The purpose of the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Schopenhauer is to offer translations of the best modern German editions of Schopenhauer’s work in a uniform format for Schopenhauer scholars, together with philosophical introductions and full editorial apparatus. *The World as Will and Representation* contains Schopenhauer’s entire philosophy, ranging through epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind and action, aesthetics and philosophy of art, to ethics, the meaning of life and the philosophy of religion. This second volume was added to the work in 1844, and revised in 1859. Its chapters are officially ‘supplements’ to the first volume, but are indispensable for a proper appreciation of Schopenhauer’s thought. Here we have his most mature reflections on many topics, including sex, death, conscious and unconscious desires, and the doctrines of salvation and liberation in Christian and Indian thought. Schopenhauer clarifies the nature of his metaphysics of the will, and synthesizes insights from a broad range of literary, scientific and scholarly sources. This new translation reflects the eloquence and power of Schopenhauer’s prose and renders philosophical terms accurately and consistently. It offers an introduction, glossary of names, bibliography and succinct editorial notes.

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The World as Will and Representation

Volume 2

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with an Introduction by
CHRISTOPHER JANAWAY
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General Editor’s Preface

Schopenhauer is one of the great original writers of the nineteenth century, and a unique voice in the history of thought. His central concept of the will leads him to regard human beings as striving irrationally and suffering in a world that has no purpose, a condition redeemed by the elevation of aesthetic consciousness and finally overcome by the will’s self-denial and a mystical vision of the self as one with the world as a whole. He is in some ways the most progressive post-Kantian, an atheist with profound ideas about the human essence and the meaning of existence which point forward to Nietzsche, Freud and existentialism. He was also the first major Western thinker to seek a synthesis with Eastern thought. Yet at the same time he undertakes an ambitious global metaphysics of a conservative, more or less pre-Kantian kind, and is driven by a Platonic vision of escape from empirical reality into a realm of higher knowledge.

Schopenhauer was born in 1788, and by 1809 had gone against his family’s expectations of a career as a merchant and embarked on a university career. He completed his doctoral dissertation On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in 1813, then spent several years in intensive preparation of what became the major work of his life, The World as Will and Representation, which was published at the end of 1818, with 1819 on the title page. Shortly afterwards his academic career suffered a setback when his only attempt at a lecture course ended in failure. Thereafter Schopenhauer adopted a stance of intellectual self-sufficiency and antagonism towards university philosophy, for which he was repaid by a singular lack of reaction to his writings. In 1835 he published On Will in Nature, an attempt to corroborate his metaphysics with findings from the sciences, and in 1841 two self-standing essays on free will and moral philosophy, entitled The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics. A large supplementary second volume to The World as Will and Representation appeared in 1844, accompanied by a revised version of the original which now appeared as Volume One; then in 1851 another two-volume work,
Parerga and Paralipomena, a collection of essays and observations. Only in the 1850s did serious interest in Schopenhauer’s philosophy begin, with a favourable review appearing in an English journal and a few European universities offering courses on his work. In this final decade before his death in 1860 he published a third edition of The World as Will and Representation and a second edition of The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics. After Schopenhauer’s death his follower Julius Frauenstädt produced the first six-volume edition of his works in 1873, providing the basis for many subsequent German editions up to the Sämtliche Werke edited by Arthur Hübscher, which we use as the basis for our translations in the present edition.

Though Schopenhauer’s life and the genesis of his philosophy belong to the early part of the nineteenth century, it is the latter half of the century that provides the context for his widespread reception and influence. In 1877 he was described by Wilhelm Wundt as ‘the born leader of non-academic philosophy in Germany’, and in that period many artists and intellectuals, prominent among them Richard Wagner, worked under the influence of his works. The single most important philosophical influence was on Nietzsche, who was in critical dialogue throughout his career with his ‘great teacher Schopenhauer’. But many aspects of the period resonate with Schopenhauer’s aesthetic theory, his pessimism, his championing of the Upanishads and Buddhism, and his theory of the self and the world as embodied striving.

Over the last three decades interest in Schopenhauer in the English-speaking world has been growing again, with a good number of monographs, translations and collections of articles appearing, where before there were very few. More general trends in the study of the history of philosophy have played a part here. There has recently been a dramatic rise in philosophical interest in the period that immediately follows Kant (including the German Idealists and Romanticism), and the greater centrality now accorded to Nietzsche’s philosophy has provided further motivation for attending to Schopenhauer. Yet until now there has been no complete English edition of his works. The present six-volume series of Schopenhauer’s published works aims to provide an up-to-date, reliable English translation that reflects the literary style of the original while maintaining linguistic accuracy and consistency over his philosophical vocabulary.

Almost all the English translations of Schopenhauer in use until now, published though they are by several different publishers, stem from a single translator, the remarkable E. F. J. Payne. These translations, which
were done in the 1950s and 1960s, have stood the test of time quite well and performed a fine service in transmitting Schopenhauer to an English-speaking audience. Payne’s single-handed achievement is all the greater given that he was not a philosopher or an academic, but a former military man who became a dedicated enthusiast. His translations are readable and lively and convey a distinct authorial voice. However, the case for new translations rests partly on the fact that Payne has a tendency towards circumlocution rather than directness and is often not as scrupulous as we might wish in translating philosophical vocabulary, partly on the fact that recent scholarship has probed many parts of Schopenhauer’s thought with far greater precision than was known in Payne’s day, and partly on the simple thought that after half a century of reading Schopenhauer almost solely through one translator, and with a wider and more demanding audience established, a change of voice is in order.

In the present edition the translators have striven to keep a tighter rein on philosophical terminology, especially that which is familiar from the study of Kant – though we should be on our guard here, for Schopenhauer’s use of a Kantian word does not permit us to infer that he uses it in a sense Kant would have approved of. We have included explanatory introductions to each volume, and other aids to the reader: footnotes explaining some of Schopenhauer’s original German vocabulary, a glossary of names to assist with his voluminous literary and philosophical references, a chronology of his life and a bibliography of German texts, existing English translations, and selected further reading. We also give a breakdown of all passages that were added or altered by Schopenhauer in different editions of his works, especially noteworthy being the changes made to his earliest publications, On the Fourfold Root and the single-volume first edition of The World as Will and Representation. A further novel feature of this edition is our treatment of the many extracts Schopenhauer quotes in languages other than German. Our guiding policy here is, as far as possible, to translate material in any language into English. The reader will therefore not be detained by scanning through passages in other languages and having to resort to footnote translations. Nevertheless, the virtuoso manner in which Schopenhauer blends Latin, Greek, French, Italian and Spanish extracts with his own prose style is not entirely lost, since we have used footnotes to give all the original passages in full.
Editorial Notes and References

Three kinds of notes occur in the translation:

(1) Footnotes marked with asterisks (*, ** and so on) are notes original to Schopenhauer’s text as it stands in the Hübscher edition.

(2) Footnotes marked with small letters (a, b, c) are editorial notes. These either give information about the original wording in Schopenhauer’s text (in German or other languages), or provide additional editorial information. All (and only) such additional information is enclosed in brackets [ ]. All footnote material not in brackets consists of words from the original text.

(3) Endnotes marked with numerals 1, 2, 3. The endnotes are collected at the end of the volume and indicate some variations between the published texts of 1844 and 1859.

Schopenhauer’s works are referred to by the following abbreviations. We give page references to the other volume in the Cambridge edition. BM and FW are found in the volume The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics. FR, VC, and WN appear collected in one volume. The page numbers of the standard German edition by Hübscher, which appear as marginal numbers in the Cambridge translations, are supplied in all cases.


BM On the Basis of Morals [Über die Grundlage der Moral].

FR On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde].

FW On the Freedom of the Will [Über die Freiheit des Willens].
Unpublished writings by Schopenhauer are referred to thus:


Passages in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* are referred by the standard method, using A and B marginal numbers corresponding to the first and second editions of the work. Other writings by Kant are referred to by volume and page number of the monumental ‘Akademie’ edition (Berlin: Georg Reimer/Walter de Gruyter, 1900– ), in the form Ak. 4: 397. References to works of Plato and Aristotle use the standard marginal annotations.
Introduction

Schopenhauer’s *The World as Will and Representation* was first published in Leipzig at the end of 1818 (with 1819 as the date on its title page). It consisted of a single volume, which ranged through epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind and action, aesthetics and philosophy of art, to ethics, the meaning of life and the philosophy of religion, in an attempt to account for nothing less than *the world*: the nature of our cognition or knowledge of reality and how it relates to reality itself, the nature of our existence and the existence of everything in the world, what is and is not of value in existence, the pain of the human condition and the possibility of deliverance from it. *The World as Will and Representation* is the major achievement of Schopenhauer’s life, and the backbone of his intellectual career. In 1844 he published a revised and extended edition of it, and now added a whole second volume of ‘supplementary’ essays. It is this second volume, even longer than the first, that we have here in translation. In 1859, the year before he died, Schopenhauer revised both volumes for a final time, making many further additions. The text we have used for this translation is essentially this last edition, subject to certain further revisions by various editors, starting with Julius Frauenstädt in 1873, through Paul Deussen’s edition of 1911, to Arthur Hübscher’s of 1988, which we treat as the standard text. Our endnotes give detailed information about changes between the different editions of Schopenhauer’s lifetime.

On first publication of volume 1 of the work, its 30-year-old author stated in the Preface that it aimed ‘to convey a single thought’. We are to assume that this also applies to the work in its entire two-volume manifestation with the supplementary essays. The nature of this single thought, however, has been the subject of some slightly perplexed debate. If there is a single thought, it must be highly elusive or highly complex, or both. But we can perhaps make an initial approach towards what Schopenhauer

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means if we examine the framework of four Books into which the original
World as Will and Representation is divided. The essays that comprise the
present volume are expressly introduced as supplements (Ergänzungen) to
the First Volume, and they are arranged according to that volume’s four-
fold division. So it will help the reader to outline the shape of the First
Volume, which comprises four Books whose titles and discursive subtitles
are as follows:

(1) The world as representation, first consideration. Representation sub-
ject to the principle of sufficient reason: the object of experience and
science.
(2) The world as will, first consideration. The objectivation of the will.
(3) The world as representation, second consideration. Representation
independent of the principle of sufficient reason: the Platonic Idea: the
object of art.
(4) The world as will, second consideration. With the achievement of self-
knowledge, affirmation and negation of the will to life.

