THE BIRTH OF CRITICAL THINKING IN REPUBLICAN ROME

In this classic work, now appearing in English for the first time, Claudia Moatti analyses the intellectual transformation that occurred at the end of the Roman Republic in response both to the political crisis and to the city's expansion across the Mediterranean. This was a period of great cultural dynamism and creativity when Roman intellectuals, most notably Cicero and Varro, began to explore all areas of life and knowledge and to apply critical thinking to the reassessment of tradition and the development of a systematic new understanding of the Roman past and present. This movement, linked to the development of writing, challenged old forms of authority and adhesion, belief and behaviour, without destroying tradition; and for this reason this rational trend can be described not as a cultural but as an epistemological revolution whose greatest achievement, Professor Moatti argues, was the development of Roman legal science.

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> The Enlightenment is man's emergence from a state of self-imposed immaturity for which he himself was responsible. A state of self-imposed immaturity is the inability to make use of one's own comprehension without direction from someone else.
>
> Immanuel Kant, 'What is Enlightenment?'

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Foreword

Malcolm Schofield

This is a book about 'the critical spirit'. It is also a book about crisis: political and cultural crisis in the Rome of the late Republic. The words 'critical' and 'crisis' – the one belonging to the discourse of knowledge, argument, rationality, the other a medical metaphor applied to analysis, particularly historical analysis, of social and political change – share a common Greek provenance. But it is comparatively unusual to find critical reason and political and cultural crisis examined in the same context, and even more unusual to find a writer conceiving what Claudia Moatti describes as the 'vast yet precise ambition' of understanding how political and cultural crisis prompted the birth of the critical spirit: at any rate in the Rome she brings before the reader's eyes.

'Crisis' suggests among other things the loss of bearings, of any clear sense of direction: conditions that can readily be imagined as debilitating. When a Cicero or a Livy sees the *res publica* – the Roman commonwealth – as endangered by calamity or shipwreck or worse, what is immediately communicated is dismay. But crisis can also be energizing. And what Moatti charts here is the dynamism it fuelled, in a society in which, for all its upheavals, thought and action were still free, and free therefore to be innovative. She presents a record of extraordinary creativity, as Rome was transformed from a traditional culture, in which much that had been important was transmitted secretly and tacitly, and when not tacitly by oral communication, into a world where writing became the 'laboratory of knowledge', and a new public forum open to dialogue and debate and scrutiny of authority was brought into being.

The names of a great variety of writers and writings from the late Republic, many now obscure to us, will confront the reader of this book. But two well-known authors are the dominant figures, illustrating the two most characteristic forms taken by critical reason as they are delineated in *The Birth of Critical Thinking in Republican Rome*. One is Cicero, the great orator, by his own account saviour of the Republic in the year of his

consulship, but also an indefatigable letter writer and author of a remarkable corpus of theoretical treatises and philosophical dialogues. The other is his contemporary Varro, the supreme Roman encyclopedist, whose literary output – mostly now lost – was vast. Treatises on agriculture and grammar survive, in the latter case only in part. Moatti discusses many aspects of these intellectual enterprises. But she explores at length one subject which was evidently a key focus for both writers: religion.

Critical analysis of religion is seen at work in two very different registers in Cicero and Varro, in each case, however, in response to a single phenomenon: the gradual dimming of collective memory, and consequently the growing inaccessibility of Rome's religious, legal and linguistic heritage. Cicero sees sound traditional religious practice as threatened both by superstition, particularly as represented by divination, and by Stoic rationalization of superstition. He deploys against them the philosophical armoury of the sceptical Academy, not to negate traditional institutions and practices, but to confer on them new legitimacy and new meaning. Varro's aim, in the last sixteen of the forty-one books of his *Human and divine antiquities*, was not dissimilar. Rome's civic religion was in his view a human invention, necessary, however, for the city's well-being. Reason's obligation as he saw it was to recover by antiquarian research knowledge of traditions, to identify their purest original strains, and to present the results in systematic form. In him, as in Cicero, religion has become not just orthopraxis (if performed scrupulously and without contamination from superstition), but a topic for debate: debate nonetheless undertaken – by them if not by Lucretius – with the practical intent of preserving the main authentic patterns they believed Roman religion to have assumed from time immemorial.

