1 Introduction

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Preliminary remarks

Racism is condemned in our times on moral and scientific grounds and in the twenty-first century there is no major movement anywhere that openly describes itself as racist. That certainly was not true for the first half of the twentieth century when racism was a central tenet in the ideology of major and ruling movements in many countries to the extent that racism itself was sometimes regarded as an inborn characteristic protecting the better races from contamination.[1] It lost its legitimacy not only because of the excesses to which it led, but, no less importantly, because it was associated with the cause of the losers in world history: Nazism, colonialism, apartheid, and the heritage of slavery. 'Racist', like 'fascist' and 'Nazi', is commonly used as a random pejorative – particularly convenient, because it places the target of the invective on the defensive, requiring her or him to prove that s/he is not a racist, fascist or Nazi. While racism certainly has not disappeared, it operates nowadays mostly in disguise and under different names. Before its demise as an officially enforced policy, however, it was a clearly defined ideology, based on elaborate theories and a pseudo-scientific apparatus that often resulted in precisely formulated legislation. In its fully developed form therefore it was a combination of group hatred and an extensive mechanism justifying such hatred as rational and based on an objective reality. Historically and as a phenomenon in social relations, the term 'racist' is to be distinguished from ethnic and cultural stereotypes and prejudice. It is more than an attitude or a set of attitudes; it is an ideology which claims to be based on scientific truth. History shows

[1] Sir Arthur Keith, *Ethnos or the Problem of Race Considered from a New Point of View* (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd, 1931), pp. 72–4: 'Race prejudice is inborn; it is part of the evolutionary machinery which safeguards the purity of a race. Human prejudices have usually a biological significance.' Thus not just race, but even racism is part of a grand natural scheme leading towards the improvement of man. It is the ultimate argument of the racist: prejudice is a natural protective mechanism. Keith, Rector of Aberdeen University, also regarded war as a natural, inborn mechanism to further the means and opportunities of life.

that it was a distinct phenomenon that could lead, and in some cases has led to, *sui generis* forms of discrimination and persecution. Racism, including its development over time, must therefore be studied as a separate phenomenon, distinguished clearly from other forms of hostility.

The most obvious characteristic of racism is the attempt to rationalize the irrational – and this is where it differs from other forms of group prejudice. Rudiments of racist thinking continue to exist in western bureaucracies without many people noticing. A traveller may encounter a questionnaire in which s/he is asked to declare 'race', a concept few serious contemporary biologists regard as having any validity. One of the possible answers may be 'Caucasian', a term widely used to indicate people with a light skin. Yet nobody nowadays attaches the slightest scientific value to it, for it was introduced by chauvinist eighteenth-century scholars who maintained that only people of so-called 'Caucasian stock' were truly beautiful.[2] Those who today describe themselves as Caucasian think they mean no more by this term than that they have a light skin. Yet it is a remnant of a pseudo-scientific edifice, more than two centuries old, which divided humanity into superior and inferior categories on the basis of physical characteristics, the best of them presumably originating in the Caucasus. All this is not to deny the social reality of social groups, some of them distinguished by skin colour.

The difficulty of studying the history of racism is compounded by profound differences in the perception of the phenomenon, determined as they are by specific historical experiences and social realities. Racism in the United States is associated with groups that are physically different. Skin colour is an essential aspect and slavery is a crucial element in the history of the relationship. In Europe the targets of racism were minorities that were not physically distinguishable from other groups of the population. They were victims of discrimination and persecution, but were not usually exploited as slaves. Thus, in the US physical characteristics are usually regarded as an essential feature of racism, while in western Europe they are not. In the US those who were discriminated against usually looked different from the discriminators; in Europe they were mostly indistinguishable and hence, in some periods, were made to wear special clothes or markings. An important result of this distinction is that in Europe the concept 'race' is no longer accepted as a valid subdivision of mankind. However, in the US 'race' is a term widely used to distinguish

[2] Christoph Meiners, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Menschheit* (Lemgo: Meyer, 1785), p. 43; Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, *Über die natürlichen Verschiedenheiten im Menschengeschlecht* (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1798), pp. 135–7. See Benjamin Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 105–6.

population groups such as African Americans, Native Americans, etc. Physical differences, notably skin colour, are an essential part of the distinction. In twentieth-century Europe the Jews were major victims of racist persecution although they were not physically different from the rest of the population; in the US anti-Semitism exists, but the Jews are not regarded as a separate race.