What we first notice here is an oscillation between the two key terms from
the book’s title. At the core of the single thought, then, is this: one and the
same world has two aspects, and we can learn about it by considering it as
representation, then as will, then as representation in altered fashion, then
as will in altered fashion. The two alterations in question introduce two
more vital oppositions. With the world as representation, we can either
consider it subject to the principle of sufficient reason, or independently of
that principle. With the world as will, we can either consider it descript-
ively for what it is, or we can consider it on an evaluative dimension – with
respect to its affirmation or negation. This, however, leaves us with an
immense amount to explain. Let us next try to flesh out these bare bones a
little, keeping in mind the four-part dynamic structure that any would-be ‘single thought’ really needs to have if it is to map on to the work as a
whole.

Schopenhauer uses ‘representation’ (German Vorstellung) in the same
way as his predecessor Kant uses it. It stands for anything that the mind is
conscious of in its experience, knowledge, or cognition of any form – somethings that is present to the mind. So our first task in The World as Will
and Representation is to consider the world as it presents itself to us in our
minds. In ordinary human experience, and in the extension of this in the
realm of scientific enquiry, we encounter objects, and these are ordered for
us, necessarily, by space and time, and by relations of cause and effect. All
the ways in which the world is thus ordered for us are species of the single
principle ‘Nothing is without a ground for its being rather than not being’, otherwise known as the principle of sufficient reason. Every object is experienced as related to something else which grounds it. Everything in space and time has a determinate position in relation to other things in space and time, everything that happens has a determinate cause, every action relates back to a motive and to its agent’s character, every truth is grounded in some other truth or in the evidence of the senses. So starting, as we must, from the world as we find it in everyday experience and empirical investigation, we see a multiplicity of objects related in necessary ways. But all of this tells us how the world must appear to us as subjects; it does not tell us how the world is when we try to consider it apart from the way it presents itself to our minds. We must next move on to consider the aspect of the world beyond representation, the world as ‘thing in itself’.

In a word, Schopenhauer argues in his Second Book that the thing in itself – what the world is beyond the aspect of it that appears to us – is will. His guiding thought is that there is one single essence that underlies all objects and all phenomena, ourselves included, one single way in which the ‘riddle’ of all existence can be deciphered. The single world manifests itself to experience as a multiplicity of individual objects – Schopenhauer calls this the objectivation of the will – and each member of this multiplicity, embodying the same essence, strives towards existence and life. Human individuals are primarily beings who will and act, and share their ultimate nature with every other being in the world. Human rationality and consciousness are extremely useful, and give us an instrumental superiority over other beings, but are really only a froth on the surface, and do not distinguish humanity from the rest of nature at the most fundamental level. Indeed, our advanced capacities for cognition can be explained, for Schopenhauer, as serving the ends of willing: our ability to perceive and investigate the world functions primarily to enable us to manipulate objects that confront us, in order to continue existing and to reproduce ourselves. If we are really to understand the world and our place within it, we must not remain at the surface of the world as representation, but must delve into this deeper and darker aspect of reality, the world as will – darker because everything that wills or strives is necessarily at the mercy of suffering, and because this suffering has neither point nor end. As long as we will, we suffer; but that we will, and ultimately what we will, is a function of our inescapable essence, not something rationally chosen, and not something we have the means to put an end to by willing.

At the mid-point of The World as Will and Representation we return to a new, and brighter, consideration of the world as representation. It can
happen, according to Schopenhauer, that we confront objects in a kind of experience that is out of the ordinary. We find all the usual kinds of relation – space, time and cause and effect – suspended, and lose ourselves in contemplation, forgetful of ourselves and of the distinction between ourselves and what we perceive. This is aesthetic experience, an extreme form of disinterestedness, a passive ‘mirroring’ of the world in which we cease to grapple with the world of objects, cease striving, and find temporary release from pain. While becoming as free as we can from subjectivity, we apprehend nature in a manner that takes our cognition as close as possible to the true essence of things: we perceive timeless features than run throughout nature, which Schopenhauer calls Ideas, intending us to take this notion in a sense close to Plato’s (or to what are often called Platonic Forms nowadays). Art provides the best opportunity for this kind of experience because it gives us a view of nature mediated through the exceptionally objective mind of a genius. Art enables in us as spectators a state of calm passivity and enhanced objectivity, and the various art forms allow us to recognize diverse aspects of the will’s manifestation in the world, from, as it were, a vantage point where our individual own will is not engaged.

The transition to the Fourth Book of *The World as Will and Representation* takes us back to the world as will, considered now with respect to its ‘affirmation and negation’, or at any rate the affirmation and negation of the ‘will to life’ that Schopenhauer finds to be the essence of each individual. This final part – by far the longest and, in Schopenhauer’s words, the ‘most serious’ – is concerned with ethics, in both a narrower and broader sense. Building on the descriptive account of the will from the Second Book, Schopenhauer gives his own answers to conventional ethical questions: What are morally good and bad actions and characters? What is the nature of right and wrong? What constitutes compassion, and the virtues of justice and loving kindness? In what sense, if at all, are our actions free? But the main thrust of the Fourth Book is a broader ethical treatment of the value of human existence as such – a profound and troubling discussion that borders on religious territory while remaining resolutely atheist in its conviction. Schopenhauer has argued that the life of the human individual is inevitably one of striving and suffering, unredeemed by any final purpose or resting point for the will that is our essence. Now he argues that some salvation is needed from such an existence, but that it can only come from the restless will’s becoming ‘quietened’ by a deep metaphysical insight that reveals individuality itself to be an illusion. The world in itself, outside of the forms of space and time that govern the world as
representation for us, cannot be separated into individuals. The truly wise human being would comprehend this and would cease to be attached to the strivings of the particular individual manifestation of will he or she is. Such a redemptive state – sometimes reached intuitively through the painful experiences of life itself – is the will’s ‘self-negation’ or ‘self-abolition’. The will that is the human being’s essence recoils from pursuing any of its goals, and the sense of individuality weakens to the point where reality can be contemplated with a serenity that is void of the usual pains of existence because the subject has become void of all striving and void of the usual sense of self.

THE SECOND VOLUME SUPPLEMENTS

The fifty chapters in the Second Volume are advertised as ‘supplements’ (Ergänzungen). This they are in the sense that each relates to topics, and in many cases to specific sections, of the First Volume. The two volumes have the same structure, divided into four Books, beginning with idealism and the theory of cognition, going through the metaphysics and psychology of the will, the theory of aesthetic experience and its relation to different art forms, and culminating in ethics and the doctrine of salvation through the will’s self-abolition. Some parts of the Second Volume have a distinctly ‘supplementary’ feel to them, in the sense that they are more or less extensions or footnotes to the existing discussions. But it would be a mistake to diminish the volume’s importance for that reason. Many of the chapters are powerful, self-contained essays in their own right, and in the years since the first appearance of the book Schopenhauer has attained a greater degree of scholarly insight into other authors, and most importantly a depth of reflection on his own position. So the Second Volume contains many chapters that are indispensable for a proper appreciation of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Here we shall merely highlight a few such chapters.

The Supplements to the First Book range fairly widely through Schopenhauer’s theory of cognition (both intuitive and conceptual), and rehearse systematic accounts of rhetoric, the association of ideas, logic, mathematics and the natural sciences. Schopenhauer includes a discussion of the use of reason in Stoic ethics, which gives him further opportunity to display his scholarship of ancient Greek texts, supplementing the similar discussion in §16 of the First Volume. The distinction between intuitive and conceptual cognition is crucial to Schopenhauer, and to mark it he divides the Supplements to the First Book into two halves, the ‘Doctrine of
Intuitive Representation (Chapters 1–4) and the much longer ‘Doctrine of Abstract Representation, or Thinking’ (Chapters 5–17). Abstract representation comprises concepts, which human beings alone are capable of forming, and the use of these concepts in judgement and reasoning. Schopenhauer believes in the primacy of intuitive cognition, which is shared with non-human animals. While conceptual thought obviously lends vastly greater sophistication to human cognition, Schopenhauer always holds that the only concepts that have any genuine content are those grounded in intuition. Philosophy becomes empty verbiage when it forgets this. Schopenhauer is able to elaborate many interesting thoughts around this central distinction. One example is his theory of the comical (Chapter 8), which rests on the notion of incongruity between the abstract and the intuitive. (Schopenhauer provides – as not all philosophers have seemed able to – some quite amusing examples.)

The first and the last chapters of the supplements to the First Book are probably the most significant. Schopenhauer explains more clearly than ever his basic idealist position, and also his claim that idealism and materialism, or subject and matter, are correlatives. Subject and matter are personified at the end of Chapter 1 in a miniature dialogue in which each claims supremacy over the other, ultimately becoming reconciled to a mutual dependence. In Schopenhauer’s view, it is true both that the world exists for subjective consciousness and that the objects in that world are exclusively material. Indeed, there is a sense in which the subject depends on matter for its existence, and a different sense in which matter, for the idealist, depends upon the subject. The final chapter of the First Book supplements is Chapter 17, ‘On Humanity’s Metaphysical Need’, and expresses Schopenhauer’s most fundamental convictions about the nature of philosophy. All humans have a metaphysical need: the human being is a ‘metaphysical animal’ (169), and by nature seeks a kind of interpretation of reality that ‘claims to go beyond the possibility of experience, which is to say beyond nature or the given appearance of things, in order to disclose something about that which … conditions appearance; or in common parlance, about what is hidden behind nature and makes it possible’ (173). Metaphysics takes two distinct forms which should be kept separate, though they have often been erroneously combined, or found to be in conflict with one another. The first form is philosophy, the second is religion. Schopenhauer’s engagement with religion deepened throughout his life, and in the present volume, as we shall see, is most manifest in the supplements to the Fourth Book. But in the First Book he already privileges Christianity, Buddhism and Brahmanism, because of their
pessimism: they ‘present the existence of the world . . . as something that can only be comprehended as a consequence of our guilt and that therefore should not really exist’ (179). Schopenhauer’s attitude to religion as such is double-sided: ‘Religions are necessary to the people and are an incalculable boon. Still, if they try to obstruct the progress of humanity in the cognition of truth, they must with the greatest tact be put to the side’ (177–8). Philosophy’s concern is with truth in the literal sense (sensu proprio), which religion can never provide. The use of religion, however, is to provide truth in the allegorical sense (sensu allegorico), thus satisfying the universal metaphysical need for the benefit of the great mass of people who are not capable of philosophy.

