Index

a posteriori, 181, 182, 208

a posteriori epistemology 208–12

a priori beliefs, 79

a priori justification, 179–200

basic a priori justification, 181, 185, 187–93

Bealer, George, 185

empiricism, 159, 193

Kant, Immanuel, 161, 188, 194

linguisticism, 199–200

modest account, 187

Plantinga, Alvin, 191, 192

purely intellectual experience, 184

rationalism, 193

reason as a source of justification, 184

strong account, 187–93

a priori knowledge, 179–200, 208–12

analytic, 179, 193–200

empiricism, 159, 193

rationalism, 193

synthetic, 193–200

abductive inference, 153

abductivist, 155

abominable conjunction, 148

acquaintance knowledge, 3

analytic, 179, 193–200

conceptual containment, 194

logical form, 196

logical truth, 196

property of sentences, 199

property of propositions, 199

vs. synthetic, 193–200

animal knowledge, 102–5, 129

vs. reflective knowledge, 102–5

Alston, William, 108

justified epistemic belief, 167

on epistemic circularity, 118–26

Amico, Robert, 163, 166

aptness, 85, 98, 101–7, 116, 117, 123, 125, 129

vs. justification, 98, 101–7, 116, 125

argument from error, 138–39

argument from ignorance, 139–43

Aristotle, 9

autonomous, 212–15

axiom, 186–88

axiomatic, 186–87

Augustine, St., 163–65

basic a priori justification, 181, 185, 187–93

axiom, 186–88

axiomatic, 186–87

certain, 187–93

indefeasible, 188

modest account, 187

strong account, 187–93

vs. nonbasic a priori justification, 181

basic belief, 45–50, 73–80, 88, 120–21, 146, 180–81

nonbasic, 45

basic virtues, 128

Bealer, George, 185

belief, 2, 7–9

dispositional, 8–9

occurent, 8–9

propositional attitude, 8

belief dependent process, 87–88

belief independent process, 87–88

Blanshard, Brand, 12

Bishop Berkeley, 155

BonJour, Laurence, 61–62, 75–80, 92, 94, 109

criticism of particularism, 169–70

dilemma of nondoxastic justification, 62–63

bootstrapping, 126, 127

Butchvarov, Panayot, 176–77

causal approach, 37–41

certainty, 134–36, 187–93

certainty argument, 134–36

Chisholm, Roderick, 158–66, 169–78

problem of the criterion, 158–78

classical foundationalism, 51–55, 59–61, 193, 203, 215

cognitive mental state, 62–63

cognitively spontaneous, 54

coherence theory of justification, 49–50, 66–84, 109, 110, 115, 203, 215

a priori justification, 183–84

doxastic theory of justification, 68

holistic conception of justification, 49

isolation argument, 80–82

coherence, 66–70, 101–4, 116, 126, 129

explanatory connections, 69

mutually supporting, 50

negative 67

positive 67

common sense judgments, 170–76

common sense particularism, 162, 169, 171, 172

conceptually contained, 194

conditionally reliable process, 88

contextualism, 149–52

contextualist response, 149–52

criteria of knowledge, 161

Darwinian argument, 204–7

defeasibility approach, 31–37

defeat, 19–21, 34–37

justificational, 34–37

factual, 34–37

Descartes, René, 13, 51–52, 133, 164–65

descriptive properties, 212–15

dilemma of nondoxastic justification, 62–63

dogmatic, 176–77

doxastic source of justification, 59

doxastic theory of justification, 68

empirical thesis, 208–12

empiricism, 159, 193

a posteriori, 181, 182, 208

a priori justification, 179–200

vs. rationalism, 193

epistemic circularity, 117–19

Alston, William, 118–26

Fumerton, Richard, 118

logically circular, 119

problem of Roxanne, 126–30

Reid, Thomas, 118

Sosa, Ernest, 124–26, 128–30

track record argument, 118–24

Vogel, Jonathan, 126–28

epistemic justification, 13–7, 108–17

a priori justification, 179–200

coherence theory of justification, 49–50, 66–84, 109, 110, 115, 203, 215

evaluative property, 57–58, 63, 166–69

evidence, 17–21, 113

externalism, 108–17, 210

foundationalism, 44–65, 73–84, 88

holistic conception of, 49

internalism, 108–17

justifying a proposition, 14, 73–75

linear conception of, 49

reliabilism, 85–90, 110, 115, 203, 210

skepticism about, 131

well-founded, 16–17

epistemic knowledge, 160

epistemic property, 212–15

epistemically responsible, 110–13

