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Stephen E. Hanson

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PART ONE

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES

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Weberian Methodological Individualism

It might seem odd to devote an entire chapter of a book on the origin and causal impact of ideologies to an analysis of Max Weber's political sociology. After all, Weber is one of the acknowledged giants of classic social theory whose work has been ritualistically cited by social scientists for more than a century. One might assume that, by now, Weber's key concepts and definitions would be so widely understood as to render a detailed account of them superfluous. Remarkably, however, this is far from being the case. Indeed, as this chapter helps to demonstrate, Weber is almost certainly the most commonly misinterpreted theorist in the history of social science.

To correct such misinterpretations is a lonely task. Despite near-universal acknowledgment of Weber's intellectual genius, self-described Weberians form a distinct minority of contemporary Western social scientists.¹ Among political scientists, in particular, only a tiny handful of scholars embraces a self-consciously Weberian paradigmatic approach.² Nor is this result due simply

¹ An outstanding exception here is Stephen Kalberg. See especially Kalberg, *Max Weber's Comparative Historical Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Other contemporary sociologists who make explicit use of Weberian theory include Alan Sica, *Weber, Irrationality and Social Order* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Julia Adams, *The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); and Philip S. Gorski, *The Disciplinary State: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

² Weber's influence has been perhaps stronger among political theorists than among the other subfields of political science. See in particular the excellent recent book by Sung Ho Kim, *Max Weber's Politics of Civil Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Within comparative politics, Reinhard Bendix stands out for his explicit Weberianism. Weberian theory was later applied to the study of comparative communism by Ken Jowitt and his school. See especially Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Bendix, *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Ken Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); and Vladimir Tismaneanu, Rudra Sil, and Marc Howard, eds., *A World without Leninism* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006). The

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to the length of time elapsed since Weber's day. In fact, most social scientists continue to profess allegiance to competing social science paradigms also developed in the nineteenth century: Marxism, Parsonian modernization theory (rooted in the works of Emile Durkheim), and the neoclassical economic approach to social scientific analysis (initially derived from Adam Smith) that is now called rational choice theory. The academic marginalization of Weberian analysis is thus a striking intellectual puzzle. The paucity of Weberians within the political science discipline is perhaps particularly surprising, because of all the classical social theorists Weber would seem to have been the one most directly concerned with politics as an independent social force.

The task of this chapter, therefore, is to reclaim original Weberianism as a worthwhile starting point for contemporary comparative political analysis. To do so, I first show how the theoretical foundations of Weber's social theory differ from those of its three main paradigmatic competitors: Marxism, modernization theory, and rational choice. Specifically, I argue, Weber's theory uniquely combines a thoroughgoing methodological individualism with an emphasis on the nonstrategic, irreducibly cultural sources of individual motivation – a theoretical combination that for some reason has been almost entirely unexplored in social theory of the past century, and which is therefore ignored in influential presentations of the history of the discipline. Second, I show how Weber's theoretical analysis of the four main types of social action – instrumental rationality, value rationality, affect, and habit – builds explicitly on rational choice theory, which confines its attention solely to the first of these types. Finally, I attempt to improve upon Weber's own admittedly confusing account of the connection between the four types of individual social action and his three types of "legitimate domination" – traditional, rational-legal, and charismatic – by explicating the deductive logic that links Weber's "microfoundations" and his macropolitical analysis. I conclude with some observations about how supporters of the Weberian approach might reply to criticisms from adherents of the other three social science paradigms.

The Four Major Social Scientific Paradigms

Any effort to categorize the intellectual history of social science in a few pages is bound to be controversial. Depending on which schools of thought and which theoretical controversies one wishes to emphasize, the past century and a half of social scientific inquiry can be characterized in potentially infinite

use of key Weberian concepts in comparative politics has also been promoted by Juan Linz and those influenced by him. See especially H. E. Chehabi and Juan Linz, eds., *Sultanistic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Robert M. Fishman, "On Being a Weberian (after Spain's 11–14 March): Notes on the Continuing Relevance of the Methodological Perspective Proposed by Weber," in Laurence McFalls, ed., *Max Weber's "Objectivity" Reconsidered* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), pp. 261–289.