At one point Moatti recalls some words addressed to Varro by Cicero in his *Academica*:

> We were wandering and straying about like visitors in our own city, and your books led us, so to speak, right home, and enabled us at last to realize who and where we were. You have revealed the age of our native city, the chronology of its history, the laws of its religion and its priesthood, its civil and its military institutions, the topography of its districts and its sites, the terminology, classification, and moral and rational basis of all our religious and secular institutions.

Rediscovery and recovery of Roman identity are what Cicero celebrates here in Varro's enterprise. But in truth Varro was turning living tradition into text – indeed into a database. Internalized ancestral knowledge

becomes objectified ancient history. In the hands of Cicero and Varro authority begins to leach away from custom to reason: reason is what supplies the methodology enabling the sifting of what is authentic from the inauthentic in habitual practice and belief, and making it possible to determine the validity of the norms underpinning the social, political and moral order, as Cicero will endeavour to show in *On Laws*.

Another remark of Cicero's, this time from one of his political speeches, is quoted early in the book. It dates from the time of the triumvirate of Pompey, Crassus and Julius Caesar before the civil war that was prelude to the final collapse of Republican government, when Cicero felt himself under pressure to support a proposal to prolong Caesar's military command in Gaul: 'Can I be the enemy of this man whose dispatches, whose fame, whose envoys fill my ears every day with fresh names of races, peoples and places?' The Romans' imperialist project had made the world their oyster. It sparked intense curiosity, particularly apparent in the surge of ethnographic and geographical writing in the late Republic that is documented here. Cicero himself at one time contemplated writing a book on geography, and needless to say Varro composed several works on geographical subjects, although as Moatti argues Caesar's own *Gallic War* is the richest surviving witness to the dispassionately critical cast of Roman geographical inquiry.

The openness of the Roman imperial experience was in the end to transform not just their understanding of the complexity of the world they inhabited, but their sense of their own identity. The gradual extension of Roman citizenship, albeit of different grades and entitlements, to great numbers of the peoples they conquered or dominated, inevitably created a new form of political entity and a more global conception of citizenship. Crucial to its success was the elaboration of law as a system defining citizenship and governing relations between citizens. Moatti argues that in law the Romans invented a *mode* of thinking about society in general and abstract and potentially universal terms: a distinct form of reason itself – and indeed the greatest achievement of reason at Rome. The speculative heights of pure theory, or again scientific investigation pursued for its own sake, were characteristically Greek preoccupations that the Romans were never to emulate. That should not prevent us from appreciating how in the last decades of the Republic (and into the early decades of the Empire) the Romans' novel application of critical reason in a great variety of cultural and social forms transformed the way society was ordered and understood.

Claudia Moatti's eloquent and learned account of how and why all this happened was first published in French in 1997. Her book was pioneering

in the questions it asked and in the range and variety of the forms of evidence it deployed in answering them. At the time there was nothing like it available in English. Since then Anglophone scholarship has begun to catch on and catch up. Two outstanding examples have been Denis Feeney's *Caesar's Calendar* (2007) and Andrew Wallace-Hadrill's *Rome's Cultural Revolution* (2008). It is a pleasure to greet *The Birth of Critical Thinking in Republican Rome*, the English edition of *Reason in Rome*, as it joins that distinguished company.

Preface

> Those enlightened centuries resembled ours.
>
> Nicolas Fréret, 'Réflexions sur l'étude des anciens historiens', *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, VI, 1727

This is a historical essay concerning the thought of a particular century, an essay prompted by deep intuition, constantly renewed and constantly confirmed by the texts: namely, that the Roman Republic, even when distracted by external conflicts and civil wars, before sinking into the imperial regime, experienced an *intellectual revolution* under the auspices of reason. The truth of this troubled age lies not only in its clashes of arms but also in its spirit of rationality.

