I

Framework

1

Introduction: "Two Worlds" of International Security

Bruce D. Jones and Shepard Forman

SETTING THE STAGE: HEGEMON CONSTRAINED?

On March 29, 2005, to the delight of the assembled diplomats, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan walked into the Security Council chamber and bested the United States.

It was fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, and ten years after France's President Chirac had termed the United States a "hyperpower."[1] In the previous two years, the United States had invaded Afghanistan and ousted the Taliban from its former safe haven and put on an extraordinary display of military might in the first phase of the Iraq war. The U.S. economy was operating with a massive surplus, and the U.S. military was not just unrivaled in contemporary terms but was realistically being described as the most powerful military force in history. In book after book, international relations scholars and historians eschewed the debate about whether there was an American Empire and turned their minds to such questions as: was the Empire good for American values and interests; was it liberal; was it stronger than the British Empire at its height; and how long it would last.[2]

Five years earlier, a confident American public, basking in eight years of prosperity and relative peace overseen by the Clinton administration, elected to office George W. Bush and the neoconservative wing of the Republican party, waving the flags of American dominance and contempt for multilateralism. "Nation building" was off the table, as was acquiescence to the belittling notion that the American superpower would submit its will to the vote and potential veto of the UN Security

---

[1] Chirac's Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine first used the term "hyperpower" publicly in 1999. See, Craig R. Whitney, "France Presses for a Power Independent of the U.S.," *New York Times*, November 7, 1999, Section 1, p. 9.

[2] For example, see, Andrew Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire* (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2004); Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2004).

Council,[3] a club of lesser states, weak-kneed Europeans, and dictators. China was to be contained, Russia managed, Europe directed, Africa aided; all from the enviable position of a power whose dominance was to be assured for the next generation.

This dominant, confident American government used its first weeks in office to repudiate the Clinton administration's decision, late and truculent though it was, to sign the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – the latest and arguably most daring innovation in international governance since the end of the Cold War. John Bolton, who was later to become Bush's ambassador to the UN, recalls in his memoirs that one of the happiest days in his career was in unsigning the Rome Statute.[4] Polite multilateralists like the amiable Secretary-General of the UN were to be treated in a manner reminiscent of a British diplomat's depiction of the late Qing dynasty's attitude to foreign envoys: "they were to be greeted with the utmost politeness, listened to with the utmost attention, and dismissed with the utmost courtesy." Later, he was to get rougher treatment.

If the tragic events of 9/11 shook the American public out of complacency and awoke the administration to the perils of far-flung corners of the globe, it certainly did not challenge the sense of the dominance of American power. So much so that when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reacted to the 9/11 bombing by offering to invoke, for the first time in the Alliance's history, the Article 5 provisions that compel its members to mobilize and to respond against an attack on another member, the administration (not very politely) turned down the offer. Several months later, the 2002 National Security Strategy, far from recognizing limits on dominance, articulated a policy of maintaining U.S. military dominance for the next generation. The result was what George Soros called "the bubble of American supremacy."[5]

And though events look different from the perspective of 2008, as we complete this volume, in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. toppling of the Taliban, Afghanistan seemed indeed to confirm, as did the early days of U.S. action in Iraq, that the United States had the will and power to project massive military and diplomatic might across the globe. The United States not only decided to launch a major military action without the support of the UN Security Council but actually did so defiantly against its expressed will. In fact, some within the U.S. administration had opposed the effort to gain Security Council backing, actively preferring to launch the attack on Iraq unilaterally, for the demonstration effect of U.S. power. The demonstration effect was there nevertheless, echoed in the administration's decision to entitle the first phase of their invasion the "shock and awe" campaign. The rapid destruction of Saddam Hussein's army by what many considered to be an undersized U.S. invasion force seemed to signal a triumph of American power projection.

[3] Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (January/February 2000), pp. 45–62.
[4] John Bolton, *Surrender is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad* (New York, NY: Threshold Editions, 2007), p. 85.
[5] George Soros, "The Bubble of American Supremacy," *Atlantic Monthly* (December 2003), pp. 63–66.

By mid-2004, falsely secure in victory in Iraq, the U.S. administration turned its attention to other troubles. First up was Lebanon, where Syria had earned U.S. ire by its opposition to the war and its actions in purported support of the ousted Hussein regime. Here, the United States scored another victory, using diplomatic pressure to compel a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, this time with the cooperation of France and the UN. Next on the list was Sudan, one-time safe haven for Osama bin Laden, oil supplier to China, and host to a Muslim dictator whose army was waging a brutal war on Christian groups – among others – in the south. Starting in 2004, the United States began to agitate for more assertive and more effective UN policy in south Sudan.

