

Index

absurd intended meanings, 168-70, 188-89. and legal principles, 2-3, 64-65, 88 See also infelicities nonexistence of, 87-88, 234 actual intentionalism, 137. See also searching for, 65-66 intentionalism; intentionalism, analogical reasoning, a fortiori constraint competitors to comparative judgments, 81-82 erroneous precedents, 77, 81 adjudication analogical methodology/reasoning, 66-67, factual comparisons, 76-79 119-20, 126 factual similarities, 76 availability heuristic, 111 factual weighting/values, 79-81 of controversies, 28-29 precedent cases, 82-83 in disputes/settlement, 117 analogical reasoning, constraint by similarity judicial cognition, 113-14 general principles/rules, 71 judicial decision making, 106-7, 117 intuition, 75-76 overruling precedent rules, 61, 63 and legal principles, 71-72 and rule making, 107-8, 125 perception of similarity, 72-73 algorithmic textualism, 200-4 and precedents, 68-69, 73-75 analogical reasoning reflective equilibrium, 70-71 appeal of, 66 supporting generalizations, 69-70 case-to-case, 66-67 application understandings, 227-29 distinguishing precedents, 83-87 Arizona, Miranda v., 154 indeterminacy of rules, 19-20 Arrow's theorem, 183 judicial craftsmanship, 233-34 Ashwander doctrine, 177-78



248 INDEX

attribution error, fundamental, 113 common-law reasoning, rule model, 36-39. authoritative rules. See rules, See also precedent rules; rule making, authoritative judicial coordination, 45, 48 authority questions, 213 errors of, 42-43, 48-49 Bassham, Gregory and judges, 41-44, 49-50 framers' intentions, 147 judicial decision making, 106-7 levels of generality, 150 vs. natural model, 42, 64 multiplicity of intentions, 145-50 and precedent, 41, 48, 105-6 term exemplars, 222-23 promulgation of rules, 50-53 Black Codes, 228-29 rule-based benefits, 40 Burton, Steven, 22 rule-making authority, 104-5 rule-sensitive particularism, 40-41 Calabresi, Guido, 181 community membership canonical legal rules. See also intentionalism, controversy settlement, 11–12, 15–16, competitors to 27-29 dynamic interpretation of, 213-14 coordination, lack of, 45 normative meanings, 165-66 and moral controversy, 10 rule-making authority designation, 12-15, rule promulgator's intended meaning, 220 canonical legal texts, intended meaning of 53, 75-76 absurd meanings, 168-70 "universal context," 20-21 in multimember rule-making bodies, and values, 13, 25 Constitution 171-73 problematic meanings, 167 intentionalist interpretation, 221 canonical legal texts, interpretation of. See as "living constitution," 225-27 also intended meaning Constitution, as super statute authors' intended meaning, 4-5 authorial intention, 222-23 dynamic interpretation, 213-14 intentionalist interpretation, 221-22 lawmakers' intended meaning, 165-66 moral reality, 223-25 Cernauskas v. Fletcher, 168-69, 202 "true nature" of clauses, 224-25 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, constitutional amendment and erroneous judicial interpretations, 169 cognitive bias. See also heuristic 229-30, 232 Fifth, 154, 224–25 fact-finding accuracy, 109-10 fundamental attribution error, 113 Fourteenth, 222, 224–25 in judicial rule making, 109-11, 114 and "living constitution," 225-26 psychology of, 47-48, 109-10 Seventeenth, 133, 135-38, 169 Coke, Sir Edward, 2 Tenth, 154-55 constitutional framers. See framers, common law Coke's description of, 2 constitutional judicial decision making, 104, 129-30 constitutional interpretation common-law reasoning, natural model change of authorship, 230-32 coordination, 36, 46-47 "paradigm case," 227-29 empirical reasoning, 34, 39 Supreme Court precedents, 229-30 equal treatment, 36-39 constraint, a fortiori expectations of consistency, 36 comparative judgments, 81-82 moral reasoning, 32, 39 erroneous precedents, 77, 81 and past decisions, 34-35 factual comparisons, 76-79 vs. rule model, 31-32, 42, 64 factual similarities, 76 rule-sensitive particularism, 45-46, 48 factual weighting/values, 79-81 salient vs. background facts, 47-48 precedent cases, 82-83



