Introduction

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Muslim societies since 1800 have been influenced by two developments of the first importance. First, the Islamic world system, which from its emergence had walked hand in hand with power, came to be dominated by forces from the West. This domination, moreover, was not just one of conquest and rule; there came with it economic, social, intellectual and political forces of great transformative power. Second, every Muslim society came to be animated by movements of Islamic revival and reform. These movements took different shapes according to the circumstances of the societies in which they flourished. By the end of the twentieth century the programmes of these movements were distinctive features in the lives of most societies and the defining features of some. From the outset it should be clear that the roots of religious reform lie deep in the pre-modern history of Muslim societies, that aspects of the movement were already manifest in the eighteenth century and that their prime purpose was inner renewal. However, the period of Western dominance gave urgency and extra purpose to these movements. From context to context there were different interplays between Western power and manifestations of Islamic revival. As time went by Western understandings of Muslim societies came increasingly to be coloured by their experience of the revival. In the same way movements of revival were both shaped by the contact with the West and energised by their resistance to it.

The onset of Western power in Muslim lands was swift and often brutal. The symbolic beginning was Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in June 1798. In fact, Muslim power had been on the retreat from at least 12 September 1683, when the Ottoman forces besieging Vienna had been ordered to retreat, never to return. Since then there had been a slow erosion of power on the margins of their world: the Dutch had gained a substantial foothold in island South-East Asia, the British in India, the Russians in the Crimea, the Habsburgs in the Balkans. But 1798 was the moment when Europe asserted itself in the central Islamic lands for the first time since the Crusades, and

did so with armies bearing the banners of reason, nationalism and state power.

Within three years the British and the Ottomans had driven the French from Egypt. But this did not in any way impair the rapid movement of European power into Muslim lands. In 1800 the Dutch government took over from its East India Company in island South-East Asia and spread its authority throughout the Archipelago until the process was completed by the end of the Aceh War in 1912. In India, in 1799, the British defeated the last major independent Muslim power in Mysore. By 1818 they were acknowledged as the paramount power in the subcontinent, keeping the descendants of the Mughal emperors virtual prisoners in Delhi. By 1858, after sacking the old Mughal capital in the suppression of the Mutiny Uprising, they ruled all India, either directly or indirectly.

The strategic demands of British India meant further British expansion into Muslim lands. The Afghans, fortunate in their terrain, their warlike habits and their position as a buffer between British India and tsarist Russia, succeeded in preserving their freedom. In the Gulf, however, British influence steadily grew, as it did in southern Iran and along Arabia's southern shore. The completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 and European competition for power led to British domination of the Nile Valley. In 1882 they occupied Egypt, which led in 1898 to the establishment of a condominium with the Egyptians over the Sudan, in which the British held effective authority. On the western shores of the Indian Ocean they shared out the considerable possessions of the sultans of Zanzibar with Germany and Italy. On the eastern shores they had from the 1870s begun to assert their hegemony over the sultans of the Malay states.

At the same time tsarist Russia spread southwards and eastwards to absorb its Muslim neighbours. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Russia pressed forward in the Caucasus, conquering the Iranian territory of northern Azerbaijan. By 1864, after a bloody struggle for Daghistan, the whole region was occupied. In Central Asia the lands of the Kazakhs were secured by 1854, the khanate of Kokand by 1873, the lands of the Turkomans by 1885 and those of the Tajiks by 1895; protectorates were established over the ancient khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. After the Russian Revolution all became Soviet republics.

The French advance into North and West Africa was no less dramatic, and was accompanied in some areas, as the Russian one had been, by a great influx of European settlers. In 1830 they invaded Algeria; in 1881 they declared Tunisia a protectorate and in 1912 Morocco. The first two were the main

focus of French settlement. By 1912 they had also expanded from Senegal eastwards across the savannah lands to the borders of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, subduing a string of Muslim states, several of which owed their origins to the Muslim revival. Only the British, who drew the sultanate of Sokoto into their main West African colony of Nigeria, also ruled large numbers of Muslims in the region. Other European powers picked up what crumbs they could; in 1912, for instance, Spain asserted a protectorate over the northern tip of Morocco, and Italy conquered Libya. By the outbreak of the First World War all the Muslims of Africa, except those in Ethiopia, were under European rule.

