INTRODUCTION

'Australia is the best country in the world.' When people feel strongly about something, they often express themselves by making a comparative claim, but usually without taking the comparison seriously. Every country seems to invent myths about its own uniqueness ('Australia is the most egalitarian country in the world'), myths typically based on an ignorance of others. Mostly such casual comparisons flatter the country they are describing. More occasionally they indulge in self-flagellation ('Australia is the most over-governed country in the world, with the world's worst politicians') or express a cultural cringe ('We are always ten years behind America').

This book makes comparison its central purpose. It systematically compares Australia with 17 other countries, all affluent and stable liberal democracies, on a wide range of important social, economic and political phenomena.

Moreover, it seeks, whenever possible, not just to make snapshot comparisons from the present but to chart trends. While there is value in presenting comparisons frozen at a single point of time, it is more instructive to trace common or contrasting trajectories; whether all these countries are experiencing greater unemployment, increased health spending, rising crime rates and so on. There is an industry of politicians, journalists and market analysts devoted to intensively reporting short-term changes and sometimes exaggerating their significance. There is much less public effort devoted to analysing the medium and long term.

This book aims to go beyond the myopic preoccupation with the present that marks political controversies and most journalism to examine trends over the last decades and where possible, even longer. Such a procedure allows us more perspective on the extent (and sometimes the limits) of the change we have already experienced. More cautiously, it gives us some, though a very imperfect, basis for considering future developments. The future is rarely a simple extrapolation from the past, but charting secular trends is one tool for projecting future scenarios, and hence for planning and making policy decisions that will give societies a greater mastery of their destiny.

The 18 countries chosen all share central socio-economic characteristics. All have conquered, at least for the majority of their populations, the basic struggle for life, so that the average life expectancy in them all is at least 75 years. The bulk of their populations has access to sufficient nutrition, safe drinking water and adequate shelter. All have close to 100% basic literacy. All are among the most affluent societies in the world. All have capitalist mixed economies, with a strong public sector. All have been stable liberal democracies since at least the late 1940s, with constitutionally governed, largely non-violent political competition with different parties alternating in power while central institutions remain stable, and where the government is by some minimal criteria representative and publicly accountable. In addition a further condition of minimum size was imposed: that the countries have populations of at least 3 million. This criterion excluded Iceland (population 270 000) and Luxembourg (418 000), which otherwise would have been included.

The comparative strategy chosen for this book can be labelled bounded comparison, selecting a fairly large range of countries with sufficiently similar political, economic and social characteristics to make comparison illuminating. This of course does not mean these countries are identical with Australia. (It is a common fallacy for people to say two situations are not comparable when they mean they are not identical.) Rather it means that the similarities are sufficient to make the pattern of commonalities and contrasts interesting, and to illuminate policy choices and institutional differences.

Why compare? Comparison serves three major purposes. First, it helps us to see ourselves more clearly. As Rudyard Kipling wrote a century ago, albeit in a somewhat different spirit, what do they know of England who

only England know? In social science terms it allows us to delineate the individual case more precisely, to make explicit what might otherwise have remained unexamined. What we imagine to be unique may be common to many societies, while what we take for granted as the natural or only way of doing things may in fact be unusual or even unique.

Second, comparison expands our universe of possibilities. It increases our knowledge that there are alternatives – alternative policies, different institutional arrangements, contrasting cultural assumptions. Most policy discussions take place within a restricted frame of reference. Domestic contention tends to focus on our hopeless politicians, obstructive trade unions or rapacious corporations, looking only inward when looking outwards can suggest policy and social alternatives beyond the framework within which domestic politicians are casting the problem. Equally, while the focus of comparison tends to concentrate on differences and contrasts, commonalities are often just as important and interesting. When trends and problems are broadly shared among a number of countries the causes are unlikely to be solely home-grown.

Third, comparison is the social scientist's substitute for the experiment. We cannot subject whole societies to experimental testing, so disciplined comparison is our means for testing generalisations. The study of commonalities and contrasts allows us to be more disciplined in ascribing explanations and examining relationships. By charting similarities and differences, we can be more precise in our descriptions and more discriminating in our analyses.