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ways.³ The utility of any particular subdivision of the literature, then, depends upon its ability to shed light on the implicit conceptual and methodological principles uniting diverse authors into coherent scientific communities – what Thomas Kuhn famously called “paradigms” – so as to give the reader a sense of her own position within and among them.⁴ A successful categorization of competing paradigms should act as a sort of map to guide further intellectual exploration rather than imposing rigid barriers that only perpetuate the division of the world of scholarship into warring camps.⁵

Of course, even the very idea that social science is “mature” enough to have developed successful paradigms in Kuhn’s sense is controversial. Kuhn himself famously considered social science to be preparadigmatic – that is, lacking any consensus whatsoever about how to define conceptually and measure empirically the field’s main objects of study, and therefore doomed to endless and unproductive debates about abstract theoretical and methodological principles.⁶ Clearly, the history of social science does demonstrate a tendency toward ongoing conflict among several competing paradigms rather than the sort of universal scholarly acceptance of a single paradigm that Kuhn saw as necessary for the pursuit of the “normal science” of cumulative, empirical puzzle solving.

Yet, upon closer examination, Kuhn’s quick dismissal of social science as preparadigmatic fails to take account of several remarkably enduring theoretical traditions that have guided social science research in identifiable and consistent ways. In particular, four great social theorists – Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber – arguably identified the main contours of the great paradigms that have competed for intellectual supremacy since the late nineteenth century: rational choice theory, Marxism, modernization theory, and the Weberian approach. Of course, these four theorists did not anticipate every new theoretical innovation in later social science. Advocates of such approaches as psychoanalytic theory, postmodernism, pragmatism, and pluralism might wish to add to the list of “great theorists” presented here. Yet it is remarkable how much of contemporary mainstream social science inquiry

³ See, for example, the disparate accounts of paradigmatic boundaries given by Andrew C. Janos, *Politics and Paradigms: Changing Theories of Change in Social Science* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986), and Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

⁴ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

⁵ In this way, the effort to delineate major scholarly paradigms in social science may be seen not as hindering but as promoting research into more tractable empirical issues, thus answering the objections of Barbara Geddes, who argues that social science progresses more through a focus on tractable empirical puzzles than through debates about grand theoretical concepts. See Geddes, *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).

⁶ Kuhn, *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, pp. 164–165.

TABLE 1.1. *The Four Social Science Paradigms*

	Strategic Motivation	Expressive Motivation
Structuralism	Marxism	Durkheimian/Parsonian theory
Methodological individualism	Rational choice theory	Weberianism

still fits quite comfortably within the theoretical rubrics set out in detail by these four authors more than a century ago.

The longevity of the rational choice, Marxist, modernization, and Weberian paradigms is due to the fact that together they represent the four logically possible responses to two central and unavoidable questions facing all social scientists: the unit-of-analysis problem, and the problem of understanding human motivation. On the first dimension, every analyst must decide either to accept individual action as a methodological starting point or to examine social groups as actors in and of themselves – that is, to adopt a “structuralist” perspective on social action. On the second dimension, analysts must decide whether actors should be seen as essentially strategic – that is, oriented toward achieving identifiable ends with available physical and social means – or as essentially expressive, frequently behaving in ways that lack any strategic element whatsoever in order to convey their subjective sense of identity to others. These two theoretical choices cannot be determined simply by examination of empirical social situations. Good social science is equally possible from a methodologically individualist or a structuralist perspective, and one can plausibly interpret the same observed social behavior as primarily strategic or expressive, depending on one’s conceptual starting point. Placing these two dimensions on a two-by-two matrix (Table 1.1), we see how the four major social scientific paradigms occupy unique and competing cells.

To be sure, such a categorization cannot do full justice to the myriad theoretical debates within each of these four traditions. It is true that there are some Marxist cultural theorists who see expressive motivations as significant in their own right, and other Marxists who embrace methodological individualism; there are rational choice theorists who take collectivities such as states or classes as actors and who accept some types of nonstrategic motivation as consequential; and so on. However, even in such cases of paradigmatic cross-fertilization, the classification in Table 1.1 helps to illustrate precisely where the boundaries of each school of thought lie.

