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Edited by David F. Ford, Ben Quash and Janet Martin Soskice

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PART I

*The End of the Enlightenment's  
Neutral Ground*

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## CHAPTER I

*The study of religion and the rise of atheism:  
conflict or confirmation?**Michael J. Buckley S.J.*

## INTRODUCTION TO THE QUESTION

'Religion' and 'theology' are not terms with fixed meanings and invariant applications. They are rather topics or commonplaces – not in the sense of the familiar and the trite, but in the classical sense of linguistic variables, terms ambiguous and capacious enough to house a vast diversity of meanings, arguments, and referents.<sup>1</sup> The interconnection of such topics constitutes neither a determined problem nor an exact proposition. It constitutes what John Dewey called 'a problematic situation', an indeterminate area out of which problems and their resolutions can emerge only if these ambiguous terms are given specific meanings and definite applications within particular inquiries.<sup>2</sup> Recognising the ambiguity of both 'religion' and 'theology', this paper proposes to obtain a greater purchase on the problematic situation they together delimit, first, by offering a few precisions on 'religion' as its meaning developed through history to reach its generic consensus in late modernity; and then, by exploring how the scientific study of religion, so understood, came to engage one of the arguments of modern theology: the existence or non-existence of God.

In a remarkable review of the scientific study of religion over a fifty-year period, Mircea Eliade provides a benchmark for this project by selecting 1912 as a date of particular consequence.<sup>3</sup> That year, five stars rose in the firmament. Émile Durkheim published his *Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*. Sigmund Freud 'was correcting the proofs of *Totem und Tabu*, to be issued in book form the following year', and Carl Jung was publishing his

<sup>1</sup> See Richard P. McKeon, 'Creativity, and the Commonplace', in Mark Backman, ed., *Rhetoric: Essays in Invention and Discovery* (Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press, 1987), pp. 25–36. For commonplaces as linguistic variables, see Aristotle, *Topics*, 1.13–18, 105a20–108a36; *Rhetoric* 1.2.1358a10–35; 2.23.1398a27–8.

<sup>2</sup> See John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), pp. 105–8.

<sup>3</sup> Mircea Eliade, 'The History of Religions in Retrospect: 1912 and After', in *The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 12–36.

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MICHAEL J. BUCKLEY S.J.

*Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido*. Raffaele Pettazoni's first monograph, *La religione primitiva in Sardegna*, appeared that same year, and Wilhelm Schmidt completed the first of the twelve volumes in his monumental study *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*.

In these five works, four very different methodologies advanced towards greater academic acceptance and influential presence in the scientific study of religion: the sociological, the psychological, the ethnological and the historical. Eliade paints all this in broad brush strokes, depicting the intrinsic value and perduring authority of each of his chosen authors. What he does not examine or evaluate, however, forms the interest of this essay. For these seminal and even paradigmatic studies from the early twentieth century bore witness, in all of their diversity of methods, to an agreement and a controversy about religion: an agreement about the genus that 'religion' had become over the centuries, and a controversy over the collateral that religion so understood would offer to belief and unbelief.

RELIGION: FROM VIRTUE TO CATEGORY  
OF 'THINGS'<sup>4</sup>

To chart something of the lengthy journey by which 'religion' reached its generic and accepted understanding by 1912, this essay proposes – as they do on the Mississippi – to take three soundings. It will drop a plumb line into the medieval controversies of Thomas Aquinas; then, gauge the modification of that tradition in the heady days of Baroque scholasticism; and finally allow Eliade's Five to exemplify the 'religion' secured by late modernity. Such discrete measurements might supplement, rather than repeat, the magisterial studies of such scholars as Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Peter Harrison.

For Thomas Aquinas, '*religio*' – irrespective of how one comes down on its etymology – 'properly denotes or implies a relationship to God (*proprie importat ordinem ad Deum*)'.<sup>5</sup> More specifically, it designates a habit or a virtue by which one gives God what is due to God, and in this way lives 'in an appropriate relationship with God'.<sup>6</sup> But since it is impossible to render to God all that is owed to the divine goodness, religion always limps. Religion is like justice in that it renders to another what is his or her due. Because of its inherent inadequacy, however, it does not simply identify

<sup>4</sup> For the history of 'religion', see Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), pp. 15–50.

