INTRODUCTION

Popular culture and the public sphere

Johann Peter Hasenclever's painting "The Newspaper Readers: Tavern Scene, 1835" depicts a quotidian moment from a Rhenish inn: three men listen with rapt attention to a man reading aloud the *Düsseldorfer Zeitung*, a prominent liberal newspaper. Gestures and facial expressions signify the three different responses of approval, qualified acceptance, and rejection toward the political topic, which collectively evoke the independent judgment and spirited participation of ordinary Rhinelanders. A younger interlocutor, either exhausted or bored, sleeps in his chair. In using a chiaroscuro technique to evoke the luminous power of print to enlighten and politically engage common people, Hasenclever betrayed his political assumptions.[1] But it also provided a nineteenth-century answer to a current question: how modern political publics arose.

That the typeset word transformed the political world of the old regime is irrefutable.[2] It remains the core of what scholars call the public sphere, a term linked with the Enlightenment ideal of civil society, which posited the free exchange of ideas between autonomous individuals as a necessary step toward a rational, self-governing society. In seventeenth-century Britain and in eighteenth-century Europe and North America an expanding open market of ideas spawned reading communities that unleashed a new dynamic in forming literary taste and further undercut the state and church as arbiters of intellectual, political, and religious

[1] Knut Soiné, *Johann Peter Hasenclever. Ein Maler im Vormärz* (Neustadt/Aisch, 1990), pp. 42–5. For the liberal direction of the *Düsseldorfer Zeitung* in the 1840s, see *RhBA*, 1, p. 589; Karl Georg Faber, *Die Rheinlande zwischen Restauration und Revolution. Probleme der rheinischen Geschichte von 1814 bis 1848 im Spiegel der zeitgenössischen Publizistik* (Wiesbaden, 1966), p. 347.

[2] A recognizable political public sphere, scholars largely agree, began in seventeenth-century England. For the print culture's role in the English Revolution, see David Zaret, *Origins of Democratic Culture: Printing, Petitions, and the Public Sphere in Early Modern England* (Princeton, 2000). For early origins of Germany's public sphere, see Andreas Gestrich, *Absolutismus und Öffentlichkeit. Politische Kommunikation in Deutschland zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen, 1994).



Fig. 2 *Die Zeitungsleser. Wirtshausszene 1835* ("The Newspaper Readers: Tavern Scene, 1835").
Painted by Johann Peter Hasenclever (1810–53), an artist of the Düsseldorf School, the canvas depicts the political engagement of ordinary Rhinelanders. The artist reportedly witnessed such reading circles and discussions.

dogma.[3] Over the course of the eighteenth century, a western European and North American "public" informed and organized itself to become a cultural and political force autonomous from corporate, ecclesiastical, and state viewpoints.[4] This imagined collectivity posited itself as a

[3] The best overviews are James Van Horn Melton, *The Rise of the Public in Enlightenment Europe* (Cambridge, 2001); T. C. W. Blanning, *The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe, 1660–1789* (Oxford, 2002).

[4] In Germany, the Enlightenment's public sphere did not counterpose itself against state and church as it did in France. See Richard van Dülmen and Anthony Williams, *The Society of the Enlightenment: The Rise of the Middle Class and Enlightenment Culture in Germany* (New York, 1992); Michael J. Sauter, "Preaching, a Ponytail, and an Enthusiast: Rethinking the Public Sphere's Subversiveness in Eighteenth-Century Prussia," *CEH* 37 (2004): 544–67.

legitimate subject of public affairs, thereby redefining the premises and precepts of statecraft. For some scholars, then, the public sphere is used as a prescriptive model to explain the rise of modern society and the ability of individuals and social groups to act on their own behalf. Historians, however, wield the term descriptively to think about how news and information circulated, the degree to which new ideas penetrated society, and the ways in which social groups deliberated as publics.