The Ottoman Empire was not exempt from the surging tide of European power. Through the nineteenth century European powers steadily put more and more pressure on the empire's Balkan territories as they annexed a piece of land here and competed for influence there. The outcome was that the Christian peoples of the Balkans – Greeks, Serbians, Romanians, Bulgarians, supported by one European power or another – threw off Ottoman rule and brought the sizeable Muslim populations of the region beneath their sway. By the First World War only the rump of Rumelia remained of the empire's European territories. The war itself saw the Arab peoples of the empire also fall under European rule as the British, with Arab help, drove Ottoman forces in the Fertile Crescent back into Anatolia, and divided the spoils with their French allies. By 1920 the Ottomans, whose subjects were now mainly Turks, were fighting to hold on to their Anatolian heartland, which the Europeans proposed to dismember, seizing chunks for themselves and creating a Greek Christian province in the west and an Armenian Christian state in the east.

In a mere 120 years or so almost all the Muslim peoples of the world had fallen under European rule.[1] Only the Muslims of Afghanistan, the Yemen and central Arabia could pretend to real independence; those of Iran had one qualified by the division of their country into Russian and British spheres of influence. Great cities – Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Samarqand, Delhi – all redolent of the changing phases of Muslim glory and achievement, were now subject to European authority. Muslim peoples were in the hands of their European masters. But worse was to come. In 1924 the caliphate was abolished: not an act of European power, but of Mustafa Kemal, as he sought to bring a secular focus and new strength to the fledgling Turkish Republic. In

1 While the master narrative is one of Western advance, in areas beyond Western control Muslim communities were coming to feel the weight of alien rule, for instance, the Uyghurs of China's Xinjiang and the Muslims of Buddhist Thailand.

one sense this meant little; the office of caliph had long been divorced of any real sense of power and leadership of the Muslim community. But in another sense it symbolised much; its demise meant the breaking of a link that reached back to the time of the Prophet Muḥammad and which spoke of how successful, until recently, the community had been.

The period from the post-First World War settlement to the 1960s saw most Muslim societies achieve freedom from European rule. First, the two peoples whose freedom was threatened by the designs of European imperialism, the Turks and the Iranians, succeeded in asserting their independence. The Ottomans under the remarkable leadership of Mustafa Kemal drove all foreign armies out of Anatolia and established a modern Turkish nation-state. In Iran the Cossack Brigade officer Reza Shāh Pahlavi followed in his wake, enabling Iran to loosen the bonds of imperial control fashioned in the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919. The limitations of his achievement, however, were demonstrated when in the Second World War both Britain and Russia were able to reassert their interests in the country. The two decades following this war saw the bulk of Muslim peoples gain their independence. In 1947 this was the fortune of one quarter of the world's Muslims when, amidst appalling slaughter of Muslims by Hindus and Sikhs, and of Hindus and Sikhs by Muslims, British India achieved independence as the sovereign states of India and Pakistan. In 1949 Indonesia emerged from Dutch rule to become, after Pakistan split into Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971, the world's most populous Muslim state. In 1957 the Malay states followed suit from British rule, becoming Malaysia in 1963. Between 1946 and 1958 it was the turn of Egypt, Libya, the Sudan and the Arab states of West Asia, which colonial power interacting with local forces had forged from the former Ottoman territories. Only the peoples of Palestine, Christians of course as well as Muslims, failed to share in the new world of infant nation-states, as Zionist settlers, whose ambition to found a homeland had been endorsed by the Balfour Declaration of 1917, forced the creation of a Jewish state in 1948. In the late 1950s and 1960s the Muslim peoples of North, West and East Africa gained their freedom, along with those of the southern Arabian shore and the Gulf. This left the Muslim peoples under Soviet rule as the last remaining group of significant numbers without their freedom. This they gained in the early 1990s.