Another difficulty in gaining an understanding of racism and its history is the disparity of the various disciplines and conceptual tools involved in the analysis of the subject. One frequently feels that the biologists, philosophers, sociologists, literary critics and various kinds of historians writing about race and racism have little in common apart from a basic disapproval of discrimination. What one group of scholars regards as a significant advance in understanding is regarded by another as entirely irrelevant. The shelves full of thematic volumes of essays, many of them cited in the notes to this introduction and elsewhere in this book, show to what extent the field is dominated by groups (not to say 'networks') of scholars representing specific disciplines or approaches who share a common perspective even if they disagree on specifics.

Given these differences in outlook it is not easy to find common ground for those who want to study the historical development of racism, for there is no consensus on what racism is or whether races exist at all. Since the subject arouses strong emotions and touches on acute sensitivities, it is also especially hard to maintain the level of dispassionate argument appropriate in an academic exchange. Those incapable of doing so sometimes attempt to de-legitimize opinions contrary to their own, for instance by dismissing as racist views of racism they do not share. This may happen even in academic exchange.[3]

The present book proceeds from a number of general premises, the first of them being that it is worth studying the history of racism. This may not be obvious to all. A distinguished historian of antiquity has asked: '*is* racism, as opposed to other ills such as economic imperialism or religious fanaticism (of several different brands), really the most urgent moral and social issue in the contemporary world?'[4] The first answer to this question

[3] E.g. Michael Lambert, 'Review of B. Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*', *Classical Review* 55 (2005), 658–62, at 661; Shelley P. Haley, 'Review of B. Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*', *American Journal of Philology* 126 (2005), 451–4, at 452. As already observed, 'racist' is now often used as a convenient pejorative.

[4] Fergus Millar, 'Review Article: The Invention of Racism in Antiquity', *The International History Review* 27 (2005), 85–99, at 86. Similarly, Joseph Geiger, *Zion* 70 (2005), 553–8 (Heb.), at 558, argues that there is no justification for the study of racism in itself, since there are also non-racist forms of discrimination and persecution. By the same token one could argue that there is no point in studying lung cancer since people also die of diabetes and cardio-vascular diseases.

is that, being historians, we are studying the history of a significant phenomenon in social history without claiming that it is *the most urgent* issue in the contemporary world. We may note also that other studies have been published on the same general theme without a defence of the relevance of the question.[5] The second answer is that, as already noted, racism may be regarded as illegitimate in our times, but has by no means disappeared. It occurs under different names and in different guises. It is our contention that this variability has been one of the characteristics of the phenomenon through the ages and it is precisely this point that, we hope, will be elucidated in the present work through the perspective of its development over a long period.

The second assumption is that it is intellectually sound and morally justified to study racism as a topic in the history of ideas; in other words, to study its conceptual development over time, rather than its practical application or the social relationships which lay at the root of the phenomenon.[6] It has been asked whether racism is an idea or an attitude. It should be regarded as an idea that leads to and justifies certain attitudes. We do not ignore the reality to which it has led through the ages: social and economic discrimination, violent persecution and slavery. It must be kept in mind, however, that other forms of prejudice and group hatred have led to similar practices. To put it bluntly, discrimination, genocide and slavery have never been the exclusive prerogative of racists. Of course they have been an essential ingredient of racism, but that does not make it futile to clarify the specific conceptual nature of racism and trace it over time.