Turning to philosophy itself, Schopenhauer explains that a mere physics, or philosophy of nature, will always be inadequate because it gives us understanding of a mere surface, of appearance, whereas ‘metaphysics aims beyond appearance itself to that which appears’ (187), in other words the thing in itself. However, Schopenhauer is insistent that his metaphysics is immanent rather than transcendent: ‘it never breaks entirely free of experience but rather remains nothing more than an interpretation and analysis of experience’ and ‘never speaks of the thing in itself other than in its relation to experience’ (192). It is vitally important for Schopenhauer that his metaphysics is not founded upon abstract concepts such as ‘essence, being, substance, perfection, necessity’ and so on, which previous metaphysicians had treated as though they were ‘primordial, as if fallen from heaven, or even innate’ (189). Rather, he claims that his metaphysics is rooted in, and gives an interpretation or ‘deciphering’ of what is available to intuitive cognition, what is given in inner and outer experience. Metaphysics is, for him, a unifying and sense-making account of the world as we experience it.

Schopenhauer shows penetrating psychological insights elsewhere, for example in Chapter 14:

The whole process of our thinking and deciding is rarely at the surface, i.e. it rarely consists of a linkage of clearly conceived judgments, although this is what we strive for in order to give an account to ourselves and to others: however, rumination on the material we receive from the outside, rumina-
tion in which our ideas are worked out, usually takes place in the obscure depths, proceeding almost as unconsciously as the transformation of nutrition into the humours and the substance of the body. This is why we are frequently unable to account for the origin of our deepest thoughts: they are the fruits of our mysterious interiority. Judgments, ideas, decisions arise from this depth unexpectedly and in ways that amaze us. (144–5)
The secret locus of control lies not in our consciousness but in the underlying will. But here, as Schopenhauer comments, we already anticipate the main theme of the Second Book of *The World as Will and Representation*.

The supplements to the Second Book concern Schopenhauer’s central concept of will. The first essay tackles an important issue: how is it possible to have cognition of the thing in itself? Schopenhauer makes an important clarification about his position here, saying what in the end is this will, which presents itself in the world and as the world, ultimately in itself? That is, what is it quite apart from the fact that it presents itself, or in general appears, which is to say is cognized, as will? – This question is never to be answered because, as was already mentioned, being-cognized inherently contradicts being-in-itself and everything we cognize is as such mere appearance. But the possibility of this question shows that the thing in itself (which we cognize most directly in willing) may have – entirely outside of any possible appearance – determinations, properties, and ways of being that entirely elude our grasp or cognition, but which would remain as the essence of the thing in itself even when, as we have shown in the Fourth Book, it has freely annulled itself as will. (209)

Schopenhauer, then, does not claim knowledge that penetrates beyond all experience to some ultimate reality (as might have been thought from his assertions that the thing in itself is will). He intends instead that the will is what we can understand the whole of the world of our experience (inner and outer) to be. So again it is an immanent, not a transcendent metaphysics that he propounds. The last part of the quoted passage raises an issue of serious concern for Schopenhauer, however. In the culmination of his philosophy in the Fourth Book he will say that the will can negate or annul itself. It is notoriously unclear how something whose essence is willing can transform into something that ceases to will. Here there is the hint of an answer: something that ordinarily manifests itself in our experience as will can in principle, in virtue of its unfathomable absolute nature, stop manifesting itself in that way.

Chapters 19–22 of this volume form a continuous and detailed discussion of the relation of will and intellect, centring around the idea that we may adopt both objective and subjective investigative standpoints. Schopenhauer states emphatically that ‘what in self-consciousness, and thus subjectively, is the intellect, is presented in consciousness of other things, and thus objectively, as the brain: and what in self-consciousness, and thus subjectively, is the will, is presented in consciousness of other things, and thus objectively, as the entire organism’ (258). For Schopenhauer the intellect, the capacity to understand and reason about
the world around us, is secondary, a tool or instrument of the will. The cognitive apparatus we are endowed with functions to serve ends which the will strives for. The will is simple and primordial, present in all living things, and at bottom is an ‘attachment to life’ as such (249). In self-consciousness we are likewise aware that the will is primary: the basis of consciousness is a ‘direct awareness of a longing . . . and the alternating satisfaction and non-satisfaction of this longing’ (215), and this applies to both human and animal consciousness.

The subjective side of the human case is explored in Chapter 19, ‘On the Primacy of the Will in Self-consciousness’, where Schopenhauer makes interesting observations concerning a number of psychological phenomena. One such is the observation that our conscious understanding of the world is frequently shaped by desires, inclinations and aversions that are not fully known to us or within our rational control. Thus we see things selectively because of the desires and purposes that are governing us: ‘We are often quite unable to grasp or conceive anything that stands in opposition to our cause, our plan, our wish, our hope, even though it is obvious to everyone else: on the other hand, anything favourable strikes the eye, even from a great distance’ (229–30). At the same time, what we will is sometimes hidden from conscious awareness:

We often do not know what we want, or what we fear. We can nourish a wish for years without either admitting it to ourselves or even letting it come clearly into consciousness because the intellect is not supposed to find out about it lest it spoil the good opinion we have of ourselves: but if the wish is granted, then we learn from our joy (not without some shame) that it is what we wanted: for instance, the death of some near relative from whom we are to inherit. And sometimes we do not know what we really fear because we lack the courage to bring it clearly into consciousness. (221)

The ‘I’ or self is a kind of composite of will and conscious intellect for Schopenhauer, and the interplay between the two is complex. The intellect guides all our action by providing motives for the will, but the will ultimately has hegemony. Schopenhauer seems to anticipate the psychoanalytic conception of repression when he comments that in order to avoid painful emotions ‘the will forbids the intellect certain representations, when it simply blocks certain trains of thought’ (219). In this long chapter Schopenhauer offers many more psychological insights concerning ways in which cognition can be both hindered and enhanced by the emotions, how the will forms the core of the individual’s character and is not changeable in the same way as their intellectual capacities, and how many aspects of life reveal the naturalness of treating the will as the ‘being and essence’ of the
human being. With his knack for a vivid image, Schopenhauer likens the relation between will and intellect to ‘that of a strong blind man who carries a seeing but lame man on his shoulders’ (220).

In other chapters supplementary to the Second Book Schopenhauer turns to the objective investigation of organisms, human and non-human, and exhibits a studious engagement with contemporary physiological literature. His aim here is to show that his metaphysical concept of a will that permeates all natural processes is borne out by independent scientific work. Among those for whose work he shows appreciation is Marie François Xavier Bichat, whose distinction between ‘organic life’ and ‘animal life’ he maps on to the distinction between will and intellect, the former manifest objectively throughout the organism, the latter in the brain. Objectively occurring brain function shows up subjectively as unified consciousness, and this is how we acquire a sense of self:

this focus of brain activity remains in the first instance a mere subject of cognition and as such capable of being the cold and disinterested spectator, the mere guide and adviser to the will, and also of apprehending the external world in a purely objective manner without regard to the will’s well-being or woe. But as soon as it directs itself internally, it recognizes the will as the basis of its own appearance and blends with it into the consciousness of an I. That focal point of brain activity (or the subject of cognition) is, as an indivisible point, certainly simple, but not for that reason a substance (soul) but instead a mere state ... This cognitive and conscious I is to the will (which is the basis of its appearance) what the image in the focus of a concave mirror is to the mirror itself, and as in the example, has only a conditional, indeed, strictly speaking, a merely apparent reality. (291)

Two notable features of this account are that the self or ‘I’ is not a substance or soul, reflecting Schopenhauer’s consistent rejection of the Cartesian, Christian and Platonic traditions of thinking thus about the self; and that the subject of cognition is capable of ‘being the cold and disinterested spectator’ and ‘apprehending the external world in a purely objective manner without regard to the will’s well-being or woe’. These claims are vital to Schopenhauer’s whole system of thought, since this potential independence of the subject of cognition from the will is what characterizes both aesthetic experience and the freedom from willing in which, as he argues, salvation consists.