<sup>5</sup> *Summa theologiae* 2-2.81.1.      <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-2.81.2.

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with justice, but is a virtue joined to justice, i.e., a potential part of justice.<sup>7</sup> God enters into the constitution of religion not as its direct object, not that to which it immediately attends, but as the end or purpose of what *religio* does properly attend to, i.e., any human action or thing that embodies the worship and service of God. Such practices could be external activities like public adoration or sacrifice or vowing or, more importantly and primarily, internal actions such as devotion and prayer.<sup>8</sup> These individual or social actions and cultic units are not religion; they are the acts and objects of religion. They look to God; religion looks to them. Thus *religio* is a moral rather than a theological virtue, taking such human acts and practices as its direct object.<sup>9</sup>

For this reason, unlike the use of this term in the English Enlightenment, religion could never substitute in Aquinas for faith, though to be 'true religion' it had to be grounded on true faith.<sup>10</sup> But religion was comprehensive; it could command the acts of all the virtues and human activities insofar as they were directed to the service and honour of God.<sup>11</sup> William T. Cavanaugh narrows the range and acts of religion considerably by maintaining that *religio* for St Thomas 'presupposes a context of ecclesial practices which are both communal and particular to the Christian Church'. It certainly includes these practices, but there is no justification for limiting *religio* in this fashion. *Religio* can command a single and private act of worship or service as well as a communal one. Cavanaugh further and needlessly insists that 'religion refers specifically to the liturgical practices of the Church'.<sup>12</sup> Again these are certainly included in Aquinas's *religio*,

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-2.80.prol and art. 1; 81.5.ad 3.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-2.81.1.ad 1; 81.4. ad 4; 81.7: 'Mens autem humana indiget ad hoc quod conjungatur Deo, sensibilibus manuductione . . . Et ideo in divino cultu necesse est aliquibus corporalibus uti, ut eis quasi signis quibusdam mens hominis excitetur ad spirituales actus quibus Deo conjungitur. Et ideo religio habet quidem interiores actus *quasi principales et per se ad religionem pertinentes*, exteriores vero actus quasi secundarios et ad interiores actus ordinatos.' (Emphasis added.)

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-2.81.5. See *In Boeth. De Trinitate* 3.2: 'Ipsa tamen religio non est virtus theologica: habet enim pro materia quasi omnes actus, ut fidei, vel virtutis alterius, quos Deo tamquam debitos offert; sed Deum habet pro fine. Colere enim Deum est hujusmodi actus ut Deo debitos offerre.'

<sup>10</sup> Peter Harrison, *'Religion' and the religions in the English Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 61ff. See *In Boeth. De Trinitate* 3.2: '... actus fidei pertinet quidem materialiter ad religionem, sicut et aliarum virtutum, et magis in quantum fidei actus est primus motus mentis in Deum; sed formaliter a religione distinguitur, utpote aliam rationem objecti considerans. Convenit etiam fides cum religione praeter hoc, in quantum fides est religionis causa et principium. Non enim aliquis eligeret cultum Deo exhibere, nisi fide teneret Deum esse creatorem, gubernatorem et remuneratorem humanorum actuum.'

<sup>11</sup> *Summa theologiae* 2-2.186.1.ad 2; 81.1.ad 1. See *In Boeth. De Trinitate* 3.2: 'Sic ergo omnes actus quibus se homo subjicit Deo, sive sint mentis, sive corporis ad religionem pertinent.' And even further: 'et sic diligenter consideranti apparet omnem actum bonum ad religionem pertinere.'

<sup>12</sup> William T. Cavanaugh, 'The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State', *Modern Theology* 11/4 (October 1995), pp. 403-4. For the sweeping character of Aquinas's understanding of *religio*, see

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but by no means exhaustive of it. Aquinas, relying explicitly upon Cicero, is far more generous in the inclusion he gives to *religio*. It can be pagan or Christian, private or social, as long as it directs one to the service and reverence of God.

