Introduction

The condition of a society's money is a symptom of all of its conditions.[1]

In August 1988, an 84-year-old working-class resident of Leipzig named Erich K. wrote to the Central Committee (Zentralkomittee, ZK) of the East German communist party to complain about money. Ironically, he was less concerned about not having enough money than he was that the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had too much of it. Because of money, K. argued, socialism had so far been unable to create the economic conditions necessary for the liberation of humanity. Instead, "socialist states with their bank notes are enmeshed in the capitalist network of bank notes, and for this reason the socialist economies in all socialist states do not make much headway."[2] The problem with money, according to K., was that it derived its value from human suffering. In a reference to his experience of the First World War and his service in Hitler's army during the Second, K. contended that "the trail of capitalism leads over the war dead and much other human misery, and capitalism turned all of this into money, minted increasingly from the suffering of humanity."[3] Not only had the GDR's entanglement with capitalist money impeded the economic progress of socialism, but the use of money itself had also compromised socialism's moral superiority. To restore ethical and economic autonomy to the project of socialism, K. urged the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) to abolish money.

Officials at the ZK were greatly disturbed by K.'s letter. Despite the fact that the party officially encouraged East Germans to communicate their concerns by writing letters of grievance, ZK officials were taken aback by

1 Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Das Wesen des Geldes* (Göttingen, 1970), p. 1.
2 Bundesarchiv Berlin (BArchB), DN10, 3287, petition from 23.8.88, p. 1. The names of petitioners have been rendered anonymous to protect their privacy.
3 Ibid. See also BArchB, DN10, 3287, petitions from 10.11.85 and 20.6.77.

the challenge to their authority contained in K.'s letter. They arranged for local representatives of the party and state to visit the elderly man in his home and "discuss" his ideas. Although the delegation clearly sought to intimidate K. into retracting his letter, it nonetheless took pains to create the semblance of a dialogue between an attentive state and a concerned citizen. K., at any rate, appears to have taken this pretense of debate for the real thing. After a brief exchange of views, the elderly man declared himself satisfied by the delegation's explanation of socialist monetary policy. To the relief of the ZK, he withdrew his letter. Not two weeks later, however, in a second letter, K. recanted, complaining that his guests had not really engaged him in conversation but had instead put words into his mouth.[4]

SED leaders were incensed by K.'s new letter. Not only had he demonstrated open disregard for the coercive etiquette of letter writing in the GDR, but he persisted in willfully misunderstanding a fundamental aspect of SED policy. Furious at the inability of their subordinates to silence K., officials at the ZK shifted responsibility for the fiasco onto the East German central bank. In a scathing letter to the Staatsbank, Günther Ehrensperger, head of the powerful Department of Planning and Finance at the ZK, implied that the bank was unable to control the circulation of ideas in the area of its own expertise – the circulation of money. Ehrensperger then demanded that the central bank coerce K. into rescinding the retraction of his withdrawal.[5]

Faced with intense political pressure from the SED leadership to silence K. on the one hand and an avalanche of cantankerous letters from the elderly man on the other, Gerhard Serick, Deputy President of the Staatsbank, tried to depoliticize the affair by attributing K.'s recalcitrance to his advanced age rather than some heretical obstinacy. Noting that K.'s ideas were "totally confused and ludicrous," Serick suggested that he was simply senile. In a report to the Politburo, Serick concluded that "Herr K. is no longer able intellectually to comprehend our arguments regarding the theory and praxis of money under socialist conditions. Further conversations are futile – his last letter is renewed demonstration of that."[6]

Even if K. was merely muddled and ornery, however, he had succeeded in agitating the communist party leadership with his suggestion that a profound discrepancy between theory and praxis existed in the GDR. Not only had K. pointed out that the party had yet to implement its egalitarian promise of a moneyless society, but he also suggested that the GDR's entanglement

4 BArchB, DN10, 3287, petition to Herzog, Staatsbank Leipzig, 25.11.85.
5 BArchB, DN10, 3287, Ehrensperger to Meier, 7.9.88. See also BArchB, DN10, 3287, Serick to Wackernagel, 20.11.85.
6 BArchB, DN10, 3287, Serick to Ehrensperger, 9.9.88.

with capitalism had compromised the "better" German state financially and morally. And he had done so in defiance of the SED's otherwise tight control over the circulation of ideas.