The Second Book supplements range quite widely across the natural sciences, because for Schopenhauer the will must be found to manifest itself throughout the whole of nature. Thus we have chapters on the objectivation of the will in nature devoid of cognition’, on matter, teleology in nature, and on animal instincts. Schopenhauer argues in favour of
teleological accounts of nature as opposed to mechanistic ones, provided that we free teleology of any connotation of conscious design by a divine mind, something Schopenhauer consistently finds repugnant. But mechanism is equally repugnant: Schopenhauer insists that science is mistaken in trying to eliminate the ‘life force’ from its explanations of phenomena, that atomism produces theoretical ‘monstrosities’, with atoms being nothing but ‘a fixed idea of the French scholars, which is why they talk about them as if they have seen them’ (314). Schopenhauer also collects many examples of instinctive behaviour in animals, favouring a teleological explanation in which the timeless will that is the essence of each animal provides for its future well-being and that of its offspring, but does so in a way that entirely bypasses cognition. The final chapter in this part of the book is the powerful ‘Characterization of the Will to Life’:

Everything strains and drives towards existence, towards organic existence if possible, i.e. towards life, and then towards the highest possible level of this: in animal nature it is obvious that will to life is the tonic note of its essence, its only immutable and unconditional property. Just consider this universal straining for life, look at the infinite zeal, ease and wantonness with which the will to life everywhere and at every moment strains wildly to exist in millions of forms, through fertility and seeds or even, where these are lacking, spontaneous generation, seizing every opportunity, grabbing greedily at every material capable of life; and then cast a glance at the terrified alarm and wild uproar when the will to life gives way in any individual appearance and slips out of existence, particularly where this takes place in the clarity of consciousness. (365–6)

In his final revision of The World as Will and Representation in 1859, Schopenhauer added a significant passage, which describes a scene witnessed in Java by the explorer Franz Wilhelm Junghuhn: a vast field of tortoise skeletons, the result of repeated attacks by wild dogs, who themselves were sometimes attacked by tigers. Schopenhauer responds: ‘The whole misery has repeated itself thousands upon thousands of times, year in, year out. This is what these tortoises are born to. What have they done wrong to deserve this torture? What is the point of this whole scene of abomination? The only answer is: this is how the will to life objectifies itself’ (370). In his notebooks Schopenhauer recorded another Javanese example, of a squirrel mesmerized and eaten by a snake. The example has made its way into a footnote thanks to Schopenhauer’s editors, along with Schopenhauer’s comment on it: ‘This story is significant . . . as an argument for pessimism . . . How terrible is this nature to which we belong!’ (371, n.).
The section of supplements to the Third Book is the shortest in length. Its chapters show Schopenhauer’s continuing adherence to his theory of aesthetic experience and artistic genius, and his in-depth appreciation for the arts. There are chapters on natural beauty, the visual arts, architecture, literature and music, which parallel the treatments in the First Volume. In line with his previous acknowledgement that there can be no knowledge of the thing in itself in an absolute sense, Schopenhauer now makes clear that when aesthetic experience allows us to recognize the timeless Idea in a particular object of perception, we still do not grasp the thing in itself: ‘the Ideas do not reveal the essence in itself of things but only their objective character, and hence they only ever reveal appearance’ (381). By ‘objective’ here Schopenhauer means, as always, what pertains to objects that fall within the subject’s experience (not what is absolutely real). The timeless objective character of a thing coincides with its species, a kind of universal existing in nature. Both Ideas and concepts are universal, but while the former are to be conceived as real prior to experience, the latter are constructs of rational reflection by the human mind. The state of mind in which Ideas can be grasped is one in which the principle of sufficient reason is not applied, so that the particular object can be viewed in isolation from its relations to other objects, and in which the intellect becomes free of its attachment to the will of the individual person. ‘One grasps the world in a purely objective manner only when one no longer knows that one belongs to it; and the more we are conscious only of things, and the less we are conscious of ourselves, then the more beautifully everything presents itself’ (385). Artistic contexts especially facilitate this detachment from self, because fictional things can have no real relation to our will: we can neither genuinely want them nor suffer from them. In real life, for the same reason, scenes that are foreign to our lives, such as distant destinations to which we travel, are more amenable to aesthetic detachment than our everyday surroundings, unless even there one were to experience ‘some degree of abstraction from one’s own will’ (387). But all such willlessness is only temporary, and one must eventually return to life. The value of aesthetic experience rests on its being a kind of respite, for ‘To appear interesting, delightful, enviable, any state, person or scene of life need only be grasped in a purely objective way and made into the object of a portrayal, whether in brushstrokes or in words – but if you are stuck within it, if you yourself are it, then (it is often said) it is hell’ (389).

Genius, which is required for the production of works that engender such detachment, is for Schopenhauer the rare capacity to sustain this very state to a heightened degree over extended periods of time.
ventures to say that ‘if the normal person consists of \(\frac{2}{3}\) will and \(\frac{1}{3}\) intellect, the genius on the other hand possesses \(\frac{2}{3}\) intellect and \(\frac{1}{3}\) will’ (394). Intellect here claims for itself a kind of autonomy, but genius manifests itself not in conceptual thought, rather in intuition and imagination, the capacity to create fresh images. Art that is the product of conceptual thought is never authentic, for Schopenhauer. He expatiates at some length about the qualities of genius, its exceptional clarity of mind (Besonnenheit), its distinction from mere talent or practical cleverness, its childlike nature, the (alleged) fact that it goes with an enlarged brain, and so on. One of the prominent themes of his later works, for example Parerga and Paralipomena (1851), is that people of mere talent and practical ability are recognized by their time, but geniuses are often neglected; he picks up the same theme here, saying ‘Talent is like a marksman who hits a target others cannot reach; genius is like a marksman who hits a target too far for others even to see; that is why it is appreciated only indirectly, and therefore late’ (408).

The Third Book is not wholly devoted to the aesthetic: we also find chapters on madness and on history. These topics arise for Schopenhauer because they are corollaries of his central claims about the nature of genius and cognition of the timeless Ideas, as set out in the opening three chapters of this section. History (in Chapter 38) is for Schopenhauer a kind of knowledge that, as Aristotle already said in the Poetics, is inferior to poetry precisely because unlike the latter it cannot grasp what is universal. As for madness, Schopenhauer had already taken a close personal interest in particular mental patients during his earlier life in Berlin, and in the First Volume (§ 36) he made much of the link between genius and madness, citing literary forerunners for this idea, such as Pope’s line ‘Great wits to madness sure are near allied’. In the Second Volume he now inserts a brief chapter on madness (Wahnsinn) as a self-contained topic. Mental health consists in good recall of the past, and particular kinds of disruption to memory characterize insanity. Schopenhauer’s theory is that madness occurs when the assimilation of cognitive material cannot be accomplished because of the resistance of the will. We all naturally encounter much material that is detrimental to our interests and contrary to our desires, and a healthy mind will, however painfully, accomplish the task of accepting it and so produce an ordered memory. However,

if the will’s resistance and refusal to assimilate some cognition reaches the point where the operation simply cannot be carried out; if, therefore, certain events or circumstances are fully repressed [unterschlagen] from the intellect because the will cannot bear the sight of them, and if the gap that then arises

is patched up with some invention due to the need for coherence – then there is madness. (417–18)

If the mind loses a memory in this way, it has to make up for it: ‘madness can be seen to originate from violently “casting something out of one’s mind”, and this is possible only by the “putting into one’s head” of something else’ (418): a delusion thus results.

In the aesthetic chapters per se Schopenhauer emphatically reiterates his central claim that art arising out of a predetermined conceptual plan is contrived and inferior in comparison with art that stems from the clear intuition of a genius. Art is fundamentally concerned with truth, because it answers the question ‘What is life?’ All genuine artworks ‘hold an intuitive image before the questioner and say: “look here, this is life!”’ (423) Chapter 35 comprises a full and detailed discussion of architecture, which for Schopenhauer expresses for our intuition the most fundamental Ideas in nature, those of gravitiy and rigidity. In order to do so properly, he concludes, architectural structures must consist essentially of loads and supports whose separate functions are clearly discernible. This predisposes him to a very strict classical style, and he even says that architecture as a fine art has been ‘perfected and finished since the high point of Greece, or at least it is no longer open to any significant enrichment’ (433). He concedes merely ‘a certain beauty in its own way’ to the Gothic style, but asserts that it can only be a degeneration from the proper way of doing architecture, so that ‘when it tries to set itself on equal footing with antique architecture, this betrays a barbaric presumptuousness that cannot be allowed to stand’ (434).

In the following chapters there are discussions of many particular points concerning painting, poetry and drama. Tragedy, which gives us the feeling of the sublime, retains its central importance among artistic representations for Schopenhauer because it portrays ‘the terrible side of life, the misery of humanity, the rule of chance and error, the fall of the just, the triumph of the evil; in other words, we see before our eyes the state of the world diametrically opposed to our will’ (450) – or in other words, life as it is. But even more important is the fact that tragedy displays (or in Schopenhauer’s view, should display) resignation on the part of its protagonists. In so doing, it rehearses for us the necessary step to salvation: ‘in the tragic catastrophe we turn away from the will to life itself’ (450).

The supplements to the Third Book end in the same way as the Third Book itself, with a discussion of music, which, as Schopenhauer reminds us here, ‘does not present the Ideas or the levels of objectivation of the will,
but rather directly presents the will itself (465). Music is as direct a manifestation of the will as is the objective world itself. However, in the supplementary remarks Schopenhauer does not dwell on the metaphysics of music, but rather on its physical properties and the psychology of our reception of it. Schopenhauer has a theory that ratios between frequencies that sound together are unpleasant to us ‘due to the fact that what resists our apprehension, the irrational or the dissonant, is a natural image for something that resists our will; and conversely, consonance, or the rational, since it easily facilitates our apprehension, is the image for the satisfaction of the will’ (468). Music is profound because it mirrors to us the very essence of willing, while leaving our personal will unmoved, as Schopenhauer says in this elegant passage:

Thus the affections of the will itself, which is to say actual pain and actual pleasure, are not to be excited but only their substitute, what is suitable to the intellect, as the image of the satisfaction of the will, and what offers it more or less resistance, as the image of the greater or lesser pain. It is only in this way that music never causes us actual pain but remains enjoyable even in its most painful harmonies, and we gladly perceive in its language the secret history of our will and all of its excitations and strivings, with their most varied prolongations, obstacles and agonies, even in the most melancholy melodies. When on the other hand, in reality with its horrors, our will itself is excited and pained, we are not dealing with notes and their numerical relations but are now ourselves the vibrating string that is stretched and plucked. (468)

The last paragraph of the supplements to the Third Book, which Schopenhauer added in the final edition of 1859, ends with an obscure quotation, in a strange mixture of languages, from Oupnek’hat, the two-volume compilation (principally in Latin) of texts from the ancient Indian Upanishads that Schopenhauer read and treasured throughout his life.3 The quotation nicely primes us for the strong presence of Indian thought in the ensuing Fourth Book (a few pages into which Schopenhauer begins referring to Buddhism and Brahmanism), but its relevance to music is not straightforwardly obvious. We translate the passage as ‘And blissfulness, which is a sort of joy, is called the highest ātman because everywhere that joy might be, this is a part of its joy’ (474). Schopenhauer offers this as a rejoinder to someone tempted by the thought that if music so powerfully reveals to us the nature of willing, then it ‘serves to flatter only the will to life since it presents its essence, portrays its successes, and ends up expressing its satisfaction and contentment’. Isn’t all art, including music,

3 See p. 474, n. 2.
supposed to be about turning away from the will to life? Schopenhauer’s response is that the joy in willlessly contemplating music’s image of the will is, like all joy, part of the joy of the ātman, the supreme self, which is equated with the bliss of salvation. Aesthetic release from willing is a glimpse of the state in which one is freed from willing altogether.

