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Index
More information

# *Index*

Abbott, K.W. 16, 200, 205, 232, 256
accountability 42, 193, 235, 315, 337, 349, 355; of agents 50, 312, 347
adverse selection 116, 231, 238
Afghanistan 10, 250
Africa, IMF programs 160
agency 45, 140, 205; formal and informal 141, 144
agency losses 9, 24, 41, 169, 196, 226
agency slack 8, 24–26, 31, 255–78, 311, 343, 361, 364, 278; autonomy and 31, 33, 204; degree of 290, 304, 306; IMF 283–85, 291–303, 309; international organizations 255, 258–62, 261, 263, 279, 342; measurement of 285–87, 291–303; multiple principals and 35, 46; opportunities for 258, 262; variations in 282, 285, 307, 309
agenda-setting power 16; in the European Union 174, 177–78; in the IMF 147, 148, 149
agents 8, 31–33, 36–37, 145, 168–69, 199–228, 341–44; *see also* autonomy, control mechanisms, discretion, preferences of agents, permeability of agents; accountability 50, 346, 347; agenda-setting agents 16; arbitrating agents 17, 18; buffering 210–12, 213; characteristics of 25, 35–38, 200, 226, 227, 279, 345, 350; collaboration agents 16; competition between 30; conformity 43, 286, 290; coordinating agents 15; cost of establishing 14, 25, 26, 203; costs of monitoring 211, 345; and delegation of conditionality 285–91; domestic 41; dualism and ceremonialism 210–12, 222, 223, 224, 225; economic agents 204; enforcing agents 19; faithfulness of 46, 50, 75; human rights agents 212–25; incentives for 26, 362; influence of 32, 33; interpretation and reinterpretation of rules 206–7, 210, 212, 213, 224; opportunistic 24, 26; policy-biased 20, 27; political agents 204; sanctions 30–31, 169; scope conditions for 204; screening and selection procedures 28–29, 210, 227, 229, 231, 314, 317–21; self-reporting of activities 347, 348; shirking 8, 14, 28; size of pool of existing 205; slack: *see* agency slack; slippage 8, 28; specialization 25, 304; strategies 37, 199, 200, 201, 205–12, 226, 227; third-party testimony 348; and trustees 334, 335
Alchian, A. 9, 346
Alesina, A. 108, 109
Alexandrova, O. 243, 245
Alter, Karen J. 210, 274, 312
Ansolabehere, S. 94
Arnold, R.D. 86
Arvin, B.M. 124



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Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-86209-7 - Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney
Index
More information

*Index*

Asian Development Bank 59, 65
Åslund, A. 160
Atlee government, Britain 219
Aufricht, H. 292
autonomy 8, 31, 205, 212, 308, 341–44; and control mechanisms 221, 226; degree of 18, 21, 26, 32, 200, 221, 226; discretion and 18, 258, 279; formal and informal 141; of IO staff 143, 147; limiting 170; sources of 141–47, 142, 145, 161; of states 248
Azzam, M. 242, 244

Bacchus, James 274, 276, 278
Bailey, M. 86
Baker, James 239, 243, 245, 246, 302
Baldwin, D.A. 111
Baldwin, R.E. 84
Balogh, R. 114, 115
Barnett, M.; autonomy 141, 154, 207, 254, 308; IMF 285, 304; international organizations 42, 194, 200, 205, 256, 284, 347; UN 3
Barro, R. 77, 78, 81, 98
Barsoom, P. 332
Bawn, K. 170, 290, 291, 308
Bell, Peter D. 53
Bendor, J. 290, 291
Bergman, T. 199
Berkov, R. 264
Bernheim, B.D. 9, 58, 282
Beschloss, M. 238, 245
Bhagwati, J.N. 78
Bird, G. 77, 84
Bitzer, J.M. 328
Blackburn, R. 214
Blix, H. 235
Boli, J. 360, 368
Bordo, M.D. 87
Bosnia 235
Boughton, J. 85, 286, 287, 301, 302
Bradley, A. 214, 215, 221, 223
Bradley, C. 365
Bretton Woods Act 85, 150
Britain 219
Bronars, S.G. 94
Brown, C. 333
Brown, D. 209
Brown, R. 361
Broz, J. Lawrence 77–100
Brundtland, Gro 266–67, 270
Buira, A. 162
bureaucracies, political 204, 253
Burley, A.-M. 32
Burnside, G. 108
Busch, M.L. 336
Bush, Pres. George H. 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 247
Bush, Pres. George W. 229, 241, 242, 250

Calomiris, C.W. 95
Calvert, R. 44, 46
Candau, Marcolino 268
Caprio, G. 97
Carozza, P.G. 225
Carpenter, D.P. 227
Caruson, K. 328
*Cassis de Dijon* case 314
Castanza, George 201
Caves, R.E. 348
chain of delegation 78, 79, 115, 116, 347, 364
Chalmers, Damian 325
Cheney, Dick 240
Chicken game 15
China, SARS 270
Chwieroth, J.M. 288
civil society, international 360, 368
Clark, W.K. 258, 288
Clines, F.X. 53
coalitions 22, 46, 59, 61, 233, 253
coercion 235, 236, 238, 239, 247, 248, 252
Cohen, M. 270
Cold War 123, 126, 132
collaboration dilemmas 15, 16
collective choice problem 16, 200, 227
Colombia 151
Comparative Manifesto Project 125
conflict of interest 142–45, 158, 347, 349
conformity 281–310
consensus 81, 148