While the potential value of comparative work is great, so unfortunately are the obstacles confronting it. One problem, common to all social science research, is particularly pronounced in comparative research: many of the most interesting and subtle aspects of socio-political life defy quantification or the construction of valid indicators to summarise in a simple manner their trends and differences. There is often truth in the charge that comparative measures are too crude to be meaningful. We do not claim that the tables in the following pages exhaust all there is to say about the quality of social and political life in these countries, but they offer data that can set the parameters so that such qualitative discussions can proceed in a more informed way.

In terms of data quality, the two most central problems of comparative research are reliability and equivalence. Different countries often measure the same concept in different ways (or in some countries with problematic accuracy), making apparently comparable data in fact incomparable. The problem of equivalence means that comparing some isolated measure of behaviour may have very different meanings when put in its larger social context.

Although these problems are still pertinent, fortunately they have been greatly reduced over the last few decades. Care must still be taken with problems of comparability, but today's scholar has access to many more, and more extensive and harmonised, data banks than used to be the case. International bodies such as the United Nations and its member agencies, the World Bank, the IMF, the European Union, as well as commercial organisations and academics, have laboured to produce valid and reliable comparative data. In particular the many sections of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development have produced a range of high-quality data on the relevant countries. Their work is the central resource for all interested in the comparative study of these advanced democracies, and we would like to think this book is testament to the importance and value of that work.

Although as will be evident we have been the beneficiaries of the competent work done by the professionals in these organisations, the frustrations have still been considerable. Discrepancies in data between different organisations often seemed inexplicable. One always had to be alert to changes or inconsistencies in the basis of measurement. Missing data for individual countries, often for no apparent reason, was another frequent irritant. As far as possible, we have only included tables where data was available for all 18 countries, to keep the basis for comparison as constant as possible. But we have often had to depart from this standard when the interest of the data outweighed its incompleteness.

This book differs from the two most common types of books calling themselves comparative, first in focusing consistently upon the same set of countries throughout and making comparison the key within each part. In academic studies, edited books calling themselves comparative are more accurately described as juxtapositions, as different authors tackle different countries in different ways, and the genuinely comparative element is minimal. Or else there may be comparative work, but the comparisons are based on convenience, without a consistent or theoretically bounded set of countries being compared.

While most academic studies focus intensively on one narrow area, our aim has been to produce an encyclopaedic source book. We have sought to provide a reference source offering comparative data on as many aspects of social life as possible, from taxation to traffic accidents, homicide rates to health expenditure, from interest rates to Internet usage. We have tracked economic indicators, but also demographic and social ones, and where possible different institutional and policy settings.

The second major source of comparative data is found in compendia of statistical information. Most are done by international agencies (sometimes constrained by diplomatic considerations to present their data in a neutral and non-controversial way), or by individuals whose primary aim is to put on record comprehensive data. These compilations often provide valuable data. But they are commonly not reader-friendly. Nor do they make any effort to explain for the non-specialist the value and limits of the measures they are reporting.

In contrast, in this book we have very deliberately exercised an editorial hand in the presentation of data. For example, we have been selective rather than comprehensive about the years for which data is presented (trying to keep tables clear, and making judgements about when added detail would add more clutter than extra meaning). Similarly, rather than invariably presenting tables with countries in alphabetical order, we have often listed them in hierarchical order according to the phenomenon being studied, so that the main ordering and differences between countries are more quickly apparent. (In such 'league tables' most people focus on rankings and differences, but as indicated earlier, what is often at least as important is how they have moved in common.)

Most importantly, this is not just a book of tables, but rather each table is accompanied by a commentary about the meaning of the data, including sometimes a discussion of its limits. In this way we have sought to provide the reader not only with reliable and pertinent data but with some discussion of its interpretation and significance. We try to probe the meaning of different measures, look at both common trends and countries which have performed quite differently from the norm, and sometimes sought to see whether there are any patterns in the differential performance of countries. In these discussions, however, as the title *How Australia Compares* indicates, we have always tried to put Australian experience into comparative perspective, invariably returning to the implications of these facts for considering Australia's performance, policies and prospects.