INDEX 249

constraint, by similarity in judicial decision making, 106, 129-30 general principles/rules, 71 and legal principles, 40 intuition, 75-76 and natural reasoning, 104 and legal principles, 71-72 determinacy, challenges to perception of similarity, 72-73 facticity of intentions, 162-65 "Kripkenstein" critique, 160–62 and precedents, 68-69, 73-75 reflective equilibrium, 70-71 levels of generality, 150 multiplicity of intentions, 145-50 supporting generalizations, 69-70 constraint, procedural norm-governed interpretations, 164 levels of generality, 185-88 translation, 152-59 determinate rules. See rules, determinate norms for failed law, 182-85, 189 norms of form, 178-82 diction. See grammar/grammatical context types of, 178 distinguishing rules, 122-24 "do the right thing," 152, 168, 186-87, 217-18 constraint, substantive absolute/presumptive constraints, 174-75 doctrine of lenity, 176-77 Ashwander doctrine, 177-78 Dworkin, Ronald contract/document interpretation, 175-76 idealized author, 211-12 doctrine of lenity, 176-77 legal principles, reasoning from, 89, 91, infelicitous result avoidance, 173-74 95-97, 101-2 controversy dynamic statutory interpretation, 213-14 and community membership, 10 moral costs of, 12-13 Easterbrook, Frank H., 208 settlement, 11-13, 15-16, 27-28 emendation, 155 counterfactual scope belief/intention empirical reasoning, 34, 232 and framers, 146-47 epistemological questions, 213 and semantic intention, 148 equal protection clause, 224-25, 228-29 courts. See also constraint, a fortiori; equal treatment constraint, by similarity competitive disadvantages, 39 acceptance over time, 57-58 moral error/imperative, 36-39 and Ashwander doctrine, 177-78 past decisions, 37-39 binding precedent rules, 53-56 Eskridge, William, 213 and canonical texts, 63 common-law reasoning, 31-32, 39 failed law, norms for coordination benefits, 36, 46 apparent laws, 184 distinguishing precedents, 83-87 Arrow's theorem, 183 and doctrine of lenity, 176-77 authority of decision-making bodies, 185 moral/empirical reasoning, 32, 34 and majorities, 182-83 overruling precedent rules, 127 in multimember rule-making bodies, 182 past decisions, use of, 34-35 procedural higher order norms, 189 "reauthored" laws, 184 reasoning by analogy, 66-67 reasoning from legal principles, 64-65 faulty logic. See legal principles, faulty logic role/function of, 25-26, 28-29, 108-9 fidelity, in translation. See translation, rule model, 43 fidelity in rule treatment, 40, 51, 56-57 Fidelity in Translation (Lessig), 153-54 and serious rules, 115 Fifth Amendment, 154, 224-25 Supreme Court precedents, 229-30 Fletcher, Cernauskas v., 168–69, 202 craftsmanship, judicial, 233-34 Fourteenth Amendment, 222, 224-25 framers, constitutional and counterfactual scope belief/intention, deductive reasoning in common-law decision making, 40 and determinate meaning, 23-24 of Fifth Amendment, 154



250 INDEX

framers, constitutional (continued) intended meaning, in legal interpretation intentions of, 147 authoritative settlement, 140-41 and originalists, 197-98 common understanding, 140 substantive constraints, 173-74 interpretive norms, 138-39 value presuppositions, 158-59 language identification, 135-40 Frickey, Philip, 213 lawmaker's state of mind, 141-45 fundamental attribution error, 113 speaker's meaning, 132-33 utterance meaning, 134-35 generality, levels of intended meaning, procedural constraints challenges to determinacy, 150 levels of generality, 185-88 norms for failed law, 182-85, 189 in determinate rules, 151 procedural constraints, 185-88 norms of form, 178-82 types of, 178 of rule maker's intentions, 185-88 grammar/grammatical context intended meaning, substantive constraints average interpreter, 206-7 absolute/presumptive constraints, idealized author, 211-12 174-75 impure textualism, 203-4 Ashwander doctrine, 177-78 infelicities of language, 133 contract/document interpretation, interpretive norms, 138-39 175-76 language identification, 135-138 doctrine of lenity, 176-77 procedural norms, 178–80, 182 infelicitous result avoidance, 173-74 textualist algorithms, 200-3 intention-free textualism. See textualism, utterance meanings, 140-41 intention-free intentionalism heuristic hypothetical, 137 affect, 112 moderate form, 147 anchoring, 112-13 rejection of, 171 availability, 47-48, 111 utterance meanings, 137 fact-finding accuracy, 109-10 intentionalism, competitors to fundamental attribution error, 113 concepts/underlying purposes, 217-18 Holy Trinity case, 169 original public meaning, 215-17 humility, in translation, 155-56 judicial craftsmanship, 233-34 idealized author, 211-12 judicial decision making idealized reader, 208-11 and adjudication, 117 impure textualism. See textualism, impure rule model of, 106-7 indeterminacy of rules. See rules, judicial decisions. See also common-law indeterminacy of reasoning, natural model infelicities in controversies, 28-29 absurd intended meanings, 168-70, equal treatment, 36-39 188-89 legitimacy of, 53 and language/style, 133 judicial rule making. See rule making, normative meanings, 165-66 iudicial opaque intended meanings, 170-71 judicial rule making, correctives to. See rule intended meaning, challenges to determinacy making (judicial), correctives to facticity of intentions, 162-65 justifications, failure of "Kripkenstein" critique, 160-62 changeability, 100-1 levels of generality, 150 morally incorrect decisions, 100 multiplicity of intentions, 145-50 normative arguments, 100 norm-governed interpretations, 164 past decisions, 101-2 translation, 152-59 retroactivity, 101