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978-0-521-86209-7 - Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney
Index
More information



contract between principal and agent 7, 27, 196, 202, 286; discretion and 259; incomplete nature of 17, 18, 174; and international courts 334; rewriting 324–26
control mechanisms 26, 199, 212, 289, 303–6, 307; autonomy and 205, 221, 226; design of 170, 212; effectiveness of 34, 103; selection of 169, 170, 256; variation in 282
Cooley, A. 11
Cooper, S. 19
cooperation 10, 11, 13, 33
coordination 15, 20, 113
Cooter, R.D. 27
Cortell, Andrew P. 141, 255–78, 310, 361, 278
Council of Europe 16, 361
Cox, G. 17
Cox, R.W. 258
Crawford, V. 233
credibility 18–19, 30, 110, 174, 240, 342
credible commitment 18, 168, 170, 171, 189; European Union 171, 172, 178, 187, 191; measurement of 173
crisis situations 35, 77, 79, 97; Asia 83; Mexico 83, 87, 90; Russia 160, 284, 303

Dam, K.W. 150
decision-making 21–23, 43, 45, 56, 143, 345; collective 16–17, 20, 35, 59, 344; European Union 177, 188; IMF 78, 81, 86, 96, 98, 148; international courts 315, 318, 319, 334; multilateral development banks 56, 57; World Bank 367
delegation 8, 23–33; accountable 354–58, 367; chain of 78, 79, 115, 116, 347, 364; domestic 12, 107–33, 366; incentive condition for 354, 355–56, 358, 360, 364, 365, 367; interest condition for 356; knowledge condition for 354, 355, 357, 358, 360, 363, 364, 365, 367; model of 349–54; successful 344–58, 359, 367
delegation to international organizations 10–12, 23, 107, 140–64, 341–65; and autonomy 341–44; benefits of 6, 13–20, 22, 23, 289; causes and consequences of 4; comparative analysis of 195; costs of 26, 32, 304; definition of 7–12, 201; discretion-based 27; and expertise 172; failure of 66, 349; fiduciary logic of 172, 189, 312, 331; functional logic 166, 167, 187; incentives for 230; informational rationale for 170, 189; institutional design 21–23, 166, 167; motivation of 12–23, 30, 111, 195, 342; nature of 11–12, 283, 347–49; and re-contracting 12; third-party actors 345
Dell, S. 150, 156, 157, 285, 291
Demirguc-Kunt, A. 84
Demsetz, H. 9, 346
Denzau, A. 86
developing countries 156, 157, 158, 159, 162; and the IMF 156, 157, 158, 159, 162; and the WHO 266; and the WTO 325
development aid: *see* foreign aid
DiMaggio, P.J. 191, 202, 205, 210
discretion 8, 27–28, 173, 194, 226, 257, 258; autonomy and 18, 258, 279; degree of 15, 19, 169; uncertainty and 27
dispute resolution 17–18, 30, 255, 343
distributional conflict 142–45, 158
Dixit, A. 9, 282
Dogan, R. 180
Dollar, 108, 109
donor countries 108, 122–23, 127
Dornsife, Cinnamon 57
Downs, G. 332
Dreher, A. 77, 81, 83
Dudley, L. 108, 109

Eastwood, Clint 201
Eckaus, R.S. 162
Ehlermann, Claus-Dieter 272, 274, 275, 278
Eisner, M.A. 204
El Salvador 52–53



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Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-86209-7 - Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney
Index
More information



Elster, Jon 328
Enron 211
Epstein, D. 169, 182, 185, 363; costs and benefits of delegation 189, 290, 291; US Congress 12, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175
Epstein, L. 331
European Central Bank 195
European Commission 3, 166, 175–89, 227, 361; administrative law and judicial review 180–81; agenda-setting power 177–78, 180, 187, 188, 194; appointment and dismissal procedures 179–80, 190, 193; autonomy 33, 35, 213; comitology committees 180; common commercial policy 183, 184, 186, 188; competition policy 183, 184, 186, 188; control mechanisms 179–81, 182, 183, 185; decision-making rules of 177, 188; delegation of functions in secondary legislation 185–87, 189; delegation of functions in the Treaties 176–77, 182, 184, 185; discretion 172, 175, 178, 179, 181–85, 186, 194; Equal Treatment directive 323; functions delegated to 187, 193; implementation and regulation functions 178–79, 183, 187, 188, 194; influence of 337; informational role 174, 187; institutional checks 181; judicial review 183; *Lawless* decision 216; monitoring and enforcement functions 174, 178, 183, 187, 188, 194; oversight procedures 180; preferences 180; speed and efficiency 187, 189; tasks and composition 176–77; voting rules 177, 262
European Convention of Human Rights 212, 214, 215, 224, 225
European Court of Auditors 181, 191
European Court of Human Rights 20, 212, 214, 227, 317, 320, 323; access to 221, 222; appointment of judges 318; autonomy 213, 217–18, 220, 222, 224, 225, 324; *Barber* decision 325; delegation to 26, 329; *Golder vs. United Kingdom* decision 224; influence of 31, 32, 214; individual petition 215, 216, 221, 223; jurisdiction of 215, 221; *Lawless vs. Ireland* decision 222, 223; margin of appreciation 216, 225; membership of 216, 219; permeability 217–18, 225; recontracting 325; role of 329; *Tyrer vs. UK* decision 224; *Vagrancy* decision 223; *Wenhoff vs. FRG* decision 224
European Court of Justice 3, 178, 180, 195, 196; access to 28, 209; autonomy 313; *Cassis de Dijon* case 314
European Ombudsman 181, 191
European Parliament 190–93, 195, 361; supervisory role of 192, 194, 192
European Union 28, 32, 124, 165–88, 188; autonomy 342; competition policies 19; credible commitment 176, 178, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191; *see also* European Commission; development aid 108, 132; institutional structure 176, 193; member states 166; multiple principals 192–93; Treaties 176; voting rules 325
Evans, P. 288
expertise 170, 172, 173, 186, 189, 290, 304; *see also* specialization
externalities 15–16, 109