In theory, the public sphere is a politically neutral space of communication accommodating many voices, yet by the eighteenth century it also served as a solvent of the old regime.[5] New reading practices, scholars argue, promoted a sensibility of individualism that chafed under the collective identities of corporate society. The proliferation of reading material opened up a broader "horizon of expectations" among readers, who came to question the political privileges of birthright and the circumscribed liberties of the lower social orders. By encouraging communication, commentary, and private reflection, the public sphere strained the social contract of absolutism, which assumed compliant subjects. While absolutist rulers disseminated knowledge for more efficient and productive subjects, reading publics also perceived "publicity," "transparency," and the "openness" of *Öffentlichkeit* as a means of checking arbitrary rule and of initiating reform. Moreover, the eighteenth-century themes of rationality, utility, and natural law redefined subjects as rights-bearing citizens. Following the French Revolution, Europeans defined sovereignty not only as dynastic prerogative but as the collective will of the nation. Indeed, the very idea of the modern nation as a political community is difficult to explain without recourse to the phenomenon of "public opinion."[6]

This definition of the public sphere is indebted to Jürgen Habermas's *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, a landmark work of 1962 that offered philosophers, social scientists, and literary critics a historical trajectory in tracing the impact of public opinion on

[5] In his brilliant survey of old regime culture, T. C. W. Blanning argues that the public sphere "was not essentially or even mainly bourgeois" and that nobles "made the most of the emancipatory opportunities provided by the public sphere" (*Culture of Power*, p. 181). This view is plausible, but the cultural dynamic of opinion formation nonetheless undermined the status society of the old regime.

[6] The above paragraphs have drawn on an earlier essay: James M. Brophy, "The Public Sphere," in *Germany, 1800–1870*, ed. Jonathan Sperber (Oxford, 2004), pp. 185–208.

political sovereignty.[7] Not surprisingly, scholars – including Habermas himself – have sedulously critiqued, reworked, and redefined the historical accuracy of the public sphere.[8] By focusing on the normative exclusion of women from the public sphere, for example, historians have challenged the public sphere's putative universality.[9] Others questioned whether opinion formation is class-specific and national in nature.[10] Further, Habermas's premise that the print world of civil society superannuated representative publicity has also been dismantled. Nations, monarchs, and the bourgeoisie deployed public space to project power and control; the rituals and invented traditions of nations and bourgeois political cultures are thus part of the public sphere.[11] Social histories of

[7] Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Mit einem Vorwort zur Neuauflage 1990* (Frankfurt a. M., 1990). See Reinhart Koselleck, *Kritik und Krise. Ein Beitrag zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt* (Freiburg, 1959); Lucian Hölscher, *Öffentlichkeit und Geheimnis. Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zur Entstehung der Öffentlichkeit in der frühen Neuzeit* (Stuttgart, 1979); Anthony de la Vopa, "Conceiving a Public: Ideas and Society in Eighteenth-Century Europe," *JMH* 64 (1992): 79–116; Mona Ozouf, "Public Opinion at the End of the Old Regime," *JMH* 60 (1988): 1–21; Dena Goodman, "Public Sphere and Private Life: Toward a Synthesis of Current Historiographical Approaches to the Old Regime," *History and Theory* 31 (1992): 1–20; Peter Uwe Hohendahl, *The Institution of Criticism* (Ithaca, 1982).

[8] For a good introduction to the English reception and its critical assessments see Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, MA., 1992). For Habermas's own revisions, see his *Vorwort* in Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*, pp. 11–50.

[9] Joan Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* (Ithaca, 1988); Goodman, "Public Sphere and Private Life"; Mary Ryan, "Gender and Public Access: Women's Politics in Nineteenth-Century America," in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA., 1992), pp. 259–88; Belinda Davis, "Reconsidering Habermas, Gender, and the Public Sphere: The Case of Wilhelmine Germany," in *Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870–1930*, edited by Geoff Eley (Ann Arbor, 1996), pp. 397–426; Carla Hesse, "French Women in Print, 1750–1800: An Essay in Historical Bibliography," *Studies in Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 39 (1998): 65–82. See too the forum in *French Historical Studies* 18 (1992): 883–953.