Our third assumption is that racism essentially is a form of rationalization and systematization of the irrational, an attempt to justify prejudice and discrimination through an apparently rational analysis of presumed empirical facts. While group prejudice in general has been known at all times and by all peoples everywhere, the attempt to legitimize it by rational and systematic analysis is not universal. It developed in the West, in Europe and the Americas, even if it spread and made its adherents and victims elsewhere over time. Conflicting assertions occur frequently: either it is claimed that group prejudices have been rationalized always and

[5] E.g. Thomas F. Gossett, *Race: the History of an Idea in America* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963); Imanuel Geiss, *Geschichte des Rassismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988); Albert Memmi, *Le racisme. Description, définitions, traitement*, second edition (Paris: Gallimard, 1994); Christian Delacampagne, *L'invention du racisme: Antiquité et Moyen Age* (Paris: Fayard, 1983); Christian Delacampagne, *Une histoire du racisme. Des origines à nos jours* (Paris: Le livre de poche: France-Culture, 2000); George M. Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).

[6] Naomi Zack, *Philosophy of Science and Race* (New York and London: Routledge, 2002) for the modern period from Hume and Kant onwards.

everywhere in a form resembling that which they acquired in nineteenth-century Europe, or, alternatively, it is maintained that racism is a phenomenon of the past few centuries, connected with colonialism. We disagree with both ideas. Even if Europeans applied it elsewhere and even if it was taken over by non-Europeans in recent times, we claim that the origins of racism, as a form of rationalized group prejudice subject to systematic thinking, are to be sought in the West, as the title of this book indicates.

One often encounters a vague sense that racism is basically the same as ethnic prejudice and discrimination, but in a more malicious and serious form. We regard this as an erroneous view: there are mild or even seemingly kind manifestations of racism while the vilest acts have been perpetrated in ethnic and religious conflicts where racism did not play a role. It may be said that racism has led to the most widespread systems of discrimination and persecution in history, but it will not clarify our understanding of these topics if we assume that racism is merely a more virulent form of discrimination in general or that it is somehow worse for the victims than other forms of prejudice. The present book is based on the assumption that racism is to be distinguished conceptually from other forms of collective discrimination. Thus religious persecution need not be associated with any form of race hatred, to mention one obvious form of non-racist group conflict. Nobody doubts the importance of religion in the struggle between the Jews and the Seleucids in the Hellenistic period or between Protestants and Catholics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, whatever political and social tensions were also part of these conflicts. Ethnic hostility can be fierce, but it will not be conducive to clarity if we claim that racist hatred and conflict between ethnic groups are one and the same. The Spartans kept their neighbours, the Messenians, in perpetual collective submission and categorized them as 'between free men and (chattel) *douloi*'.[7] The helots were treated with notorious brutality and their hatred for the Spartans was commensurate,[8] yet there is no suggestion they were ever seen as anything but Greek, nor is there evidence that they were seen as inferior by nature. Any study of racism must be based on a clear idea of what it is, what it is not, and what distinguishes it from other forms of inequality and discrimination. The aim of this

[7] Pollux, *Onomasticon* 3.83. The literature is vast. For the helots, see among others Paul A. Cartledge, in Paul A. Cartledge and F. David Harvey (eds), *Crux: Essays in Greek History presented to G. E. M. de Ste Croix on his 75th Birthday* (London: Duckworth, 1985), pp. 16–46; Yvon Garlan, *Slavery in Ancient Greece* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Annalisa Paradiso, *Forme di dipendenza nel mondo greco: Ricerche sul VI. Libro di Ateneo* (Bari: Edipuglia, 1991).

[8] Thucydides 4.80; Xenophon, *Hellenica* 3.3.4–11. One dissatisfied Spartan asserted that the helots even wanted to eat their Spartan masters raw (Xenophon, *Hell.* 3.3.6).

collection of studies, then, is to see whether we can trace a pattern of such forms of rationalized prejudice, originating in the western world, in various periods before 1700.

Ethnic identity and race

For the sake of clarity in discussing racism and its development, it is essential to avoid discussions of identity. The concept of identity is a complex notion: it involves how a person, or a group of persons, thinks about her/himself or themselves; how others see him/her or them; how this affects the person or persons, and so on.[9] It attempts to understand how a person or a group reaches an answer to the question: 'Who am I?' or 'Who are we?' If we want to understand the history of racism we must concentrate on the question of how one group saw another.[10]

Also, we discuss *racism*, not race. As already noted, while European society including its academics did not consider 'race' a respectable concept after World War II, the term never died out in the US and is still used there widely. To cite a few examples: 'To argue that the concept of race is badly abused and exaggerated does not, of course, alter the fact that some racial differences exist. Scientific research is backward in telling us precisely what they are.'[11] Another work goes even further: 'Whereas racial

[9] David Joël de Levita, *The Concept of Identity* (Paris and The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1965), continues the seminal study of Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: Norton, 1950).