By the same act, a human being both serves and worships God. For worship looks to the excellence of God, to which reverence is due. Service, however, looks to the subjection of the human person, who by reason of his condition is obliged to give reverence to God. To these two acts belong all the acts that are attributed to religion, because through all of them the human being acknowledges the divine excellence and his subjection to God, either by offering something to God or also by accepting something divine.<sup>13</sup>

This is far more sweeping than Christian liturgical practices and specific symbols and beliefs and is not constrained into the public/private distinction. *Religio* looks to all of the acts by which God is served and worshipped as ‘*principium creationis et gubernationis rerum*’, whether Christian or not.<sup>14</sup>

For Aquinas, *pace* Wilfred Cantwell Smith, this virtue constituted the fundamental meaning of *religio* – a good habit, not ‘an activity of the soul’ and not just a ‘prompting’, but a developed capacity and inclination.<sup>15</sup> What is astonishing to record is the close conjunction that Aquinas draws between *religio* and *sanctitas* – in light of the role that ‘the sacred’ will play later in the works of Durkheim and Eliade. *Sanctitas* and *religio* differ not in essence but only in their grammar, as one might here translate *ratione*. *Religio* (*dicitur*) is said to look to all of the acts by which God is served and worshipped as ‘*principium creationis et gubernationis rerum*’ whether Christian or not, while sanctity (*dicitur*) bespeaks not only divine worship but ‘the work of all of the virtues or all good works by which the human person disposes herself for divine worship.’<sup>16</sup>

It is here that institution entered into the ambit of Thomistic ‘*religio*.’ Those who dedicate their entire lives to this divine service are called *religiosi*, and their groupings and communities became ‘religious orders’ or

2-2.81.4. ad 2: ‘Omnia, secundum quod in gloriam Dei fiunt, pertinent ad religionem, non quasi ad elicentem sed quasi ad imperantem; illa autem pertinent ad religionem elicentem quae secundum rationem sua speciei pertinent ad reverentiam Dei.’

<sup>13</sup> *Summa theologiae* 2-2.81.3.ad 2: ‘Eodem actu homo servit Deo et colit ipsum; nam cultus respicit Dei excellentiam, cui reverentia debetur; servitus autem respicit subjectionem hominis, qui ex sua conditione obligatur ad exhibendam reverentiam Deo. Et ad haec duo pertinent omnes actus qui religioni attribuuntur, quia per omnes homo protestatur divinam excellentiam et subjectionem sui ad Deum, vel exhibendo aliquid ei, vel etiam assumendo aliquid divinum.’

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-2.81.3.

<sup>15</sup> See Smith, *Meaning and End of Religion*, p. 32. See *In Boeth. De Trinitate* 3.2: ‘religio est specialis virtus, in actibus omnium virtutem specialem rationem objecti considerans, scilicet Deo debitum.’

<sup>16</sup> *Summa theologiae* 2-2.81.3.

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'religions'.<sup>17</sup> 'Religion' not only denoted a virtue, but also the 'status' of those whose vows were specified by that virtue.

In the thirteenth century, *religio* combined into a phrase that bespoke an Augustinian rather than a Ciceronian heritage. At least sixty-eight times, Aquinas, following a lead taken from Augustine, joined *christiana* with *religio*. Indeed, he made the avowed purpose of the *Summa theologiae* 'to treat those things that pertain to Christian *religio* in the manner that would be appropriate to the instruction of beginners'.<sup>18</sup> But what was meant by this *christiana religio* was not the institution and the set of characteristic beliefs, symbols, or ceremonial practices of the Church, as it is so often interpreted, but rather something much closer to what one would today call Christian piety or devotion. Aquinas, of course, specified 'piety' quite differently, but *religio* remained a virtue that would govern and be expressed in practices and devotions. For Aquinas, these latter were not religion, either severally or collectively; they were the objects of religion. With such an understanding, it could make perfect sense to assert that 'the highest reaches of Christian religion consist in mercy in so far as one is speaking of exterior works; but the interior affection of charity, whereby we are united with God, takes precedence over love and mercy towards our neighbor'.<sup>19</sup> Aquinas never gives any indication that Christianity is one institutional religion out of many, that religion was a genus specified into various communities of different beliefs, practices and traditions. In fact he never groups *religio* with other traditions such as the Jewish, Muslim or pagan.