Freedom from European rule, however, did not bring freedom from Western power. As they gained their freedom many Muslim states, particularly in the central Islamic lands, found themselves entangled in the Cold War rivalries of the Great Powers. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan became part of what was known as the 'northern tier' of defence against the expansionism of

the Soviet Union. Pakistan's generals in 1958 would keep Washington closely informed of their intention to launch a coup.[2] Arab socialist republics, on the other hand – Egypt, Syria and Iraq – allied themselves with the Soviet Union; for a time it seemed the better way of asserting their independence and gaining some extra strength in confronting Israel. There were significant interventions, or attempted interventions, in the affairs of Muslim societies: the Anglo-American overthrow of Mosaddegh's regime in Iran in 1953, which arguably held back the growth of democracy for decades; the inglorious Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956 to secure the Canal Zone, which was the last 'hurrah' of the old European imperial powers; in 1958 the USA sent troops to the Lebanon and the British to Jordan with the aim of stemming the onward march of Arab nationalism; in 1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, leading to resistance organised by the USA, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, among others, which had a considerable impact on Muslim lives from Central Asia, through Afghanistan and Pakistan to Kashmir; from 1982 there was the substantial support which the USA, the USSR and France, in particular, gave to Iraq in its eight-year war with Iran; in 1983 and 1984 there was the intervention of the USA in the Lebanon which was supposed to hold back the advance of Syrian, and therefore also Soviet, influence.

From the 1990s the USA was the hegemonic power in the Muslim world. Russia imposed its will in its backyard most notably and with brutal force on the Chechens of the Caucasus. Elsewhere the 'new world order' was decreed by the USA. It forced the Indonesians out of their rule of Christian East Timor. Very belatedly, although here British foot-dragging bears a heavy responsibility, it delivered aid to assist the Muslim Bosnians in resisting ethnic cleansing by the Christian Serbs.[3] With greater expedition it used massive force to relieve the Kosovan Muslims from Serbian oppression. Various states stood up to the hegemonic ambitions of the USA, among them Libya, the Sudan, Syria and Iran; indeed, the continuing capacity of the Islamic Republic of Iran to resist American pressure has demonstrated the greater strength of the revolutionary regime in the face of outside forces as compared with the Qājār and Pahlavi regimes that preceded it. All have been warned; they have been designated 'states of concern'. In two cases, one an organisation, the other a state, active opposition to the hegemonic will led to awesome displays of American power. From the early 1990s Osama Bin Laden's al-Qā'ida

2 Ayesha Jalal, *The state of martial rule: The origins of Pakistan's political economy of defence* (Cambridge, 1990), p. 275.
3 Brendan Simms, *Unfinest hour: Britain and the destruction of Bosnia* (London, 2001).

al-Sulbah (The solid base) organisation conducted a series of assaults on symbols of American power, culminating on 11 September 2001 in the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. In the autumn of 2001 the USA responded by destroying the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which sheltered Bin Laden. In 1990 Saddam Hussein of Iraq invaded Kuwait. The immediate response was the destruction of Saddam's invading force by Western armies in the first Gulf War, the establishment of a major American military presence in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, action throughout the 1990s to contain Iraq, which led, when those containment measures appeared to be weakening, to an Anglo-American invasion of the country in the spring of 2003 and to the destruction of its Ba'thist regime. A Muslim of historical bent might reflect that, some 205 years after the French entered Cairo, the West was playing the same old game in Baghdad; forcing its way into a major capital city of the Muslim world and claiming that it was bringing freedom and enlightenment to the people.

Nothing has more constantly reminded Muslims of the power of outside forces in their lives than the existence and the policies of the state of Israel. They know that the process of Zionist settlement in Palestine would not have been successful without British support, however qualified. They know that the emergence from the mid-1950s of Israel as a major power in West Asia would not have been possible without the unstinting material and political support of the West. They know that Israelis have only been able to achieve their colonial settlement of Arab lands seized in the war of 1967, and in breach of international law, because of American support. They know, too, that Israel has treated Palestinians with scant justice and much brutal force – though no more brutal than that deployed by many Muslim regimes – with the assurance of American support. For many Muslims the injustices meted out to the Palestinians symbolise both the injustices many experience in their own lives and their own impotence in the face of overwhelming power. In the twenty-first century Muslims know that the power of the West to intervene in their world in pursuit of its ends is greater than ever it was in the nineteenth.