This book is about the East German attempt to create a society of inexhaustible plenty and limitless good by eliminating money. Like communist parties elsewhere, the SED sought to reverse what Karl Polyani called the "great transformation" and reembed economic activity in social relations.[7] By unmaking money, the party believed it could turn private into common wealth and eventually realize the promise of Edenic riches.

The East German heirs of Marx and Lenin failed, however, to devise a genuine alternative to capitalism, much less put an end to social injustice. Though there were many reasons for this failure, this book argues that the most important involved a confusion of money with the market. In their quest to subordinate the instrumental reason inherent in economic calculation to ethical principles, East German communists tried to preempt capitalist exchange by creating extramonetary relationships between producers and consumers. As Marx himself noted, however, merely reforming the system for allocating resources would not alter social relations under capitalism because it could effect no change in the methods of production. Far from reordering trade along nonmarket lines, the SED's partial elimination of money only aggravated existing asymmetries between supply and demand, unleashing increasingly bitter distributional conflicts that eventually discredited central planning.

If the shortcomings of economic planning were broadly similar across Eastern Europe, what distinguished the GDR from other Soviet-style regimes was the division of Germany. Unlike its communist allies, East Germany was forced to compete with a hostile capitalist state in the same national space. This geographical and cultural proximity involved the GDR with the capitalist West to a degree not experienced by other Eastern European states. The SED's decision in the 1970s to introduce capitalist currency and commodities into the GDR, for example, initially stabilized the planned economy. But this economic reliance on the West undermined the political authority of socialism. Not only did borrowing money from the class enemy constitute a tacit admission that capitalism was the superior system, but the official promotion of West German money and merchandise supplanted the East German currency and commodities, reinforcing the sense of ordinary East Germans that they were second-class citizens in a capitalist world. Despite the SED's commitment to fashioning a society that would

7 Karl Polyani, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston, 2001).

suspend the "laws" of capitalism by transforming the function of money, the GDR's entanglement with the West ultimately devalued the meaning of socialism by undermining the actual currency itself.

At least initially, however, the philosophical anticapitalism of Marx and Engels, as interpreted by Lenin, resonated powerfully with the anticapitalist traditions of German history. In particular, the portrayal of money as a source of social injustice animated East German communists, who agreed that money could have no place in the future of the socialist state. To some extent, their mistrust of money had been shaped by the peculiarities of German history. The traumatic experiences of the hyperinflation during 1922–3, when Germans had too much money, and the radical deflation of the Great Depression, when it seemed as if they had too little, turned a majority of Germans away from liberal democratic solutions to the challenges of modernity. While the Nazis linked the circulation of money to the expansion of "Jewish" values, denouncing interest rates as a form of servitude that obstructed racial solidarity, the German left sought to expose the uneven distribution of power and privilege masked by money.[8] As the playwright Bertolt Brecht, who would settle in East Berlin after 1945, put it, "What is robbing a bank compared to founding one?"[9]

After World War II and the defeat of German fascism, the renewed threat of hyperinflation heightened the determination of many Germans to organize economic activity according to the principle of social justice. The role of money as a causal factor in German history took on new meaning in 1948, however, when the *Deutsche Mark* replaced the *Reichsmark* in the Western zone of occupation and precipitated the partition of Germany into a capitalist West and a communist East. For forty years, the two German states sought to link national identity with economic organization – the social market economy in the Federal Republic and the planned economy in the GDR. In 1989–90, the systemic competition between capitalism and communism would once again thrust money onto center stage, as East German demand for West German marks paved the way for German–German reconciliation after the collapse of the Berlin Wall.[10] For the first time in German

8 On the hyperinflation, see Gerald D. Feldman, *The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics, and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924* (New York and Oxford, 1993). On the Depression, see Harold James, *The German Slump: Politics and Economics, 1924–1936* (Oxford, 1986); Richard Evans and Dick Geary, *The German Unemployed: Experiences and Consequences of Mass Unemployment from the Weimar Republic to the Third Reich* (London, 1987). On the Nazis, see Avraham Barkai, *Nazi Economics: Ideology, Theory, and Policy*, trans. Ruth Hadass-Vashitz (New Haven, Conn., 1990); Richard J. Overy, *War and Economy in the Third Reich* (Oxford, 1994).