Table 1.1: Population

	Millions		
	1900	1950	2000
United States	76.0	152.3	282.6
Japan	43.8	83.8	126.6
Germany	56.1	68.4	82.8
United Kingdom	36.7	50.1	59.5
France	38.9	41.8	59.3
Italy	32.4	47.1	57.6
Canada	5.4	14.0	31.3
Australia	**3.8**	**8.3**	**19.2**
Netherlands	5.2	10.1	15.9
Belgium	6.7	8.6	10.2
Sweden	5.1	7.0	8.9
Austria	5.8	6.9	8.1
Switzerland	3.3	4.7	7.3
Denmark	2.4	4.3	5.3
Finland	2.7	4.0	5.2
Norway	2.2	3.3	4.5
Ireland	3.1	3.0	3.8
New Zealand	0.8	1.9	3.8

Table 1.2: Area and population density, 1998

	Population/km^2	Area (000 km^2)
Australia	**2**	**7 687**
Canada	3	9 976
Norway	14	324
New Zealand	14	269
Finland	15	338
Sweden	20	450
United States	29	9 372
Ireland	53	70
Austria	96	84
France	107	549
Denmark	123	43
Switzerland	172	41
Italy	189	301
Germany	230	357
United Kingdom	242	245
Belgium	335	31
Japan	335	378
Netherlands	385	41

Table 1.3: Population growth rates

	Population ratio 2000:1900	Annual growth rate 1900–1950 %	Annual growth rate 1950–2000 %
Canada	5.8	1.9	1.6
Australia	**5.0**	**1.6**	**1.7**
New Zealand	4.8	1.8	1.4
United States	3.7	1.4	1.2
Netherlands	3.1	1.3	0.9
Japan	2.9	1.3	0.8
Denmark	2.2	1.2	0.4
Switzerland	2.2	0.7	0.9
Norway	2.1	0.8	0.6
Finland	1.9	0.8	0.5
Italy	1.8	0.7	0.4
Sweden	1.8	0.6	0.5
United Kingdom	1.6	0.6	0.3
Belgium	1.5	0.5	0.3
France	1.5	0.1	0.7
Germany	1.5	0.4	0.4
Austria	1.4	0.4	0.3
Ireland	1.2	–0.1	0.5
Mean	2.5	0.9	0.8

Table 1.4: Population growth summary

Summary data by decades 1950–2000

	1950–60	1960–70	1970–80	1980–90	1990–2000
Mean growth rate (% pa)	1.0	1.0	0.6	0.5	0.6
Australian growth rate (% pa)	**2.3**	**2.0**	**1.4**	**1.5**	**1.2**
Fastest growing country and rate (% pa)	Canada 2.7	**Australia**	**Australia** Ireland	**Australia**	New Zealand 1.3
Slowest growing country and rate (% pa)	Ireland −0.5	Ireland 0.4	Germany Austria 0.1	Belgium Germany 0.1	Japan Italy 0.2
Australia's rank	2	1	=1	1	=2

1 PEOPLE
Population

One of the first concerns of the Australian federation was population. A Royal Commission was established to see 'whether we shall be able to people the vast areas of the continent which are capable of supporting large populations'. World War II brought a new intensity of concern with population. Australia's first Minister for Immigration, Arthur Calwell, said in 1948 that 'Additional population is Australia's greatest need. For security in wartime, for full development and prosperity in peacetime, our vital need is more Australians.'

Tables 1.1 to 1.4 both confirm and qualify Australians' traditional fears of being 'under-populated'. Table 1.2 shows that population density ranges from the sparseness of Australia's two persons/km^2 to the Netherlands' 385. On the other hand, in terms of population size, Australia is certainly not a minnow. It ranks in the top half of these countries, and 52nd among the 227 countries listed by the US Census Bureau. But it is dwarfed by the United States, the biggest European countries, and of course the most populous Asian countries: China 1.28 billion, India 1.03 billion and Indonesia 231 million.