The growing power of the West in the Muslim world meant much more than the capacity to dictate the boundaries of states or the lifespans of regimes. It transformed many of the structures of Muslim societies, as it has those of societies throughout the globe. The economies of Muslim societies came to be integrated into a global economy, driven by the industrial revolutions of the West, with their continuous processes of scientific and technological innovation. Whether it was in the plantations of South-East

Asia, the cotton fields of Egypt or the oilfields of the Middle East, whole new worlds of production and exchange were created which overshadowed those of peasant husbandry, handicraft production and the bazaar – the communal solidarities they had bred and the Islamic institutions that had rested upon them for centuries. No new physical presence signalled the changes taking place more dramatically than the new Western-style cities, which more often than not grew up alongside the old ones, and which brought a new world of broad streets, glass-fronted shops, public clocks for the precise regulation of time and suburban hinterlands of slums, flats and villas.

Forms of the modern state were introduced, either during the period of colonial rule or as part of an attempt to keep the Europeans out. Powered by ever-growing bureaucracies, such states were increasingly concerned to reach down to individual citizens, direct them towards their purposes, and make them focus their first loyalty upon the state. Such states were likely to be intolerant of tribal and other competing sources of allegiance. Their relationship with the '*ulamā*', and others concerned to focus Muslim energies on godly ends, was likely to be more strained than previously in Islamic history. Western knowledge, which seemed to be a key source of Western power, increasingly came to be used in Muslim societies. It was needed to run the modern economy and modern state; it was particularly needed to enable Muslim societies to strive to keep up with the West and to be strong enough to look after themselves in an age of Western domination. Inevitably, the great traditions of *madrasa* learning came to be pushed to one side, as were the attitudes that pervaded the *madrasa*. No longer was the search for knowledge primarily a process of trying to discover and preserve all that one could learn from an age of past perfection. Now the emphasis was on innovation, the discovery of new ideas, new facts, new processes and the testing of all old knowledge in the light of new understandings.

New elites formed to run the new economic and political structures: bankers, traders, commercial farmers, industrial workers, bureaucrats, soldiers, politicians, intellectuals, journalists. All embraced the new knowledge to the extent that they needed it. Some were educated in the languages of Europe: English, French, Dutch, German, Russian. Many became divorced from their heritage of learning, and sought to understand it primarily through Western sources. Even those who did come to lead the cultural resistance to the West often drew on its wisdom to make their case. Thus, the thought of Muḥammad Iqbāl, poet-philosopher of the Pakistan movements, owed much to that of Nietzsche, Bergson and Renan, and that of 'Alī Sharī'atī, who prepared the Western-educated young for the Iranian revolution, to Sartre,

Fanon and Massignon. This was the case, moreover, even for the founding fathers of Islamism for whom the preservation of Islamic cultural authenticity meant so much. Sayyid Quṭb, the leader of the second stage in the development of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (Ikwān al-Muslimīn), was profoundly influenced by the French fascist thinker and Nobel Prize-winning biologist Alexis Carrel; Mawlānā Mawdūdī, the creator of the subcontinent's Jamā'at-i Islāmī, was deeply read in Western thought, from Plato, through Darwin and Marx, to George Bernard Shaw.

Through these new elites, as well as through the education systems of the colonial states and their successors, ideas derived from the European Enlightenment came increasingly to circulate in Muslim societies. There was a growth in the scientific mentality and the idea that knowledge should be tested against the advances of scientific discovery, a process that was likely to disenchant the world and threaten the supremacy which could be claimed for God. There were the outcomes of the great Enlightenment political achievements of the American and French revolutions with their emphasis on the rights of man, the political freedom of individuals and the sovereignty of the people as the source of state power. In the twentieth century there was the considerable influence of socialist thought among secular elites, attracted by its critique of Western capitalism, its apparently 'progressive' nature and its proposal of a secular communitarian ethic instead of the Islamic one. For much of the twentieth century Muslim elites drew on aspects of these ideas as they strove to free themselves from Western dominance. On achieving independence command economies were often adopted to limit the economic impact of the West.

