

Cambridge University Press

0521845564 - Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi

Edited by Erik J. Olsson

Index

[More information](#)

Index

- abduction, 26, 29, 143, 170
- agency, 267; and causality, 272; and freedom, 272; as a necessary condition of thought, 269; the normative idea of, 374
- AGM theory, 131, 133, 152, 188, 201, 214, 352; of contraction, 194, 197, 330
- Arrow's impossibility theorem, 10
- artificial intelligence: role of abduction in, 149; role of belief change in, 202
- Austin, John L., 237
- backward induction, 297, 303
- basic partition, 359
- Bayesian decision theory, 12, 157, 170, 235
- Bayesian ideal of rationality, 245
- Bayesian network, 134, 213
- belief: a priori, 137; behavioristic interpretation of, 101; categorical, 101; control of, 369; as dispositional state, 246, 343; as doxastic commitment, 15, 181, 201, 243, 252, 270, 343, 368, 372; full, 128, 137, 242, 343; instinctive, 27; origin of, *see* pedigree epistemology; partial, 66, 102; plain, 132, 348; reduction of probability to, 245; as resource in inquiry, 21; robust, 66, 339; stable, 20, 257, 329; as standard of serious possibility, 21, 189, 335, 369
- belief-doubt model, 2–5, 6, 18, 332; as distinctively pragmatist, 37; as theory of belief change, 248
- Bohr, Niels, 76, 341
- boldness, 129, 158, 186, 338, 352
- Bovens, Luc, 168
- categorical matching, 133
- catharsis, 284
- certainty, 66, 169, 174, 338
- ceteris paribus* clause, 315
- chance, 111, 346; attribution of, 379; and conditionals, 113; and frequency, 114, 115; and propensity, 115, 117; as relative to kind of trial, 346
- cognitive limitation, 245, 250, 251, 368
- cognitive option, 157, 159
- commensuration requirement, 182
- commitment: definition of, 279; as promise to oneself, 270
- commitment-performance distinction, 2, 14–16, 251, 367, 371
- Comte, Auguste, 6
- conceptual framework, 7, 181
- conditional bet, 295
- conditioning, 100, 108
- confidence, 234; and high stakes, 235
- confirmational commitment, 106, 343, 345, 349
- consistency: logic of, 253. *See also* inconsistency
- contraction, 6, 83, 341; aim of, 190; maxichoice, 194, 204, 359, 360; mild, 195, 207, 359, 363; potential, 190, 204, 359; as a problem of rational choice, 12, 130, 189–92; saturatable, 192, 204, 359
- convexity, 88, 98, 103, 104, 105, 343

Cambridge University Press

0521845564 - Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi

Edited by Erik J. Olsson

Index

[More information](#)

- corrigibilism, 1, 6, 42, 65, 199, 336; and betting, 228
 counterfactual conditional:
 possible-world semantics for, 117;
 truth value of, 9
 Craig, Edward, 52
 credal coherence, 98
 cyclical preference, 299, 375, 377

 decision making, 235; with foresight, 296; Socratic approach to, 93; unified, 290, 376
 decision theory, 87, 88–89
 degree of belief, measuring, 97. *See also* probability
 Dewey, John, 14, 25, 256, 329, 367
 direct inference, 111, 119, 345
 disposition, 117, 346; acquisition of, 364; awareness of, 280; categorical basis of, 122; change of, 369; finkish, 319, 379; interpretation of, 279; metaphysics of, 324; mystery-raising, 371, 380; subconscious, 282, 372
 disposition predicate, 313, 378; as placeholder, 121, 315, 372, 378; in social science, 379
 doubt-belief model, *see* belief-doubt model
 Dutch book, 290, 376, 377; diachronic (dynamic), 219, 294–98; synchronic, 292–94

 E-admissibility, 88, 342
 Elster, Jon, 262, 317, 378, 379
 entrenchment, 352
 epistemic utility, 129, 158
 epistemic welfare, 61
 evidentiary value, 342
 exchangeability, 119
 expansion, 83, 129; deliberate, 146, 148, 184–89, 364; routine, 70, 146, 201, 333
 explanation, etiological vs. constitutive, 321

 fact-value distinction, 242, 255, 367
 fallibilism, 1, 6, 19, 65, 199, 257, 335, 336

 Feyerabend, Paul, 7
 Foley, Richard, 252
 foundationalism, 3, 259
 Frege, Gottlob, 77, 341, 351
 frequency principle, 112
 Freud, Sigmund, 283, 284, 286–87

 Hacking, Ian, 112
 hard choice, 95, 198
 Harper identity, 220
 Hawthorne, John, 168
 Hempel, Carl, 159
 Hintikka, Jaakko, 9
 homeostasis, 256
 Hume, David, 254

 idealization: as perfection, 241, 368; as simplification, 241, 367, 368
 illocutionary force, 237
 incommensurability, 7
 inconsistency, 70; avoiding, 340; benefits of, 73; deliberate expansion into, 84; routine expansion into, 70, 334
 induction, 146, 202; as relative to a question, 354
 infallibilism, *see* fallibilism
 inference: ampliative, 144; to the best explanation, 350; explicative, 144
 information: public sources of, 57; value of, 56
 informational value, 130, 158, 182, 204, 213; as autonomously theoretical, 365; components of, 138, 365; as constrained by weak monotonicity, 365; damped, 131, 192–98, 210, 361
 inquiry: aim of, 73, 180, 327; communal, 49, 176; framework for, 184; as goal-driven, 11; as promoting distinctively scientific values, 11; as question-driven, 173; as response to an indeterminate situation, 256; roadblocks of, 5–10, 41, 173
 intentionality, 269, 368, 370, 371
 intentional state: as commitment, 270, 372; as normative, 270, 372
 iterated belief change, 136, 153, 214–22, 353, 363