ethics, 217

ethical naturalism, 213

evaluative property, 57–58, 63, 166–69, 202, 203, 215

supervenience, 57–58, 166–69, 212, 214–15

evaluative question, 204–7

evidence, 17–21, 113

conclusive evidence, 17–19

defeat, 19–21

inconclusive, 18

nonconclusive, 18–19, 24

total, 19

experience, 182–93

purely intellectual experience, 184

noncognitive mental state, 62–63

nondoxastic experience, 59–65, 73–75, 88, 109

externalism, 108–17, 210

vs. internalism, 108–17

factual defeat, 34–37

Feldman, Richard, 33–34, 71–72, 203

foundationalism, 44–65, 73–84, 88

classical, 51–55, 59–61, 193, 203, 215

dilemma of nondoxastic justification, 62–63

givenist, 88, 109, 110, 115, 123

modest, 55–56, 59–61, 160, 193

nondoxastic source of justification, 59–61

regress argument, 47–50

scatter problem, 64, 65

two main theses, 47

Frege, Gottlob, 191, 196

Fumerton, Richard, 118

generality problem, 92–94, 105–7

Gettier, Edmund, 22, 23

Gettier’s counter-examples, 23–27

Gettier problem, 22–27, 210

no false grounds approach, 27–31

defeasibility approach, 31–37

causal approach, 37–41

givenist foundationalism, 88, 109, 110, 115, 123

global skepticism, 132

Goldman, Alvin, 38–41, 85–90, 93–98, 216–18

Hare, R. M., 166–67

hedonistic utilitarianism, 161

holistic conception of justification, 49

Hume, David, 159

immediately justified belief, 45

inconclusive evidence, 18

indefeasible, 188, 190–93

infallible, 51–53, 82, 87, 136–37, 193

infallibility argument, 136–37

inference to the best explanation, 153–57

inference to the best explanation response, 152–57

Lipton, Peter, 154, 155

Russell, Bertrand, 154

intellectual virtues, 98–107, 113, 116, 123, 125

internalism, 108–17

epistemically responsible, 110–13

vs. externalism, 108–17

isolation argument, 80–82

James, William, 11

JTB account of knowledge, 7, 13, 23, 24

justificational defeat, 34–37

Kant, Immanuel, 161, 188, 194

a priori knowledge, 181–82

analytic, 194

Kim, Jaegwon, 203

knowledge, 2–7, 116

a priori knowledge, 179–200, 208–12

acquaintance, 3

animal knowledge, 102–5, 129

causal approach, 37–41

defeasibility approach, 31–37

epistemic knowledge, 160

Gettier’s counter-examples, 23–27

“how to,” 4–5

JTB account, 7, 13, 23, 24

no false grounds approach, 27–31

propositional, 2–7

reflective knowledge, 102–5

skepticism about, 131

Kornblith, Hilary, 204–7

Darwinian argument, 204–7

Leibniz, G. W., 180

linear conception of justification, 49

limited naturalism, 215–18

linguisticism, 199–200

Lipton, Peter, 154, 155

inference to the best explanation response, 152–57

local skepticism, 132

Locke, John, 159

logically circular, 119

logical consistency, 68

logical form, 196

logical truth, 196

Maffie, James, 208, 212–14

Magoo, Mr. 125

Matrix, The, 51

maximally justified, 134, 188

metaphysical continuity, 212–15

methodism, 158–69

objection from supervenience, 166–69

problem of the criterion, 158–78

vs. particularism, 158–78

Mill, John Stuart, 167

modest account of a priori justification, 187

modest foundationalism, 55–56, 59–61, 160, 193

Moore, G. E., 143–47, 159, 162, 169–73, 212

response to skepticism, 145, 151

Moore’s counterargument, 145, 151

Moser, Paul, 170–76

mutually supporting, 50

natural facts, 213–15

naturalized epistemology, 201–18

a posteriori epistemology, 208–12

Darwinian argument, 204–7

empirical thesis, 208–12

ethical naturalism, 213

limited naturalism, 215–18

Kornblith, Hilary, 204–7

Maffie, James, 208, 212–14

metaphysical continuity, 212–15

normative epistemology, 203

replacement thesis, 203–7

Quine, W. V., 201–3, 208

neighborhood reliabilism, 126

new evil demon problem, 91–92, 95–96, 104

no false grounds approach, 27–31

noncognitive mental state, 62–63

nonconclusive evidence, 18–19, 24

nondoxastic experience, 59–65, 73–75, 88, 109

dilemma of nondoxastic justification, 62–63

experience, 182–93

purely intellectual experience, 184

noncognitive mental state, 62–63

nondoxastic source of justification, 59–61

normal world chauvinism, 95–96