Crucial to the spread of knowledge of Europe – indeed, of all forms of knowledge in Muslim societies – was the sustained adoption from the nineteenth century of print. Muslims had known about the printing-press for 300 years, but its adoption had been resisted for a range of reasons, among them a shrewd understanding of its potential impact on the authority of religious and political leadership. From the nineteenth century, however, Muslim elites began to use the press with vigour. Muslim states saw its potential for building up state power; other Muslims saw its potential in supporting either their struggles for power within society or the campaigns to overthrow colonial rule. Lithographic printing became a major new activity for the artisans of towns and cities, and printed matter – books in particular – an important new trade for the Muslim world. The growth of the newspaper industry was of great importance. In part this was because it created a new public space in which ideas could be transmitted and discussed, but in part

too, and especially after the introduction of the telegraph in the second half of the century, because it increasingly integrated Muslims into a global world of shared news and information – though not, of course, of shared perception. From the mid-nineteenth century the press led the expansion of the horizon of Muslim minds. If at first they were focused on the doings of their courts or governments, by the early twentieth century they readily embraced the Muslim world, and after the First World War were developing a global reach from Japan and China through Europe to the Americas.[4]

From the second half of the twentieth century, and particularly from the 1970s, the pressures of Western capitalism and Western culture became increasingly intense. The increase in pressure was initiated from within the Islamic world. The great oil-price rise of 1973, which was engineered through OPEC (Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries), brought much new wealth to the Muslim oil-producing countries, at least some of which spread more widely through the Muslim world as the oil-producing economies sought labour and bought influence. Growing numbers of Muslims engaged with Western consumerism. The major change, however, came with the Thatcher/Reagan market revolution in the West, which cut public spending, privatised nationalised industries, freed financial services and deregulated foreign-exchange markets. This 'capitalist revival', as it has been called, transformed the conditions for economic success so that they no longer lay in manufacturing production but in the financing and marketing of goods and services. This process was boosted first of all by the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the removal of both an alternative economic model and a restraint on Western capitalism. It was also boosted by the way in which the major Western powers used the institutions of global economic governance such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank, etc., to impose their vision of good practice on the weaker economies of the world. Indebtedness made Muslim economies, along with other weaker ones, susceptible to being restructured on Western terms. Towards the end of the twentieth century Muslim societies were increasingly facing the choice of either liberalising their economies, with the huge risks of economic, social and political instability that such action would involve, or of falling further and further behind the economic development of much of the rest of the world.[5]

4 Francis Robinson, 'Islam and the impact of print in South Asia', in Francis Robinson, *Islam and Muslim history in South Asia* (Delhi, 2000), pp. 66–104.
5 Simon W. Murden, *Islam, the Middle East, and the new global hegemony* (Boulder, 2002).

In the case of Western ideas and culture, in particular its consumerist culture, influences were pouring into Muslim societies in ever-increasing quantities. Increased trade, travel and tourism played a role in this, but of major importance were the internet and satellite television. The former provides access to an extraordinary panoply of representations of humanity and human interests in institutional and individual form, while at the same time enabling Muslims to interact with the world of Muslim ideas and organisations as never before. The latter was bound to have an attraction in environments in which the media were often exposed to state control and censorship. Nevertheless, the satellite channels were dominated by news gathered by Western news corporations and edited to suit Western agendas and by entertainment in large part generated in the West and projecting individualism, consumerism, sanitised violence and female liberation. Muslim states, however repressive, have had difficulty in restricting access. Individual Muslims have been enabled to interact with the West as never before.

Western domination set Muslim societies major challenges. At first they did not seem to demand a fundamental transformation of the way in which Muslims thought and lived. Indeed, in the early stages of colonial rule Europeans often adapted themselves to the societies to which they had come, learning their languages, using their systems of law and marrying their women. But as Western power grew, the fundamental nature of its challenges became clearer. There was the challenge of defeat. How was it that the Muslim community, which the Qur'ān described as the 'greatest nation raised up for mankind' and which had been throughout its history an expanding and dominant force, had come to be subjected to the power of the West? There were the challenges posed by Western science and philosophy to God, His relationship to nature and to man, and to the life hereafter. There were the challenges from capitalism and Enlightenment values to aspects of the organisation of Muslim society on which the Qur'ān had ruled precisely. European capitalism challenged the Qur'ānic prohibition on taking interest; the new European commitment to the rights of man challenged the Qur'ānic acceptance of slavery; while the new European belief in the equality of all human souls challenged the inferior position that the Qur'ān seemed to have designated for women.[6]

The greatest challenge, however, came at the level of the state. The modern state seemed to be the prime source of Western strength. It was aspects of this state that Muslims introduced to make themselves strong enough to keep the

6 W. G. Clarence-Smith, *Islam and the abolition of slavery* (Oxford, 2006).