[10] Emma Dench, *Romulus' Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexander to the Age of Hadrian* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), ch. 4, 'Flesh and Blood', pp. 222–97, discussing ideas of blood and descent, proceeds from the opposite assumption and considers all these topics: how Romans saw themselves and their relationship with other Italian peoples, how Greeks saw them through the ages, how Romans saw others, the meanings they attached to descent and culture, the way in which they saw the body, physiognomy, abnormal appearances, physical transformation and modern interpretations of all this. In passing the chapter discusses the Athenian views of their pure lineage (also in ch. 2) and much more. It is hard to distill any clear-cut conclusions from the text, but her point seems to be that '"culture" and physiognomy, or "culture" and descent are by no means universally treated as mutually exclusive categories in ancient explanations and judgments of human difference' (p. 224). Thus she denies that modern notions of race are applicable in Roman thinking (p. 280). These are answers to questions which we are not asking in the present volume. A general account of integration and discrimination in Greece and Rome has recently been published by Fik Meijer, *Vreemd volk, Integratie en discriminatie in de Griekse en Romeinse wereld* (Amsterdam: Athenaeum-Polak & van Gennep, 2007).

[11] Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954, repr. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 110–11. In the US much academic work concentrates on the extent to which races are objective facts, while the two main opposing groups are called objectivists or essentialists and constructionists or constructivists. See e.g. Leonard Harris (ed.), *Racism* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1999), introduction.

groups are distinguished by socially selected physical traits, ethnic groups are distinguished by socially selected cultural traits … It is only when social and cultural attributes are associated with physical features that the concept "racial" and hence that of racial groups takes on special significance.'[12] The existence of both ethnic and racial groups is taken for granted in this approach and the mix of social, cultural and physical features results in serious confusion.[13]

Recent developments in genetics have revived the discussion of whether race exists at all. It is not the aim of this volume to contribute to this debate and none of its contributors are taking part in it. Recent publications are mostly cautious in their conclusions.[14] The subject is highly charged and attracts lively attention in the news media.[15] There is, however, encouraging resistance to this tendency.[16] 'There is no conceptual basis for race

[12] William J. Wilson, *Power, Racism, and Privilege: Race Relations in Theoretical and Sociohistorical Perspectives* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 6.

[13] Denise K. Buell, *Why this New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 13–21, uses the term intentionally and purposely employs both race and ethnicity interchangeably in her analysis of early Christian attitudes. She gives her reasons with copious references. The terminology in Buell's work is therefore quite different from that in the present book, but the general aims and approach are related and even similar, although the focus is on religion in particular which is central in only some of the papers here.

[14] See references in Isaac, *The Invention of Racism*, pp. 30–3. A work that early on denied the validity of the concept of race, and thus its applicability to the Jews, is Karl Kautsky, *Rasse und Judentum* (first edition: Stuttgart: J. H. W. Dietz, 1914; second edition: 1921); English translation: *Are the Jews a Race?* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1926).

The anti-racist UNESCO statement on the nature of race and racial differences of 1950 still assumes the existence of races in some form. See *The Race Concept: Results of an Inquiry* (No authors, Westport, CT, 1952, copyright: Paris, UNESCO), p. 99. For more recent discussions: Michael J. Bamstead and Steve E. Oleson, 'Do races exist?' *Scientific American*, December, 2003: their answer is '"no" if races are defined as genetically discrete groups, but researchers can use some genetic information to group individuals into clusters with medical relevance'; see further the special issue of *Nature Genetics* 36 (2004) with at least seven useful articles. Particularly helpful is Charles N. Rotimi, 'Are medical and nonmedical uses of large-scale genomic markers conflating genetics and "race?"' (43–7). See now Zack, *Philosophy of Science and Race*, p. 7: 'The case for the scientific nonexistence of biological race is straightforward and consistent with (accepted) scientific cases for the nonexistence of many other things.'

