.84
Chow Hung Ching v The King (1948) 77 CLR 449, 15 ILR 147	12.113
Chung Chi Cheung v The King [1939] AC 160, (1938) 9 ILR 264 (PC)	3.19, 3.24, 3.26
City of Berne in Switzerland v Bank of England (1804) 9 Ves Jun 347, 32 ER 636	10.26, 10.31
City of Gotha v Sotheby's, The Times, 8 October 1998	11.67
Civil Aeronautics Administration v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2004] SGCA 3, 133 ILR 371	10.59
Civilian War Claimants Association v R [1932] AC 14, (1931) 6 ILR 237 (HL)	9.18
In re Claim by Helbert Wagg & Co Ltd [1956] 1 Ch 323, (1955) 22 ILR 480	11.137, 12.147, 12.163
Clark (Inspector of Taxes) v Oceanic Contractors Inc [1983] 2 AC 130, (1982) 78 ILR 526 (HL)	5.124
Commercial and Estates Co of Egypt v Board of Trade [1925] 1 KB 271, (1924) 2 ILR 423 (CA)	3.56, 7.15, 7.39