Thus we arrive at the Fourth Book, which for Schopenhauer is the ‘final, most serious, and most important of our Books’ (480). In the First Volume of The World as Will and Representation the theme of the Fourth Book is ethics. The same is true of the supplementary essays, but with a qualification which Schopenhauer makes in a short preface: there are two major ethical topics that he will not be dealing with this time around, namely freedom of the will and the basis of morality. Schopenhauer exempts himself from further discussion of these topics on the grounds that they have already been covered in the volume The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics (first published in 1841). What remains is the more broadly ethical theme of the affirmation and negation of the will, which lies at the heart of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, and which receives its fullest and most powerful treatment in these pages. In introducing the supplements to the Fourth Book Schopenhauer singles out for mention the long Chapter 44, ‘Metaphysics of Sexual Love’. This, he says, is a topic that belongs in ethics but has been neglected hitherto by philosophers. It has its place here because sexual desire and the sex drive are primary manifestations of the affirmation of the will to life. At the start of Chapter 44 he comments that it really forms a whole with the three preceding chapters, ‘On Death and its Relation to the Indestructibility of our Essence in Itself’, ‘Life of the Species’ and ‘The Heritability of Traits’. These four chapters between them constitute well over half the length of this final section of the volume, and add significant new depth to The World as Will and Representation.

The first chapter ‘On Death and its Relation to the Indestructibility of our Essence in Itself’ is the longest in the book. Schopenhauer’s attitude to death is one of consolation. He begins with the overwhelmingness of the fear of death, but immediately states that this fear cannot be rational in origin, because animals fear death without any knowledge that they will die. The elemental fear of death must therefore lie in what is common to humans and other animals, namely the will to life. It is because in essence we are concrete manifestations of this striving for life that the fear of life’s ending is so ingrained in us. Views on this topic tend to ‘vagillate between the view of death as an absolute annihilation and the assumption that we are immortal, flesh, blood and all’, but, Schopenhauer continues, ‘Both are
equally false: and we do not need to find a correct middle ground but rather a higher perspective from which both ideas fall away of their own accord’ (481).

Anyway, if death were complete annihilation, why would that be a bad thing? Schopenhauer gives eloquent expression to some oft-expressed Epicurean arguments:

[I]t is . . . absurd to consider non-being an evil since every evil, like every good, presupposes existence and indeed consciousness; and consciousness comes to an end when life ends, as it does in sleep or in a faint; and so the absence of consciousness is no evil. (484)

It is irrefutably certain that non-being after death can be no different from non-being prior to birth, and therefore no more lamentable. An entire infinity has passed when we did not yet exist: but this does not upset us in the least. By contrast, what we find difficult, or even intolerable, is the fact that, after the momentary intermezzo of an ephemeral existence, there should be a second infinity in which we will no longer exist. Now has this thirst for existence arisen because we have tasted existence and found it so entirely wonderful? Certainly not . . . it is much more likely that our experiences would awaken in us a longing for the lost paradise of non-being. (483)

Another consoling thought might be that the matter of which we consist does not cease to exist:

‘What?’ people will say, ‘the permanence of mere dust, of crude matter, is to be regarded as a continuation of our being?’ – But oh! Are you acquainted with this dust? Do you know what it is and what it can do? Get to know it before you despise it. This matter that lies there now as dust and ashes will, when dissolved in water, sprout into a crystal, glisten as a metal, and then electric sparks will fly from it; by means of its galvanic tension it will express a force that dissolves the most solid ties and reduces earth to metal: in fact, it will form itself into plants and animals and from its mysterious womb develop the very life that you, in your narrow-mindedness, are so worried about losing. Is it really so meaningless to continue to exist as this kind of matter? I am serious when I say that even this permanence of matter bears witness to the indestructibility of our true being, even if only in images and metaphors, or rather only in silhouette. (489)

However, Schopenhauer’s true solution to the problem of death is metaphysical: since time and space pertain only to the world as representation, the ‘higher perspective’ beyond empirical description allows us to consider reality as unchanging and non-individuated. From that perspective, Schopenhauer claims, we can deny both that the individual survives, and
that the individual’s true essence perishes. Something timeless manifests itself in the individual that I am for a while, and it does not perish with the ending of this individual. The species renews itself over again:

Just as the spraying drops of the roaring waterfall change with lightning speed while the rainbow they support remains steadfast in immobile rest, entirely untouched by the restless change of the drops, so too every Idea, i.e. every species of living being, remains completely untouched by the constant change of its individuals. But it is the Idea or the species in which the will to life is genuinely rooted and in which it manifests itself: thus the will is only truly concerned with the continuation of the species. For instance, lions that are born and die are like the drops of the waterfall; but the *leonitas*, the Idea or form of the lion, is like the unmoving rainbow above. (499)

Just as we ordinarily think that the person who enters the unconsciousness of sleep and the one who wakes up next morning are one and the same, so this human being here and now and other humans elsewhere in the future are not distinct from the higher perspective that reveals their true essence.

For Schopenhauer the worst doctrine concerning death is that traditionally associated with Christianity – though he unfortunately does his best to blame it on Christianity’s adoption of an allegedly purely Jewish idea of the creator God, which is ‘alien’ to Christianity and makes it into an unworkable hybrid. The view in question is that each individual comes into existence ‘out of nothing’ at some point in time, but then goes on existing forever. Against this:

anyone who considers a person’s birth to be his absolute beginning must consider his death to be his absolute end. For both are what they are in the same sense: consequently we can only think of ourselves as *immortal* to the extent that we think of ourselves as *unborn*, and in the same sense . . . The assumption that a human being is created out of nothing leads necessarily to the idea that death is his absolute end. (503–4)

Far preferable to Schopenhauer are the ideas he finds in Indian thought (though giving them Greek names): metempsychosis (transmigration of souls) and palingenesis (rebirth). He does not regard these doctrines as literally true, since in his ontology there are no such things as souls. However, as allegories, they graphically represent the idea that something fundamental to me both survives and predates the existence of the particular individual I identify myself as. He explains thus: ‘the word “I” contains a huge equivocation . . . Depending on how I understand this word, I can say: “death is my total end”, but also: “my personal appearance is just as small a part of my true being as I am an infinitely small part of the world” (507).
Someone taking the latter view could happily ‘leave his individuality behind, smile at the tenacity of his attachment to it and say: “why do I care about the loss of this individuality since I carry in myself the possibility of countless individualities?”’ (507). In the sense of ‘I’ that attaches to the individual human being, ‘death is the great opportunity not to be I any longer’ (524).

In Chapters 42 and 43 Schopenhauer focusses on human reproduction. The will, the essential part of each human being, is neither conscious nor individual. Rather, it is the will to life which resides in the species as a whole, and this will to life (Wille zum Leben) is not just a will to live, it is most importantly a will to propagate life, hence the sex drive is the very kernel of the will to life:

Indeed, one can say that the human being is the sex drive made concrete, since he arose from an act of copulation, the wish of all his wishes is to engage in copulation, and this drive alone perpetuates and holds together the whole of his appearance. It is true that the will to life expresses itself mainly as the striving to preserve the individual; but this is only a stage in the effort to preserve the species . . . So the sex drive is the most complete expression of the will to life. (530)

Accordingly, sexual relations ‘are the invisible focal point of all our doings and dealings, and they peep through in spite of all the veils thrown over them’ (529). Schopenhauer has some definite, and in some cases rather bizarre, views about the continuities of character and ability that are passed on to new individuals through procreation. Certain traits must come from the mother and some from the father, and since he is confident in assigning these parents respectively to the ‘inferior sex’ and the ‘stronger sex’, he sees fit to associate the primary element in character, the will, with the father, and the secondary intellect with the mother: ‘the human being inherits all moral features, character, inclinations, heart, from the father, while getting the degree, structure and direction of his intelligence from his mother’, believing that this is ‘confirmed by experience’ (533). Typical of Schopenhauer’s methods on many topics is that fact that the alleged confirmation comes largely from examples in Roman history, nineteenth-century authors and contemporary newspaper reports. Some of his remarks on heritability – such as ‘sometimes the children of a second marriage still bear some resemblance to the first spouse, and children conceived through an adulterous relationship are similar to the legitimate father’ (534) – are speculative, to say the least.

These chapters lead up to ‘Metaphysics of Sexual Love’. Schopenhauer’s topic in this magisterial essay is Geschlechtsliebe, which we translate as
'sexual love'. Here we should think not just of a simple desire for sexual activity or gratification. The phenomenon Schopenhauer addresses is, he says, best described in fictional works such as Romeo and Juliet, La Nouvelle Héloïse and Goethe’s Werther: being in love (Verliebtheit), an exceptional state in which individuals are sometimes driven even to madness, homicide or suicide by the intensity of their passion. This state is rooted in the sex drive (Geschlechtstrieb), but is more specific: it occurs when the sex drive is ‘more precisely determined, specialized, and . . . individualized’ (549), while ‘mere sex drive is base because it is directed to everyone and not individualized’ (565). By contrast, the phenomenon that concerns Schopenhauer is the sex drive strongly and persistently addressed to a single personal love object, and intensified into an ‘excessive passion’. Thus ‘individualization, and with it the intensity of being love, can reach such a high pitch that if it is not satisfied, then everything good in the world, indeed life itself, loses its value’ (565–6). In other words, in the consciousness of one human individual another human individual can become such an exaggeratedly important and irreplaceable object of desire that other objects of desire, including even being alive, are no longer recognized as having value for the individual.