Cambridge University Press

0521845564 - Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi

Edited by Erik J. Olsson

Index

[More information](#)

- James, William, 180; on convergence, 35; on ethics, 28; on temperament, 44; on truth, 34, 39–41, 329, 331
- Jeffrey, Richard C., 127, 348–49
- justification of belief, 3, 21, 128, 139, 179, 199, 327, 335
- Kant, Immanuel, 268, 373
- Keynes, John Maynard, 97
- knower, social conception of, 358
- knowing how, 370
- knowledge, 180; attribution of, 52, 357; and betting, 227, 365; definition of, 249; economy of, 57, 63; first-order vs. second-order, 87; and high stakes, 226, 233, 365, 366; importance of, 233, 236; as justified true belief, 174, 357; problem-solving nature of, 18; public, 52, 59, 335; role in inquiry of, 176, 231, 233; social account of, 175, 358; statistical, 99; as true belief, 174; and willingness to act, 226
- Kripke, Saul, 270
- Kuhn, Thomas S., 7
- Kyburg, Henry E., 167, 168
- language acquisition, 258, 369
- law of large numbers, 118
- Levi identity, 182, 218
- Lewis, David, 9, 112
- liar paradox, 74
- logic: deontic, 244; higher order, 82; inductive, 112; paraconsistent, 71, 341; as restricted to matters of consistency, 98
- logical omniscience, 245, 365, 368, 373, 374
- lottery paradox, 126, 167, 354
- Lund school, *see* evidentiary value
- maximality, 342
- Messianic Realism, 4, 23, 331
- metaphysical possibility, 43
- money pump, 300
- moral commitment, 373
- neurosis, definition of, 285
- P-admissibility, 89, 342
- partial structure, 79
- pedigree epistemology, 3–4, 18, 176–77, 357, 364
- Peirce, Charles Sanders, 5, 6; on abduction, 144–45, 350; as advocating double standards of serious possibility, 13; on Cartesian epistemology, 2, 19; on the concept of truth, 24, 328; as corrigibilist, 336; on ethics, 25, 27; on induction, 165; as infallibilist, 336; on the limits of knowledge, 6; as a messianic realist, 23, 329, 337; on psychologism in logic, 351; on scientific method, 20, 26, 327; on the ultimate goal of inquiry, 328
- pessimistic induction, 6
- Plato, 87, 259
- Pople, Harry E., 149
- Popper, Karl, 292–94, 351
- potential answer, 147, 204, 353
- potential state of full belief, 7; join of, 7; meet of, 7
- potential surprise, 130, 133, 188, 352
- pragmatic argument, 289, 375
- pragmatism: as criterion of significance, 36; as theory of truth, 32
- prediction, of one's own choices, 259, 375
- principal principle, 112
- probability, 99, 125; based on known statistical facts, 99; indeterminate, 368; objective, 8, 99–100; partial order of, 97, 106; subjective, 8
- psychoanalysis, 266, 281, 371, 372
- Quine, Willard Van Orman, 14, 351
- Ramsey, Frank Plumpton, 97, 114, 253, 290
- Ramsey revision, 220
- Ramsey sentence, 324
- ranked probability measure, 141
- ranking function, 133, 209, 215, 348
- rationality: bounded, *see* cognitive limitation; instrumental conception of, 248; minimal, 374; naturalization of, 249

Cambridge University Press

0521845564 - Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi

Edited by Erik J. Olsson

Index

[More information](#)

- rationality principle: as immune from revision, 248; justification of, 248; pragmatic argument for, 289; significance of, 244, 250, 369
- recovery postulate, 136, 202, 206, 210
- reflection principle, 294
- reliabilism, 3, 55
- reliability, 53; of inconsistent theories, 72; reference class problem, 54, 334
- requirement of total evidence, 230
- residual hypothesis, 148
- residual shift, 131
- revision, 131
- risk, 88, 90, 230; communication of; epistemic, 91
- rule for ties, 188, 191, 195, 197, 361
- S-admissibility, 89, 342
- Salmon, Wesley, 321
- Schafer, Roy, 267
- Shackle, George L. S., 130, 133, 188, 348
- secular realism, 4, 22, 329
- self-criticism, 374
- self-knowledge, 266
- serious possibility, 12, 42, 68; double standard of, 332; and probability, 128; and scientific progress, 5; truth value of appraisals of, 9–10
- severe withdrawal, 196, 207, 359
- skepticism, Parmenidean, 137
- Skyrms, Brian, 296
- social epistemology, 61, 93
- Stickle, Mark E., 150
- stop-gap explanation, 314, 378, 379
- Strawson, Peter F., 273
- suspension of judgment, 7–8, 160, 205, 361
- technology, 283, 372
- therapy, 252, 364
- transference, 283
- truth: as absolute, 34; correspondence theory of, 51; at the End of Days, *see* Messianic Realism; in inquiry, 4–5, 32; as judged relative to the evolving doctrine, 328; logic of, 253; partial, 79; Tarski's definition of, 80
- ultimate partition, 147, 157, 181, 354; consensus about, 356; and informational value, 355–56
- uncertainty, 87
- unity of reason, 11–14, 157; and instinctive belief, 28; and standard of serious possibility, 12; structural, 12, 159
- urcorpus, 39
- utility function, 88
- V-admissibility, 376
- value, practical vs. theoretical, 11, 366
- value pluralism, 367
- van Fraassen, Bas, 295
- verdoppelte Metaphysik*, 9
- weak monotonicity, 205
- Williamson, Timothy, 227
- wisdom, 87
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 175, 177, 282, 358