[10] Geoff Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century," in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA, 1992), pp. 289–339; Eley, "Edward Thompson, Social History, and Political Culture: The Making of a Working-Class Public, 1780–1850," in *E. P. Thompson: Critical Perspectives*, edited by Harvey J. Kaye and Keith McClelland (Philadelphia, PA, 1990), pp. 12–49; Eley, "Rethinking the Political: Social History and Political Culture in 18th and 19th Century Britain," *AfS* 21 (1992): 427–49.

[11] George Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (Cornell, 1977); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, 1983); David E. Barclay, "Ritual, Ceremonial, and the 'Invention' of a Monarchical Tradition in Nineteenth-Century Prussia," in *European Monarchy: Its Evolution and Practice from Roman Antiquity to Modern Times*, edited by Heinz Duchardt (Stuttgart, 1992), pp. 207–20; Charlotte Tacke, *Denkmal im sozialen Raum. Nationale Symbole in Deutschland und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1995); Davis, "Reconsidering Habermas"; James M. Brophy, "Carnival and Citizenship: The Politics of Carnival Culture in the Prussian Rhineland, 1823–1848," *JSH* 30 (1997): 873–904; Simon P. Newman, *Parades and the Politics of the Street. Festive Culture in the Early American Republic* (Philadelphia, 1997). For a critique of historians' spatialization of Habermas's public sphere,

Grub Street printers, journalists, and their all-too-human motives also provide correctives to Habermas's ideal of print communication as an arena of rational and critical deliberation.[12] Recent scholarship has furthermore queried the conceptual dichotomies of state/society and private/public; in place of strict division, they see porosity and interconnectivity.[13] And, inevitably, there are prominent scholars who question the concept altogether.[14] In spite of the criticisms and modifications, the intrinsic importance of the public sphere endures.[15] At issue is the ability of a civil society to communicate and establish a consensus for governance. Although history repeatedly shows that social groups excluded from the realms of political discussion must exercise violence to access it, the heuristic of non-violent dialogue and reform remains critical.

This study positions itself as a contribution to a broader understanding of the public sphere, the mechanisms by which public opinion is formed, and the shifting boundaries of political citizenship in the early nineteenth century. It responds to the challenge of Hasenclever's painting of 1835, which boldly claimed that common Rhinelanders participated in the public sphere and sought to join the political nation as rights-bearing citizens.[16] But Hasenclever's deft brushwork covers the question of how these common laborers arrived at this point of political engagement. Whence the motivation to read and listen to political reportage? Where and how did these workers acquire the necessary mental equipment to

Harold Mah, "Phantasies of the Public Sphere: Rethinking the Habermas of Historians," *JMH* 72 (2000): 153–82.

[12] Robert Darnton, *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime* (Cambridge, MA, 1982); Robert Darnton, *The Forbidden Bestsellers of Pre-Revolutionary France* (New York, 1996); Sarah Maza, *Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Cause Célèbres of Pre-revolutionary France* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993); William Reddy, "The Condottiere of the Pen: Journalists and the Public Sphere in Post-Revolutionary France," *AHR* 99 (1994): 1546–70.

[13] Catherine Hall and Lenore Davidoff, *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780–1850* (London, 1987); Rebekka Habermas, *Frauen und Männer des Bürgertums. Eine Familiengeschichte (1750–1850)* (Göttingen, 2000); Matthew Levinger, *Enlightened Nationalism: The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806–1848* (New York, 2000); Ian McNeeley, *The Emancipation of Writing: German Civil Society in the Making, 1790–1820* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2003); Joan W. Scott and Debra Keates, *Going Public: Feminism and the Shifting Boundaries of the Private Sphere* (Urbana, IL, 2004).

[14] Pierre Bourdieu, "The Public Sphere does not Exist," in *Communication and Class Struggle: An Anthology in Two Volumes*, edited by Armand Mattelart and Seth Siegelaub (New York, 1979); Bruce Robbins, ed., *The Phantom Public Sphere* (Minneapolis, MN, 1993).

[15] Blanning, *The Culture of Power*, p. 14; Nick Crosby and John Michael Robert, eds., *After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere* (Oxford, 2004).