Sexual love leads, or tends to lead, to procreation of further human individuals, which is at least a relative good, a good for the human species. But the mere indiscriminate exercise of the sexual drive would accomplish that. Love is a more refined form of good in Schopenhauer’s eyes, though not what lovers usually think it is. Its remarkable selectivity of focus, its training of extreme desire and minute attentiveness exclusively upon a certain individual, serves the end of producing better human specimens in the succeeding generation. For Schopenhauer has the belief, which he expounds in some detail, that we are most powerfully attracted to the one with whom we can produce fitter offspring, and unconsciously select the anatomical features of the beloved under the guidance of this reproductive end. And yet, for the individual who feels the passion of sexual love, or for the recipient of such passion, there is no direct value at all. They are merely used as instruments by what Schopenhauer calls the will of the species. The will of the species succeeds by deluding the individual into the belief that he or she stands to gain something of value from the whole exercise. In happier cases (if that is ever the right word for Schopenhauer) the individual at least attains relief of sheer sexual appetite, but that again is something common to any exercise of the sexual drive and not specific to being in love. More importantly, being in love does not, in Schopenhauer’s view, deliver the bliss of high personal fulfilment it appears to promise.
One might go on to form a successful and rewarding relationship with the object of one’s desire, because one also shares their likes and dislikes, appreciates their intellect, and so on, but those are not goods that arise from being in love as such. Being in love brings no peculiar value of its own to the individual lover, and is a good only because of its benefit to the unborn offspring likely to result from its consummation.

Schopenhauer’s idea is that the whole process relies on our naturally dominant egoism, the state in which we identify with the ends, the pleasure and the fulfilment of what Schopenhauer calls our ‘person’ – the one individuated human individual we regard ourselves to be. So sexual love relies on a human being’s retaining the natural, unreformed consciousness characteristic of individuals, and yet it does so only in the service of a value that bypasses the individual entirely:

egoistic goals are the only ones that can be relied upon to arouse an individual being into action ... And so in such a case, nature can only achieve its aim by implanting a certain delusion [Wahn] in the individual that makes what in truth is good only for the species appear to be good for the individual ... What therefore guides people here is really an instinct oriented towards the best for the species, while people themselves imagine they are seeking simply to heighten their own pleasure. (554–6)

So, in Schopenhauer’s view, the individual is both powerless, driven by the force of nature at large, and necessarily blind to what is really happening. Though you continue to believe that you pursue a goal uniquely valuable to yourself, a larger will that permeates nature is using you, the individual, for ends that are not your own.

Equally weighty is Chapter 46, ‘On the Nothingness and Suffering of Life’. Nichtigkeit is the stark German word in the title; we translate it as ‘nothingness’ to emphasize its connection with Nichts, nothing – although it might also be translated as ‘nullity’, ‘worthlessness’ or ‘vanity’ (in the sense of being in vain or for nothing). This chapter is very often cited as the encapsulation of Schopenhauer’s philosophical pessimism (although this is not a term he uses to characterize his own philosophy directly). The message is hammered home throughout this chapter that life is a continual round of striving for one goal after another, with no genuine reward. Happiness is only the temporary cessation of our sense that something is lacking, and it is an illusion that we will ever achieve anything more by willing. Suffering is endemic to our condition, and saps value away from it, which nothing can replace or compensate. The rhetoric of this chapter is heartfelt and striking:
Awoken to life from the night of unconsciousness, the will finds itself as an individual in a world without end or limit, among countless individuals who are all striving, suffering, going astray; and it hurries back to the old unconsciousness, as if through a bad dream. – But until then its desires are unlimited, its claims inexhaustible, and every satisfied desire gives birth to a new one. No possible worldly satisfaction could be enough to quiet its longing, give its desires a final goal, and fill the bottomless pit of its heart... Happiness always lies in the future, or in the past, and the present is like a small dark cloud driven by the wind over the sunlit plains: both in front of it and behind it everything is bright, it alone casts a constant shadow. The present is therefore always unsatisfying, but the future is uncertain, and the past cannot be recovered. (588–9)

It is fundamentally beside the point to argue whether there is more good or evil in the world: for the very existence of evil already decides the matter since it can never be cancelled out by any good that might exist alongside or after it, and cannot therefore be counterbalanced... The mere existence of evil would still be sufficient to ground a truth that can be expressed in different ways although only ever somewhat indirectly, namely that we should be sorry rather than glad about the existence of the world; that its non-existence would be preferable to its existence; that it is something that fundamentally should not be, etc. (591–2)

Although he does not espouse pessimism explicitly by name, Schopenhauer inveighs against the philosophical optimism of Leibniz and others as a glaringly absurd and pernicious doctrine, given the state of the world as empirically manifest, but also given the nature of desire, satisfaction and the character of will to life as portrayed in his theory. Once again, he reads Brahmanism, Buddhism and also Christianity (if deprived of its optimistic theism) as correctly pessimistic because they ‘regard work, deprivation, misery and suffering, all crowned by death, as the goal of our lives’ (600). In customary fashion he ends this impressive chapter with confirmatory references to Voltaire, Byron, Homer, Greek tragedy, Shakespeare, Balthasar Gracián, Leopardi and others. But it would be short-sighted to leave Schopenhauer there, as a pessimist pure and simple. The clue comes when he praises the three ‘pessimistic’ religions on the grounds that by seeing the value of life correctly they ‘lead to the negation of the will to life’ (600). There is a way of seeing the world aright, which will bring us liberation, or salvation, from the life to which our will and individuated existence naturally condemn us, and the two penultimate chapters of the book, ‘On the Doctrine of the Negation of the Will to Life’ and ‘The Way to Salvation’ offer Schopenhauer’s mature thoughts on these issues.
In the first of these chapters Schopenhauer relies on an interpretation of Christianity that sees asceticism and self-denial as its central, defining feature, and not the belief in God. This enables Schopenhauer to run together his three favoured religions, speaking of ‘the great fundamental truth of Christianity as well as Brahmanism and Buddhism, namely the need for redemption from an existence given over to suffering and death, and our ability to attain this redemption by means of the negation of the will’ (644). Schopenhauer refers to much secondary literature on the Indian doctrines, but in the case of Christianity he displays detailed engagement with original sources, such as St Paul, St Augustine, Meister Eckhart, Luther and the anonymous German Theology. Other strands of Christianity come in for equally engaged critique. Clement of Alexandria’s discussion of the advocacy of celibacy by various heretical groups is dissected, and charged with mixing the truly Christian ascetic viewpoint of the New Testament with the solely Old Testament doctrine of theism, with its verdict of ‘everything was very good’. Mainstream Protestantism in Europe has given up on celibacy and self-denial, and in addition has succumbed to a ‘shallow rationalism’ (640), on which grounds Schopenhauer dares to say that is not even genuine Christianity any more.

Negating the will is not achieved by rational plan or resolve, but must come about as though from an outside source, similar to the effect of divine grace in Christianity. Having lamented the presence of a life of suffering and sorrow, Schopenhauer now turns the tables and suggests that ‘it would be more accurate to posit the goal of life in our woe than in our well-being’:

life . . . seems to be specifically intended to show us that we are not supposed to feel happy in it, since the whole structure of life has the character of something we have lost the taste for, something meant to disgust us, and that we have to distance ourselves from, as from an error, so that our heart can be cured of the craving for pleasure or, in fact, for life, and can turn away from the world. (651)

So Schopenhauer’s philosophy comes to rest, not with the pessimistic description of the world, but with a way to salvation from the world, a reversal of the natural sense of self, so that the individual human being with its self-centred desires is left behind. Saintly human beings can attain an immediate sense of universal suffering that elevates their knowledge above the natural individualistic standpoint. For the majority of humans the ‘second way’ to salvation is the only one open, that is, being cleansed of their attachment to life by suffering itself. Schopenhauer concludes by reminding us that we are naturally equipped only to give explanations in
And so for instance, after all of my arguments, one can still inquire from where has this will arisen that is free to affirm itself (the appearance of this being the world) or to negate itself (an appearance of what we do not know)? What is the fatality that lies beyond all experience, and that has put the will in the highly precarious dilemma of either appearing as a world governed by suffering and death or of negating its ownmost being? Or in fact what could have induced it to leave behind the infinitely preferable peace of blissful nothingness? . . . [O]ne could even raise the question: ‘What would I be if I were not the will to life?’ (657–8)

Right at the end of this extended supplementary volume Schopenhauer makes the tentative suggestion that there might be a different form of willing, a willing away from the world and life, of which we might be capable. So what he has called negation may be another form of will, but we cannot provide an account, limited as we are by our existence as finite individual beings.
Notes on Text and Translation

GERMAN EDITION

The translation in this volume is based on the German edition of Schopenhauer's works edited by Arthur Hübscher, Sämtliche Werke (Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus, 1988), volume 3. Page numbers of that edition are given in the margins of the translation. Hübscher’s definitive edition follows the first complete edition compiled by Julius Frauenstädt in 1873 and published by Brockhaus in Leipzig, with revisions taking account of numerous later editorial interventions. A paperback version of the Hübscher edition that preserves the same text, with different script and fewer editorial notes, is the so-called Zürcher Ausgabe, Werke in zehn Bänden (Zurich: Diogenes, 1977), in which The World as Will and Representation (volume 2) appears in volumes 3 and 4. (Those wishing to read the German text of the work that Schopenhauer himself last issued should consult Ludger Lütkehaus (ed.), Arthur Schopenhauers Werke in fünf Bänden. Nach den Ausgaben letzter Hand (Zurich: Haffmans, 1988), vol. 1.) Arguments for using Hübscher as the basis for translation are given by Richard Aquila in his 'Introduction' to Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Presentation, vol. 1, trans. Richard E. Aquila in collaboration with David Carus (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2008), xli–xlii, the main reason being that Hübscher is commonly cited as the standard edition. When compiling our own editorial notes we have found it useful to consult those of Hübscher in the Sämtliche Werke, and also those in Paul Deussen (ed.), Arthur Schopenhauers Sämtliche Werke (Munich, 1911–12), whose notes are sometimes fuller.¹