More recently the emergence of trading blocs such as the European Union has allowed member nations to exploit economies of scale far beyond their individual size. However, no conceivable amount of population growth by Australia is going to change the crucial equations affecting either its economic or military prospects.

Neither is it likely that Australia will ever rank anywhere but near the bottom of league tables on population density. Merely to catch up with Norway and New Zealand's 14 people/km^2, Australia's population would have to increase to an improbable 107 million.

Rather, the differences in population density suggest that to some extent geography is destiny. The seven countries with the lowest population density all have substantial areas inhospitable to human settlement, with either desert or arctic wastes. At the other extreme, the area from Britain through the Low Countries into Germany has the densest population in Europe, while in Asia there is another centre of high population density running through Japan, Korea (population density 465/km^2) and some parts of China.

While these 18 countries show very different rates of population growth, and great changes in growth rates over time, socio-cultural factors and government policy seem more germane to explaining the differences than population density. The two countries with the greatest density, the Netherlands and Japan, are in the top third of countries in population growth for the whole century, though both slowed markedly over the last generation.

Population growth is most in favour among the four countries which grew out of the English New World settler colonies, and the difference was more pronounced in the second half of the century than the first. Only Australia, Canada and New Zealand more than doubled their population between 1950 and 2000. In contrast, half the countries – all European – grew by less than 50%. The cumulative impact of consistent differences in growth rates can be seen by comparing Australia and Austria, the fastest and slowest growing countries. In 1950, the difference in their populations was 1.4 million. By 2000, it was 11.1 million.

Taking the half century as a whole, Australia had the highest population growth rate, and as Table 1.4 shows, in each of the decades had either the highest or second highest growth. But as that table also shows, the population growth rate in all the countries was much slower in the last decades of the century.

Table 1.5: Life expectancy

Life expectancy at birth, years

	1900	1950	2000
Japan	44.5	63.9	80.7
Australia	**56.5**	**69.6**	**79.8**
Sweden	55.8	71.8	79.6
Switzerland	50.7	69.2	79.6
Canada	–	69.1	79.4
Italy	44.5	66.0	79.0
France	47.0	66.5	78.8
Norway	56.3	72.7	78.7
Netherlands	56.1	72.1	78.3
Belgium	47.1	67.5	77.8
New Zealand	59.4	69.6	77.8
Austria	40.1	65.7	77.7
United Kingdom	50.5	69.2	77.7
Finland	46.7	66.3	77.4
Germany	46.6	67.5	77.4
United States	49.3	69.0	77.1
Ireland	49.5	66.9	76.8
Denmark	54.6	71.0	76.5
Mean	50.3	68.5	78.3

Table 1.6: Male life expectancy

Male life expectancy at birth, years

	1960	2000
Japan	65.3	77.6
Sweden	71.2	77.4
Switzerland	68.7	76.8
Australia	**67.9**	**76.6**
Canada	68.4	76.3
Norway	71.3	76.0
New Zealand	68.7	75.7
Netherlands	71.5	75.5
Austria	65.4	75.4
Italy	67.2	75.3
France	67.0	75.0
United Kingdom	67.9	75.0
Germany	66.9	74.7
Belgium	67.7	74.4
Denmark	70.4	74.2
Ireland	68.1	73.9
United States	66.6	73.9
Finland	65.5	73.8
Mean	68.0	75.4

Table 1.7: Female life expectancy

Female life expectancy at birth, years

	1960	2000
Japan	70.2	84.6
France	73.6	82.5
Switzerland	74.5	82.5
Australia	**73.9**	**82.0**
Sweden	74.9	82.0
Canada	74.3	81.7
Italy	72.3	81.6
Norway	75.8	81.4
Austria	71.9	81.2
Finland	72.5	81.0
Belgium	73.5	80.8
New Zealand	73.9	80.8
Germany	72.4	80.7
Netherlands	75.4	80.6
United Kingdom	73.7	79.8
United States	73.1	79.4
Ireland	71.9	79.1
Denmark	74.4	79.0
Mean	73.5	81.2

Life expectancy

Politicians and social commentators are increasingly talking of the problems caused by the ageing of society. Although there are substantial policy issues posed by this demographic trend, it should be remembered that its most basic cause is good news: increased longevity. The ageing society was a problem the caveman never had to wrestle with.