It should be noted at the outset that this two-by-two matrix has much in common with those recently presented by Alexander Wendt and by Rudra Sil.⁷ However, while these authors agree that one of the key paradigmatic divides in

⁷ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Rudra Sil, “The Foundations of Eclecticism: The Epistemological Status of Agency, Culture, and Structure in Social Theory,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 12 (July 2000): 353–387. A rather different sort of categorization of social scientific theories is presented in Craig Parsons, *How to Map Arguments in Political Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

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social science is the unit-of-analysis problem, both Wendt and Sil take as their second dimension a supposed division between “materialist” and “idealist” social science approaches. This, I believe, is a mistaken characterization of the main debates about the nature of human motivation among social scientists. In particular, rational choice theorists are by no means necessarily materialists. They generally postulate only that actors maximize “utility”; this may frequently take the form of wealth maximization, of course, but rational actors can also maximize status, personal security, their chances for salvation, or myriad other things.⁸ It is true, however, that social scientists are generally divided between those who see actors (individual or collective) as essentially strategic – instrumentally calculating the best means to attain their goals while taking into account as much as possible the likely actions of others – and those who see actors as primarily oriented toward conduct that is expressive of their personal or shared subjective beliefs, often only secondarily considering such behavior’s strategic consequences.

Thus, rational choice theory embraces both methodological individualism and a view of individual social behavior as, at the core, strategic in nature. The main goal of social analysis, from this paradigmatic perspective, is to understand how collective outcomes – whether socially optimal or suboptimal – reflect the strategic choices of reasoning individuals who, whatever their cultural or social environment, are savvy enough to pursue their self-interest in a reasonably consistent manner. Such a characterization of the foundations of rational choice theory, I think, will not be controversial.⁹ Note that the characterization of individual action as generally “strategic” applies even to the growing number of rational choice analysts who see cultural norms or identities as important. Indeed, the primary goal of most rational choice analysis of culture is to show that seemingly “irrational” cultural behavior actually makes good strategic sense for the individuals who engage in it.¹⁰

⁸ Margaret Levi, “Reconsiderations of Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis,” in Lichbach and Zuckerman, *Comparative Politics*, 2nd ed., pp. 127–128.

⁹ One sees precisely these two theoretical elements set out explicitly as foundational for rational choice theory by such well-known practitioners of this approach as Michael Hechter, Jeffrey Frieden, and Barbara Geddes, for example. See Hechter, *Principles of Group Solidarity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Frieden, *Debt, Development, and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965–1985* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Geddes, *Paradigms and Sand Castles*. Geddes, it should be noted, objects that rational choice theory should be seen not as a paradigm but rather as an “approach,” because “it includes uncountable numbers of hypotheses and theories, many of which are inconsistent with each other”; *ibid.*, p. 22. In fact, such a situation is typical of all scientific paradigms, according to Kuhn. It is certainly also true of the Marxist, modernization, and Weberian paradigms as well.

¹⁰ David M. Kreps, “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,” in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 90–132; Avner Greif, *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and David Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

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Karl Marx and most subsequent theorists in the Marxian tradition essentially embrace the rational choice view of social action as strategic but insist that the main actors in social history are collectives: social classes rather than individuals. Indeed, Marx analyzes the dynamics of class conflict precisely in order to uncover previously hidden mechanisms of collective exploitation that are obfuscated by conventional individualist political economy. As in the case of rational choice theory, too, Marxism frequently places an important emphasis on the role of “ideological” or “cultural” factors in human history – but, in the end, such forces are always analyzed as having a strategic function in upholding a given mode of production. The very notion of the isolated individual as a rational actor – for Marx himself and for cultural Marxists in the Gramscian tradition – reflects the dominance of bourgeois ideology that works to camouflage the systematic nature of capitalist domination by portraying it as the product of free individual choices.¹¹ Similarly, from this paradigmatic perspective, the eventual revolution of the working class against the capitalist system will occur not because of any “moral beliefs” or “principles” motivating particular groups of workers but rather because revolution is in the collective strategic interest of the proletariat.¹²

The common orientation of Marxism and rational choice theory toward a view of class motivation as primarily strategic rather than expressive accounts for the strong affinity between these two scholarly traditions. Indeed, practitioners of “analytical Marxism” hold that Marx’s theory is fully compatible with methodological individualism; some interpreters insist that Marx himself was a methodological individualist.¹³ In my view, a careful reading of Marx’s own writings makes it clear that he really did see classes, rather than individual members of classes, as the key actors of history. For the purposes of an overarching analysis of social science paradigms, however, the resolution of this debate is not crucial. We can simply say that to the extent that analytical

¹¹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The German Ideology,” in Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: Norton, 1978), pp. 176–193; Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

¹² Note that this summary of Marx’s views refers only to his analysis of class-based society – that is, of human history from the earliest empires through the end of capitalism. With the final victory of the proletariat and the resulting end of class struggle under communism, Marx thinks, humanity will finally be free to act in fully self-expressive ways, which will be in some sense a return to our true “species-being.” Moreover, seeds of free self-expression exist even within class-based society, to the extent that ascendant revolutionary classes are able to break the chains of the past through collective action against the ruling class. However, the preceding categorization of Marx’s theory as postulating strategic behavior by collective actors is generally adequate for describing his analysis of precommunist history, and this is Marx’s main legacy in contemporary social science. See Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” in Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, pp. 67–125; Stephen E. Hanson, *Time and Revolution: Marxism and the Design of Soviet Institutions* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).