¹ We have also sometimes found it useful to consult the editorial notes in The World as Will and Presentation, Volume 2, trans. Richard E. Aquila and David Carus (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2010).
Notes on Text and Translation

VOCABULARY

Many terms from the German text are given in editorial footnotes where this may be of help to the reader of a particular passage. Here we shall comment on some of the more important decisions that have been made about translating frequent items in Schopenhauer’s vocabulary. The term Vorstellung, for whatever comes before the mind in consciousness, has been translated as ‘representation’. This follows the most common rendering of the term in Kant’s writings (Kant uses the Latin *repraesentatio* when he wishes to elucidate his use of *Vorstellung*).\(^2\) A case could be made both for ‘idea’ and for ‘presentation’ as English translations of *Vorstellung*. The case for the former could be made, firstly, on the grounds of continuity with the use of ‘idea’ by Locke and other British empiricists; secondly, on the grounds that Schopenhauer himself uses ‘idea’ for *Vorstellung* in a sample of English translation composed in 1829, when he was proposing to translate Kant himself for an English audience;\(^3\) and thirdly, ‘idea’ is simply a less clumsy word for the English reader.\(^4\) Nonetheless, the mainstream translation in Kantian contexts nowadays is ‘representation’, and this continuity is arguably more important to preserve. Finally, particularly in his all-important aesthetic theory, Schopenhauer himself uses the term Idee – which is most comfortably translated as ‘idea’ (or ‘Idea’) – in a quite different sense, which he intends to be very close to a Platonic usage. We have chosen to avoid introducing the opposition of ‘idea’ versus ‘Idea’ and have opted instead for ‘representation’ versus ‘Idea’, which better reflects the opposition *Vorstellung* versus *Idee*.\(^5\) The case for ‘presentation’ might be that, while ‘representation’ unnecessarily imports the connotation of a definitive item in the mind that is a copy, depiction, or stand-in for something other than itself, ‘presentation’ resembles *Vorstellung* in suggesting simply the occurrence of something’s coming before the mind or entering into its conscious experience.\(^6\) However,

\(^2\) See *Critique of Pure Reason* A320 / B376.

\(^3\) See Schopenhauer’s letter ‘To the author of Damiron’s Analysis’ (21 December 1829), in Arthur Hübscher (ed.), *Arthur Schopenhauer: Gesammelte Briefe (GB)*, 122–3. In this letter, written in English, Schopenhauer advocates a ‘transplantation of Kant’s works into England’ and promotes his own translating abilities, at one point commenting ‘I hope . . . to render Kant more intelligible in English than he is in German: for I am naturally fond of clearness and precision, & Kant by the by was not’ (122).


\(^5\) Paul F. H. Lauxtermann suggests ‘Form’ for *Idee*, in line with recent usage in translating Plato; but in the end he reverts to our policy of ‘representation’ versus ‘Idea’ (*Science and Philosophy: Schopenhauer’s Broken World-View* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), 43 n.)

this is a rather subtle difference, and since ‘presentation’ has to be construed as a term of art just as much as ‘representation’, we have not resisted the pull of the latter, more conventional term.

Already in the title of this work Schopenhauer presents the world as being both Vorstellung and Wille. This second central term in Schopenhauer’s philosophy can only be translated ‘will’. Some interpreters writing in English impose a distinction between ‘will’ and ‘Will’, intending by the latter the will that Schopenhauer equates, or appears to equate with the world as a whole in itself. But there is in general no such orthographic differentiation in any of Schopenhauer’s texts themselves, and we have not made any such distinction in the translation. (Arguably one would anyway need more variants than just two if one wanted to reflect the many nuanced roles that Schopenhauer gives to the term Wille: standing for the individual’s will as manifested in his or her actions, for the underlying, non-empirical but individual character that is my will, for the one will that is common to all creatures, and so on.) The verb wollen is standardly translated as ‘to will’ (except in non-technical contexts where ‘to want’ is more appropriate) and das Wollen as ‘willing’. The vital Schopenhauerian notion Wille zum Leben is always rendered as ‘will to life’. It is not just a striving for individual survival, but also towards the end of propagating new life.

German has two words that are ordinarily translated as ‘knowledge’—Wissen and Erkenntnis; and Schopenhauer makes a philosophical distinction between the two of them, arguing that Wissen is just one form of Erkenntnis. We have therefore tended to reserve the term ‘knowledge’ for Wissen, rendering Erkenntnis as ‘cognition’, its cognate verb erkennen as ‘recognize’, ‘cognize’ or ‘have cognition of’, and erkenntend as ‘cognitive’ or ‘cognizing’ in contexts where they make a contribution to Schopenhauer’s epistemology and theory of mind. This group of terms occurs very often in the text. One of Schopenhauer’s major themes (from the very first line of § 1) is that Erkenntnis is common to human beings and other animals, but that animals have only an ‘intuitive’, immediate and non-conceptual understanding of the world, and lack the abstract, conceptual, or mediate kind of Erkenntnis that he calls Wissen. The other part of this theme is that the portion of cognition that we do not share with animals, conceptual thought, reasoning, Vernunft, is really of far less importance than philosophers have tended to think: it contains only what immediate cognition already contains, but in a more handy form. Schopenhauer ultimately argues that concepts and reason do not confer any particular ‘dignity’ or ‘freedom’ on human beings, and have nothing to do with moral value. This
Notes on Text and Translation

is all fairly radical in the post-Kantian climate. Schopenhauer certainly uses the Kantian terms *Sinnlichkeit*, *Verstand*, *Anschauung* and *Begriff* (which we translate conventionally as ‘sensibility’, ‘understanding’, ‘intuition’ and ‘concept’), but he does so in order to present a theory of cognition that diverges markedly from Kant’s in many ways. ‘Intuition’ is therefore to be understood as a term of art denoting an awareness of objects in space and time through the senses; and we translate *anschaulich* as ‘intuitive’ and so on.

In this usage we differ from Payne’s well-known translation, which tended to translate *Anschauung* as ‘perception’. We, again more standardly, use ‘perception’ to translate *Wahrnehmung*. A similar case is that of *Erscheinung*, where we normally use the customary ‘appearance’ (not ‘phenomenon’, except in cases where to talk of ‘appearances’ could be misleading in English). Schopenhauer accuses Kant of misusing the terms *phenomenon* and especially *noumenon*, and his own philosophy can be stated entirely without use of either term. Behind the world’s aspect as appearance or representation lies the world as thing in itself (*Ding an sich*), and Schopenhauer uses somewhat novel expressions for the relation between thing in itself and appearance, saying that the latter is the *Objektivation*, or the *Objektität* of the former. The world of appearance is the world ‘become object’. We coin the equally novel English words ‘objectivation’ and ‘objecthood’ for these two terms. In his revision of the text for the 1859 edition Schopenhauer frequently replaces *Objektität* with *Objektivation* – though the difference between the two is one of nuance, the latter suggesting more a process, the former more its product.

We have been fairly scrupulous with the cluster of terms *Mensch* (‘human being’), *Person* (‘person’), *Individuum* (‘individual’), *Selbst* (‘self’) and *Ich* (‘I’), all of which should be kept distinct from the ubiquitous term *Subjekt* (‘subject’). Schopenhauer quite often talks about ‘my person’, ‘my individual’, and so on. I am the subject of cognition, while the individual that I am, unlike the subject, is something in the world that I experience. We translate *Leib* and *Körper* both as ‘body’.

The frequently occurring *Grund* is usually translated as ‘ground’. Sometimes this refers to a cause, at other times to a reason – and indeed there are four basic types of ground, as Schopenhauer had explained in his earlier essay *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*. In fact the principle referred to in that title, and throughout Schopenhauer’s work, is *der Satz vom zureichenden Grunde* which should in strictness be rendered as ‘the principle of sufficient ground’. However, in this one instance we have used ‘principle of sufficient reason’ simply as the more
readily recognizable set phrase in English. Everywhere else Grund is ‘ground’.

German has two words that are commonly translated as ‘poetry’: Poesie and Dichtkunst. The English term ‘poetry’ has a somewhat narrower semantic field than either of these (the somewhat archaic ‘poesie’ corresponds more closely), but we decided to reserve ‘poetry’ for Poesie and translate Dichtkunst as ‘literature’. This enables the reader to make sense of the fact that Schopenhauer refers to Shakespeare as a producer of Dichtkunst and the novel as a Dichtungsart.

The most important positive term in Schopenhauer’s ethics is Mitleid. We translate it as ‘compassion’, not as ‘pity’. The latter is in many contexts a legitimate rendering of the German term, but is a poor candidate for the fundamental incentive on which actions of moral worth are based, because instances of pitying often involve a sense of distance from or even superiority over those whose suffering one recognizes, whereas Mitleid for Schopenhauer must involve the collapse of any such distance or even distinction between the sufferer and the one who acts out of Mitleid. The two virtues in which Mitleid manifests itself are Gerechtigkeit, ‘justice’, and Menschenliebe, which we have translated as ‘loving kindness’. It seems important that Menschenliebe is a species of Liebe, love. At some places in his text Schopenhauer originally had Liebe, but corrected it to Menschenliebe; and he glosses it as similar to the Christian concept of agape. Literally it is ‘human-love’, love of (and by) human beings. ‘Philanthropy’, though an exact parallel in Greek-based vocabulary, seems to refer less to a prevailing attitude of mind or incentive in one’s character and more to the resultant good deeds.

In talking of human actions Schopenhauer varies his terminology without any detectable change in basic sense. Thus often he talks of handeln and Handlung, ‘to act’, ‘action’, then switches to That, thun, or Thun (modern German Tat, tun, Tun), which we generally translate as ‘deed’, ‘to do’, ‘doing’ or ‘doings’ to preserve a similar variation in style. The th for t here (see also Theil, Werth etc.) is one instance of divergence in spelling from that of the present day. All German words in editorial notes are given in the original orthography that the Hübscher edition preserves (other examples being aa for a, ey for ei, ä for e, and dt for t, thus Spaß, Daseyn, Säligkeit, gescheidt).