It may seem provocative to speak of reason in connection with Rome, when the concept remains so very Greek: ever since the 1960s, philosophers and historians have been examining the origins of Greek reason, its forms and the historical conditions in which it appeared. Was it necessary to attempt a similar demonstration for Rome if Roman reason supposedly resembled that of its neighbour? The Latin word *ratio*, from which the 'reason' of all Romance languages stems, certainly covers almost all the meanings of the prestigious *logos*, but neither philosophy, nor political experience, nor science *had* the same history in Rome as in Greece. To be sure, the philosophical and rhetorical uses of this term underwent considerable development between the second and the first centuries BCE, but the original sense of 'an account or a calculation' never disappeared from its history.[1]

Without neglecting the multiple meanings of *ratio*, we shall no longer dwell upon them any more than we shall be analysing the idea of reason. The present book does not propose to speculate on the notion of rationality, or to enumerate all the rational aspects of Roman civilization. It has a

[1] On Greek reason, see especially Vernant 1962 and Vidal-Naquet 1981. For studies on the Latin word *ratio*, see Yon 1933 and Frank 1992.

vast yet precise ambition: firstly, to understand how it was that, from the second century onward, Roman society switched to something radically new; and also to describe the appearance, in this period, of discourses and practices detectable simultaneously in thought, knowledge and sources of power, all of which were rational or aimed to be so. It is this common aim that concerns us.

The 'rationality' of those discourses and those practices is constituted by the fact that they manifest a notion of criticism, understood as a capacity to break away, to question and to formalize, in other words as a reflexive ability. No doubt some will detect here solely the influence of Greek philosophy, but the appearance of such a phenomenon cannot be understood as a fashion imported from elsewhere. It expresses a manner of apprehending the world that, to be sure, involves philosophy, but that also goes beyond. So this concept of reason should be understood at once as a *principle of thought* thanks for which it is possible to distinguish and separate, to judge and refute; also as a *norm* that can underpin certainty and truth as opposed to the traditional model of authority; and, finally, as a universal *method* of organization and classification. This age was seeking general categories that could frame reality, think through and control diversity and subsume historical particularities. Through this creation of forms and through the construction of a new logical order that encompassed historical singularities without destroying them, Rome would impose its universality.

In all these aspects through which a society discovers the positive value of thought and judgement, reason becomes rationality in its logical operations, rationalism in its progress towards abstraction, and rationalization in its obsession with finding order and meaning. (It seems probable that, in history, it is always the third form that ends up prevailing.) Reason always has a history: but that does not mean that it is born and dies, that there is a 'before it' and an 'after it', that an enlightened form of the human mind takes over from a primitive type of thinking. What it does mean is that the rational process takes root at a certain point in certain conditions but without excluding other trends, yet undergoing many changes; after all, how many times in history has critical reason turned into dogmatism?

The inherent interest of such a question would in itself be enough to justify a study of this period. But something even more important was at work: the formation of a Roman identity. Between the second and the first centuries, when they were coming brutally into contact with the most diverse peoples, in particular the Greeks, the Romans were turning back to their own past. They were 'inventing' their tradition, establishing it

theoretically and critically in a huge endeavour of remembering that also involved forgetting and selecting. They located it within a new unifying logic, reconstituting a detailed chronology more or less precisely and also elaborating its *topoi*: those which, with a few variants, would gain acceptance right down to the Renaissance, which would then take them over. From the Principate onward, it was not to tradition itself that one referred but to the intellectuals who had established it. And in the centuries that followed, antiquarian erudition simply took the form of a lengthy commentary on the pioneers of the Republic. In the fifth century CE, Augustine reflected on the nature of Rome, the city of Man par excellence, and was still referring to Varro, Sallust and Cicero; Symmachus, one of the last pagans, was repeating the words of Livy; and in the fifteenth century, Flavio Biondo began his *Antiquities* with a citation from a Republican text, an extract from a letter sent by Quintus to his brother Cicero. If Varro and Cicero and those others were singled out in this way, it was not only because they were great writers, but also because they established the city's memory. Thanks to them and their contemporaries, the traditions came to form a coherent whole; they were both set at a distance and also reappropriated, in an *essential tension*[2] between what was ancient and what was new: a sign of a dynamism that later centuries were to envy. The term 'reason' also covers the critical and formalizing process by which Rome's *raison d'être* was elaborated.

In this construction of an identity, two different factors played a major role. The first of these was the first-century granting of Roman citizenship to all the free inhabitants of the Italian peninsula, which had the concrete result of extending political society and the ruling class. As can be imagined, this certainly affected the composition of a collective memory and also the definitions of consensus, unity and even authority. The second factor was the diffusion of writing, which had prevented forgetting and constituted the laboratory of knowledge. Not that oral transmission disappeared; but intellectual tools were perfected and, above all, thought emerged outside the private space in which it had until then been confined.