In this understanding of 'religion', John Calvin and Huldreich Zwingli seem much closer to Aquinas. When Zwingli titled his book, *De vera et falsa religione commentarius*, he was not distinguishing between two communities with their characteristic and divergent beliefs, symbols and practices. He differentiated, as had Lactantius before him, between two different attitudes towards worship.<sup>20</sup> True religion is that piety or reverence that emerges from the comprehensive entrustment of oneself to the true God in faith; false religion occurs when this reverence is given to anything other than God.<sup>21</sup> When John Calvin published *Christianae religionis institutio* in 1536, he was writing not about 'the' Christian religion – one denomination

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.81.1.ad 5 and 2-2.186.1.ad 2.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, Prologue: '... ea quae ad Christianam religionem pertinent eo modo tradere secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium.'

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-2.30.4.ad 2: '... summa religionis Christianae in misericordia consistit quantum ad exteriora opera, interior tamen affectio caritatis, qua conjungimur deo, praeponderat et dilectioni et misericordiae in proximos.'

<sup>20</sup> Smith, *Meaning and End of Religion*, pp. 27–8.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 35–6, 224 n. 83, 84. For the meaning of *vera religio* in Aquinas, see 2-2.81.3.sc.

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among many other religious bodies – but about Christian piety. It was not until the nineteenth century that translations placed a definite article before the adjective ‘Christian’ and brought John Calvin into the more contemporary understanding of ‘religion’, one that he had never actually shared.<sup>22</sup>

This basic understanding of ‘religion’ allowed Schleiermacher to move consistently from a defence of religion as the intuition and feeling of the infinite in his youthful *Über der Religion* to the *Glaubenslehre* in which the foundational concept is piety (*Frömmigkeit*) or the feeling of absolute dependence. The intuition and feeling of the first identified with the piety of the second, and he was at pains to advance this understanding against the false attribution of religion to external forms, symbols and propositional beliefs. Kant equated his *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* with a fundamental and habitual ethical orientation towards duty.

One can register the beginnings of a radical change in *religio*, however, by taking a second sounding, this time among theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and specifically as it was bodied forth in the massively influential textbooks of Francisco Suarez. *De virtute et statu religionis* (1608–9) continued much of the Thomistic tradition, with *religio* a moral virtue, realised in the vowed ‘religious’ state and sometimes modified by *christiana* to indicate the fundamental habit of Christian worship and service of God founded upon Christian faith.<sup>23</sup> But here one can discover also the subtle beginnings of what will become a sea change. For Suarez contended that the term *religio* – like ‘*fides*’ and ‘*votum*’ – was legitimately and ‘customarily applied (*tribui solere*) not only to internal affect, but also to the *external actions* and, indeed, to the *things (rebus)* by which God was worshipped as also to the *doctrina* that teaches such worship or ceremony’.<sup>24</sup> Religion in this sense is no longer simply a virtue; it is also both things such as external ritual and ceremonial objects and the teachings and the beliefs that instruct about their appropriate use. Scripture is cited for the legitimacy

<sup>22</sup> Wilfred Cantwell Smith has it exactly right: ‘To the author and those who first read it the title of Zwingli’s book meant, “An essay on genuine and spurious piety”; and Calvin’s, something like “Grounding in Christian piety”’ (*Meaning and End of Religion*, p. 37).

<sup>23</sup> Francisco Suarez, S.J., ‘Tractatus primus: De natura et essentia virtutis religionis’, in *Opus de virtute et statu religionis*, in *Opera omnia*, editio nova, vol. XIII (Paris: Louis Vivès, 1859), 3–76. The first two volumes, dealing with the virtue of religion, and XIV of the *Opera omnia*, were published by 1609, while the second two volumes were published posthumously at Lyons in 1623 and 1625. See Joseph de Guibert, S.J., *The Jesuits: Their Spiritual Doctrine and Practice: A Historical Study*, trans. William J. Young, S.J. (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1972), p. 268.