Fahd, King 242
Falk, Richard 229
Fama, E. 9
Farnsworth, C.H. 302
Federal Election Commission 89
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Country Exposure Lending Survey 89, 97
Felton, J. 249
Fidler, D.P. 267, 268, 269, 270
Figueiredo, John de 94
Figueiredo, Miguel de 317
Finch, C. David 302
Finch, D. 153
Finnemore, M. 288; autonomy 141, 154, 207, 254, 308; IMF 285, 304; international organizations 43, 194, 200, 205, 256, 284, 347; UN 3



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978-0-521-86209-7 - Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney
Index
More information



"fire alarms" 28, 202, 208
Fisher, L. 365
flexibility 145, 146, 159, 249, 250
foreign aid 41–75, 115, 120, 123, 75; benefits for donors 122; bilateral 109, 114, 118; commitments to 122, 126, 127, 128–29, 130–31, 133, 134–35, 136–37; conditional 109, 138; costs of 111–14; information about and evaluation of 116, 117–18, 119, 120, 138; multilateral 114, 118, 119; policy 57, 60, 62, 70–72, 73, 107–33
forum shopping 29, 247–53
Fox, J. 209
France 242, 245
Franchino 173, 180, 182, 183, 185–86
free rider problem 16, 228
Freedman, L. 237, 240, 241, 243, 245
Fulbright, Sen William 114
Fuller, G. 245
Furubotn, E.G. 24

G-7 65, 66, 112
Gabel, M.J. 125
Garrett, Geoffrey 59; European Court of Justice 313, 314, 324, 325
Garritsen de Vreis, Margaret 157, 158, 162, 163; IMF board 143, 161, 162; IMF staff 153, 158, 161, 162, 163
Gates, W. 237, 239
GDP 65, 123
Germany 246
Gilligan, Thomas 233, 237
Gilpin, R. 42
Glazer, A. 290, 291
Glennon, Michael 229
Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network 269
Global Public Health Intelligence Network 269
globalization 79, 84, 89, 95, 102; protests against 3, 5, 277
Godlee, F. 268
Gold, J. 143, 148, 161, 291, 292, 296, 297
*Golder vs. United Kingdom* 224
Goldstein, J.L. 5, 17, 181, 324, 360
Golove, D. 365
Golsong, H. 219
Gorbachev, M. 238, 241, 245
Gordon, E. 319
Gould, E. 31, 78, 79, 141, 202, 281–310
Gourevitch, P. 3
Grant, R.W. 18, 316, 328, 335, 337
Grieco, J.M. 56
Grossman, G. 9, 86, 120, 282
Gruber, L. 22, 203
Gulf War, 1990–91 237–47
Gump, Forrest 201
Gutt, Camille 150

Haggard, S. 51
Haftel, Y. 232
Haiti 305–6
Hall, R. 94
Hallstein, Walter 188
Hamilton, A. 365
Hammond, T.H. 44, 46, 112
Harris, D.J. 221, 224
Haskel, J.E. 84
Hawes, Michael Brewster 77–100
Hawkins, Darren 3–24, 54, 228
hegemony 62, 66, 73, 123, 195
Heikal, Mohamed 238, 244
Helfer, Lawrence 313, 331, 332
Helmes, Jesse 53
Helmke, G. 220
Helpman, E. 9, 282
Hess, Rudolph 216
Hill, J. 204
HIV/AIDS 268
Hix, S. 45
Hoadley, J.S. 117–18
Holland, M. 108
Horsefield, Keith 150, 151, 291, 292; IMF autonomy 152, 153, 154–55, 156; IMF conditionality 285, 291, 292
Huber, J.D. 125, 168, 170, 225, 226; discretion 173, 226; monitoring and enforcement 290, 291
Hug, Simon 192
Huizinga, H. 84
human rights policy 32
Hurd, Ian 254, 336, 337



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CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-86209-7 - Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney
Index
More information