[16] The claim is still bold, for some scholars continue to argue that ordinary nineteenth-century Germans were unpolitical, uninformed, and not prepared to participate in public life. See Karl H. Wegert, *German Radicals Confront the Common People: Revolutionary Politics and Popular Politics, 1789–1849* (Mainz, 1992).

display the partisan spirit exhibited in the canvas? What media and institutions were the cultural agents that allowed the Rhenish underclasses to imagine alternative political vistas? The rudimentary, initial phase of popular politicization is not addressed. Prior to the fixed party-political positions in the mid and late nineteenth century, there was a preliminary period that awakened a population to political alternatives and the possibility of participation in a new political landscape. To debate a newspaper article in a tavern, or eventually join a political party, presupposes a disposition that is no longer disengaged. This study centers on this phase and asks how forms of popular culture inducted broader publics into the civic realm of participatory politics.

For this crucial non-institutional phase, scholarship is particularly wanting. The Habermasian model does not account for social groups outside the upper echelons of the bourgeoisie.[17] For both Habermas and subsequent generations of scholars, the engines of transformation remain elite print matter – journals, novels, gazettes, scientific treatises – and its consumers, whose associational bases composed the imagined community of the literary and political nation.[18] In Karl-Georg Faber's landmark study on the Rhenish press in the Vormärz, the well-heeled merchants, industrialists, notables, pastors, civil servants, court councilors, military officers, free professionals, and other bourgeois elite constituted the political class.[19] Agrarian laborers, factory hands, and waged workers were certainly not part of this communicative network, nor were lower-middle-class artisans, craftsmen, and rural farmers. How ideas and information disseminated throughout German society, and how it became widely politicized in the first half of the nineteenth century, remains largely unresolved. Clearly Habermas's template of associational networks and elite print culture does not accommodate investigations of popular political communication. For the popular realm, the public sphere should be understood less as a fixed set of institutions and social groups than as an elusive communicative phenomenon in a state of play, movement, and development.[20]

[17] Habermas briefly addressed the idea of a plebeian public sphere, which briefly opened up in the French revolution, but did not pursue the linkage between the liberal and plebeian public sphere (*Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*, p. 52).

[18] Dülmen and Williams, *The Society of the Enlightenment*; Melton, *Rise of the Public*; Hohendahl, *Institution of Criticism*.

[19] Faber, *Die Rheinlande*, pp. 419ff.

[20] Robert Darnton has criticized scholars' reification of the public sphere as a "thing-in-itself" with causal agency ("Book History, the State of Play: An Interview with Robert Darnton," *SHARP News*, Summer 1994, p. 3). To a large degree, the interpretive role of *Vereinswesen* in historiography has fallen victim to this problem.

In the mid-1980s, the German historical profession turned its energies to assessing the strengths and weaknesses of nineteenth-century civil society. The voluminous research is of a high standard, and we are indebted to the questions, theorizing, and empirical research that has transported the discussion to new levels.[21] Two research programs in particular merit attention. The first is the University of Frankfurt's multi-dissertation research project on the old urban bourgeoisie (*Stadtbürgertum*) and its role in effecting continuity between old-regime corporatism and early civil society. Although each of the urban case studies offers its own particularities, the research approach emphasized the centrality of city burghers and patricians in transforming a stratified society of rank into a civil society inspired with principles of self governance, individual autonomy, and civic freedoms.[22] The second *Bürgertum* project emanates from Bielefeld University, another massive project that produced a formidable phalanx of doctoral theses. This cluster of studies resists any simple generalization because of differing theoretical and comparative frameworks. Nonetheless, this project's *Bürgertum* is wrought more from the modernizing forces of capitalism, professionalism, and state building than from patricians and notables. Conventional class definitions proved insufficient to capture the fragility and complexity of *Bürgertum*, with its dizzying array of economic relationships, cultural attitudes, and social behaviors. Instead, Jürgen Kocka and others viewed *Bürgertum* as a cultural formation, whose values and aspirations bound together numerous social classes and