9 Bertolt Brecht, *The Threepenny Opera*, Act III, scene i.

10 For more on the social market economy in the Federal Republic, see Anthony James Nicholls, *Freedom with Responsibility: The Social Market Economy in Germany, 1918–1963* (Oxford and New York,

history, money played a unifying, rather than a divisive, role: German unification was preceded and made possible by German monetary union, which replaced the East with the West German mark in the summer of 1990. In the meantime, however, K. and millions of other Germans like him experienced money as a medium for creating and intensifying social stratification.

In addition to this historical equation of money with social inequality, East German communism inherited a philosophical antipathy toward money from the Soviet Union. Like the utopian socialists before them, the Bolsheviks identified money with economic exploitation – as the instrument employed by capital to dispossess labor of its value. Marxism-Leninism presented capitalist exchange not as the mutually beneficial and therefore welfare-enhancing activity of liberal economic theory, but rather as a zero-sum game in which one party necessarily exploits the other. The asymmetrical structure of power intrinsic to market relations favors those who possess capital over those who must sell their labor power or risk destitution.

Not only do workers suffer from material oppression, but their apparent freedom to alienate their labor by selling it for money also leads to a form of spiritual alienation. Capitalism's elevation of economic rationality over ethical concerns, the SED claimed, encourages people to treat their lives as if they were a means to an end, rather than an end in themselves. The liberal celebration of private vice as advancing public good further confuses the purpose of human economic production – the sustenance of life – with the instrument people employ to sustain that life – the pursuit of money. As a result, people end up living to work, rather than working to live. For this reason, East German communists perceived in money both the starting point and the ever-receding horizon of people's enslavement to this confusion of ends and means.

In addition, the party argued that capitalism produces a form of alienation Marx termed commodity fetishism, or the false attribution to products of the power to gratify human needs. According to Marx, money is the quintessential commodity fetish because it "debases all the gods of man

1994). For the Soviet zone of occupation, see Mary Fulbrook, *Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949–1989* (Oxford, 1995); Christoph Kleßmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung: Deutsche Geschichte, 1945–1955* (Bonn, 1991); Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995); Hermann Weber, *Geschichte der DDR* (Munich, 1989). For more on the East German planned economy, see Jeffrey Kopstein, *The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945–1989* (Chapel Hill, N.C., and London, 1997); André Steiner, *Die DDR-Wirtschaftsreform der sechziger Jahre: Konflikt zwischen Effizienz- und Machtkalkül* (Berlin, 1999). For more on the collapse of the GDR, see Hans-Hermann Hertle, *Der Fall der Mauer. Die unbeabsichtigte Auflösung des SED-Staates* (Opladen, 1996); Konrad Jarausch, *The Rush to German Unity* (New York, 1994); Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton, N.J., 1997).

and turns them into commodities. Money is the universal, self-constituting value of all things. It has therefore robbed the whole world, human as well as natural, of its own values."[11] Everything can be had for money, yet only money is completely fungible; it stands in for every value, but none in particular.

Building on these insights into capitalism, the SED sought to distinguish between "real" and "false" needs. According to the party, the needs of an individual, whether physiological or spiritual, are shaped by social relations in a given society. In capitalist societies, a person's real needs are manipulated and falsified by the exploitative constraints of market forces. Through this dichotomy, the SED established an equivalency between false needs and commodity fetishism, between desire and money.

The planned economy, or so the SED alleged, was superior to capitalism because it removed the grounds for desire by creating social conditions in which only real needs exist. Although money continued to circulate in socialist society, it existed only in vestigial form, as a medium for the satisfaction of real needs, and would become entirely redundant once the GDR was transformed into a communist society.[12] Where capitalist currency functioned as an agent of economic scarcity and social alienation, the currency of socialism offered the opportunity to apportion the wealth of society along egalitarian lines – "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."[13] For factories, the stimulus to production was no longer profit, but rather a matrix of economic targets formulated by the party according to its political preferences. Unable to command resources, socialist money circulated as an accounting unit that recorded centrally authorized transactions, such as the payment of wages. Nor did acquiring money for its own sake hold much attraction for private economic actors. The SED's decision to subsidize the basic needs of consumers, from food to housing, helped uncouple wealth from money. In this manner, the SED hoped, the currency of socialism would recast the relation between economy and society, between desire and need.

