

Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	<i>page ix</i>
PART A. PACIFISM AND JUST WARS	
1 Introduction: Between the Horrors and Necessity of War	3
I. <i>Condemning War but Fighting for Peace</i>	6
II. <i>War and Contemporary International Law</i>	9
III. <i>Many Unjustified Wars but Few Criminal Leaders</i>	13
IV. <i>Minimalism, Consensus, and Solidarity</i>	17
V. <i>Summary of the Arguments of the Book</i>	21
2 Grotius and Contingent Pacifism	25
I. <i>Grotius on Just Wars</i>	27
II. <i>Grotius on Justifiable Killing in War</i>	30
III. <i>The Idea of Contingent Pacifism</i>	33
IV. <i>An Objection to Contingent Pacifism</i>	37
V. <i>Contingent Pacifism and International Law</i>	40
3 International Solidarity and the Duty to Aid	46
I. <i>A Historical Note</i>	47
II. <i>The Idea of an International Community</i>	51
III. <i>Solidarity of the International Community</i>	55
IV. <i>Objections</i>	60
V. <i>The Duties of Solidarity</i>	64
PART B. RETHINKING THE NORMATIVE AD BELLUM PRINCIPLES	
4 The Principle of Priority or First Strike	73
I. <i>Gentili and the Justification of Offensive War</i>	75
II. <i>Grotius on Fear of Attack</i>	78

	<i>III. First Strikes: The Priority Principle</i>	81
	<i>IV. Last Resort as the Ultimate Restraint</i>	84
	<i>V. Contemporary Warfare and the Priority Principle</i>	87
	<i>VI. International Law and the Priority Principle</i>	90
5	The Principle of Just Cause	94
	<i>I. Conversion of Heathens and Promotion of Democracy</i>	96
	<i>II. Paradigmatic Just Causes: Individual and Collective Self-Defense</i>	100
	<i>III. Reconceptualizing the Principle of Just Cause</i>	103
	<i>IV. Just Cause and the Element of State Aggression</i>	107
	<i>V. The Bifurcated Normative Principles of Jus ad Bellum</i>	110
	<i>VI. Rethinking the Separation of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello</i>	113
6	The Principle of Proportionality	117
	<i>I. Proportionality in Traditional Just War Theory</i>	119
	<i>II. Necessity and Proportionality in International Law</i>	124
	<i>III. Self-Defense and Proportionate Response</i>	126
	<i>IV. Proportionality and Minor Jus ad Bellum Principles</i>	129
	<i>V. Connecting Proportionality, Priority, and Just Cause</i>	133
PART C. THE PRECEDENT OF NUREMBERG		
7	Custom and the Nuremberg “Precedent”	141
	<i>I. Just War Theory and Aggression</i>	142
	<i>II. The Nuremberg “Precedent”</i>	146
	<i>III. Rules in International Law</i>	149
	<i>IV. Jus Cogens Norms and the Crime of Aggression</i>	152
	<i>V. The Conservative Approach to Custom</i>	156
	<i>VI. The Rules of the International Community</i>	159
8	Prosecuting Military and Political Leaders	163
	<i>I. The Admiral Doenitz Case</i>	165
	<i>II. Doenitz’s Defense</i>	168
	<i>III. The Ministries Case</i>	171
	<i>IV. Political Ministers and Waging War</i>	174
	<i>V. Roles and Actus Reus</i>	177
	<i>VI. A Successful Prosecution: Admiral Raeder</i>	181
9	Prosecuting Civilians for Complicity: The Krupp and I. G. Farben Cases	185
	<i>I. The Case against Krupp</i>	186
	<i>II. The Case against I. G. Farben</i>	191

	<i>Contents</i>	vii
<i>III. Judge Hebert's Concurring Opinion</i>		194
<i>IV. Mens Rea and Conspiracy</i>		198
PART D. CONCEPTUALIZING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION		
10	Defining State Aggression	207
	<i>I. What Is Aggression?</i>	209
	<i>II. Historical Roots of the Idea of State Aggression</i>	212
	<i>III. Waging Aggressive War</i>	218
	<i>IV. The Wrong of Aggression</i>	222
	<i>V. Who Decides? Another Lesson from Nuremberg</i>	225
11	Act and Circumstance in the Crime of Aggression	229
	<i>I. The Problem of Acts</i>	230
	<i>II. State Aggression as a Circumstance</i>	234
	<i>III. Participating and Being Liable</i>	239
	<i>IV. Participating in the Circumstances of War</i>	242
	<i>V. Revisiting the Superior Orders Defense</i>	246
12	Individual <i>Mens Rea</i> and Collective Liability	250
	<i>I. Conspiracy at Nuremberg</i>	251
	<i>II. Intent to Wage War</i>	256
	<i>III. Two Intentions</i>	260
	<i>IV. Conspiracy to Wage Aggressive War</i>	263
	<i>V. Collective Liability Schemes</i>	266
PART E. HARD CASES AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS		
13	Humanitarian Intervention	273
	<i>I. Humanitarian Intervention in International Law</i>	275
	<i>II. Immunity, Complicity, and Collective Liability</i>	278
	<i>III. The Applicability of the Doctrine of Double Effect</i>	283
	<i>IV. Collective Responsibility of States</i>	286
	<i>V. Defending Humanitarian Wars</i>	289
	<i>VI. Should Anyone Be Prosecuted for Humanitarian Wars?</i>	293
14	Terrorist Aggression	297
	<i>I. Piracy and Terrorism</i>	298
	<i>II. Legitimate Authority and Non-State Actors</i>	302
	<i>III. Similarities between State and Non-State Actors</i>	306
	<i>IV. Prosecuting Terrorist Aggression</i>	308
	<i>V. Terrorists and Due Process Rights</i>	312
	<i>VI. Human Rights after September 11, 2001</i>	315

15	Defending International Criminal Trials for Aggression	319
	I. <i>Koskenniemi's Critique of International Criminal Law</i>	320
	II. <i>The Diversity of Norms Defense</i>	324
	III. <i>Drumbl's Arguments about Retribution and Deterrence</i>	329
	IV. <i>Political Leaders Defending Themselves</i>	333
	V. <i>International Criminal Trials and Aggression</i>	338
	<i>Bibliography</i>	343
	<i>Index</i>	351