[21] The literature is too vast to be handily cited. For leading programmatic contributions see Otto Dann, ed., *Vereinswesen und bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland* (Munich, 1984); Wolfgang Hardtwig, "Strukturmerkmale und Entwicklungstendenzen des Vereinswesen in Deutschland 1789–1848," in *Vereinswesen und bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland*, edited by Otto Dann (Munich, 1984), pp. 11–50; Utz Haltern, *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft. Sozialtheoretische und sozialhistorische Aspekte* (Darmstadt, 1985); Jürgen Kocka, ed., *Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1987); Kocka, ed., *Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert. Deutschland im europäischen Vergleich.*, 3 vols. (Munich, 1988); Lutz Niethammer *et al.*, *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland* (Frankfurt a. M., 1990); Lothar Gall, *Von der ständischen zur bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*, ed. Lothar Gall, vol. xxv, *Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte* (Munich, 1993); Jonathan Sperber, "*Bürger, Bürgertum, Bürgerlichkeit, bürgerliche Gesellschaft*: Studies of the German (Upper) Middle Class and its Sociocultural World," *JMH* 69 (June, 1997): 271–97.

[22] For representative works see Hans-Werner Hahn, *Altständisches Bürgertum zwischen Beharrung und Wandel. Wetzlar 1689–1870* (Munich, 1991); Ralf Roth, *Stadt und Bürgertum in Frankfurt am Main. Ein besonderer Weg von der ständischen zur modernen Bürgergesellschaft 1760–1914* (Munich, 1996); Karin Schambach, *Stadtbürgertum und industrieller Umbruch. Dortmund 1780–1870* (Munich, 1996); Gisela Mettele, *Bürgertum in Köln 1775–1870. Gemeinsinn und freie Association* (Munich, 1998); Frank Möller, *Bürgerliche Herrschaft in Augsburg 1790–1880* (Munich, 1998); Suzanne Kill, *Bürgertum in Münster 1770–1870. Bürgerliche Selbstbestimmung im Spannungsfeld von Kirche und Staat* (Munich, 2001).

outlooks.[23] In spite of the projects' different points of departure, both share the assumption that urban (mostly male) bourgeois groups – with their print culture, associational bases, professional networks, and economic needs – constituted the principal motor of change.[24] This premise, however valid, has unintentionally produced a narrow definition of the political cultures that made nineteenth-century civil society, overlooking other social groups and their spheres of activity. Staying within conventional boundaries of the bourgeois experience, these projects do not explore the communicative links between civil society's core and peripheral groups. The question of civil society's elasticity and expansive capacity is not posed. If cultural commonality lent coherence to a socially fragmented *Bürgertum*, then the power of culture to attract and bind other social groups to the ideals of civil society should also be assessed.

Although narrow, juridical definitions of *Bürgertum* and civil society in central Europe can easily elide plebeian classes, there is a wider meaning of civil society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*).[25] Eighteenth-century political discourse advocated forms of individualism and contract theory that envisioned a classless society of free citizens. More pointedly, the French Revolution altered the terms of debate on sovereignty and governance, setting new notions of citizenship into circulation that affected German political development.[26] In spite of political exclusion at the municipal,

[23] For a succinct discussion of this matter, see Sperber, "*Bürger, Bürgertum*," p. 275.

[24] This project presently exceeds twenty volumes and has displayed a broad range of approaches and theses. For a resumé of the project's achievements, see Peter Lundgreen, ed., *Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte des Bürgertums. Eine Bilanz des Bielefelder Sonderforschungsbereich (1986–1997)* (Göttingen, 2000). For particular monographs, see Rudolf Boch, *Grenzenloses Wachstum? Das rheinische Wirtschaftsbürgertum und seine Industrialisierungsdebatte 1814–1857* (Göttingen, 1991); Monika Weinfort, *Monarchie in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Deutschland und England von 1640 bis 1848* (Göttingen, 1993); Thomas Mergel, *Zwischen Klasse und Konfession. Katholisches Bürgertum im Rheinland 1794–1914* (Göttingen, 1994); Manfred Hettling, *Politische Bürgerlichkeit. Der Bürger zwischen Individualität und Vergesellschaftung in Deutschland und der Schweiz von 1860 bis 1918* (Göttingen, 1999); R. Habermas, *Frauen und Männer des Bürgertums*; Frank-Michael Kuhlemann, *Bürgerlichkeit und Religion. Zur Social- und Mentalitätgeschichte der evangelischen Pfarrer in Baden 1860–1914* (Göttingen, 2001).