The figures in Table 1.5 tell a great success story. During the course of the 20th century, average life expectancy in the advanced democracies rose by more than half: from around 50 years to nearly 80. Indeed according to James Riley, life expectancy at birth across the whole globe was only 30 in the year 1800 but had risen to 67 by the year 2000. Moreover, in both the developed and developing world life expectancy was predicted to keep on increasing in the first half of the 21st century, to produce a global mean life expectancy at birth of 76 in the year 2050.

Australia ranked second in Table 1.5, with life expectancy at birth now touching 80 years, and it was also second back in 1900. The rise was most dramatic in Japan, which went from having the lowest life expectancy in 1900 to the highest in 2000. It was particularly with its post-World War II prosperity and democracy that Japanese increases in life expectancy outpaced the other countries.

But the most notable aspect of the data is the commonality between the countries. Life expectancy in all of them increased substantially (somewhat less so in some of the already long-living north-west European countries). Now life expectancy in all 18 countries is closely grouped, all falling within a range of just over four years, and all still trending upward.

Both males and females are enjoying longer life spans, and life expectancy at birth is increasing by a similar number of years for both. Between 1960 and 2000 women's life expectancy in these countries had increased by 7.7 years and men by 7.4 years (Tables 1.6 and 1.7), so the gap between them increased marginally, with women on average expecting to live 5.8 years longer than men in the year 2000.

In every one of these countries women live longer than men. For whatever reason, the sex difference is greatest in France (7.5 years) and least in Norway and Denmark (4.6 and 4.8 years respectively). Among both males and females Australia ranks near the top, but again the outstanding feature of the tables is the close grouping and the shared trends towards greater life expectancy among both sexes and across all countries.

The OECD notes that these gains have been made possible by rising standards of living, improved working conditions, public health interventions and progress in medical care. It explains that improvements in life expectancy at birth actually reflect a decline in mortality rates at all ages, ranging from a sharp reduction in infant mortality to higher survival rates at older ages. The Australian Bureau of Statistics observed that in Australia longer life expectancy in the first half of the 20th century was because of a decline in deaths from infectious diseases, due to cleaner water and better sewerage systems, as well as initiatives like mass immunisation. Rises in life expectancy slowed in the decades after World War II largely because of increases in cardiovascular disease. In recent decades the enhanced life expectancy of older people has been a major source of increase.

It should be remembered that these figures offer the mean life expectancy for each country, and can conceal substantial differences between sub-groups of the population. Most dramatically, in Australia's case the life expectancy for indigenous people was almost 20 years lower than for whites. In 1996, the life expectancy for Aboriginal women was 61.7 years and for Aboriginal men 56.9 years.

Table 1.8: Birth rates

Live births per 1000 population

	1900	1950	2000
Ireland	23	21	15
New Zealand	26	26	14
United States	30	24	14
Australia	**27**	**23**	**13**
Norway	30	19	13
Denmark	30	19	12
France	21	21	12
Netherlands	32	23	12
United Kingdom	29	16	12
Belgium	29	17	11
Canada	29	27	11
Finland	33	25	11
Austria	35	16	10
Japan	32	28	10
Sweden	27	16	10
Switzerland	29	18	10
Germany	36	16	9
Italy	33	20	9
Mean	29	21	12