<sup>24</sup> Suarez, ‘De natura et essentia virtutis religionis’, 8a: ‘... advertere oportet nomen religionis non solum interno affectui, sed etiam exterioribus actionibus, imo et rebus quibus Deus colitur, tribui solere, atque etiam doctrinae quae talem cultum vel caeremoniam docet.’

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of this extension as is Clement of Alexandria (*'religio est actio quae Deum sequitur'*), but not Aquinas or the medieval doctors.

Thus, Suarez subsumes what Aquinas had called the acts or objects of religion into religion itself, and in doing so, he opens up *religio* to the cultural and anthropological meanings and inquiries that will constitute its character in modernity. He enters this extension of the meaning of *religio* as one already in common usage. Religion's objects have come to constitute religion. Harrison would trace to the English Enlightenment the emergence of *religio* as denoting the externals of worship and practice. But this attribution should go back farther, at least to the major influence that mediated scholasticism to modern philosophy, Francisco Suarez, 'Doctor Eximius'.<sup>25</sup> Because of his continuous presence within the textbook tradition, Suarez exercised a profound influence on subsequent centuries.

One must note also the virtually contemporary *Natural and Moral History of the Indies* (1590) by the contentious polymath José de Acosta. Acosta took the understanding of *religio* as 'the belief system that results in ceremonial behavior', as 'that which is used (*que usan*) in their rites' by the American indigenous peoples. It was also around this period that the credal content of religion could be somewhat separated from ceremonies, and so it was emphasised that 'religion' could substitute for 'faith' and become a genus – as Jonathan Z. Smith so helpfully traces. Now religion as a generic system of beliefs and practices could break down into the constituent species of 'Christianity, Mohametanism, Judaism and Idolatry'. The palm for advancing into popular reading the plural of 'religion' in this sense, i.e., for 'religions', seems to go to the redoubtable Samuel Purchas with the 1613 appearance of the first volume of *Purchas His Pilgrimage; or, Relations of the World and the Religions Observed in All Ages and Places Discovered from the Creation unto this Present . . .* In a year, following hard on its heels was Edward Brerewood's *Enquiries Touching the Diversity of Languages and Religions through the Chiefe Parts of the World* (1614).<sup>26</sup> Here, we are much closer to modernity.

<sup>25</sup> Armand A. Maurer, C.S.B., *Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 356–7. Maurer cites Suarez's presence in the education of Descartes and among the philosophical influences on Leibniz, Schopenhauer and Christian Wolff.

<sup>26</sup> See Jonathan Z. Smith, 'Religion, Religions, Religious', in Mark C. Taylor, ed., *Critical Terms for Religious Studies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 271–2. But the older usage did not die. Even when Samuel Johnson's *Dictionary of the English Language* or the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* took up 'religion', they bespoke the reverence that was due to God or the reasonable service of God. This was to continue in some variation the differentiation that obtained since the Middle Ages between the habit of religion and the objects – ceremonials, adoration, cult, and all of the virtues that *religio* could comprehensively command 'insofar as they were directed to the service and honor of God' (*Summa theologiae* 2-2.186.1.ad 2; 81.1.ad 1.).



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A third sounding can be made as we come back to Eliade's *annus mirabilis*. Durkheim and Freud, Pettazoni, Jung and Schmidt are not talking about a particular human virtue or its characteristic functions. Religion was not a virtue; it had become 'things' – many of which it used to govern – but 'things' in the sense of discrete units such as sacrifice and vows, moral practices and rituals and commitments, and also myths, beliefs and symbols indicative of or common to a particular community. Religion was a congeries of such 'things', marked by the sacred or by taboo or by the fearful. One religious system of such beliefs and practices could and should be distinguished from another; its identity required it. And the conjoined units owned as sacred or interdicting were to be distinguished from another realm of 'things', that of the profane. Like 'science' and 'art', 'religion' changed from a quality of the human being or of a community to a territory of particular things, external things that could be studied by sciences such as anthropology, sociology, psychology and ethnology to determine a specific culture or cast of human character.