Making money worth less, however, was not the same as making it worthless. The social construction of value in the GDR was mediated not

11 My translation of Karl Marx, "Zur Judenfrage," in *Marx-Engels Werke* (*MEW*), vol. 1 (East Berlin, 1981), p. 374 (Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: Collected Works*, vol. 3, p. 172).

12 In communist parlance, "socialism" is an intermediary stage in the transition from capitalism to communism. While most socialists believe in the organic historical development of socialism out of capitalism, communists are socialists who advocate the violent overthrow of capitalism and its replacement with a centralized economy supervised by a one-party dictatorship.

13 Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," in *Marx/Engels Selected Works*, vol. 3 (Moscow, 1970), p. 19.

by a utopian transparency of need, but by shortages of economic and ethical goods. Replacing money with planning indicators permitted the party to emphasize its production priorities. Yet the system of apportioning resources from the center led to the uneven distribution and waste of resources. Freed from the threat of bankruptcy, East German factories were no longer guided by cost constraints, but were responsible instead for fulfilling the plan. Ignoring costs, however, made for increasing inefficiency, low levels of productivity, and waste, all of which eventually overwhelmed the productive capacities of the GDR.

In the consumer sector, moreover, the chronic shortages of consumer goods afflicting the planned economy further undermined the value and function of socialist money. Although the East German mark sufficed to complete purchases of the basic necessities of life, such as bread and the rent, it could not overcome shortages or the unofficial forms of rationing typical of the planned economy, such as exorbitantly high prices for consumer durable goods or exceedingly long lines. To ensure the prompt delivery of washing machines, reduce the long wait for cars, or purchase stockings, not to mention Western consumer goods, West German currency came to play an increasingly prominent role. As a result, the GDR's monetary regime fragmented into two competing modes of exchange: Socialist money was used to satisfy basic needs, while capitalist money was used to fulfill the desires of East German consumers for convenience, creature comforts, and social status. The SED sought to construct political authority through economic practice, but its attempt to govern an industrial – and divided – nation by force fostered instead the creation of political identity through national currency. By 1989 at the latest, it was clear that the party's attempt to control what money can buy, as well as what purchase it has on human imagination, had failed.

The SED's attempt to subordinate economy to society had not always met with such rejection, however. In the immediate postwar period, for example, the economic reorganization of society along socialist lines enjoyed considerable support, not least because many Germans perceived the "Third Reich" as the logical outcome of capitalist excess.[14] The party also benefited from the political topography that coalesced out of the Cold War. In

14 For the communist view, see Gunther Kohlmey, *Das Geldsystem der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik* (East Berlin, 1956), pp. 19–32. Even many Christian Democrats initially expressed sympathy with socialism, as in the Ahlener Program (Weber, *Geschichte der DDR*, pp. 78–9, 136–8). The reputation of West German industry continued to suffer from its association – both real and imagined – with National Socialism. On the ties of industry to the Nazis, see Reinhard Neebe, *Großindustrie, Staat und NSDAP 1930–1933: Paul Silverberg und der Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie in der Krise der Weimarer Republik* (Göttingen, 1981). On the postwar image of industrialists, see S. Jonathan Wiesen, *West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945–1955* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001).

particular, the territorial and ideological division of Germany facilitated the SED's efforts to establish its moral superiority over its capitalist cousins. The fact, for example, that prominent Nazis continued to wield influence in West German public life – from Hans Globke, coauthor of the Nuremberg racial laws and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's top aide, to Kurt Georg Kiesinger, a Nazi expert in radio propaganda who became chancellor in 1966 – lent the SED's tireless efforts to conflate capitalism with fascism more credibility than they merited.[15] Nevertheless, the party's skilled representation of the GDR as a bastion of antifascism, along with its promises of social equality and solidarity, ensured it a measure of loyalty, especially among intellectuals.[16] The commitment to socialism, moreover, entailed the concomitant belief that political freedoms are derived from the economic organization of society. Thus, the SED's ideological justifications for its despotism, and for its subjugation of civil to economic rights in particular, resonated with many other interpretations of Weimar's collapse and the rise of National Socialism.[17]

