Ethics Done Right

Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory

*Ethics Done Right* examines how practical reasoning can be put into the service of ethical and moral theory. Elijah Millgram shows that the key to thinking about ethics is to understand more generally how to make decisions. The papers in this volume support a methodological approach and trace the connections between two kinds of theory in utilitarianism, in Kantian ethics, in virtue ethics, in Hume’s moral philosophy, and in moral particularism. Unlike other studies of ethics, *Ethics Done Right* does not advocate a particular moral theory. Rather, it offers a tool that enables one to decide for oneself.

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For (and against) John Rawls
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