Introduction

This book is a sequel of sorts. Sixteen years ago, its author published a work entitled *Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution*. Although it was some twelve hundred pages in length, inevitably, it gave some figures short shrift, and others it neglected entirely. Niccolò Machiavelli was discussed and his importance was underlined, but his thinking was not treated in depth. John Milton and Marchamont Nedham were not mentioned at all. Thomas Hobbes was accorded a chapter, but little was said about the evolution of his thought; and, while James Harrington's significance was emphasized, the foundations of his thinking were not discussed at length.

What follows is an attempt to redress the balance – to do justice to Milton and Nedham, to explore in greater depth the thinking of Machiavelli and Hobbes, and to provide a setting within which to understand Harrington. Its purview is the political opening that took place in the period that began on 30 January 1649 – when the execution of a recalcitrant English king occasioned an abortive experiment in the construction of a republic in Britain – and that ended on 1 May 1660, when a Parliament more or less freely elected voted to recall to the throne that king's eldest son. Its subject is the republican speculation, of a sort hitherto unprecedented, to which this brief, abortive experiment gave rise. It is not my claim that a close study of Milton, Nedham, and Harrington – or, for that matter, Hobbes – is crucial for understanding the course of events in the period. Their thinking was, to a considerable degree, epiphenomenal. Initiative lay in the hands of the self-styled saints. I do wish to suggest, however, that the long-term impact of their speculative effort was considerable – that their thinking marked a turning point in the history of constitutional prudence, that one of the principal reasons the events of the period deserve close attention is that they inspired such thinking, and that what Milton, Nedham, and Harrington had to say can best be understood when considered as a response the thinking of Machiavelli and, in Harrington's case, to that of Hobbes as well.

I begin, therefore, with the author of *The Prince* and the *Discourses on Livy* – with an exploration of the reasons why his republicanism initially failed to catch fire, with a consideration of the circumstances that induced Englishmen to pay more attention to the latter work in and after 1649, and with a close examination of the character of his thinking not only as a republican but also as a critic of what one of his most ardent English admirers dubbed "Priest-craft." Readers should be warned that the Machiavelli whom they will encounter in these pages is not the unabashed admirer of classical antiquity commonly portrayed

in late-twentieth-century literature on the subject. If I am correct, Machiavelli was a critic of classical republicanism, and he owed far more to Epicurus than to Aristotle, Herodotus, and Thucydides and far more to Lucretius than to Cicero, Sallust, and Livy. Moreover, I argue that, if he is to be properly understood, his political science must also be situated with regard to a conceptually powerful tradition of thought crafted in tenth-century Baghdad in response to the epochal political transformation that the emergence of universal, monotheistic religions equipped with clerical establishments had brought about. This tradition, which reached Europe by way of the Latin translation of works written by the Arab philosophers Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroës and by Averroës' fellow Cordoban Maimonides, provided Machiavelli with a point of departure. It is my contention that the new species of republicanism, which he fashioned in the intellectual netherworld dominated by Averroës and Lucretius, was grounded in an appropriation, critique, and break with the thinking of them both.

My treatment of Milton is no less unorthodox. Some readers will surely regard it as heretical. If I am correct, the poet who became Secretary of Foreign Tongues for the Commonwealth of England, Scotland, and Ireland was precisely what Machiavelli was not – a genuine classical republican, profoundly indebted to Plato and Aristotle, to Thucydides and Isocrates, to Cicero, Sallust, and Livy – and I try to show that he studied Machiavelli's *Discourses on Livy* with care and that he considered and in the end rejected its argument on rigorously classical republican grounds. If, I argue, he was nonetheless at odds with Aristotle and Cicero, with Herodotus, Thucydides, Livy, and Sallust, it was because, like Machiavelli, he lived in the epoch of revealed religion and had to cope with the consequences – which he tried to do, not in the fashion recommended by Lucretius (whom he read, appreciated, and recommended) nor by means of the Erastianism advocated by Paolo Sarpi, the Machiavellian state theologian of Venice (whose work he studied and admired), but in a manner faithful to the teaching of the Arab *falāsifa* and Maimonides: by becoming a practitioner of the art they called *kalām* – which is to say, by deploying his rhetorical and poetics gifts in an attempt to reconfigure the dominant superstition as a civil religion, favorable to political liberty and friendly to philosophy as well.