Competition with West German economic success dogged the East German regime from the start. Especially after the violent suppression of the popular uprising of 1953, when the SED relied on Soviet tanks to quell a workers' revolt, many who were unwilling to serve the regime or suffer its repression braved the growing obstacles and emigrated to West Germany. The result was a more homogeneous and pliant population, as open dissent was diminished by a combination of material blandishment, administrative coercion, and sheer attrition. But whatever advantage the SED might have gained from the exodus of "undesirables" was offset by the yawning economic gap the émigrés left behind them. In particular, the flight of skilled

15 In addition, "examples of right-wing extremism or meetings of former Nazis in the Federal Republic offered the argumentation of the GDR important assistance" (Weber, *Geschichte der DDR*, p. 373). Of course, a number of former Nazis also exercised key functions in the GDR, such as State Prosecutor Ernst Melsheimer, who had been a prominent Nazi legal advisor; Herbert Kröger, a high-ranking SS officer who would become the SED's most important jurist; and State Planning Commissioner Erich Apel, who helped organize slave labor to produce V2 rockets for Wernher von Braun. Nor did the Nazi past of the GDR's central bank president, Horst Kaminsky, prevent his rise through the ranks of the East German economic bureaucracy. On the high numbers of ex-Nazis in the ranks of the East German professoriate, see John Connelly, *Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945–1956* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000), pp. 134, 158.

16 Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997); Sigrid Meuschel, *Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft in der DDR* (Frankfurt/Main, 1992); Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel* (New York, 1992), p. 210; John C. Torpey, *Intellectuals, Socialism, and Dissent: The East German Opposition, and Its Legacy* (Minneapolis, Minn., and London, 1995).

17 As Ralf Dahrendorf has pointed out, this subordination of civil to economic rights is present in Marx's use of the phrase *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* – a term referring both to the bourgeoisie and to civil society – to disparage liberal democracy as a social order that serves the economic interests of capitalists (Ralf Dahrendorf, *Der moderne soziale Konflikt. Essay zur Politik der Freiheit* [Stuttgart, 1992], p. 15).

labor, attracted away by the "magnet" of growing West German affluence, threatened to destabilize the socialist state during the late 1950s.[18] When the seven-year plan ran into difficulties and the rhetoric directed at stanching the outflow of emigrants backfired, the SED responded by sealing off the country with the Berlin Wall.[19] The construction of the Wall on 13 August 1961 removed any lingering doubts regarding the nature of the East German state, revealing that communist party rule rested primarily upon the threat of violence.

The relation between theory and practice in the GDR became increasingly clear during the 1960s. Under pressure from the USSR and his own party, SED chief Walter Ulbricht put an abrupt end to the regime's brief attempt to reform itself from within in 1965, then responded to the more sustained reformist efforts in Czechoslovakia by advocating the use of force against Prague in 1968.[20] While Marxist-Leninist ideology continued to be an important factor in East German life, especially among SED members, the party's ability to manage popular dissent was on the wane. Its decline as an effective tool of political integration was hastened by the ascendancy of Erich Honecker.

Honecker's assumption of power in 1971 heralded a significant change in the party's stance toward many of the GDR's most pressing problems. His most immediate and significant accomplishment consisted of leading the GDR out of the wilderness of diplomatic isolation. After signing treaties with the United States and West Germany in 1972, the GDR's international position improved dramatically. By 1978, the GDR entertained diplomatic relations with 123 countries and could claim membership in major international organizations, including the United Nations.[21] These

18 The flow of skilled laborers westward continued to be a source of concern to economic experts well after the construction of the Wall. See, for example, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski and Heinz Volpert, "Zur Vermeldung ökonomische Verluste und zur Erwirtschaftung zusätzlicher Devisen im Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung des Ministeriums für Außenwirtschaft der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik" (Ph.D. dissertation, Potsdam, 1970), Anlage 10. I am thankful to Rainer Karlsch for permitting me to read the copy in his possession.