As in the case of Iraq, U.S. and UN policies had for some time been at odds. A particular bone of contention between the United States and the rest of the membership of the Security Council was the question of the International Criminal Court (ICC), John Bolton's bête noire. Established in 2002 after extensive negotiations, and against the negative vote of both the United States and China, among others, the ICC had come tenuously into existence at a time when the divisions in international politics revealed by Iraq were deepening and sharpening. In New York, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, with the support of most Council members and the broader "international community" – in this case, the middle powers, the signatories to the Rome Statute with which the ICC was established, and the human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) – was seeking to wield the new tool of the ICC against the government in Khartoum, widely accepted to be barbarous in its policy in south Sudan and bloody-minded in its contempt for the UN.

UN policy put the United States into a dilemma. On one hand, it sought firm UN action against the Khartoum regime, which had not been deterred either by sanctions imposed (at U.S. instigation) in 1995 or by diplomatic pressure to rein in the Janjaweed and the other tribal militias waging a scorched earth campaign against civilians in Darfur. On the other hand, the United States had opposed the idea of the ICC, resisted its establishment, and had been working consistently to avoid being confronted by its application. In a display of diplomatic muscle, the United States had in fact sought and received in 2002, and again in 2003, a Security Council resolution exempting it from ICC jurisdiction on an annual basis.

Secretary-General Annan had used the unpopularity of U.S. policy on the ICC to his advantage before. In 2004, against the backdrop of the recently launched war in Iraq, Annan had opposed the third annual resolution granting the United States an exemption from the ICC, and got his way. And Annan had then cleverly taken U.S. Secretary of State Powell's statements in fall 2004 that the situation in Darfur constituted genocide[6] as an invitation to launch an international commission of inquiry into the killings in Darfur, which reported to the Secretary-General in January 2005.

[6] Glenn Kessler and Colum Lynch, "U.S. Calls Killings in Sudan Genocide," *Washington Post*, September 10, 2004, p. A1.

Although avoiding the word genocide, the report clearly established a pattern of large-scale war crimes and Sudanese government complicity therein.[7] Thus the stage was set for a confrontational meeting of the UN Security Council.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan had been buffeted in the preceding months by a deliberate campaign against him, accusing him first of corruption and malfeasance in the oil for food scandal and then (more tellingly) of mismanagement of the institution as a whole. Annan had been weakened by perceptions in Congress that he was acting against U.S. interests in Iraq; weakened among the UN's southern members by perceptions that he had caved into U.S. pressure by deploying a UN political office into Iraq; and had taken a blow to his standing within the UN Secretariat when twenty-one members of that office, including the charismatic Sergio Vieira de Mello, were killed by a truck bomb in their poorly guarded compound in Iraq. So it was that a weakened and bowed Secretary-General confronted a dominant United States in the UN Security Council chamber.

Annan was nothing if not a master of diplomatic maneuver. His aides leaked the rumor that he might introduce the notion of calling for the Sudanese to hand over suspects to the ICC, putting the dilemma confronting the United States into the public domain. Before the meeting, the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Pierre-Richard Prosper said in a news conference that the United States does not "want to be party to legitimizing the ICC," clearly assuming that the Secretary-General would back down in the face of U.S. opposition. He did not; that March morning Annan took his seat in a tense Security Council chamber and called on the members to endorse a resolution referring the Sudanese suspects to the ICC. Faced with the prospects of vetoing fourteen other votes in favor of the motion, the United States backed down, allowing the resolution to proceed[8] and the ICC to come more actively into existence.

The Dilemma: Hegemony and Multilateralism in Conflict

If the Sudan/ICC vote had been the only instance in which the United States in its post–9/11 policy had found itself constrained by evolutions at the UN it neither sought nor supported, it could be written off as an aberration, an uncharacteristic moment. But in fact, despite the sound and fury of Ambassador Bolton's ringing condemnations of the vacuity and fecklessness of the organization, by mid-2005 the United States found itself reliant on or embedded with the UN in virtually every major issue on its agenda. As Stedman notes in Chapter 3, literally all of the top-tier security issues confronting the Bush administration in 2005 – from Iraq and Iran to

---

[7] Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into War Crimes in Sudan. Available at: http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf.
[8] The text of UNSCR 1591 is available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/287/89/ PDF/N0528789.pdf?OpenElement.