normative epistemology, 203

normative questions, 216

objection from supervenience, 166–69

particular epistemic proposition, 160, 165, 172

particularism, 158–78

common sense particularism, 162, 169, 171, 172

dogmatic, 176–77

objection from supervenience, 166–69

problem of the criterion, 158–78

question-begging, 173–76

Plantinga, Alvin, 191, 192

Plato, 1, 43

practical rationality, 121–24

prima facie principles, 161

principle of deductive closure, 24–26

principle of exclusion, 139–40, 147–49

problem of Roxanne, 126–30

problem of the criterion, 158–78

Amico, Robert, 163, 166

BonJour, Laurence, 169–70

Butchvarov, Panayot, 176–77

Chisholm, Roderick, 158–66, 169–78

common sense particularism, 162, 169, 171, 172

criteria of knowledge, 161

dogmatic, 176–77

Moser, Paul, 170–76

methodism, 158–69

objection from supervenience, 166–69

particular epistemic proposition, 160, 165, 172

particularism, 158–78

prima facie principles, 161

question-begging, 173–76

problem of unknown reliability, 92, 94–95, 104–5

process tokens, 87

process types, 87

property identity, 213

proposition, 8, 10

propositional attitude, 8

propositional knowledge, 2–7

psychology, 201–12, 216–18

purely intellectual experience, 184

question-begging, 173–76

Quine, W. V., 201–3, 208

rationalism, 193

a posteriori, 181, 182, 208

a priori justification, 179–200

vs. empiricism, 159, 193

reason as a source of justification, 184

reflective knowledge, 102–5

vs. animal knowledge, 102–5, 129

regress argument, 47–50

Reid, Thomas, 118, 159, 162, 180, 191–92

Testimonial defeat of a priori justification, 191–92

relevant alternatives, 147–49

relevant alternatives response, 147–49

reliabilism, 85–90, 110, 115, 203, 210

a priori justification, 184

generality problem, 92–94, 105–7

Goldman, Alvin, 85–90, 93–98

neighborhood reliabilism, 126

new evil demon problem, 91–92, 95–96, 104

normal world chauvinism, 95–96

problem of Roxanne, 126–30

problem of unknown reliability, 92, 94–95, 104–5

process tokens, 87

process types, 87

strongly justified, 96–98

weakly justified, 96–98, 104

replacement thesis, 203–7

Russell, Bertrand, 154, 189, 191

scatter problem, 64, 65

Schmitt, Frederick, 94

sensitivity, 139–40

sensitivity requirement on knowledge, 142–43

skepticism, 131–62

about knowledge, 131

about justification, 131

argument from error, 138–39

argument from ignorance, 139–43

certainty argument, 134–36

contextualist response, 149–52

global, 132

infallibility argument, 136–37

inference to the best explanation response, 152–57

local, 132

Moore’s counterargument, 145, 151

relevant alternatives response, 147–49

sensitivity requirement on knowledge, 142–43

Sosa, Ernest, 98–108, 113–14, 116, 124–26, 128–30

animal knowledge, 102–5, 129

aptness, 85, 98, 101–7, 116, 117, 123, 125, 129

epistemic circularity, 124–26

justification, 98, 101–7, 116, 125

reflective knowledge, 102–5

virtue epistemology, 98–107, 115, 130

Steup, Matthias, 18–19, 34, 109, 190–91

justificational defeat, 34–37

factual defeat, 34–37

strong account of a priori justification, 187–93

strongly justified, 96–98

Superman, 64, 100

subjunctive conditional, 32

substitution instance, 196

supervene, 57–58, 166–69, 212, 214–15

evaluative property, 57–58, 63, 166–69, 202, 203, 215

objection from supervenience, 166–69

property identity, 213

synthetic, 193–200

vs. analytic, 193–200

Tienson, John, 137–38

total evidence, 19

track record argument, 118–24

truth, 9–10, 199–200

Aristotle, 9

Blanshard, Brand, 12

coherence theory, 12–13

correspondence theory, 9–10

James, William, 11

JTB account of knowledge, 7, 13

logical truth, 196

pragmatic theory, 10–12

unanalyzable, 196

Vogel, Jonathan, 126–28

problem of Roxanne, 126–30

virtue epistemology, 85, 98–107, 115, 130

aptness, 85, 98, 101–7, 116, 117, 123, 125, 129

intellectual virtues, 98–107, 113, 116, 123, 125

justification, 98, 101–7, 116, 125

Sosa, Ernest, 98–108, 113–14, 116

weakly justified, 96–98, 104