Milton's "particular friend" and "crony" Marchamont Nedham I treat, by way of contrast, as a genuine Machiavellian. If I am right, it was he who first Anglicized the Florentine's thought, exploiting certain bourgeois propensities inherent in Machiavelli's argument, restating as a critique of episcopalianism and presbyterianism alike his mentor's analysis of priestcraft, and refashioning the Florentine's novel account of republicanism in such a fashion as to make it not only compatible with the establishment of a free state on an extended territory but also supportive of the traditional English concern with rights, the security of property, and the rule of law. If Milton found the company of so notorious a libertine congenial, it was arguably because, though they differed in the measures they thought best suited to countering priestcraft and promoting republican liberty, the two men shared a common appreciation for the merits of philosophy and a common enemy.

In my judgment, James Harrington, the man who actually coined the term "Priest-craft," was not, as was in the last century so often supposed, a

thoroughgoing Machiavellian. His thought, as I try to demonstrate, is rooted in Thomas Hobbes's appropriation, critique, and reorientation of the argument presented in *The Prince* and the *Discourses on Livy*. To fully understand Harrington, I argue, to situate him properly within his intellectual milieu, one must first trace Hobbes's trajectory – noting the Machiavellian and republican proclivities he displayed in his youth, exploring the manner in which he was led to a more positive appreciation of monarchy in the course of the 1620s as he worked on Thucydides and contemplated the struggle emerging between Parliament and King and attending to the profound debt he owed Sir Francis Bacon, Paolo Sarpi, the poet Lucretius, and their admirers among the French libertines. Then, one must consider the Machiavellian foundations of his argument; attend to the analysis of priestcraft that he shared with the Florentine and with Sarpi, Milton, and Nedham; and take note of the radically Erastian posture he adopted with regard to ecclesiastical polity. Above all, one must attend to the degree to which the Malmesbury philosopher's monarchism was at all times prudential, provisional, and subject to republican revision, and one must ponder whether, in publishing *Leviathan*, in returning to England, and taking the Engagement required by the Commonwealth, he was not just acquiescing in the Roundhead victory, as scholars generally assume, but actively lending support to the Rump and to its lord general, Oliver Cromwell, by offering them sage counsel and by attempting to guide public policy – especially with regard to ecclesiastical polity.

If, in the end, England's republican experiment failed, I contend, it was largely because of the inadequacy of its leaders. They were faced with grave difficulties, largely of their own making, to be sure; and, though impressive in a variety of ways, as statesmen they were found wanting in the end. If the theorists examined here also as statesmen fell short, if they failed to provide those who sought to direct events with the guidance required, it was in part because they were not in tune with the religious sentiments of those responsible for Pride's Purge, and in part because they were genuinely at odds with one another. What Oliver Cromwell reportedly said to his murmuring officers shortly after the establishment of the Protectorate could have been said with equal justice to nearly everyone involved in the project of republican construction: they knew not what they meant – or, rather, though they certainly knew what it was that they were rejecting, they could not agree on what to put in its place.

If the speculative efforts of Milton, Nedham, Hobbes, and Harrington were nonetheless of lasting significance, it is because of their legacy. They pioneered lines of thinking that others – such as Henry Neville, Algernon Sidney, John Locke, the contributors to the standing army controversy of the late 1690s, the third earl of Shaftesbury, the authors of *The Independent Whig* and *Cato's Letters*, David Hume, and the baron de Montesquieu – would recast in such a fashion as to enable statesmen, at the time of the American and the French Revolutions, to act on their schemes. This book's aim is to explore the earliest stages in the development of the various Whig understandings of the constitution of liberty.