Reversing an expression borrowed from André Malraux, you could say that a period that no longer finds its meaning in action may find it in the mind. Such was the case of late Republican society. And by 'the mind', I mean not only the discovery of philosophy or the extension of the ruling class's interest to cultural questions but also, precisely, the access of

[2] This expression is borrowed from Kuhn 1980: 305.

intellectual activity to the status of a public discipline, and the free expression of opinions and of divergences in the texts: all are means by which a secretive society may be transformed into a society engaged in dialogue.

Methodological questions about intellectual history

As Ernst Cassirer writes in the preface to *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, 'it is a matter of understanding the thought of a century not so much in its full range but in its depth, of presenting not the totality of its results and its historical manifestations, but the unity of its intellectual sources . . ., of revealing the internal movement taking place and the dramatic action in which it finds itself somehow engaged.' Such a programme cannot be taken for granted. What historical object could be more elusive than thought in the process of transformation and less describable in its completeness? How does one question questioning, clarify uncertainties and express what is not said? How does one seize upon that which is at once unstable, contradictory and dynamic? Yet that is what has attracted me: an intellectual history, that is to say not a study of mentalities or individual ideas, but one more formal, focused on concepts, debate and methods, and one more pragmatic: a study of their political and social effects in the construction of the Roman identity and universality.

It will no doubt be objected that it is surely hard to date the emergence of new forms of thought with precision. Those who study antiquity certainly know how deceptive, fragmentary and inexplicit sources may be. Yet their meaning is not always impenetrable. For my own part, although conscious of the fluctuating character of their chronology, I have chosen to follow the ancient authors' evidence on the changes that affected social structures and minds between the mid-second century and the 30s. For that evidence seems to me to be trustworthy given that it was corroborated by a bunch of converging signs, some stemming from actual reality, some from the imaginary representations of society, the one group illuminating the other. Out of this *conjunction* of forms and positive facts and this mass of more or less well-dated fragments, I have endeavoured to conjure up a picture that makes the whole scene 'intelligible'. But I am well aware that such unity would certainly not constitute a perfect representation, since not everything could be said or shown. More important here is to sketch in or even perhaps do no more than suggest the main outlines, however blurred they may be, both where they begin and where they fade away. From this point of view, the Augustan Principate manifests

a fundamental and very telling ambiguity. Presenting itself as a formal continuation of the Republic, but in reality breaking with the latter's openness, it retained certain of its aspects (the creation of a world of utility and management, for example), while rejecting others. It can thus be invoked as an illustration not only of certain tendencies of Republican society but also of its demise.

One might also object that in the last century of the Republic critical rationality was not the only form of thought. But surely a plurality of attitudes is characteristic of every age and often to be found even in a single thinker. One of the contributions made by the sociology of action has been to demonstrate that human beings live in a series of different worlds. In the history of thought, the rational and the irrational (insofar as it is possible to differentiate between them with certainty) coexist in many ways, whether they constitute separate trends or their forms intermingle: chronologies may be misleading and calculations may be mistaken, but they are nevertheless presented as forms of rationality, thereby indicating the latter's importance.

To explain some of these contradictions, we should also take into account the *different temporalities*, the two ways of thinking: the traditional way, which was set in the long term, and the more recent way, which, when it emerged, did not immediately cause the former to disappear. Just as when an old scientific theory survives alongside a new one, this double temporality even seems to be necessary. We should undertake a *synchronic* study of the emergence of critical rationality and its opposite principles which were, after all, indispensable for it to come into being. Finally, we should bear in mind that, when treated solely from a cognitive point of view, contradictions may seem irreducible, irresolvable. The history of ideas often hesitates over what seem to be contradictions, or else switches to doxography: consider, for example, those studies that limit themselves to analysing the influences of Greek philosophy, as if these constituted some foreign body in Roman thought. But as soon as one analyses the arguments, the intellectual tools and the forms of thought, a noticeable coherence, on the contrary, becomes detectable. In this way, one comes to see how it was that, in Rome, one could speak rationally about religion yet still respect its authority; one could try to explain divination reasonably yet still be an augur or a pontiff, and also how it was that Romans could remain traditionalists even as they produced a critique of tradition. The fact was that their approach had changed, even if the contents remained the same. Meanwhile they had engaged in epistemology.