19 Hertle, *Der Fall der Mauer*, pp. 17 ff.; Christoph Kleßmann, *Zwei Staaten, eine Nation* (Göttingen, 1988), pp. 303–24. For an evaluation of the party's perspective, see Andreas Malycha, "Von der Gründung 1945/46 bis zum Mauerbau 1961," and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, "Vom Mauerbau 1961 bis zur Wende 1989," in Andreas Herbst, Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, and Jürgen Winkler (eds.), *Die SED: Geschichte – Organisation – Politik. Ein Handbuch* (Berlin, 1997), pp. 53–8. For a typical account of the "antifascist protective barrier" during the Honecker period, see Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED (ed.), *Die Volkswirtschaft der DDR* (East Berlin, 1979), pp. 125–6.

20 Kopstein, *The Politics of Economic Decline*, pp. 41–72; Steiner, *Die DDR-Wirtschaftsreform*; Stephan, "Vom Mauerbau," pp. 59–68.

21 Before the Basic Treaty was signed with Bonn on 21 December 1972, the GDR had formal diplomatic relations with thirty-eight states (Weber, *Geschichte der DDR* [Munich, 1989], pp. 432–3; M. E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973* [Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001]).

foreign political successes contributed to a "normalization" of relations for the GDR that enhanced Honecker's status at home and abroad. In addition, Honecker relaxed domestic political constraints and introduced a new economic course that would fundamentally alter the structure of the East German economy.[22] According to the party, the GDR was now entering the phase of "real-existing socialism," a slogan reflecting the new policy of shifting resources to meet consumer demands. Initially, Honecker's economic policies, enshrined in the slogan of the "Principal Task" (*Hauptaufgabe*), succeeded in producing tangible improvements in the East German standard of living. Soon, however, the political climate began to change. The liberalization of cultural policy initiated in 1971 had been languishing for some time but was completely repudiated in 1976 with the expatriation of the folksinger Wolf Biermann.[23] In its place, an unabashedly neo-Stalinist approach to cultural politics flourished under the watchful eyes of Kurt Hager, Cultural Secretary of the ZK.

More fateful than the political crackdown, however, was Honecker's economic program. The Principal Task had introduced imbalances into the GDR's economy that were to worsen with time. These failures might not have been so grave had the gap between East German shortcomings and West German achievements not become so clear to East Germans by the late 1970s.[24] Nowhere was the asymmetry in wealth more apparent than in the supply of consumer goods, from cars to coffee, and in the money necessary to purchase them. At the same time, the ideological justifications the party deployed to obscure its dictatorial methods proved increasingly unable to manage material dissatisfaction. The nimbus of antifascism, whose almost talismanic qualities had once possessed an integrative force, had congealed into an obscurantist fog by the 1980s. By renouncing future utopias in favor

22 Stephan, "Vom Mauerbau," pp. 76–8; Jürgen Winkler, "Kulturpolitik," in Herbst et al., *Die SED*, pp. 399–400; Rüdiger Thomas, "Kulturpolitik und Künstlerbewußtsein seit dem VIII. Parteitag der SED," in Gert-Joachim Glaeßner (ed.), *Die DDR in der Ära Honecker: Politik, Kultur, Gesellschaft* (Opladen, 1988); Weber, *Geschichte der DDR*, pp. 451–5.

23 Winkler, "Kulturpolitik," pp. 400–3; Weber, *Geschichte der DDR*, pp. 452–3. For the growing disillusionment among intellectuals caused by the expatriation of Wolfgang Biermann, see Manfred Krug, *Abgehauen: Ein Mitschnitt und ein Tagebuch* (Düsseldorf, 1997). Rüdiger Thomas and Heinrich Mohr imply that this disenchantment with the GDR also entailed a generation gap defined by receding memories of the "Third Reich" (Thomas, "Kulturpolitik und Künstlerbewußtsein seit dem VIII. Parteitag der SED," pp. 605–7; Heinrich Mohr, "'Das gebeutelte Hätschelkind': Literatur und Literaten in der Ära Honecker," in Glaeßner [ed.], *Die DDR in der Ära Honecker*, pp. 627–9). See also the work of the East German poet Uwe Kolbe, who coined the term *hineingeboren* to describe those who had no other experience outside the GDR (Uwe Kolbe, *Hineingeboren: Gedichte 1975–1979* [East Berlin, 1980]).

24 Except for those living in the so-called valley of the clueless (*Tal der Ahnungslosen*) near Dresden, East Germans were able to receive West German television and radio. Copies of West German periodicals also found their way into the GDR.