[25] For a review of the central definitions, see notes 7 and 21. See too Hans-Jürgen Wehler, "Bürger, Arbeiter und das Problem der Klassenbildung 1800–1870. Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich," in *Arbeiter und Bürger im 19. Jahrhundert. Varianten ihres Verhältnisses im europäischen Vergleich*, edited by Jürgen Kocka (Munich, 1986), pp. 1–77.

[26] The impact of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Era on German society has traditionally produced exaggerated claims. For Rhenish historiography, however, a judicious balance has been struck in the last decades. See Michael Rowe, *From Reich to State: The Rhineland in the Revolutionary Age, 1780–1830* (Cambridge, 2003); Hansgeorg Molitor, *Vom Untertan zum Administré. Studien zur französischen Herrschaft und zum Verhalten der Bevölkerung im Rhein-Mosel-Raum von den Revolutionskriegen bis zum Ende der napoleonischen Zeit* (Wiesbaden, 1980);

regional, and state levels, common social groups acquired partisan views and exercised political agency. Such politicizing processes should be part of an interpretative framework of civil society. Because common classes constituted roughly three-quarters of German society, the capability of civil society to convey political ideas to other social groups is hardly a side show. When viewed as a cultural formation, civil society enveloped additional groups that facilitated the expansion of political activity to non-elite classes.

Excluding ordinary Germans from the early nineteenth-century public sphere has enormous ramifications. At issue is the central question whether common people grasped the ideals and ideological impulses of post-revolutionary civil society – a precondition for participation in the partisan, ideological world of German politics after 1815. Whereas the mutually reinforcing effect of bourgeois and popular politics is a long-established theme in French and English historiography, the relationship between the political cultures of ordinary and middle-class Germans rests on a less firm basis.[27] The relative neglect in German historiography is partially explained by the long-standing dominance of the *Sonderweg* thesis; the model's arguments about retarded nationhood and undeveloped bourgeois political culture posited in turn a politically backward

Jonathan Sperber, "Echoes of the French Revolution in the Rhineland, 1830–1849," *CEH* 22 (1989): 200–17; Jeffry M. Diefendorf, *Businessmen and Politics in the Rhineland, 1789–1834* (Princeton, 1980); Karl Georg Faber, *Recht und Verfassung. Die politische Funktion des rheinischen Rechts im 19. Jahrhundert* (Cologne, 1970). For left-wing scholarship on Jacobinism, see Heinrich Scheel, *Deutscher Jakobinismus und deutsche Nation. Ein Beitrag zur nationalen Frage im Zeitalter der Grossen Französischen Revolution* (Berlin, 1966); Axel Kuhn, *Jakobiner im Rheinland. Der Kölner konstitutionelle Zirkel von 1798* (Stuttgart, 1976); Helmut Haasis, *Deutscher Jakobiner. Mainzer Republik und Cisrhenan 1792–1798* (Mainz, 1981); Walter Grab, *Ein Volk muss seine Freiheit selbst erobern. Zur Geschichte der deutschen Jakobiner* (Frankfurt a. M., 1984). The best rebuttal to this research is T. C. W. Blanning, *Reform and Revolution in Mainz, 1743–1803* (New York, 1974); Blanning, *The French Revolution in Germany: Occupation and Resistance in the Rhineland, 1792–1802* (Oxford, 1983).