A particular period thus thinks along many different lines, but it has a spirit, that is to say a style, of its own. By this I mean not the techniques

that it develops, or its view of life, or its ideas about the world (for instance, what so-and-so thinks about the origin of society and politics), but rather the language that expresses its aspirations: its grammar.[3] To describe that language and the forms it takes is to write history, for those forms are facts, just as events and representations are.

Such a 'formalist' agenda entails many consequences: in the first place, the need to neglect no domain. Law, art, grammar and political philosophy all provide evidence. In this history of modes of thought, culture as such does not hold a special place. It is but one of the historian's many objects, just as are the methods of administration and the law. In other words: erudition and administration use the same means, the same language. The fact that rhetoric invites one to transcend particular situations by resorting to general categories reminds one of the care that juridical practice devotes to establishing the rules of law and to subsuming particular experiences under general definitions; it also reminds one of the birth of a community spirit in first-century BCE Italy.

The formal point of view that I am adopting also makes it possible partially to extricate myself from an impasse, namely the question of Greek influences. Undoubtedly, this period owed a great deal to Greece but, in the first place, the rapidity with which the Romans assimilated those influences does not mean that they accepted them all. One of the rules governing acculturation is precisely that it involves selection and rejection. Secondly, the Romans did not use the Greek philosophical systems that were presented to them exactly as they were. With no sectarianism, they gleaned from them whatever interested them. The very idea of a system, if such a thing existed in Greece, did not impose: it confirms that moral life is possible without a systematic view of the world and it also raises the question of the relationship between truth and authority – a question that even resounded among a ruling class that was experiencing a complete social mutation. So one cannot really relate a Roman's political choices to his philosophical ones or find coherence, or rather orthodoxy, in the thinking of a Latin philosopher. The fact is that the Romans were not seeking content alone from philosophy: rather, what they wanted were methods of argumentation and decision. In law, it is striking to find that the influence of Hellenism was more or less limited to methods of forming concepts or of explaining. The same is true of many other domains. Such inspiration reappears in the Humanism of the Renaissance which, as

[3] For a theoretical approach to this problem, see Panofsky 1983, Dagognet 1975 and de Certeau 1982: esp. 79–82.

Eugène Garin has shown, differed considerably from the speculation of the medieval schools.[4] Rome is definitely on the side of the Renaissance, modernity and independent thinking. So it usually turns out to be impossible to gauge the influence of Greek philosophy. Especially as, even within a single school of thought, there were serious divergences and also as we do not always know which Greek texts (complete works or collections of doctrines?) the Romans were reading.

Consider the example of Greek logic. Cicero's *Topics* are presented as a translation of Aristotle's book of the same name. However, the work does not testify to any profound knowledge of Aristotle's work. Cicero probably never had access to the original, and besides, Aristotelianism was not well known in Rome. The grammarian Tyrannio and, more importantly, Andronicus of Rhodes did not start to publish the works of Aristotle until the second half of the first century.[5] Moreover, Cicero himself admits to intermingling a Stoic tradition that may in truth have been his only source. When he defines logic, both in his *Topics* and elsewhere too, that is the tradition to which he refers, and he delineates its principal methods: namely, the theory of definition, that of demonstration (syllogisms) and that of sophisms.[6] However, Cicero seems to be using not any specific Stoic source, for example Chrysippus, but rather a kind of common patrimony conveyed through second-century Stoic thought on the doctrines of Chrysippus.[7] We should also consider the role played by other Stoics: Posidonius, who was close to Pompey, Diodotus, a friend of Cicero's, and Antipater of Tyre, Apollonides and Athenodorus of Tarsus, who were linked with Cato of Utica. These two sources of inspiration, the one Aristotelian, the other Stoic, were clearly acknowledged by Cicero,[8] but here again, qualification is necessary: how much of this teaching was still available in Rome?

[4] Garin 1954.

[5] The date and the location of Andronicus' work are not well known. Moraux proposes dating his work around 46 (1973: 48–58), while Gottschalk proposes the 60s (1987: 1079–81). Both agree in locating the composition of his work in Athens. For my part, the date of 46 seems probable. It is at this time that Cicero offered a Latin translation of the *Topica*, a way for him to participate in an important intellectual movement and to do so in Latin.

[6] *Fin.* 1.22; cf. Sext. Emp. *Pyr.* 2.16–20. Stoic logic is presented three times in Cicero's works dating to 45–44: *De fato* (*passim*), *Academica Priora* (91–8) and *Topica* (26–34, 47–9 and 53–9). On Cicero and Aristotle, see Fortenbaugh and Steinmetz 1989.