Prologue

Machiavelli in the English Revolution

In mid-afternoon on the 30th of January, 1649, Charles Stuart, king of England, Scotland, and Ireland, stepped out of a window on the second floor of the Banqueting House in London onto a platform erected within the yard of the Palace of Westminster. He had spent the morning in prayer. Now he gave a brief speech to those in close attendance. He began by asserting his innocence, and he asked God's forgiveness for those responsible for his trial and condemnation. He attested his desire for the "liberty and freedom" of his countrymen, which consisted, he said, "in having of government, those laws by which their life and their goods may be most their own." He denied that the people had a rightful "share in government." That, he argued, "is nothing pertaining to them," for "a subject and a sovereign are clear different things." These remarks he concluded with a confession, confirming that he died a Christian according to the profession of the Church of England as he had found it left him by his father. "I go," he observed, "from a corruptible to an incorruptible Crown, where no disturbance can be, no disturbance in the world." Then, and only then, as a deep groan issued from the otherwise silent crowd below, did he surrender his head to the executioner's axe.[1]

This grave and unprecedented event shocked all of Christendom; and, though to all appearances it owed nothing at all to the reflections of the Florentine Niccolò Machiavelli, it nonetheless marked an epoch in the reception of his thinking. Prior to the clear, bitterly cold day on which the English beheaded their king, Machiavelli was generally known to the larger world as a counselor of princes, as an enemy to morality and the Christian religion, and as an inspiration to the advocates of *raison d'état*, who had glossed over his argument on behalf of personal aggrandizement, repackaged his harsh account of the dictates of political necessity, and rendered it more palatable to men of conscience by defending the occasional use of deceit and even injustice in domestic and foreign affairs as requisite for the good of each and every realm.[2] It was not until the

[1] For a detailed account, see C. V. Wedgwood, *A Coffin for King Charles: The Trial and Execution of Charles I* (New York: Book-of-the-Month Club, 1964), 191–223.

[2] Note Machiavelli, *Discorsi* 3.41, in *Opere*, 249, where the Florentine invites us to misread him as an impassioned patriot; and, for a survey of those who fell prey to the temptation to do so, see Giuseppe Toffanin, *Machiavelli e il "Tacitismo": la "politica storica" al tempo della Controriforma* (Padua: A. Draghi, 1921); Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d'État and Its Place in Modern History*, tr. Douglas Scott (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998), 1–204; George L. Mosse, *The Holy Pretence: A Study in Christianity and Reason of State*

decade that followed the execution of Charles I that Machiavelli would become almost equally famous also as an advocate for republican rule.

There is no great mystery in this. Machiavelli's *Prince* is, at least on the surface, a much more accessible book than his *Discourses on Livy*. It is shorter, pithier, and more vigorous, and it enjoyed a *grand succès de scandale* from the very first. In contrast, the *Discourses on Livy* is long, and it is quite obviously difficult to decipher – not, as some suppose,[3] because it is unfinished, fragmentary, provisional, and replete with confusion (though there is reason to think that Machiavelli may have been revising the work when he died),[4] but because it is exceedingly subtle, complex, and playful in a literary manner. In short, the work in which republicanism looms large is as unattractive to the casual reader as *The Prince* is alluring. Even today, the longer book is much more rarely read.

Of course, from the outset, there were those who argued that Machiavelli revealed his true opinions only in his *Discourses on Livy*. Within six years of the appearance of the Florentine's two great masterpieces in printed form, an inquisitive and well-connected English visitor to Florence named Reginald Pole was told by one or more of Machiavelli's compatriots that the author of the *Discourses on Livy* had written *The Prince* solely to trip up the Medici and bring about their demise. Machiavelli had purportedly acknowledged as much himself. Although Pole was not himself inclined to entertain this claim,[5] others

from William Perkins to John Winthrop (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1957); Rodolfo de Mattei, *Il problema della 'ragion di stato' nell'età della Controriforma* (Milan: Ricciardi, 1979); Peter S. Donaldson, *Machiavelli and Mystery of State* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 111–40; Peter Burke, "Tacitism, Scepticism and Reason of State," in *The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700*, ed. J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 479–98; and Victoria Kahn, *Machiavellian Rhetoric: From the Counter-Reformation to Milton* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 60–165. Machiavelli is accorded a less prominent role in Richard Tuck's discussion of Tacitism and reason of state: see *Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 30–119.

[3] Cf. Francesco Bausi, "Introduzione," in Niccolò Machiavelli, *Discorsi*, ed. Francesco Bausi (Rome: Salerno Editrice, 2001), I ix–xxxiii, and Bausi, *Machiavelli* (Rome: Salerno Editrice, 2005), 163–81, who is inclined to explain in these terms the contradictions that abound and Machiavelli's frequent misrepresentation of classical sources, with Harvey C. Mansfield, *Machiavelli's New Modes and Orders: A Study of the Discourses on Livy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), who attempts to do justice to the Florentine's literary playfulness and to his rhetorical skill. For an earlier statement along similar lines, see Francesco Bausi, *I "Discorsi" di Niccolò Machiavelli: Genesi e strutture* (Florence: Sansoni, 1985).