[15] For instance, an editorial in the *New York Times* of July 30, 2005: 'Debunking the concept of "race"'; and an article in *The Economist* of April 15– 21, 2006, 79–80: 'Race and medicine, Not a black and white question'. Note also the review article by the Race, Ethnicity, and Genetics Working Group, 'The Use of Racial, Ethnic, and Ancestral Categories in Human Genetics Research', *American Journal of Human Genetics*, 77(4) (October 2005), 519–32.

[16] For instance, Joseph L. Graves, *The Emperor's New Clothes: Biological Theories of Race at the Millennium* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001); *The Race Myth: Why We Pretend Race Exists in America* (New York: Dutton, 2004); Charles Hirschman, 'The Origins and Demise of the Concept of Race', *Population and Development Review* 30(2)

except racism.'[17] We are satisfied quoting the anonymous author of a brief article: 'The process of using genetics to define "race" is like slicing soup. You can cut where you want, but the soup stays mixed.'[18]

Another approach, now widely accepted in the US, redefines race as a social reality in contemporary society. Thus it is denied that race, defined as a biological concept, reflects reality, but it is claimed that it can profitably be used as a social concept.[19] A recent study of the history of modern racism states:

> Race [i.e. racist] science, although undergoing many changes in the course of its history, nevertheless is best understood not in terms of changing stages, but in terms of an underlying continuity … To a large extent, the history of racial science is a history of accommodations of the sciences to the demands of deeply held convictions about the 'naturalness' of the inequalities between human races.[20]

This is a radically different manner of justifying prejudice and it is therefore useful to investigate whether all or only some stages of this development served to justify far-going persecution and oppression.

Racism and the West

Some critics claim that an historical study of racism should not be centred exclusively on western, European society, ignoring Turkish, Chinese,

(2004), 385–421. Hirschman discusses the current confusion, mostly in the US, over the meaning of race between a biological concept which is untenable and a social category for which there is no logical basis. The term continues to be used, even if there is no longer a theory to justify this. See now: Charles Loring Brace, *'Race' is a Four-Letter Word: The Genesis of the Concept* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, inaccessible to us).

17 Hirschman, 'Origins and Demise', 401.

18 Anonymous, 'Slicing Soup', *Nature Biotechnology* 20 (2002), 637. Cf. Pat Shipman, *The Evolution of Racism: Human Differences and the Use and Abuse of Science* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994): 'drawing a line around an ephemeral entity like a human race is an exercise in futility and idiocy.' See also: Kwame Anthony Appiah, 'Why There Are No Races' in Harris (ed.), *Racism*, 267–77. For an early and authoritative, critical discussion: Julian S. Huxley and A. C. Haddon, *We Europeans: A Survey of 'Racial' Problems* (New York and London: Harper, 1936), introduction and p. 215: '[the concept of] *race* turns out to be a pseudo-scientific rather than a scientific term.' The works of Robert Miles, published since the 1980s, also argue that the subject to be studied is racism, not race. See his *Racism after 'race relations'* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), ch. 1 and 'Apropos the Idea of "Race" … Again', in: Les Back and John Solomos (eds.), *Theories of Race and Racism: A Reader* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 125–43. See now: Robert Miles and Malcolm Brown, *Racism*, second edition (London and New York: Routledge, 2003) with a new Introduction.

19 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s* (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986; second edition New York: Routledge, 1994). See especially the Introduction, pp. 1–6 and the definition, pp. 60–5.

20 Nancy Stepan, *The Idea of Race in Science: Great Britain 1800–1960* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1982), p. xx.