Afghanistan to North Korea and Sudan – had either a UN political or peacekeeping presence on the ground or a UN Security Council role.[9]

In several of these cases, the United States found itself needing more than it had thought from allies and multilateral institutions. By late 2003 in Afghanistan, the administration was forced to reverse its earlier positions and call on NATO to help stabilize the country, just as it found itself (rather more graciously) accepting the UN's help in nation building. U.S. policy still explicitly eschewed that notion until 2005, when it belatedly accepted that helping to build the core institutions of the Afghan state was a necessary corollary to defeating the enemies of that state, but it had given the UN's Lakhdar Brahimi both space and support in his efforts to play the role of tolerant but firm uncle to Afghanistan's maturing government.

Also, the United States found itself bested in negotiations on a major institutional shift at the UN, the establishment of the Human Rights Council in early 2006, following decisions of the 2005 World Summit to upgrade the functioning but increasingly discredited Human Rights Commission. In an astonishing failure of U.S. diplomacy at the UN, several months of active negotiations by the United States, led by Ambassador Bolton, took the starting position for the new body outlined in the 2005 Summit Outcome Document and watered it down disastrously, creating what even its supporters acknowledged was a far weaker body than had been called for or anticipated. Also in the realm of human rights, the United States pushed for a Security Council resolution in 2006 condemning human rights abuses in Myanmar, only to find this resolution the subject of a rare double veto by Russia and China, as well as negative votes by putative friendly states such as South Africa. Though subsequent events in Myanmar would lend credence to the U.S. position, the double veto was a humiliating defeat for the United States at the UN.

In Lebanon, too, the United States would find its position in 2006 resisted and its proposals rejected. Having taken a public stand against a ceasefire in the Israel-Hezbollah war of summer 2006 (a position quietly supported by many Arab governments, but universally rejected in public), the United States then pushed for the creation of a regional force to be followed by a NATO force to undertake stabilization operations – only to find both positions rejected in favor of the European/Arab preference for a UN mission, which was subsequently deployed in July 2006.[10]

Had the mighty fallen? Had accounts of U.S. power been hyperbolic? Could the dramatic decline in U.S. diplomatic prowess be explained only by its troubles in Iraq? Or was there more to the events of 2005 onward?

This volume argues that the explanation is more complex. If the United States was losing battles to the UN in 2005 and 2006, and if it was against the Bush administration that Kofi Annan had his public bouts, the roots of confrontation lay

---

9 Stephen John Stedman, "UN Transformation in an Era of Soft-Balancing," *International Affairs* 83 no. 5 (2007), pp. 933–44. (Reproduced here as Chapter 3.)

10 Technically, the force was not a new one but a remandated and reconfigured version of the preexisting UN force on the ground, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon.

deeper. And if Kofi Annan could best the United States at the Security Council in
2005, it was not a product just of a clash between the Secretary-General and the
administration, but of the evolution of two distinct worlds of international security
after the Cold War.

TWO WORLDS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: BETWEEN BERLIN AND BAGHDAD

The story of the evolution of those "two worlds" of international security is a story
of U.S. power, of international institutions, and of their evolution and adaptation
after the Cold War. It is a story that has not yet been fully told, a story about the
changing nature of power, and of careful adaptation and surprising innovation in
international governance.

Since the end of the Cold War, conflict and cooperation among states on matters
of peace and security have been increasingly managed, regulated, or implemented
by and through multilateral security institutions. The most visible manifestations
of this evolution in the practice and form of international politics have been the
vast expansion of the work of the UN Security Council; the enormous expansion
of tools such as international mediation, peacekeeping, and postconflict operations
to manage civil wars; and the proliferation both of new instruments for tackling
conflict and security challenges and of new mandates for older institutions to adapt
themselves to changing security realities.

The literature on international security and international relations has not kept
pace with the scale of these changes. Although numerous case study or comparative
study volumes exist on the management of civil wars[11] and peacekeeping,[12] few if any
have begun to assess the broader implications of the evolution of the international
security architecture since the end of the Cold War. A separate literature examines
the evolving (and arguably eroding) structures for the management of disarmament
and nonproliferation,[13] though that literature largely underplays the role of such
institutions as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

So too the theoretical literature on international institutions and international
regimes has with rare exception ignored the realm of security and conflict manage-
ment. Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander's *Imperfect Unions*[14] is an important

[11] An early and still influential exemplar of the literature is Michael Brown, ed., *International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).

[12] Among the most influential in both research and policy terms are Stephen Stedman, Don Rothschild, and Elizabeth Cousens, eds., *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002); and William Durch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

[13] See, for example, Joseph Cirincione et al. *Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

[14] Helga Haftendorn, Robert Keohane, and Celeste Wallander, eds., *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999).

exception, and one that has helped to shape the conceptual framework for this volume.