[4] See Cecil H. Clough, *Machiavelli Researches* (Naples: Istituto Universitario Orientale, 1967), 79–107, and Clough, "Father Walker's Presentation and Translation of Machiavelli's *Discourses* in Perspective," in *The Discourses of Machiavelli*, ed. and tr. Leslie J. Walker, second edition (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), xv–xlviii (at xxii–xxxix).

[5] See the report in his *Apologia ad Carolum Quintum* (1539), in *Epistolarum Reginaldi Poli S. R. E. Cardinalis et aliorum ad ipsum collectio*, ed. Angelo M. Quirini (Brescia: J. M. Rizzardi, 1744–1757), I 66–171 (esp. 151–52, which is cited in L. Arthur Burd, "Introduction," in Niccolò Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, ed. L. Arthur Burd [Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1891], 36–38) – where Pole refers to a visit to Florence that took place in the winter of 1538. The full Latin text of Pole's discussion of Machiavelli has been reprinted as an appendix to Heinrich Lutz, *Ragione di stato und christliche Staatsethik im 16. Jahrhundert* (Münster in Westfalen: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1961), 48–62. In this connection, see Donaldson, *Machiavelli and Mystery of State*, 1–35, 87–88, and Sydney Anglo, *Machiavelli – The First Century: Studies in Enthusiasm,*

who learned of the report were perfectly prepared to do so,[6] and the tendency for students of the subject to discount *The Prince* on one ground or another and to treat the *Discourses on Livy* as representative of Machiavelli's real thinking has had adherents ever since – especially in the English-speaking world, where in some quarters Machiavelli's apparent espousal of republicanism has long inspired admiration.[7]

Alberico Gentili is a case in point. In a scholarly volume on the conduct of embassies, which he dedicated to Sir Philip Sidney and published in 1585, not long before he was created Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford University, Gentili singled out as "precious" the *Discourses on Livy*, described their author as "*Democratiae laudator et assertor*," termed him "a very great enemy to tyranny," and claimed that he had written *The Prince* not "to instruct the tyrant but to expose openly his secret deeds and exhibit him naked and clearly recognizable to the wretched peoples" of the world. "It was," he explained, "the strategy of this most prudent of all men to educate the people on the pretext of educating the prince."[8]

Hostility, and Irrelevance (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005), 115–42. It is by no means inconceivable that Machiavelli engaged in such special pleading when, toward the end of his life, the Medici were overthrown, the republic was for a brief time restored, and he sought to regain the office he had lost in 1512. Pole was closely acquainted with a number of figures who had known Machiavelli, and through them he no doubt met more: see Thomas F. Mayer, *Reginald Pole: Prince and Prophet* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 97–98.

[6] See, for example, Giovanni Matteo Toscano, *Peplus Italiae* (Paris: Morelli, 1578), 52, and André Rossant, *Les meurs, humeurs et comportemens de Henry de Valois* (Paris: P. Mercier, 1589), 11. Cf., however, Thomas Fitzherbert, *The First Part of a Treatise Concerning Policy and Religion* (Douai: L. Kellam, 1606), 412. Although Pole's *Apologia ad Carolum Quintum* was not published in printed form until the eighteenth century, what he said therein almost immediately found its way into diplomatic reports: see *Letters and Papers (Foreign and Domestic) of the Reign of Henry VIII*, ed. J. W. Brewer, James Gairdner, and R. H. Brodie (London: Longmans, 1862–1910), XIV:1, no. 200.

[7] For an analysis and critique of the most influential recent attempt to drive a wedge between *The Prince* and the *Discourses on Livy* and to justify giving precedence to the latter, see Paul A. Rahe, "Situating Machiavelli," in *Renaissance Civic Humanism: Reappraisals and Reflections*, ed. James Hankins (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 270–308. For an otherwise informative example of this species of special pleading not treated in my essay, see Cecil H. Clough, "Niccolò Machiavelli's Political Assumptions and Objectives," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 53:1 (Autumn 1970): 30–74.