Imbeau, L.M. 57
IMF 3, 22, 26, 29, 32, 37, 44, 77–100, 291, 342; agency slack 303; Articles of Agreement 87, 147, 151, 161; automaticity 149, 150; autonomy 31, 342; Board of Governors 81, 143; as a collective principal 287–89; commercial bank exposure 98; *Conditionality Dataset* 289, 291, 295, 297; confidential information 161–63; decision-making 78, 81, 86, 96, 98, 148; delegation of conditionality 291–92; directors' preferences 81, 82; Early-Warning System 97; Executive Directors 86, 102, 103, 140, 152; Extended Fund Facilities programs 96; influence of lobbying on loan decisions 80; "lapse of time" procedure 153; lending decisions 77, 96–102, 296; negotiation and approval of programs 149, 154; policy and policy-makers 86–87; political interference 292, 302, 309; principal preferences 300–3; private actors and 78, 79, 82, 83–85, 96, 102, 103; quotas 80, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 148; size of loans 100; slack 283, 291–303; structure of 80–82, 147–49, 288; success of programs 305, 309; third-party actors 308, 309, 310; transparency 78, 79, 82, 141, 304; and the USA 34, 82, 85–86; voting rules 80, 262, 287
IMF conditionality 140–64, 281–310; agreements 284, 289; binding conditions 157, 292, 293, 294, 295, 297, 299, 303, 305; conformity 295–99, 303; consultation clauses 293, 297; guidelines 147–59, 160, 163, 287, 291, 299–300, 303, 307; phasing 293, 295, 296, 303, 304; preconditions 159–61
IMB Executive Board 81, 148, 158, 287, 292, 343; and conditionality 159, 160, 292, 302; relationship with staff 147, 152, 153, 155, 159
IMF staff 142, 148, 152, 155, 163, 288, 292; authority of 153, 155, 156, 164; autonomy of 35, 141, 153, 154, 159, 161, 163; and conditionality 149, 152, 159; expertise 162, 305
IMF Stand-By programs 96, 148, 151, 292; binding conditions and 293, 294; mechanisms for implementing 155–59, 293, 294, 300
information 109, 138, 140–64, 229–54; asymmetric 194, 231, 347, 348, 349; borrowing countries and 146; confidential 159; demand for 172; hidden 25, 347, 348; imperfect 170; and international organizations 229–54; private 141–47; problems of 116; transmission of 233, 237, 252, 253
institutional checks and balances 29–30, 206
institutional design 167, 170, 255, 256, 263, 341
institutional rules 21–23, 42, 56, 208
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 320
Inter-American Development Bank 34, 42, 47, 59, 65, 342; delegation to 46, 54, 74; Social Progress Trust Fund 47, 50, 51, 52
Inter-American Foundation 42, 46, 48, 52, 53, 74; budget 53; coordination with other agencies 48, 49; monitoring and reporting requirements 49, 50; multiple principals 53
International Atomic Energy Agency 16
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 64, 108
international community 231, 234, 238, 260
International Court of Justice, and the US 325, 330, 334
international courts 31, 37, 312, 315, 317, 319, 322–24, 332, 338; access to 315, 332, 333, 335; appointment of judges 320, 321, 330, 331–32, 337; autonomy 324, 343; control of 214, 321–22, 330; decision-making 315, 318, 319, 334; delegation to 327, 329, 337; design of 332, 333; independence of 331–34, 335, 336, 337



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CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-86209-7 - Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney
Index
More information



international courts (*cont.*)
interpretation of rules 337; jurisdiction of 315, 332, 333, 335; legitimacy 330, 336; non-compliance with rulings 329, 336; political influence 315, 316–31, 335; prosecutors in 321; re-contracting 317, 333; reservations 323; sanctions 324–26, 327; slippage 316, 322, 336; standard of review 322–24
International Criminal Court 14, 29, 319, 320; and the US 312, 317, 336
International Criminal Tribunals 320, 321
International Development Association 108
International Health Regulations 267, 268, 269
international organizations 3–24, 29, 44, 233, 284, 358–67; accountability 41, 42; as actors 5, 200; autonomy 140, 342; constraints on staff activity 144; constraints on states 234, 238, 241, 242, 248, 252; control of 4, 5, 66, 73, 261; culture of 42, 280; decision-making rules of 45, 56, 235, 239; and information 147, 229–54; membership of 232, 235, 250, 252, 253, 254; neutrality of 232, 234, 247, 248, 252; preferences 248, 257, 259, 261, 262, 280; public confidence in 120, 121; regional 252, 253, 319; responsibilities 5, 145, 235; screening function 231, 232–37, 238–43, 247, 248, 249, 253; and slack 255, 258–62, 263, 279, 342; and state preferences 282; variation among 247–53, 306–9; voting rules 257, 261, 262, 279
international organization staff 143, 256, 257, 259–60, 279; autonomy of 143, 144, 260; international staff 257, 260–61
International Sanitary Regulations 267
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 320
Iraq 8, 235, 237–47, 250; "Arab solution" 241, 243; public opinion and 243–47, 246; US war on 229, 230
isomorphic mimicry 327, 329, 330