The words Moral and Moralität are translated as ‘morals’ and ‘morality’ respectively. An immediate effect is to change the title of Schopenhauer’s 1841 essay, sometimes referred to in footnotes in The World as Will, to On the Basis of Morals (when in Payne’s version it was On the Basis of Morality).
Schopenhauer tends to treat 'morals' as a theoretical study or philosophical enterprise for which the term 'ethics' is equivalent, while 'morality' describes people's real-life actions and judgements. The adjective moralisch is easily translated as 'moral' (and the adverb as 'morally'), Ethik and ethisch likewise as 'ethics' and 'ethical'. In his revisions Schopenhauer replaced many occurrences of 'ethical' with 'moral', though it is hard to say whether this is a mere change in stylistic preference.

The culmination of Schopenhauer's ethics is the idea of the will to life negating itself. There are a number of somewhat tricky terms in this area, which we translate as follows: Bejahung, 'affirmation', Verneinung, 'negation'; Selbstbejahung, Selbstverneinung, 'self-affirmation', 'self-negation'; Selbstverleugnung, 'self-denial'; Selbstaufhebung, 'self-abolition'. Nichts ('nothing' or 'nothingness') and its compounds become increasingly prominent as the book reaches its conclusion. We usually tend to translate Vernichtung as 'annihilation', nichtig as 'unreal', Nichtigkeit as 'nothingness', but also as 'vanity', in the sense of being in vain.

**STYLE, SYNTAX AND PUNCTUATION**

Throughout this translation we have tried to render Schopenhauer into flowing, readable English. Schopenhauer is not a clumsy stylist – his German is fluent and very able. A translation that follows German syntax very closely might reflect the gross character of the original text quite accurately, but not its spirit. We aim for accuracy of translation in the sense of showing Schopenhauer for what he was, a clear and eloquent writer, successfully pursuing an ideal of clarity and readability. There are many factors to take into account in understanding Schopenhauer's stylistic decisions, but it is important to remember that he is positioning himself in relation to the constellation of post-Kantian thinkers. Kant had a notoriously dense style, which is famously taken up by Fichte and Hegel, whom Schopenhauer regards as his intellectual enemies. In making a point of writing fluently, Schopenhauer is explicitly breaking with this tradition, and announcing a new philosophical point of departure and a new function for philosophy, i.e. that it should not be confined to the academy, but should be a source of popular inspiration, something that Schopenhauer's work decidedly was in the latter part of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century.

Schopenhauer writes German sentences of great variety in length and structure. Often he uses a direct and punchy statement, or a balanced classical sentence with two or three well-constructed clauses. But the
greatest challenge for the translator is presented by those many occasions where Schopenhauer launches into a disproportionately long sentence. Helped by well-known features that distinguish German from English, notably the ability to frame long subordinate clauses with a verb postponed to the end, and three grammatical genders which allow nouns from earlier in the sentences to be picked up anaphorically without ambiguity, he can produce majestic sentences whose parts fit together perfectly and which make a powerful cumulative effect on the reader. In line with our policy of allowing Schopenhauer to speak eloquently to the English reader, we have sometimes divided up such longer sentences and reordered clauses within a sentence, always with the aim of reflecting the overall structure of his argument more clearly.

Schopenhauer’s punctuation, as transmitted by way of the Hübscher editions, is unlike standard present-day usage. One feature retained in the translation is the use of a simple dash (--) between sentences to separate out parts within a long paragraph. But we have tried to reflect his practice of inserting commas, colons and semi-colons inside sentences loosely and idiomatically rather than copying it. Another feature is Schopenhauer’s italicization of proper names, which we have tended to limit to occasions when Schopenhauer first mentions someone in a given context, or shifts back to discussing them.

Schopenhauer’s use of other languages

A major decision has been made here which affects virtually every page of Schopenhauer’s published writings. Schopenhauer is a master of many languages and delights in quoting extracts from other authors in Greek, Latin, French, Italian and Spanish. These extracts vary in length from the isolated phrase within a sentence to several unbroken pages of quotation which he thinks will substantiate his own view. Very often he will round off his argument with some apt words from Homer, Dante or Voltaire, always in the original language. He also has the scholar’s habit of incorporating short tags in Latin or Greek into his own idiom (e.g. he will generally refer to something as a *petitio principii* rather than saying that it begs the question, or as a *πρώτον ψεύδος* rather than ‘a false first step’ or ‘primary error’). Finally, when a substantial passage of Greek occurs Schopenhauer helpfully adds his own Latin translation for the reader’s benefit.

The cumulative effect gives Schopenhauer’s style historical depth and a pan-European literary flavour (with the occasional foray into transliterated Sanskrit). The question is how to deal with all of this in an English
translation. Earlier versions have taken two different lines. One is simply to reproduce all the non-German passages in their original languages and leave it at that. This was done by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp in their translation of *The World as Will and Idea* in 1883 and by Madame Karl Hillebrand in *On the Fourfold Root and On the Will in Nature* in 1891. While it may have been a reasonable assumption in those days, as it may have been for Schopenhauer himself, that anyone likely to read his book seriously would have sufficient access to the requisite languages, at the present time of writing such an assumption would appear misplaced. The second expedient is to leave all the original language passages where they stand in the text, but to add footnotes or parentheses giving English equivalents. This is the method, adopted in Payne’s translations, that readers of Schopenhauer in English are now most familiar with. In the present translation, by contrast, we have adopted a third strategy: with a few exceptions, everything in the text is translated into English, and the original language version given in footnotes. This sacrifices some of the richness involved in reading Schopenhauer – but it arguably disadvantages only a reader who is a good linguist in several languages but not German. For all other readers of English, the relevance of Schopenhauer’s quotations to his argument, and the overall flow of his writing, are better revealed by following the sense of quotations directly, especially on those many pages where he makes his point by way of a chunk of Greek followed by a chunk of Latin that gives a second version of the same, or where he quotes two or more pages in French. Nor is anything really lost by our policy, since every word of the original language extracts is given in footnotes on the same page.

Some exceptions to this practice occur where Schopenhauer specifically introduces a word in another language for discussion of its sense, or where he offers a Latin expression from the mediaeval scholastic tradition as especially apposite. In such cases the original language expression is retained in the text and the English equivalent offered in a footnote.
Chronology

1788  Arthur Schopenhauer born on 22 February in the city of Danzig (now Gdansk), the son of the Hanseatic merchant Heinrich Floris Schopenhauer and Johanna Schopenhauer, née Trosiener

1793  Danzig is annexed by the Prussians. The Schopenhauer family moves to Hamburg

1797  His sister Adele is born. Schopenhauer begins a two-year stay in Le Havre with the family of one of his father’s business partners

1799  Returns to Hamburg, and attends a private school for the next four years

1803–4  Agrees to enter career as a merchant and as a reward is taken by his parents on a tour of Europe (Holland, England, France, Switzerland, Austria). From June to September 1803 is a boarder in Thomas Lancaster’s school in Wimbledon

1804  Is apprenticed to two Hanseatic merchants in Hamburg

1805  His father dies, probably by suicide

1806  Johanna Schopenhauer moves with Adele to Weimar, where she establishes herself as a popular novelist and literary hostess

1807  Schopenhauer abandons his commercial career for an academic one. Enters Gotha Gymnasium and then receives private tuition in Weimar

1809  Studies science and then philosophy (especially Plato and Kant) at the University of Göttingen

1811  Studies science and philosophy at the University of Berlin. Attends the lectures of Fichte and Schleiermacher

1813–14  Lives in Rudolstadt, writing his doctoral dissertation, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which is accepted by the University of Jena and published in 1814. Conversations with Goethe on colour and vision

1814  Begins reading a translation of the Upanishads. Stays with his mother in Weimar, but breaks with her permanently after a final quarrel. Lives in Dresden until 1818

1814–18  Works on The World as Will and Representation

1816  Publishes On Vision and Colours

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March: completion of *The World as Will and Representation*, published by Brockhaus at the end of the year, with ‘1819’ on title page

Travels in Italy (Florence, Rome, Naples, Venice) and returns to Dresden

Is appointed as unsalaried lecturer (*Privatdozent*) at the University of Berlin

Gives his only course of lectures, which is poorly attended

Travels again to Italy (Milan, Florence, Venice). Returns from Italy to live in Munich. Is ill and depressed

Lives in Bad Gastein, Mannheim and Dresden. Proposes to translate Hume’s works on religion into German, but does not find a publisher

Returns to Berlin

Plans to translate Kant into English, without success; publishes *Commentatio Exponens Theoriam Colorum Physiologicam, Eandemque primariam, Auctore Arthurio Schopenhauero*

Leaves Berlin because of the cholera epidemic. Moves to Frankfurt am Main

Lives temporarily in Mannheim

Sets in Frankfurt, where he remains for the rest of his life

Publishes *On Will in Nature*

His mother dies

Enters competition set by the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences and wins prize with his essay *On the Freedom of the Will*

Submits *On the Basis of Morals* in a competition set by the Royal Danish Society of Sciences, and is not awarded a prize

*On the Freedom of the Will* and *On the Basis of Morals* published under the title *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*

Publishes second, revised edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, adding a second volume consisting of fifty essays elaborating on ideas discussed in the first volume

Publishes second, revised edition of *On the Fourfold Root*

Publishes *Parerga and Paralipomena* in two volumes

An article on his philosophy by J. Oxenford in *Westminster and Foreign Quarterly Review* marks the beginning of his belated recognition

Publishes second editions of *On Will in Nature* and *On Vision and Colours*. Julius Frauenstädt publishes *Letters on Schopenhauer’s Philosophy*

Schopenhauer’s philosophy taught at Bonn University

Declines invitation to be a member of Berlin Royal Academy

Publishes third edition of *The World as Will and Representation*

Publishes second edition of *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*. Dies on 21 September in Frankfurt am Main
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