¹³ See, for example, John Roemer, ed., *Analytical Marxism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Edition de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1986).

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Marxism replaces structural units of analysis with individuals, it moves from the top left to the bottom left cell in Table 1.1 and should be seen as a variant of rational choice theory – as, in fact, most analytical Marxists themselves tend to claim.

Moving to the top right-hand cell in Table 1.1, we arrive at the paradigmatic viewpoint that dominated Western social science for most of the postwar period: modernization theory. This paradigm, like Marxism, accepts that social structures should be seen as the primary units of social analysis but rejects the notion that human action is best understood as strategic in nature, insisting that expressive behavior based on diverse human cultural norms has an autonomous influence in social life. The roots of this approach can be traced back to the initial formation of sociology in France by such figures as August Comte and Herbert Saint-Simon, but the best and most comprehensive explication of what is now known as the modernization paradigm was presented in the works of Emile Durkheim. Like Marx, Durkheim argued that “individualism” itself is a product of historical changes in social organization; thus it is a mistake to see the individual actor as somehow ontologically or methodologically prior to social structures. Unlike Marx, however, Durkheim insisted that the essential ties binding human beings together in communities of solidarity are expressive, not strategic; indeed, strategic actors bereft of any “higher” form of social solidarity would find themselves in a state of anomie – isolated, adrift, and prone to various forms of mental illness and social pathology.¹⁴ The chief task of sociology, Durkheim insisted, is to chart new, “organic” forms of cultural solidarity adequate to the individualism, impersonalism, and interdependence of the modern age, to replace the “mechanical” forms of cultural solidarity that dominated earlier stages of human history; in this respect, he sees the goal of social science as analogous to that of medicine in its diagnosis of “diseased” social forms resulting from “disequilibrium” within society as a whole.¹⁵

Talcott Parsons’s effort to systematize European social theory in the postwar period, which exercised an unparalleled influence on the later development of global social science, also fits squarely within the “expressive-structuralist” cell of Table 1.1. Although Parsons saw himself as synthesizing the main contributions of Durkheim, Weber, and Freud into a single overarching theory of the “social system,” almost all of his central claims were contained within, and anticipated by, Durkheimian theory. Like Durkheim, Parsons sees the key divide of human history as lying between “traditional” forms of social organization based upon ascription at birth to cultural roles prescribed by particular communities and “modern” forms of social organization based upon achievement orientations and legal universalism.¹⁶ Like Durkheim, Parsons explicitly upholds a Spencerian interpretation of “social evolution” as involving progress

¹⁴ Emile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology* (New York: Free Press, 1966).

¹⁵ Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964); Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

¹⁶ Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), pp. 182–191.

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from “lower” to “more complex” forms of organization, culminating in liberal capitalist democracy.¹⁷ And while Parsons formally insisted on the importance of avoiding “value judgments” in science, like Durkheim, he still saw the role of social science as contributing in an essential way to the maintenance of system stability and integration.¹⁸

That Parsons nevertheless claimed to be a Weberian – indeed, becoming the first translator of many of Weber’s major works into English – was of inestimable significance for the future course of social scientific intellectual history. Generations of Western social scientists who were trained within the Parsonian tradition naturally tended to accept Parsons’s characterization of Weberian sociology as in essence paralleling the Durkheimian and Spencerian views of modernization. Certainly, several key themes in Weber’s work, such as the emphasis placed on “the rise of the West” for understanding global social change and on the progressive “rationalization” of modern capitalist societies, appeared to fit neatly within the structural-functionalist view of modernization theory. Even in Germany, where Weber’s own sociology had been tarnished by its perceived association with the failures of Weimar democracy, leading scholars such as Wolfgang Schluchter and Jürgen Habermas tended to build on Parsons’s reinterpretation of Weber’s work, emphasizing the linear process of rationalization in modern society and deemphasizing Weber’s concurrent insistence on the unpredictable political and social effects of new belief systems articulated by charismatic individuals.¹⁹ The result is that most social scientists tend to equate Weberianism with modernization theory – greatly complicating the task of resurrecting Weber’s distinctive theoretical approach for contemporary audiences.²⁰

¹⁷ Parsons, “Evolutionary Universals in Society,” *American Journal of Sociology* 29(3, June 1964): 339–357.