[7] This doctrine came to be known in Rome from the second century BCE, either through Carneades (whose ideas were transmitted by Clitomachus and Philo of Larissa) or through Antiochus of Ascalon, an Academic close to the Stoics. See Baldassari 1985: 7, who refers specially to Boethius (*In Cic. Top.* 292.8 Orelli). On Antiochus, see Glucker 1978.

[8] *Top.* 6 and *Orat.* 11.5–7. On Cicero and Diodotus, see *Brut.* 309.

Cicero himself represents a typical example of this complicated situation. He refers explicitly to the Stoic Panaetius and he also follows Aristotle and the Peripatetics (but, again, it is not clear how much he knew about their work). However, his preference was for the Academy, or rather for a particular form of Academic thinking. It is, of course, important to define the sources of Ciceronian philosophy – and no historical question is without some interest – but that is a different investigation, involving the history of ideas or of acculturation. As the present work follows up the Latin texts, it cannot avoid citing Aristotle and Carneades, Plato and Panaetius, and even Hellenistic philosophy. But its true purpose is not to establish systematic filiations. To do so would, to some degree, be to succumb to what Marc Bloch called 'the illusion of origins'.[9] From my point of view, it seems more relevant to study Roman thinking without seeking to find in its shadow tutelary influences which, one way or another, would force comparisons. Instead, let us see what is Roman in Rome, that is to say whatever claims to be Roman and produces the desired effect. Another question is *why* the Romans turned to Greek philosophy for inspiration. So we must also determine the terrain in which it flourished and clarify the purposes assigned to these borrowings: Cicero, for his part, was not seeking to Hellenize his contemporaries; he was pursuing other aims.

I shall leave aside systematic comparisons between the Greek and the Latin philosophies and any attempt to draw up a list of borrowings and differences. We should also dismiss the idea that between the fifth and the first centuries, that is to say between classical Greece and the Roman Republic, a regression took place because the spirit of speculation had become less acute. It may well seem surprising that a civilization might be judged on the basis of its speculative faculties, as if periods of popularization and compilation necessarily mark a decline in the history of thought. Any such judgement is, after all, bound to be relative: in the eighteenth century, Herder regarded the French fashion for dictionaries as a sign of decline and weak creativity.[10] The *encyclopédistes* thought otherwise. Similarly, the Romans were conscious of living in an age of progress: there was more knowledge, a greater critical spirit and more books were available; in short, there was more enlightenment. Popularization also presupposed a 'democratization' of philosophy, or at least an extension of the educated class. Taking over from the Hellenistic period, which had embarked upon

[9] 1986: 85–9. [10] *Journal de mon voyage en l'an 1769*.

a slow and long endeavour of diffusion, Rome definitively completed this. But it did not do so by following up classical thought.

Finally, it has yet to be proved that the only authentic form of speculation is philosophical. The Romans developed another form: the law. They succeeded in transforming their concrete experiences into legal categories, universalizing them and formulating increasingly abstract rules and increasingly general definitions: that of citizenship, which was purely legal, with no reference either to soil or to blood, is one of the most forceful examples. Once this study is completed, we should therefore reconsider Alexandre Koyré's pejorative assertion that, unlike the Arabs, the Latins took no interest in either philosophy or science.

I should like to express my gratitude to Claude Nicolet, who has been directing my studies for close on twenty years, to Paul Veyne, for his faith in me, to Jean-Louis Ferrary, whose erudition and unstinting generosity have saved me from making many mistakes. I must also thank François Hinard and Clara Auvray Assayas for all the friendship and time that they have devoted, and Marie-Henriette Quet and Yann Thomas for their fruitful comments. Although they may not realize it, the present book owes much to Mario Bretone, Emilio Gabba, Aldo Schiavone and Cornelius Castoriadis. I also wish to recognize my debt to the Institut universitaire de France, which offered me the precious gift of time, and to the École française de Rome, to its directors and, in particular, to Noëlle de La Blanchardière and Christiane Baryla who, over several years, opened their library to me during the solitude of the months of August. Finally, I should like to acknowledge the part that Alain Borer has played. His companionship and vigilance throughout long years of work have never once failed me.