Table 1.9: Fertility rates

Average number of children born to each woman

	1900	1950	2000
United States	3.8	3.4	2.1
Ireland	–	3.3	1.9
Australia	**3.4**	**3.2**	**1.8**
New Zealand	–	3.5	1.8
Norway	4.1	2.6	1.8
Denmark	4.0	2.6	1.7
Finland	4.8	3.0	1.7
France	2.8	2.7	1.7
United Kingdom	3.4	2.2	1.7
Belgium	4.0	2.3	1.6
Canada	4.8	3.7	1.6
Netherlands	4.5	3.0	1.6
Sweden	3.9	2.2	1.5
Switzerland	3.3	2.3	1.5
Austria	4.9	2.1	1.4
Germany	4.8	2.2	1.4
Japan	5.2	3.6	1.4
Italy	4.4	2.3	1.2
Mean	4.1	2.8	1.6

Table 1.10: Age composition: young people

Proportion of population aged 15 or less

	1960	2000
New Zealand	32.9	22.9
Ireland	30.5	21.8
United States	30.8	21.3
Australia	**30.2**	**20.5**
Norway	25.9	20.0
Canada	33.7	19.1
United Kingdom	23.3	19.1
France	26.4	18.8
Netherlands	30.0	18.6
Denmark	25.2	18.5
Sweden	22.4	18.4
Finland	30.4	18.1
Belgium	23.5	17.6
Switzerland	23.5	16.8
Austria	22.0	16.7
Germany	21.3	15.3
Japan	30.2	14.6
Italy	22.4	14.5
Mean	26.9	18.5

Table 1.11: Age composition: ageing societies

	Proportion of population			
	aged 65 and over		aged 80 and over	
	1960	2000	1960	1999
Italy	9.2	17.7	–	4.0
Japan	5.7	17.3	0.7	3.6
Sweden	11.8	17.3	1.9	5.1
Germany	10.9	17.2	–	3.8
Belgium	12.0	16.6	1.8	3.6
France	11.6	16.1	2.0	3.7
Switzerland	10.2	15.8	1.5	3.8
United Kingdom	11.7	15.6	1.9	4.0
Austria	12.2	15.5	1.8	3.5
Norway	10.9	15.2	1.9	4.3
Finland	7.3	15.0	0.9	3.3
Denmark	10.6	14.8	1.6	3.9
Netherlands	9.0	13.6	1.4	3.2
United States	9.2	12.6	1.4	3.2
Canada	7.6	12.5	1.2	2.9
Australia	**8.5**	**12.3**	**1.2**	**2.8**
New Zealand	8.7	11.8	1.5	2.7
Ireland	10.9	11.2	1.9	2.6
Mean	9.9	14.9	1.5	3.6

Ranked in order of proportion aged 65+ in 2000.

Birth rates and the ageing society

Apart from increased life expectancy, the other cause of the ageing society is that people are having fewer children. Despite the glacial pace of such demographic revolutions, their long-term impact is a dramatic change in the age composition of society, as Tables 1.10 and 1.11 show.

The birth rate in the selected countries from the start of the 20th century to the end more than halved, down from 29 births per 1000 population to 12 (Table 1.8), with the reduction being more marked in the second half of the century. To some extent a reduction in the birth rate is a natural consequence of increased longevity. With a higher proportion of the population living well beyond the normal child-bearing years of 15–45, the birth rate falls for that reason alone. But this is only a small part of the explanation.

Table 1.9 shows the dramatic reduction in the number of children each woman is having: from a mean across the selected countries of 4.1 in 1900 to 1.6 in 2000. In all the countries except the United States, the fertility rate is now below the natural replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. In other words, if this rate continues, and without immigration, all these countries will eventually experience declining population size.

While the secular trend is clear and indisputable, it has not followed a smooth, linear progression. The discussion of the ageing society has become so prominent in recent years because the demographic hump of 'baby boomers' (people born in the decade and a half following World War II) is now reaching retirement age. In contrast, birth rates during the economic hardship of the 1930s depression and especially during the upheavals and suffering of the war had been reduced. For example, Chesnais' detailed figures on birth rates show that Australia's bottomed in 1934 at 16.4, in the depths of the depression. It did not reach such a low again until the mid-1970s, but has continued to decline ever since.

This is what makes the current dramatic decline in fertility historically unique. Normally falls in fertility have been associated with poverty and uncertainty, but this prolonged fall is happening amid unprecedented affluence. Clearly, however, all sorts of other factors – including the changed aspirations of women, the financial pressures of contemporary society, and the availability of reliable contraception – are also pertinent.