[8] Alberico Gentili, *De legationibus libri tres* (London: Thomas Vautrollerius, 1585) 3.9 (Sig. oiii). The pertinent passage is quoted at length in Pierre Bayle, "Machiavel," in Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (Basel: Brandmuller, 1741), III 246–49 (at 248, note O), and in Burd, "Introduction," 63–64. For an English translation, see Alberico Gentili, *De legationibus libri tres*, tr. Gordon J. Laing (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), II 156. Cf. Diego Panizza, "Machiavelli e Alberico Gentili," *Il pensiero politico* 2:3 (1969): 476–83, with Donaldson, *Machiavelli and Mystery of State*, 86–110. Traiano Boccalini's satirical account of his contemporaries' response to Machiavelli points in the direction of Gentili's conclusions: see *De'ragguagli di Parnaso* (Venice: P. Farri, 1612–1615) 1.89. Parts of this work were translated into English in 1626 by William Vaughan and again in 1656 by Henry, earl of Monmouth. Spinoza and Rousseau advanced a quite similar claim: see Baruch Spinoza, *Tractatus politicus* 5.7, in *Benedicti de Spinoza opera, quotquot reperta sunt*, ed. J. van Vloten and J. P. N. Land (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1914), II 24, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Du contrat social* 3.6 (with note a), in Rousseau, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1959–1995), III 409, 1480.

Some of the most enthusiastic seventeenth-century admirers of Machiavelli's republican reflections thought this sort of special pleading preposterous. Henry Neville was one such. After the Restoration, James Harrington's longtime friend and associate published an English translation of Machiavelli's works, to which he contributed a preface. Included in his preface was a letter purportedly by Machiavelli himself, describing *The Prince* as "both a Satyr against" tyrants "and a true Character of them." To this letter, which was to mislead unsuspecting readers from the late seventeenth well into the nineteenth century, Neville puckishly assigned the date 1 April 1537 – which was April Fool's Day, some ten years after its putative author's death.[9]

Neville's gentle mockery of those who could not stomach *The Prince* should serve as a warning to us all, for it makes no sense to suppose that work incompatible with his *Discourses on Livy*. After all, these two books were written concurrently,[10] and each presupposes and refers to the other.[11] Moreover, Machiavelli's republican book is by no means as unfriendly to principality as one might suppose. In fact, the author of the *Discourses on Livy* appears to have been no less willing than the author of *The Prince* to dispense his advice indiscriminately – not just to republics and their citizens, but to princes, to aspirants to one-man rule, and even to those whom he unashamedly singles out as tyrants.[12] In both works, the Florentine displays a marked interest in and a decided admiration for what he calls "the new prince." His *Discourses* are

[9] See *The Works of the Famous Nicholas Machiavel, Citizen and Secretary of Florence* (London: John Starkey, 1675) sig. (***3) v. On the letter and its authorship, see Felix Raab, *The English Face of Machiavelli: A Changing Interpretation, 1500–1700* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964), 219–21, 267–72, and Anna Maria Crinò, "Un Amico Inglese del Granduca Cosimo III di Toscana: Sir Henry Neville," *English Miscellany* 3 (1962): 235–47.

[10] There are three reasons to suppose this true. *The Prince*, which reached its final form and began circulating in 1516, makes reference to the *Discourses on Livy*: see Machiavelli, *Il principe* 2, 8, in *Opere*, 258, 269. The *Discourses* makes no mention of any events subsequent to 1517. And Machiavelli makes no use of the first six books of Tacitus' *Annals*, which were first published in 1515, until well into the third book of the *Discourses*: cf. Machiavelli, *Discorsi* 3.19–23, in *Opere*, 225–30, with Tac. *Ann.* 3.52–55, and see Robert W. Ulery, Jr., "Cornelius Tacitus," in *Catalogus translationum et commentariorum: Mediaeval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries*, ed. Paul Oskar Kristeller, F. Edward Cranz, and Virginia Brown (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1960–), VI 87–174 (esp. 92–97), VIII 334–35. He makes use of these books as well in his *Florentine Histories*, which were composed in the early 1520s: cf. Machiavelli, *Istorie fiorentine* 2.2, in *Opere*, 659–60, with Tac. *Ann.* 1.79. In this connection, see Kenneth C. Schellhase, "Tacitus in the Political Thought of Machiavelli," *Il pensiero politico* 4:3 (1971): 381–91, and Schellhase, *Tacitus in Renaissance Political Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 3–30 (esp. 12–13), 66–84 (esp. 78–83).