Jacobs, L. 237
Jacobson, H.K. 258, 264, 265, 266
Jacobsson, Per 156
Jacoby, Wade 228
James, H. 87, 158, 284, 291
Janis, M. 214, 215, 221, 223
Japan 246
Jeanne, O. 83
Jensen, M.C. 346
Jensen, N. 81
Joergens, K.J. 275
Johnston, A.I. 261, 337
Johnstone, Ian 337
Jordan, R.S. 259
Joskow, P. 348
Joyce, J.P. 77
judicial independence 321, 326

Kahler, Miles 284, 285; IMF conditionality guidelines 301–2; IMF staff autonomy 153, 158, 159
Kahn, A. 350
Kaplan, J.H. 25
Kapur, D. 286, 288
Karsh, E. 237, 240, 241, 243, 245
Katzenstein, P. 56
Kay, R. 214, 215, 221, 223
Kay, S. 259
Keck, M.E. 208, 337, 353, 360, 368
Keener, E.B. 330
Keleman, Daniel 313, 324
Kelley, J. 336
Keohane, R.O. 10, 13, 16, 18, 203; international organizations 41, 56, 167, 168, 235, 260, 332
Keynes, John Maynard 149, 150
Khalidi, W. 242
Khan, M.S. 305
Kiewiet, D.R. 17, 287, 290, 346; agents 24, 25, 44, 256, 290, 291
Kilroy, Bernadette 314
King Fahd, Saudi Arabia 238
King, G. 93
Kissinger, H.A. 214, 241
Klepak, H. 56
Klingebiel, D. 97
Knight, J. 331



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Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-86209-7 - Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney
Index
More information



Knott, J.H. 44, 46, 112, 290, 291
Koremenos, B. 5, 24, 167, 200
Kosovo 250, 252
Krause, G. 204
Krauthammer, C/ 3, 229
Krehbiel, Keith 172, 233, 237, 252
Kreppel, A. 188
Kroszner, R.S. 94
Krueger, Anne 302
Kuemmel, G. 324

Lacomte, S. 118, 119, 132
Laffont, J.-J. 116, 346
Lake, David A. 3–24, 56, 204, 234, 341–65, 366; Iraq war 237, 242, 244
Larkins, C.M. 220
Latin America 249
Laver, M. 59
*Lawless vs. Ireland* 216, 222, 223
Lawrence, J. Broz 77–100
Lazurus, D. 266
Lee, J. W. 77, 81, 98, 270
legislative committees 232, 233, 237, 250, 252
legitimacy, democratic 167, 191, 192
LeoGrande, W. 250
Lesch, A.M. 238, 244
Lester, Lord 220
Lewis, J.P. 286
Lewis, P. 267
Liebert, U. 324
Lijphart, A. 20
Lippman, T.W. 49, 53
Lipson, C. 5, 24, 167, 200
Little, R. 108, 109
lobbying 77
lock-in (creating policy bias) 19–20
Lott, J.R. 94
Lovasay, G. 291, 292
Lumsdaine, D.H. 109, 114, 118, 124–25
Lupia, A. 120; information 233, 236, 348; model of delegation 345, 346, 350–52, 356; non-government organizations 120
Lutz, Ellen 324
Lyne, Mona M. 75, 361

Magee, C.S. 84
Mahler, Halfdan 267
Maizels and Nissanke 108, 114
Majone, Giandomenico 328; delegation to courts 316, 328; European Union 174, 186, 278; logic of delegation 172, 187, 189, 312, 331
Makinson, L. 94
Malone, David 250
Mansfield, E. 119
March, J.G. 260, 350
Marks, Brian 327
Marshall Fund 150
Martens, B. 11, 51, 114, 116
Martin, Lisa L., 140–64; cooperation 13, 15, 56; credibility 18; international organizations 5, 234, 304
Martimort, D. 116
Matthews, K. 237
Mattli, W. 32
McCubbins, Mathew 28, 341–65; agents 24, 27, 256, 290, 291, 308; delegation 17, 327, 332, 345, 346, 350–52, 356; discretion 28, 258; "fire alarms" 28, 202, 208; information 25, 233, 236, 304, 348; multiple principals 44; non-government organizations 120
McDonnell, I. 118, 119, 132
McKinlay, R. 108, 109
McNamara, K. 327
McNollgast, 12, 20, 32
Mearsheimer, J. 344
Meckling, W.H. 346
Meier, K. 204
Meltzer, A.H. 95
Meltzer Commission 3, 83, 282
Merrills, J.G. 215, 216, 221, 222, 223
Meunier, Sophie 314
Mexico 83, 87, 90, 284
Meyer, J. 210
Milgrom, P. 7, 235, 327
Miller, S. 255, 273
Milner, Helen V. 15, 51, 107–33, 348, 367
Mingst, K.A. 266
Mitterand, F. 245
Moe, T.M. 19, 25, 181, 204