INDEX 25I

Kanneman, Daniel, 47–48	Manning, John, 195
Kress, Ken, 101-2	"mindless" algorithm, 201
Kripke, Saul, 160-62	mindless/meaningless text, 182, 198-99,
"Kripkenstein" critique, 160–62	203
	Miranda v. Arizona, 154
Lamond, Grant, 82-83	mistaken expression, 194. See also scrivener's
Lee, Spike, 152, 168, 217-18	errors
legal decision making. See legal reasoning	moral controversy, 9-15, 50-53, 105-6, 168
legal interpretation. See intended meaning	moral principles
legal principles	in a fortiori decision making, 83–87
in judicial decision making, 102–3	and analogical methodology, 120–22,
pernicious effects, 98–100	234
reasoning from, 88	assumptions, 10
legal principles, failure of justifications for	and common law, rule model of, 107–8
changeability, 100–1	consensus on outcomes, 98
morally incorrect decisions, 100	determinate rules, 151
normative arguments, 100	and equal treatment, 36–37, 100–1
past decisions, 101–2	and faulty logic, 95–97
retroactivity, 101	and legal principles, 1–3, 87–88, 92–93, 97,
legal principles, faulty logic	101–2
function of weight, 95–96	posited by humans, 12
and moral principles, 97	and precedents, 122–24
products of convention, 97–98	and rules, 23–24, 99
professional consensus, 98	and settlement, 34
requirement of fit, 96–97	and settlement, 54
legal principles, nature of	natural law/positivism divide, 24–26
appeal/allure of, 94	no-application understandings, 227–29
constraints of, 94	no application understandings, 227-29
descriptions of, 90–91	obsolescence, statutory, 181
vs. legal rules, 91–92	ontological questions, 213
vs. moral principles, 1–3, 92–93	opaque intended meanings, 170–71
in reasoning process, 89–90	originalists, 197–98
and reflective equilibrium, 93–94	0119111111010, 197 90
uses of, 90	"paradigm case," 227–29
legal reasoning	particularism, rule-sensitive, 16–17, 40–41,
canonical authoritative rules, 130	45–46
as craft, 1–3, 233–34	pointless intended meanings, 168–70. See also
by judges, 129–30	infelicities
as ordinary reasoning, 3	positivism
rejection of, 235	and natural law, 24–26
legal training, 234–35	presumptive, 17
lenity, doctrine of, 176–77	settlement function, 25
Lessig, Lawrence	Posner, Richard, 213
factual vs. legal presuppositions, 157–59	practical reason interpretation, 213–14
legal presuppositions, 154–57	precedent rules, identification of
structural humility, 155–56	acceptance over time, 57–58
translation of legal texts, 153–54	authoritative rules, 54, 56
value presuppositions, 158–59	in common-law reasoning, 105–6
levels of generality. See generality, levels of	deliberation requirement, 56–57
"living constitution," 197, 225–27	legislative rules, 53
Locke, United States v., 169	
Lucke, United States v., 109	positing requirement, 54–56