[11] This is evident from the cross-references: see Machiavelli, *Il principe* 2, 8, and *Discorsi* 2.1.3, 20, 3.19, 42, in *Opere*, 147, 176, 225–26, 250, 258, 269. See Felix Gilbert, "The Composition and Structure of Machiavelli's *Discorsi*," reprinted in Gilbert, *History: Choice and Commitment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 115–33. Although there is much of value to be found in David Wootton, "Introduction," in Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ed. and tr. David Wootton (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1995), xi–xliv, I remain unpersuaded by his attempt to explain away the apparent references within *The Prince* to the *Discourses on Livy*.

[12] See Machiavelli, *Discorsi* 1.16.3–5, 19, 21, 25–27, 30, 32, 33.5, 40–43, 45.3, 51, 55.5, 2.12–14, 18.5, 20, 23.3, 24, 27–28, 31, 3.3–6, 8, 11, 15, 22–23, 26.2, 27, 29–30, 34.3, 38, 42–44, in *Opere*, 99–101, 104–6, 108–10, 112–16, 123–28, 133, 138, 161–64, 173, 176, 180–84, 186–88, 191–92, 198–213, 216–17, 221–22, 228–31, 233–37, 242, 246–47, 249–52.

addressed neither to the citizens of republics as such nor even to "those who are princes" already, but rather to "those who, for their infinite good parts, deserve to be" princes – for, in a republic, individual citizens may "by means of their *virtù* become princes," as happened, he expressly notes, in the case of Hiero of Syracuse.[13] It is no wonder that readers have nearly always tended to give priority to Machiavelli's counsel concerning the acquisition and retention of political power.

Bad timing no doubt contributed as well to the eclipse of Machiavelli's republican teaching. The Florentine composed *The Prince* and much, if not all of his *Discourses on Livy* in the second decade of the sixteenth century after the collapse of the Florentine republic and the reestablishment of Medici rule. *The Prince* circulated widely in manuscript for some time after it took final form in 1516, both in Florence and abroad. The *Discourses on Livy* is not known to have become available in manuscript until shortly after its author's death in 1527. But within five years both books were published in Rome, alongside the *Florentine Histories*, under the imprimatur of this last work's patron Clement VII, the second of the two Medici popes.[14] Machiavelli's *Discourses on Livy*

[13] See Machiavelli, *Discorsi* Ep. Ded., 2.2.3, in *Opere*, 75, 150, which should be read in light of *Il principe* 1, 6–14 (esp. 6 and 13), in *Opere*, 258, 264–80. The manner in which the ethos of *The Prince* periodically reappears in the pages of the *Discourses on Livy* is all too often ignored by partisans of the latter: see, for example, Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought I: The Renaissance* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 180–86, and *Machiavelli* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 48–77; and the work dedicated to him by his student Maurizio Viroli, *From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics, 1250–1600* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 154–77. Whether one is intent on depicting Machiavelli as a civic humanist, as a classical republican, or as a radical populist who simply "resents, despises, and distrusts" the rich and well-born, one will be tempted to avert one's gaze from the evidence suggesting that it was his opinion that, even in republics, princes rule – and that they do so there with even greater prospects for success than in principalities: see, for example, John P. McCormick, "Machiavellian Democracy: Controlling Elites with Ferocious Populism," *American Political Science Review* 95:2 (June 2001): 297–313. For a far more interesting attempt – elaborate, ingenious, quite often penetrating, but, at crucial moments, fanciful and more than a little bit perverse – to get around the pertinent evidence for the purpose of representing Machiavelli as an enthusiast of positive liberty who celebrates the fleeting moment of revolutionary rupture when, we are told, the distinction between rulers and ruled dissolves and the democratic potential inherent in political *práxis* is fully realized, see Miguel E. Vatter, *Between Form and Event: Machiavelli's Theory of Political Freedom* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2000). This work should be read in light of Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), passim (esp. 139–285), which is itself grounded on a vulgar misreading of Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* as a work of moral philosophy focused on political freedom. Much can also be learned from Mikael Hörnqvist's anything but fanciful attempt to subordinate *The Prince* to the *Discourses on Livy* by way of treating Machiavelli as a patriot – intent on promoting Florentine imperialism at all costs, and blind to the consequences of the larger forces that he is thereby unleashing: see Hörnqvist, *Machiavelli and Empire* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[14] For the pre-publication and publication history of Machiavelli's works, see Adolph Gerber, *Niccolò Machiavelli: Die Handschriften, Ausgaben und Übersetzungen seiner Werke im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert* (Turin: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1962). Giovanni Gaddi appears to have played a role in editing for posthumous publication both the *Discourses on Livy* and the *Florentine Histories*: see Bernardo Giunta, "Dedicatory Letter to Giovanni Gaddi," 8 May 1532, reprinted in *Opere di Niccolò Machiavelli* (Turin: UTET, 1984–1999), I :1 407–9. For what is known and can perhaps