Wilfred Cantwell Smith describes – will subsequently question – this understanding of religion in its new form:

It is customary nowadays to hold that there is in human life and society something distinctive called 'religion'; and that this phenomenon is found on earth at present in a variety of minor forms, chiefly among outlying or eccentric peoples, and in a half-dozen or so major forms. Each of these major forms is also called 'a religion', and each one has a name: Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, and so on.<sup>27</sup>

When one spoke of 'the Christian religion', similarity of phrase hid the profound difference between the sense carried by 'religion' in the nineteenth century and the understanding it bore for Aquinas and Calvin, Zwingli and even Suarez. Eliade's five authors might disagree on how religion should be further specified or what was worshipped, but they would agree that they were not dealing with human qualities, but with an aggregation of particular units.

Thus, in Durkheim's logistical reading, 'although religion is a whole composed of parts – a more or less complex system of myths, dogmas, rites, and ceremonies – they operate as if it formed a kind of indivisible entity'.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Meaning and End of Religion*, p. 15.

<sup>28</sup> Emile Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. Karen E. Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 33. 'At the foundation of all systems of belief and all cults, there must necessarily be a certain number of fundamental representations and a mode of ritual conduct that, despite the diversity of forms that the one and the other may have taken on, have the same objective meaning everywhere, and everywhere fulfill the same functions. It is these enduring elements that constitute what is eternal and human in religion. They are the whole objective content of the idea that is expressed when religion in general is spoken of.' *Ibid.*, p. 4.

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Durkheim's world bifurcates into the sacred and profane, and 'when a certain number of sacred things have relations of coordination and subordination with one another, so as to form a system that had a certain coherence and does not belong to any other system of the same sort, then the beliefs and the rites, taken together constitute a religion'.<sup>29</sup> Thus it was that 'religious phenomena fall into two basic categories: belief and rites. The first are states of opinion and consist of representations; the second are particular modes of action. Between all of these two categories of phenomena lies all that separates thinking from doing.'<sup>30</sup> What makes Buddhism a religion, Durkheim argued, is that 'in the absence of gods, it accepts the existence of *sacred things*, namely the four Noble Truths and the practices that are derived from them'.<sup>31</sup>

In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud lays out two basic components of religion, what will emerge in other works as compulsive practices whose motivations are hidden and deeply treasured beliefs about powerful realities whose justifications are equally unconscious.<sup>32</sup> The most primitive form of these compulsive practices lay with taboo and exogamy, while the original focus of fear and reverence was the totem.<sup>33</sup> For Raffaele Pettazzoni, religion was itself one component within the more general category of culture. 'Religion is historically a form of culture and cannot be understood save in the framework of that particular culture of which it is a part, and in organic association with its other forms, such as art, myth, poetry, philosophy, economic, social, and political structure.'<sup>34</sup> Each of these denoted a set of organically interrelated things. As one spoke of Greek art or poetry constituted by their own proper objects, so one could speak of Greek religion in contrast with other religions and of religion in general in contrast with the other territories of art, myth, poetry and philosophy.

With almost scholastic precision, Wilhelm Schmidt defined religion both as beliefs and objects. 'Subjectively, it [religion] is the knowledge and consciousness of dependence upon one or more transcendental, personal

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.    <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 34.    <sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 35 (emphasis added).

<sup>32</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, trans. James Strachey, with a biographical introduction by Peter Gay (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), pp. 36–7, 109–10; 97ff.

<sup>33</sup> 'Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices' (1907) had already charted the parallels between religious practices and obsessive neurosis, while *The Future of an Illusion* would point up the analogies between religious ideas and Meyert's amnesia, 'a state of acute hallucinatory confusion'. Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion*, trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), pp. 55–6, cf. esp. n. 5.

<sup>34</sup> Raffaele Pettazzoni, 'Introduction to the History of Greek Religion,' in his *Essays on the History of Religions*, trans. H. J. Rose (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954), p. 68. Ugo Bianchi points out that with *La religione primitiva in Sardegna* Pettazzoni indicates his shift from classical archaeology to the history of religions. Ugo Bianchi, 'Pettazzoni, Raffaele (1883–1959)', in Mircea Eliade, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1986), vol. II, p. 261.