252 INDEX

precedent rules, persistence of rules, authoritative. See also rules, serious adjudication task, 61-62 compliance with, 17-18 and canonical text, 63 controversy settlement, 11-13, 27-28 erroneous outcomes, 59-61 and disagreement, 13-14 middle-ground standard, 62 and lawmakers, 130 and misbehavior, 13 overruling of precedent, 58-59 procedural constraint. See constraint, posited by humans, 12 procedural rationality of following, 16 psychology rule-sensitive particularism, 16-17 analogical decisions, 75 vs. rules of thumb, 11-12 cognitive bias, 47-48, 109-10 rules, determinate judicial, 23, 61, 73 deductive reasoning, 23-24 justified/unjustified rules, 122-23 levels of generality, 151 and moral judgment, 73 rule skepticism, 18-19 and reasoning, 10 rules, indeterminacy of accumulation of rules, 22-23 and rule compliance, 17-18 punctuation. See grammar/grammatical application to cases, 19-20 context classification of facts, 22 dependence on purpose, 21 Rawls, John, 32 linguistic meaning, 20-21 Raz, Joseph, 85-86 rules, serious reasoning, 10, 129-30. See also analogical application determination, 19-20 reasoning; common-law reasoning; common-law decision making, 43 deductive reasoning; legal reasoning common-law reasoning, 31-32 reflective equilibrium deduction from, 48-49 and analogical methodology, 119 error entrenchment, 59 judicial decision making, 104 governance by, 217-18 and legal principle formation, 93-94 judicial rules, 41, 45, 66 and moral reasoning/principles, 70-71, legal principles, 98-101 129-30, 232 precedent rules, 51, 61-62, 115, 122-24 and particularism, 40-41 rule-maker intention, 151 wide reflective equilibrium, 32 rule-sensitive particularism, 47 Rubenfeld, Jed, 227–29 settlement function, 27-28 rule-making authority/power unconstrained natural reasoning, 94 community designation of, 14-15, 53 sanction imposition, 17-18 sanctions, use of, 17-18 Scalia, Antonin, 193-95, 208 and serious rule dilemma, 15-16 rule making, judicial Schauer, Frederick cognitive bias, 109-14 adjudication, 117 error reduction, 107-8 concrete facts, 111 inattention, 108-9 overlap of rules, 23 overruling problems, 114-17 overruling precedent rules, 115-17 rationality/sustainability, 125-27 rule-sensitive particularism, 16-17 rule making (judicial), correctives to semantic autonomy, 20-21 analogical methods, 120 scope beliefs, 145-48 distinguishing and overruling, 122-24 scrivener's errors precedent rule restrictions, 120-22 intended meaning, 138, 202, 204 rule quality, 118 mistaken expression, 194 summary of practices, 125 semantic autonomy rule-sensitive particularism, 16-17, 40-41, common social meanings, 22 45-46 individual rules, 22-23



INDEX 253

intended meaning, 20-21 level of generality, 149 malapropisms, 149 rich vs. spare intentions, 147 scope intentions, 148 and serious rules, 21 semantic conventions, 140 semantic intentions, 146-47, 149 settlement authoritative rules, 11-12 by chosen authorities, 27-28 by human authority, 10-11 and misbehavior, 13 of moral controversy, 10 and positivism, 25 preference for, 12-13 rule-making power, 14-15 and serious rule dilemma, 15-18 Seventeenth Amendment, 133, 135-38, Solum, Larry, 215 spelling. See grammar/grammatical context statutory obsolescence, 181 substantive constraint. See constraint, substantitive Sunstein, Cass, 213 Supreme Court precedents, 229-30 syntax. See grammar/grammatical context

Tenth Amendment, 154–55
texts, translation of legal. See also canonical legal texts
factual vs. legal presuppositions, 157–59
value presuppositions, 158–59
textualism. See also textualism, impure author identification, 198–99
"deviant" meanings, 199
dynamic interpretation of canonical legal rules, 213–14
legislative history, 194
legislative intent, 193
objectified intent, 193–94
primacy of texts, 192

relevant language, 195-96 texts vs. ink marks, 196-98 textualism, impure algorithmic, 200-4 average interpreter, 206-8 idealized author, 211-12 idealized reader, 208-11 legal reasoning, 212 nonalgorithmic textualisms, 204-5 rule-of-law restricted intentionalism, textualism, intention-free author identification argument, 198-99 "deviant" meaning argument, 199 impossibility of, 192-95 language argument, 195-96 text declaration argument, 196-98 textualist algorithm, 200-4 translation, fidelity in emendation, 155 presuppositions, 157 value determinations, 159 translation of legal texts factual vs. legal presuppositions, 157-59 legal presuppositions, 154-57 structural humility, 155-56 value presuppositions, 158-59 Tversky, Amos, 47-48

United States, Church of the Holy Trinity v., 169
United States v. Locke, 169
unjust intended meanings, 168–70. See also infelicities
utterance meanings
and hypothetical intentionalism, 137
and legal interpretation, 140–41
vs. speaker's meaning, 134–35
and textualists, 200–4

Weinreb, Lloyd, 69–70, 73 wide reflective equilibrium, 32. *See also* reflective equilibrium Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 160–62