The inevitable result of increased longevity and reduced fertility is a change in the generational balance of society. Thus in the 40 years between 1960 and 2000, the number of children under 15 dropped as a proportion of the total populations of these countries by about a third: from 27% to 19%. Conversely the proportion 65 and over rose by a half: from 10% to 15%.

The trend is in the same direction in all 18 countries, though to varying degrees and with some differences in timing. Australia, like the other New World democracies and Ireland, remains a relatively young country in its age structure. On the whole, having children has remained somewhat more popular in these countries. While steadily increasing, Australia's proportion of older people of 12.3% in 2000 was only slightly higher than the level several European countries had already reached in 1960. Those countries with the highest proportion of older people, like Italy and Japan, combine high rates of longevity with low birth rates.

While the ageing society brings changes and challenges, there is considerable fuzziness in the framing of the issues. One concern is the increased ratio of dependent to economically productive members of society, but the proportion participating in the labour force is not simply a matter of demography but also of social institutions and attitudes. The labour force participation rate (see Table 4.1) is now at an historic peak because of the greatly increased proportion of women working.

Table 1.12: Inflow of immigrants

Net intake of immigrants

	Annual net number of immigrants 1980–94 (000s)	Net annual intake of immigrants per 1000 population 1980–94	Net number of immigrants 1950–2000 (000s)	Net intake of immigrants 1950–2000 as % of 2000 population
Australia	**91.9**	**5.4**	**4 437**	**23.1**
Canada	125.8	4.6	5 732	18.3
Germany	312.5	4.3	9 355	11.3
Switzerland	29.6	4.3	–	–
Austria	24.0	3.1	–	–
United States	622.1	2.5	30 304	10.7
Sweden	20.5	2.4	743	8.3
Netherlands	27.5	1.8	817	5.1
Norway	6.6	1.6	159	3.5
Italy	83.6	1.5	−846	−1.5
Denmark	6.4	1.2	–	–
Finland	5.1	1.0	–	–
France	59.5	1.0	4 691	7.9
Belgium	8.1	0.8	–	–
United Kingdom	40.9	0.7	408	0.7
Japan	−4.6	0.0	–	–
New Zealand	−0.3	−0.1	–	–
Ireland	−15.2	−4.3	–	–
Mean	80.2	1.8	5 580	8.8

Ranked in order of net annual intake per 1000 population, 1980–94.

Table 1.13: Scale of immigration

Foreign population as proportion of total population

Country	1980	1990	2000
Australia	**20.6**	**22.3**	**23.6**
Switzerland	14.3	16.3	19.3
Canada	16.1	16.1	17.4
United States	6.2	7.9	10.4
Austria	3.9	5.9	9.3
Germany	7.5	8.4	8.9
Belgium	9.0	9.1	8.8
France	6.8	6.3	5.6
Sweden	5.0	5.7	5.4
Denmark	2.0	3.1	4.8
Netherlands	3.8	4.6	4.1
Norway	2.1	3.4	4.1
United Kingdom	2.8	3.1	4.0
Ireland	2.2	2.3	3.3
Italy	0.6	1.5	2.4
Finland	0.3	0.5	1.8
Japan	–	0.9	1.3
Mean	6.1	6.9	7.9

No data on New Zealand. For Australia, the United States and Canada, figure refers to 'foreign-born'; in others to 'foreigners'.

Table 1.14: Immigrants and citizenship

Country	Mean annual number acquiring nationality 1990s (000s)	New citizens per year per 100 000 population (1990s)
Australia	**118**	**610**
Canada	146	466
Sweden	30	339
Netherlands	47	298
Belgium	27	262
Germany	208	251
Switzerland	14	195
Norway	8	176
France	102	173
Austria	14	170
United States	441	160
Denmark	6	106
United Kingdom	54	91
Finland	1	25
Italy	7	12
Japan	11	9

No data on Ireland or New Zealand.