[27] See George Rudé, *The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England* (New York, 1964); Edward P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York, 1966); George Rudé and Eric Hobsbawm, *Captain Swing* (New York, 1968); Maurice Agulhon, *The Republic in the Village: The People of the Var from the French Revolution to the Second Republic*, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York, 1982); Edward Berenson, *Populist Religion and Left-wing Politics in France, 1830–1852* (Princeton, NJ, 1984); Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley, CA, 1984); Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Durham, NC, 1991); Peter Sahlins, *Forest Rites: The War of the Demoiselles in Nineteenth-Century France* (Cambridge, MA, 1994); Arlette Farge, *Subversive Words: Public Opinion in Eighteenth-Century France*, trans. Rosemary Morris (University Park, PA, 1995); Charles Tilly, *Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758–1834* (Cambridge, MA, 1995).

populace.[28] Although historians have long punctured the myth of an under-developed civil society in nineteenth-century Germany, the links between bourgeois and popular political cultures remain understudied. More fundamentally, how ordinary Germans encountered and acquired political opinions and how a participatory political culture took root in post-Napoleonic Germany remains rudimentary.[29]

The social history of common people has not been neglected in Germany, but methods and questions have elided the issue of political communication prior to workers' associations. Structural histories have, for example, carefully traced the socioeconomic turmoil of the Vormärz period, especially in regard to the transition from artisanal trades to industrial labor, but this approach has little need to inquire about opinion formation and the communicative link between bourgeois and popular classes.[30] The approaches of historical anthropology, *Alltagsgeschichte*, and the microhistorical use of *Eigensinn* have also de-emphasized cultural commonality between the working and middle classes. On the one hand, historical anthropology has pushed the historical discipline in a new

[28] See David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (New York, 1984).

[29] See Manfred Gailus, *Strasse und Brot. Sozialer Protest in den deutschen Staaten unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Preussens, 1847–1849* (Göttingen, 1990); Manfred Gailus and Heinrich Volkmann, eds., *Der Kampf um das tägliche Brot: Nahrungsmangel, Versorgungspolitik und Protest, 1770–1990* (Opladen, 1994); Wolfgang Kaschuba, *Volkskultur zwischen feudaler und bürgerlicher Gesellschaft. Zur Geschichte eines Begriffs und seiner gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit* (Frankfurt a. M., 1988); Wolfgang Kaschuba, "1848/49: Horizonte politischer Kultur," in *Revolution in Deutschland und Europa 1848/49*, ed. Wolfgang Hardtwig (Göttingen, 1998), pp. 56–78; Wolfgang Kaschuba, *Lebenswelt und Kultur der unterbürgerlichen Schichten im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1990); Wolfgang Kaschuba and Carola Lipp, *1848 – Provinz und Revolution. Kultureller Wandel und soziale Bewegung im Königreich Württemberg* (Tübingen, 1979); Carola Lipp, "Aktivismus und politische Abstinenz. Der Einfluß kommunalpolitischer Erfahrung und lebensweltlicher Strukturen auf die politische Partizipation in der Revolution von 1848/49," in *Die Revolution von 1848/49. Erfahrung-Verarbeitung-Deutung*, edited by Christian Jansen and Thomas Mergel (Göttingen, 1998), pp. 97–126.

[30] For the rise of organized labor movements in the Rhenish Vormärz, see Dieter Dowe, *Aktion und Organisation. Arbeiterbewegung, sozialistische Bewegung und kommunistische Bewegung in der preussischen Rheinprovinz 1820–1852* (Hanover, 1970). For Cologne, see Pierre Ayçoberry, *Köln zwischen Napoleon und Bismarck. Wachstum einer rheinischen Stadt*, trans. Ulrich Stehkämper (Cologne, 1996), 179–206. For the reconstitution of the German working class in the Vormärz, see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Zweiter Band. Von der Reformära bis zur industriellen und politischen "deutschen Doppelrevolution" 1815–1845/49* (Munich, 1987), pp. 241–96. For broader narratives of working-class formation, see Jürgen Kocka, "Problems of Working-Class Formation in Germany: The Early Years, 1800–1875," in *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States*, edited by Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg (Princeton, 1986), pp. 279–351; Jürgen Kocka, *Weder Stand noch Klasse: Unterschichten um 1800. Geschichte der Arbeiter und der Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland seit dem Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Bonn, 1990).