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978-0-521-86209-7 - Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney
Index
More information



money-center banks 77, 80, 83, 86, 89, 96, 98, 102; campaign contributions 79, 89, 93, 94, 96
monitoring and reporting requirements 28, 169, 174, 206, 347; costs of 290, 304, 348
Montmarquette, C. 108, 109
moral hazard 80, 83, 84, 86, 95, 116, 231
Moravcsik, A. 19, 64, 73, 191, 332; European Court of Human Rights 20, 215, 219; European Union 171, 187; international organizations 42, 56, 214; preferences 191, 260
Moseley, P. 115
Moubray, G. L. L. de 284
Mubarak, Pres. Hosni 244
Mueller, J. 241, 242
Müller, H. 337
Müller, W. 199
multilateral aid 111–14, 114–22
multilateral development banks 16, 41, 342; as collective principals 46, 54–59; decision-making rules of 56, 57; number of actors involved 56–57, 66, 74, 75; preferences of their principals 43, 57–58; social loans 34, 55, 74
multilateralism 107–33, 248
Munger, M. 86
Murphy, W.F. 331
mutual policy adjustment 10, 11
Mutume, G. 255

Naik, G. 270
Nakajima, Hiroshi 267
NATO 235, 252, 257, 258, 259
Nelson, P. 209
neo-functionalism 32
Nissanke, M. 108, 114
non-government organizations (NGOs) 120, 210, 269, 276, 341, 360, 368
Nicaragua 52–53, 325, 334
Nielson, Daniel 3–24, 27, 75, 141, 286, 347; delegation 347, 364; multilateral development banks 54, 75; multiple principals 46, 54, 64, 200, 205, 212, 361; preferences 21, 46, 256, 287
Niskanen, W.A. 288, 308
Noel, A. 57
Noll, R.G. 308, 327, 348
Noriega, Manual 249
North, D. 327
normative institutional isomorphism 192–93, 194, 196
Nugent, N. 174
Nye, J. 56

OAS 249, 252
Oatley, T. 56, 66, 77, 78, 83, 84, 255
O'Boyle, M. 221, 224
O'Halloran, S. 169, 182, 185, 363; costs and benefits of delegation 189, 290, 291; US Congress 12, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175
Olsen, J.P. 260
Olson, M. 22, 235
Omang, J. 48
organization costs 235, 236, 239, 240, 241, 248, 249
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 16, 120, 123; country-specific aid policy reviews 119–20; Creditor Reporting System 60; development aid 112, 113; Development Assistance Committee 110, 117–18, 119
Ovey, C. 215, 224

Page, T. 27, 28, 258
Panama 249–50
Papayoanou, P. 235
Parks, B. 22
Partsch, K.J. 219
Pauwelyn, J. 329, 336
peacekeeping 14
Perle, R. 229
permeability of agents 37, 202, 211; degree of 202, 208–10, 212, 213; European Court of Human Rights 223, 224, 225
Perrow, C. 205
persuasion, conditions of 352–54, 367
Pescatore, Pierre 188, 330
Peterson, Susan 141, 255–78, 310, 361
Pfahler, M. 173
Pierson, P. 32, 205, 261, 326



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Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney
Index
More information



pivotal-players model 59, 61, 62
Polak, Jacques 158, 285, 297
Polakiewicz, J. 214
"police patrols" 28
policy bias ("lock-in") 19–20
policy externalities 15–16, 109
political parties 124, 125, 132
Pollack, D. 28, 141, 244
Pollack, Mark 64, 205, 212, 221; European Court of Justice 313, 326; European Union 17, 45, 188; slack 261, 262, 286
Poole, K.T. 89
Popkin, S. 236
Posner, Eric 317, 318, 332, 336
Pottinger, M. 270
Powell, Colin 240, 249
Powell, R. 19, 366
Powell, W. 191, 202, 205, 210
Power, S. 3
power 13, 21–23, 37, 76, 124, 326
preferences; of agents 7, 29, 30, 36, 209, 256, 279, 308, 310; aggregation of 21, 22, 75, 287; among IMF EDs 140; of collective principals 300, 302; conformity with 290, 309; of donor governments 110, 118; heterogeneity of 6, 13, 20–21, 36, 142, 232, 254, 256; of IO staff 142, 144, 145, 147, 163, 164; measurement of 62, 287; of principals 7, 34, 42, 67–69, 70–72, 117, 212, 233, 287; revealed 79, 81, 327; short- and long-term 171; for social policy 54; of states 142, 143, 144, 145, 163, 248
principal-agent theory 3–24, 107–33, 142, 167–75, 368; control and conformity 281; goal of 225; and international courts 334–38; and legal scholarship 331–32; limitations of 282, 306–9, 310, 316; models 75; predictions of 289–91, 307; screening and selection procedures 256; slack 256; strengths of 41, 303–6, 309, 341
principals 7, 41–75, 289; agency losses 9; characteristics of 33–35, 279, 345, 350; complex 44–46, 74; IMF 285–91; models of 66, 74, 75; need for information 35; single 42, 45; strategies 345; structure of 35, 41
principals, collective 44, 84, 114, 115, 207, 213, 231, 366; decision-making 35, 46, 287; delegation to multilateral development banks 43, 60, 61, 110, 139; European Parliament 167, 193; and hegemony 195; model of 58–59, 73, 74, 75; preferences 113, 283, 287, 300; slippage 112
principals, multiple 44, 45, 46, 54, 193, 345, 361, 362, 363; European Union 167, 192–93; models of 58, 61, 63, 64, 74; slack 46
Prisoner's Dilemma 16
Pritchett, C.H. 331
Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases 269
proxy problem 173
Przeworski, A. 77
public goods 16
public opinion 110, 111, 115, 117, 118–19, 120, 125–26, 132–33, 139; Arab 238, 243; and coercion 236; in Europe 121, 146; and government policy 236; and international organizations 120–22, 236; measurement of 125–26; and military intervention 246, 251
Purrington, C. 246
Putnam, R. 237