Japanese, Hindu and African societies and their prejudices.[21] Fredrickson gives three reasons why he concentrates on racism in Europe and its colonial extensions, and two of them apply to this volume as well: 'The varieties of racism that developed in the West had greater impact on world history than any functional equivalent that we might detect in another era or part of the world.' And: 'the logic of racism was fully worked out, elaborately implemented and carried to its ultimate extremes in the West'.[22] We furthermore assert that the opinion that racism needs to be discussed also in respect of non-western cultures rests on a confusion of racism and other forms of prejudice. The mythology and sagas of numerous peoples contain stories about their own separateness and superiority. However, prejudice expressed as myth is radically different from prejudice elevated to the level of scientific truth, even though both are expressions of chauvinism and group prejudice. We do not assume that prejudice and bigotry were invented in the West; we claim rather that the specific form of rationalizing these prejudices and attempting to base them on systematic, abstract thought was developed in antiquity and taken over in early modern Europe. Racism, the nineteenth- and twentieth-century ideology familiar to us, developed in Europe, not in China, Japan or India. It is generally accepted that Greek civilization was the first to raise abstract, systematic thought to a level that we now recognize as approaching our own.[23] They were the first to develop abstract concepts in their thinking about nature and to systematize those ideas. It is therefore worth considering whether the Greeks not only pioneered attempts to think systematically about concepts such as political systems and freedom, but also made the first effort to find a rational and systematic basis for their own sense of superiority and their claim that others were inferior. In other words, they subjected their prejudices to systematic analysis, looked for a firm basis for them in nature and sought to justify them at a rational level.

The subject of this study is precisely the conceptual mechanisms that the Ancient Greeks developed towards this purpose and that were taken over with alacrity by later thinkers. Our aim is not to write the history of injustice all over the world, or of prejudice in world history. It is to trace

[21] Millar, 'Invention of Racism', 86–7; Lambert, 'Review of B. Issac', 660; Denise McCoskey, 'Naming the Fault in Question: Theorizing Racism among the Greeks and Romans,' *International Journal of the Classical Tradition* 13.2 (2006), 265. Ronnie Po-chia Hsia, in his contribution to this book, p. 265, clearly states that in ancient China it was language, culture and lifestyle that mattered, all of them features that could be changed and adapted and are therefore not to be regarded as racism.

[22] Fredrickson, *Racism*, pp. 6, 11. Fredrickson assumes that racism 'did not infect Europe itself prior to the period between the late mediaeval and early modern periods'.

[23] Henri Frankfort *et al.*, *Before Philosophy: the Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).

the development in Europe and its colonies of a particular form of prejudice, characteristic of western culture, namely racism. If after all a similar pattern remains to be discovered in China or in India or anywhere else in the non-western world before the modern period, that is a separate and independent issue and for others to describe. However, the schemas and specific manifestations of racism represent a form of rationalization that was unknown and could not have existed before the Greeks developed those forms of abstract and systematic thinking which we usually call philosophy. In this sense we still believe racism originated in the West, for nothing comparable existed in ancient Egypt, Babylonia or China, all societies saturated with prejudices and chauvinism.

Definition

It is essential to be both precise and flexible in the definition of racism. Any definition we use should exclude forms of prejudice and persecution that are not strictly racist, such as discrimination on a religious or social basis, but it should include any systematic attempt to rationalize the division of human beings into groups based on presumed inborn physical and other characteristics. This means we would exclude the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, but include even positive statements claiming, for instance, that the French are born cooks. The former was a form of religious persecution; the latter is an innocuous form of racism.

Albert Memmi defines racism as follows: 'Racism is the valuation, generalized and definitive, of differences, real or imaginary, to the advantage of the accuser and the disadvantage of his victim, in order to justify privilege or aggression.'[24]

The merit of Memmi's definition is the absence of an insistence that the differences should be biological. As he remarks: 'The difference is real or imaginary. If there is no difference the racist invents it; if it exists he interprets it to his advantage … The racist can utilize a real feature, biological, psychological, cultural or social: the colour of the skin of a Black or the cultural tradition of the Jews.'[25] Memmi describes the essential features of racism as follows:

[24] Albert Memmi, 'Le racisme est la valorisation, généralisée et définitive, de différences, réelles ou imaginaires, au profit de l'accusateur et au détriment de sa victime, afin de légitimer une aggression ou un privilège.' *Le Racisme* (revised edn Paris: Gallimard, 1994), p. 193; this was adopted by the *Encyclopaedia universalis* and, in modified form, by UNESCO. In an earlier publication, 'Essai de définition du racisme', *La Nef* 19–20 (1964), 41–7, Memmi still refers to *biological* differences.

[25] Memmi, *Le Racisme*, p. 184.