could not have appeared at a moment less favorable to the republican cause. In the century that followed, everything conspired to strengthen the executive power.

The military revolution, to which Machiavelli had contributed much, restored infantry to the supremacy that it had enjoyed in classical times,[15] but in the process it eliminated the usefulness of the feudal levy and thereby undermined the contractual foundations of limited kingship. The consequence was not a revival of the citizen militia along the lines that had sustained the republics of classical antiquity. Nor did this revolution eventuate in the arrangement Machiavelli had himself championed: the establishment of conscript armies drawn promiscuously from the various polities' citizen and subject populations.[16] The infantry's new-found primacy contributed, instead, to the predominance of professional armies, the traditional tool of absolute rulers. To make matters worse, in the very same years in which the military revolution began to reshape the conditions of political rule, the Reformation shattered the unity of Christendom and gave rise to civil strife and war in central and western Europe on a scale hitherto unknown. In this environment, almost without exception, civic republics became principalities,[17] and, in principalities, representative assemblies generally ceased to meet. The formalities associated with securing consent count for little when disorder looms and life becomes increasingly nasty, brutish, and short. In times of anarchy, for the sake of peace and protection, most men will sacrifice everything else.

Of course, England was to some extent an exception to the rule,[18] and Englishmen were acutely sensitive to this fact.[19] Prior to the 1640s, England

be surmised regarding the circumstances in which the *Discourses on Livy* were published, see Clough, *Machiavelli Researches*, 90–105.

[15] See Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[16] Machiavelli did not, as is often suggested, link arms-bearing with citizenship per se: note Machiavelli, *Il principe* 12–13, 20, and *Discorsi* 1.21, 2.10, 12.4, 13.2, 20, 24, 30, 3.24, in *Opere*, 105–6, 159–60, 162–64, 176, 181–84, 190–91, 231, 275–78, 289–91, and see *AG* 1, in *Opere*, 305–13. Cf. J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 194–218 (esp. 199–203, 208–14), 384–86, and "Historical Introduction," in *PWoJH*, 18–19, 43–44.

[17] In Italy, the exceptions were Venice, Genoa, and Lucca: see William J. Bouwsma, *Venice and the Defence of Republican Liberty Renaissance Values in the Age of the Counter Reformation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Rodolfo Savelli, *la repubblica oligarchica: Legislazione, istituzioni, e ceti a Genova nel Cinquecento* (Milan: A. Giuffrè, 1981), Giorgio Doria and Rodolfo Savelli, "'Cittadini di governo' a Genova: Richezza e potere tra Cinque e Seicento," *Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica* 10 (1980): 277–355; and Peter N. Miller, "Stoics Who Sing: Lessons in Citizenship from Early Modern Lucca," *The Historical Journal* 44:2 (June, 2001): 313–39. For the fate of republican theorizing in Italy in this period, see Vittor Ivo Comparato, "From the Crisis of Civil Culture to the Neapolitan Republic of 1647: Republicanism in Italy between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *Republicanism: A Shared Heritage* I: *Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 169–93.