Randal, J.C. 267
Rapkin, D.P. 22
rational choice theory 115, 166, 167, 170, 328
Raustiala, K. 332, 368
Reagan Administration 48, 50, 52, 301, 334
re-contracting 12, 307, 312, 314, 334, 335
regional development banks 30, 108
Reinhardt, E. 336
Rich, B. 3
Richter, R. 24
Risse, T. 208, 336
Roberts, J. 7, 235



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Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-86209-7 - Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney
Index
More information



Robertson, A.H. 216, 221, 222, 223
Robichek, W.E. 150
Rocke, D. 332
Rodrik, D. 109–10
Rogoff, K. 84
Rogowski, R. 21
Romano, C. 333
Ron, J. 11
Ropp, S. 208, 336
Rooth, Ivar 151, 155
Rosendorff, B.P. 119, 120
Rosenthal, H. 89
Rourke, F.E. 204
Rowan, B. 210
Rowlands, D. 77
Ruggie, J.G. 107
rule of law 329
Russia 160, 243, 245, 284, 303
Ryan, M. 49

Samuelson, P.A. 84
sanctions 30–31, 169, 204, 314
Sanders, Bernie 95–96
Sandholtz, W. 43
Santaella, J. 294
Santer Commission 193
SARS 255, 263, 269
Savadore, B. 270
Scandinavian countries 112
Schanzenbach, Max 317, 318
Scharpf, F. 328
Scheffer, D.J. 14
Scheve, K.F. 84
Schimmelfennig, F. 337
Schmidt, Susannah 337
Schneider, A.K. 325
Schraeder, P.J. 109
Schulz, Heiner 236, 313, 324
Schwartz, A.J. 95
Schweitzer, Pierre-Paul 157, 158
Scowcroft, Brent 239, 240, 242, 243
Shaffer, Gregory 272
Shanks, C. 25
Shapiro, Martin 328
Shapiro, R. 237
Shelton, D. 214, 225
Shevardnadze, Eduard 240, 245
Shipan, C.R. 168, 170, 173, 225, 226, 290, 291
shirking 8, 14, 28, 47
Sikkink, K. 208, 266, 324, 336, 353, 360, 368
Simmons, B. 5
Simon, H. 350
slack: *see* agency slack
Slater, J. 252
Slaughter, Anne-Marie 260, 313, 331, 332
Slaughter, M.J. 84
slippage 8, 28, 231, 234, 316
Smillie, I. 119
Smith, James McCall 333
Snidal D. 16, 22, 24; institutional design 167, 200; international organizations 5, 191, 232, 256
Snyder, J.M. 94
Sobel, J. 233
social learning 196
Social Policy Index 60, 61, 62, 66, 67–69, 73
Soros, G. 78
Southard, Frank 148, 152, 154, 155, 156, 286
sovereignty 216, 219, 234, 239, 328; pooling of 366
Soviets 243, 245
Spaak, Paul-Henri 188
specialization 13–15, 25, 27, 145, 230, 342
Spence, A.M. 231, 346
states 3–24, 37, 56–57, 123, 334–38; cooperation 10, 13, 33, 124; interests of 313, 314, 327; voting power 56, 60
states, preferences of 23, 57–58, 75, 145, 163, 164, 200, 282; and multilateral development banks 57, 60; and the IMF 142, 144; and the European Court of Human Rights 216
Steger, D. 273
Stein, E. 15, 56, 329
Steinberg, Richard 319, 321, 331
Stephan, P.B. 313
Stewart, R. 365
Stiglitz, J.E. 3, 78, 86
Stiles, K. 219
Stokke, O. 57
Stolper, W. 84



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Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-86209-7 - Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney
Index
More information



Stone, Randall 18, 81, 143, 160, 302, 305
Stone Sweet, A. 166, 316, 328
Strand, J.R. 22
Strange, Susan 148, 152, 153, 156
Stratman, T. 94
Strom, K. 199, 205
Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 255, 263, 269
supranational organizations 165
Swaine, E. 323
Sweden 219, 222

Tallberg, Jonas 28, 258, 313, 337
Tallbott, S. 238, 245
Taylor, B. 109
Telhami, S. 244
Terasawa, K. 237, 239
Thacker, Strom 56, 66, 73, 77, 81, 284
Thatcher, Mark 166
Thatcher, Margaret 239, 240
Thelen, K. 326
Thieren, J.P. 57
third-party actors 352, 360, 367, 368
Thomas, G.M. 360, 368
Thompson, Alexander 120, 229–54, 367
Tierney, Michael J 3–24, 27, 75, 141, 286, 347; delegation 347, 364; multilateral development banks 54, 75; multiple principals 46, 54, 64, 200, 205, 212, 361; preferences 21, 46, 256, 287
Tirole, J. 346
Tomz, M. 93
transactions costs 18, 168, 169, 187, 190, 191, 235; institutional 166, 167
transparency 119, 235, 277
trust 352, 353
trustees 18, 47, 316, 317, 334, 335, 343
Tsebelis, G. 188, 208
*Tyrer vs. UK* 224