What is striking, historically and theoretically, is the limited extent to which the United States, for all of its unrivaled power, shaped the evolution of the multilateral security architecture in the post–Cold War era. The United States was influential, to be sure, and in some issue areas decisive. But in major arenas and areas of international security, U.S. influence was passive at best and allowed others to drive the significant evolutions that occurred.

This book charts the evolution of the multilateral security architecture, the evolution and adaptation of a host of international institutions to security functions broadly conceived. We argue that two processes have dominated the post–Cold War period: a U.S.-led process of adaptation of Cold War instruments to the challenge of embedding Russia in the Western order; managing post–Soviet nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenals; containing terrorism; and a U.S.-tolerated but not U.S.-led process of innovation to deal with "peripheral" or "soft" security threats, largely related to internal conflict and humanitarian crises. The result was the emergence of two worlds of international security.[15]

The First World: Adapting to the End of the Cold War

That the United States, an unrivaled power after the end of the Cold War, could drive international security arrangements if and when it devoted focused policy attention to the question, is evident in chapters that form the first part of this volume. In Chapter 2, Patrick sets the stage in his analysis of Clinton and Bush policies. Some of the weaknesses of Clinton policy are on display, notably its "cut and run" attitude to UN peacekeeping after the humiliation of Somalia and under siege in Rwanda – an issue to which we return. The Clinton administration of course did engage in a process of adapting Cold War institutions in order to manage the collapse of the Soviet Union. The institutional mode was not one of innovation, but of adaptation of existing instruments.

Of particular focus for the Clinton administration was the question of the nuclear weapons left by the collapse of the Soviet Union in the hands of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. As Wing (Chapter 7) argues, the United States was throughout the post–Cold War period the dominant actor in shaping the evolution of the formal nuclear nonproliferation regime. This role rarely took the shape of strategic leadership; much of it, rather, was tactical or reactive. The dominance of U.S. policy was evident also in the biological field (as noted by Simpson in Chapter 9).

U.S. policy was also decisive, unsurprisingly, in the reshaping of NATO after the Cold War. This had two phases: the first, designed primarily to deal with containment

[15] The two worlds described herein largely align with the two worlds described in a prescient article. See James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," *International Organization* 46 no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 467–92.

of Russia; the second, to deal with terrorism. Gowan and Batmanglich (Chapter 5) discuss the first phase, setting out the impact of U.S. policy on NATO on the broader evolution of European institutions, caught as they were initially between U.S.-dominated mechanisms such as NATO, mechanisms in which both U.S. and Russian power were given institutional expression (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]), and independent European mechanisms (especially the European Community/European Union [EC/EU]).[16] By the time the OSCE's early role in managing Kosovo had given way to the G8 and then NATO and the UN (and the EU, in an initially minor role), the U.S. impact on multilateral mechanisms in Europe seemed decisive. In fact, the U.S. emphasis on NATO as a U.S.-dominated tool for multilateralism within Europe actually helped drive a European movement toward a stronger EU, resisted for a time by the UK and some of the other strong U.S. allies on the continent but ultimately the dominant expression of multilateralism within Europe.

The more dominant Clinton administration approach of gradually evolving the institutional framework to shape the post–Cold War security landscape was evident in their approach to counterterrorism. As argued by Rosand and Einsiedel (Chapter 8), U.S. policy on international institutions' role in counterterrorism was shaped by three factors: the limitations on the bodies themselves, the limitations on multilateralism per se as an approach to deal with issues like intelligence sharing, and ideological predispositions of leading figures, in both the Clinton and Bush Jr. administrations. The net result was a policy of only gradual evolution of the UN's treaty regime and some modest innovations at the level of the Security Council, notably in the establishment of UN sanctions committees dealing with counterterrorism.

The policy of institutional evolution also shaped U.S. strategy on NATO in its second phase. As documented by Berdal and Ucko (Chapter 6), counterterrorism had been the increasing focus of U.S. policy for NATO since 2002. Events in Afghanistan brought the issue into closer focus. As noted earlier, the United States initially resisted a NATO role in Afghanistan, having learned in Kosovo that in circumstances short of a full-blown Soviet threat, the organization's decision-making structures were quite cumbersome, especially with the requirement for all members to approve all targeting decisions. (One Danish diplomat recounted spending much of his time during the 1999 bombing campaign driving back and forth between the Parliament and the Queen's residence getting royal assent to parliamentary decisions on new targets.) Nevertheless, by 2003 the strain on U.S. forces from fighting in both Iraq and Afghanistan contributed to a U.S. decision to accept a NATO takeover of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

However, the lack of NATO preparedness for counterterrorism missions – an issue raised assertively by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in early 2008 – meant that the Alliance was coming under increasing strain. Side missions like

[16] See *inter alia* Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallender (1999).