[18] For a recent attempt to situate England's experience within that of Europe's as a whole, see Jonathan Scott, *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[19] See William E. Klein, "Parliament, Liberty and the Continent in the Early Seventeenth Century: The Perception," *Parliamentary History* 6:2 (1987): 209–20, and Robert Zaller, "Parliament

managed to escape the sort of disorder that had paralyzed France in the late sixteenth century, and its parliament not only continued to meet throughout this period: it gained in strength, influence, and assertiveness,[20] while local self-government flourished in the parishes, boroughs, and shires.[21] This caused some of the English crown's subjects to think of themselves as citizens and even to conceive of England as a republic of sorts,[22] and it occasioned on the part of many of the better-educated a keen interest in the political institutions, practices, and ethos of the ancient commonwealths and a curiosity concerning the sources of Venice's undoubted success.[23] Playwrights, such as William Shakespeare and Ben Jonson, seized upon this fashion as an opportunity for the exploration of republican themes,[24] and translators and commentators used Tacitus' account

and the Crisis of European Liberty," in *Parliament and Liberty: From the Reign of Elizabeth to the English Civil War*, ed. J. H. Hexter (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 201–24.

[20] Cf. Wallace Notestein, "The Winning of the Initiative by the House of Commons," *Proceedings of the British Academy* 11 (1924–25): 125–75, with G. R. Elton, "A High Road to Civil War?" in *From the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation: Essays in Honor of Garrett Mattingly*, ed. Charles H. Carter (New York: Random House, 1965), 325–47, and see J. H. Hexter, "The Apology," in *For Veronica Wedgwood These: Studies in Seventeenth-Century History*, ed. Richard Ollard and Pamela Tudor-Craig (London: Collins, 1986), 13–44; then, cf. J. E. Neale, *The Elizabethan House of Commons* (London: J. Cape, 1949), *Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments, 1559–1581* (London: J. Cape, 1953), and *Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments, 1584–1601* (London: J. Cape, 1957), with G. R. Elton, *The Parliament of England, 1559–1581* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and see Patrick Collinson, "Puritans, Men of Business and Elizabethan Parliaments," in Collinson, *Elizabethan Essays* (London: The Hambledon Press, 1994), 59–86; then, consider J. H. Hexter, "Parliament, Liberty, and Freedom of Elections"; Johann P. Sommerville, "Parliament, Privilege, and the Liberties of the Subject"; David Harris Sacks, "Parliament, Liberty, and the Commonweal"; Clive Holmes, "Parliament, Liberty, Taxation, and Property"; Charles M. Gray, "Parliament, Liberty, and the Law"; and Thomas Cogswell, "War and the Liberties of the Subject," in *Parliament and Liberty*, 1–200, 225–51.

[21] See Mark Goldie, "The Unacknowledged Republic: Officeholding in Early Modern England," in *The Politics of the Excluded, ca. 1500–1850*, ed. Tim Harris (Houndsmills, UK: Palgrave, 2001), 153–94.

[22] See Patrick Collinson, "The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I," *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester* 69:2 (Spring 1987): 394–424, reprinted in *Elizabethan Essays*, 31–57, and Markku Peltonen, "Citizenship and Republicanism in Elizabethan England," in *Republicanism: A Shared Heritage* I: *Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe*, 85–106.

[23] Note Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton, "'Studied for Action': How Gabriel Harvey Read his Livy," *Past & Present* 129 (November 1990): 30–78, and see Markku Peltonen, *Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570–1640* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995). In part because he fails to recognize the degree to which Machiavelli's *Discourses on Livy* embodies an attack on the actual presumptions of Renaissance humanism, Peltonen misconstrues as merely Ciceronian Sir Francis Bacon's quite radical critique of the contemplative life and as classical republican his interest in national greatness: cf. ibid., 136–45, 157, 169–70, 190–228, 254–57, 259–61, 265–66, with Paul A. Rahe, *Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 80–104, 260–363, and see Robert K. Faulkner, *Francis Bacon and the Project of Progress* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993).

[24] The larger political significance of their plays has attracted considerable attention in recent years: see Allan Bloom, "On Christian and Jew: *The Merchant of Venice*," "Cosmopolitan Man and the Political Community: *Othello*," and "The Morality of the Pagan Hero: *Julius Caesar*," in Allan Bloom with Harry V. Jaffa, *Shakespeare's Politics* (New York: Basics Books, 1964),