Ul Haque, N. 305
uncertainty 19, 24, 172, 203, 230, 350; and discretion 27, 291; and information 173, 237; proxies for 173
Undén, Osten 223
UNICEF, NGO consultative committees 210
unilateralism 10, 33, 248, 249–50
United Nations 3–4, 108, 204; Secretary General 29, 337
United Nations Security Council 31, 32, 36, 44, 253, 262, 345; and the 2003 Iraq war 8, 26, 229, 230, 237–47, 250; membership of 20, 247, 250, 319
Upton, B. 54
USA 77–100, 103, 115, 319; Chamber of Commerce 95; Congressional voting on IMF policy 47, 82, 85–86, 87–96; delegation of foreign aid 42, 45–46, 367; export-oriented industries 92, 95; Federal Election Commission 89, 92; Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Country Exposure Lending Survey 89, 97; foreign aid policy 46–54, 112, 365; Foreign Assistance Act 47, 51; hegemony 123, 126, 132; House Committee on Foreign Affairs 47, 51; and the IMF 22, 77–100, 152, 284, 301; and IMF conditionality 150, 151; and international courts 312, 317, 330, 336; and Iraq 237, 238–43, 246; multiple principals 50–54; Senate Foreign Relations Committee 53; as a single principal 47, 74; skill levels of Congressmen's constituents 89, 90, 93, 95; Social Policy Index 62, 64, 66; Supreme Court, *Marbury vs. Madison* decision and the UN Security Council 235, 326; war on Afghanistan 10; and the World Bank 112

*Vagrancy* case 223
Van Houtven, L. 81
Vaubel, R. 77, 83, 288, 308
veto 35, 59, 112, 262
Voeten, Erik 254, 317, 318–19
voting rules 195, 255–78, 279, 327, 344, 345; European Commission 177, 325; IMF 80, 262, 287; NATO 257; UN Security Council 262; World Bank 56; WHO 261, 263, 265, 271; WTO 271, 275, 276
Vreeland, J.R. 77



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Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-86209-7 - Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Edited by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney
Index
More information



Wade, R. 28
Wallander, C. 235
Waltz, K.N. 344
Warbrick, C. 221, 224
Ward, A. 181
Wayman, F.W. 94
Weaver, 286
Weber, S. 203
Webb, R. 286
Wegimont, L. 118, 119, 132
Weil, G.L. 216, 222
Weiler, J. 329
Weingast, Barry 44, 286, 308, 313; European Court of Justice 313, 314; international courts 327, 328
Weissert, C. 204
*Wenhoff vs. FRG* 224
Wertman, P.A. 85
Whinston, M.D. 9, 58, 291
White, Harry Dexter 149
White, R. 215, 224
Williams, D. 266, 267
Williams, F. 266
Williamson, J. 151, 159, 285, 301
Williamson, O.E. 7, 9, 17, 24, 199, 348
Wittenberg, J. 93
Witteveen, Johannes 162
Wolfowitz, Paul 29
Wood, A. 84, 204
Wood, B.D. 204
Woodward, B. 240, 242, 249
World Bank 3, 27, 29, 30, 44, 108, 367; Articles of Agreement 112; collective nature of 112; conditionality 111; decision-making 367; members' preferences 64; membership of 112; social loans 54, 59
World Development Indicators 60, 123
World Health Assembly 265, 266
World Health Organization (WHO) 16, 33, 44, 255–78, 361; Committee on Communicable Diseases 268; communicable disease surveillance and response 267, 271; constitution 264, 268; Executive Board 265, 268; expert committees 264, 265; information from non-state sources 268, 269; mandate of 270, 271; politicization of 266; procedures 271; SARS 270; secretariat 264, 265; slack 263, 271; staff 260, 263, 266, 270; technical assistance 265; travel alerts 270; voting rules 261, 263, 265, 271; World Health Assembly 265, 266
WorldCom 211
Wright, J.R. 94
WTO 3, 255–78; access to 274; *amicus* briefs 276, 277, 278, 325; Appelate Body 255, 260, 271, 272, 275, 320; Appelate Body membership 273, 274; Asbestos case 277; consensus 261, 271, 275, 277, 278; dispute resolution process 255, 271, 272, 273, 278; General Council 275, 277; legitimacy of 278; NGOs (non-government organizations) 276, 277; non-state actors and 272, 276, 277; reform of the legal process 331; rules of 322; screening and selection procedures 273; secretariat 272; slack 275, 276, 278; transparency 277; voting rules 271, 275, 276

Yackee, J. 56, 66, 77, 78, 83, 84, 255
Ying, L.S. 270
Yoo, John 313, 332
Yourow, H.C. 216, 225

Zettelmeyer, J. 83
Zysman, J. 43



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