¹⁸ Parsons, *The Social System*, pp. 348–359.

¹⁹ See Wolfgang Schluchter, *The Rise of Western Rationalism: Max Weber’s Developmental History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984–1987). The broad and enduring influence of Wolfgang Mommsen’s scurrilous and highly misleading critique of Weber’s supposed great-power statism, originally published in the 1950s, was particularly damaging. It is surely one of the great ironies of intellectual history that Weber – a committed liberal democrat who died more than a decade before Hitler’s rise to power – is now more frequently associated with the failure of Weimar democracy than the committed Nazi theorists Karl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger, whose works are approvingly cited by contemporary left-wing academics. See Wolfgang Mommsen, *Max Weber and German Politics, 1890–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); for a thoughtful recent critique of Mommsen’s views, see Sung Ho Kim, *Max Weber’s Politics of Civil Society*.

²⁰ Another influential conflation of Weberianism and modernization theory was offered by Edward Said, who argued that Weber’s reliance on nineteenth-century scholarship about the non-Western world led him “perhaps unwittingly” to replicate Orientalist categories of analysis. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978), p. 259. For an insightful refutation of Said’s interpretation of Weber’s work, see Mohammad Nafissi, “Reframing Orientalism: Weber and Islam,” in Ralph Schroeder, ed., *Max Weber, Democracy, and Modernization* (Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s, 1998), pp. 182–201.

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As the matrix in Table 1.1 demonstrates, however, the distinction between Weber's approach and that of Durkheim and Parsons is simple and fundamental: both paradigms see expressive motivations for human social action as primary and strategic motivations as secondary, but Weber – like rational choice theorists and unlike modernization theorists – is a staunch methodological individualist. As he puts it succinctly, “For sociological purposes there is no such thing as collective personality which ‘acts.’ When reference is made in a sociological context to a state, a nation, a corporation, a family, or an army corps, or to similar collectivities, what is meant is, on the contrary, *only* a certain kind of development of actual or possible social actions of individual persons.”²¹ In a nutshell, Weber sees collective social outcomes as generated by the actions of individuals who are motivated by their diverse subjective interpretations of their positions in the social world. Because of the conflation of Weberianism and Parsonian modernization theory, this theoretical viewpoint has been remarkably unexplored in the history of social science. “Culturalists” are almost invariably assumed – usually correctly – to be methodological structuralists, and methodological individualists are almost always assumed to accept a primarily strategic view of human motivation.²² The new wave of “constructivism” in international relations and, increasingly, within the comparative politics subfield of political science has unfortunately only further reinforced this divide.²³ Only a few scholars have been willing to embrace methodological individualism while accepting that people are essentially interpretive and expressive beings.²⁴

²¹ Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, trans. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 14 (emphasis in original).

²² The affinity between culturalism and structuralism has endured across multiple changes of intellectual fashion among interpretivists. Whatever their other theoretical differences, an essentially collectivist approach to the units-of-analysis problem unites cultural approaches ranging from Parsonian structural-functionalism, to Geertzian and Huntingtonian primordialism, to Gramscian cultural theories of “hegemony,” to Foucauldian studies of “discourse,” to Bourdieuan studies of “habitus.” Scholars in all of these camps tend to reject “methodological individualism” as a simple synonym for rational choice theory.

²³ For representative works, see Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*; Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Mark Blyth, *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). An important work that examines the microfoundations of emerging belief systems in rather more detail is Yoshiko Herrera, *Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

²⁴ Note, for example, that both Wendt and Sil in their works cited previously reject the “individualist/idealist” cell of their own two-by-two matrices. Wendt associates this cell with the liberal school in international relations theory – which he then compellingly demonstrates is actually rooted in an essentially rationalist ontology, thus leaving the methodologically individualist/expressive cell in effect empty. Sil, meanwhile, describes individualistic idealism as the terrain of social psychologists but does not cite any scholars working in this tradition by name; he sees Weber, like Giddens and Bourdieu, as adopting a pragmatic “middle ground” among all four competing approaches. See Wendt, *Social Theory*, and Sil, “The Foundations of Eclecticism.”