Introduction

The specter haunting the historiography of early modern Europe is the specter of transition. To be sure, the relatively recent[1] designation of the period *c.* 1450–*c.* 1750 as an era unto itself represented multiple intellectual currents, in the first instance a rising interest in social and economic (as opposed to religious and political) questions. At the same time, however, the definition of these centuries as the decisive and traumatic passage from a medieval to a modern world generated a literature pervaded by themes of crisis and revolution (agricultural, commercial, financial, military, scientific, etc.), culminating in a breakthrough variously defined as the beginnings of industrialization, the end of the economic *ancien régime*, or the transition from feudalism to capitalism.[2] Of course, it was always recognized that economic growth was hardly a universal experience in early modern Europe, but this was accounted for by labeling some parts of the continent (the Mediterranean in general and Spain in particular) as examples of failed transitions and others (northwest Europe in general and England and the Netherlands in particular) as successes. Outcomes were bound to vary, it was

[1] The first English-language textbook to frame sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European history in these terms was George Norman Clark's *Early Modern Europe from about 1450 to about 1720* (London, 1957). This periodization gained broad acceptance during the following decade, reflected by the inauguration (1970) of the "Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History." The conception of an early modern period is much older in English historical linguistics, and dates back to the 1930s at least.

[2] The literature on the crisis is huge. The concept originated in Eric Hobsbawm's "The General Crisis of the European Economy in the Seventeenth Century," *Past and Present* 5 (1954), pp. 33–56 and 6 (1954), pp. 44–65. This article and others it inspired are collected in Trevor Ashton, ed. *Crisis in Europe 1560–1660* (London, 1965); subsequent echoes in Geoffrey Parker and L. M. Smith, eds. *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century* (London, 1978). Jan de Vries, *The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis 1600–1750* (Cambridge, 1976) has been very influential. See also Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, Vol. I: *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (San Diego, 1974) and Vol. II: *Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy 1600–1750* (New York, 1980); Peter Kriedte, *Peasants, Landlords and Merchant Capitalists*, trans. V. R. Berghahn (Cambridge, 1983). A more recent contribution is Sheilagh C. Ogilvie, "Germany and the Seventeenth Century Crisis," *Historical Journal* 35, 2 (1992), pp. 417–41.

felt, in such a wide-ranging struggle between the forces of growth and change and traditional social and economic limits.

Over time, the transitional narrative of early modern social history has lost much of its initial coherence. First and foremost, fifty years of research have forced historians to acknowledge that the performance of the early modern European economy as a whole was sluggish at best.[3] The special status claimed for these centuries has also been eroded from without, as a consensus emerges over the decidedly modest pace of economic growth during the early Industrial Revolution,[4] while the turbulence of the later Middle Ages is now reframed as an episode of such "creative" destruction that there was virtually nothing left to be accomplished during the subsequent early modern era.[5] Nevertheless, historians have been extremely hostile to the one attempt to face this conundrum squarely: Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie's famous 1974 pronouncement that the quintessential feature of early modern European society was its "immobility," that is, its inability to escape the limits to economic growth imposed by the technological backwardness of agriculture.[6] Increasingly uncomfortable with an earlier insouciance in judging success and failure, scholars have in recent years preferred to reconceptualize early modern economic stagnation and depression as "readjustment,"[7] while monographic investigations increasingly stress the adaptability, hard work, and above all the agency of all peasants and commoners.[8] As the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries become an age in which everybody wins and all must have prizes while no fundamental social change occurs, textbooks have been at pains either to minimize differential economic performance and its

[3] For a recent overview, see Jan Luiten van Zanden, "Early Modern Economic Growth: A Survey of the European Economy, 1500–1800" in Maarten Prak, ed., *Early Modern Capitalism: Economic and Social Change in Europe, 1500–1800* (London, 2001), pp. 69–87.

[4] N. F. R. Crafts, "British Economic Growth, 1700–1831: A Review of the Evidence," *Economic History Review* 36, 2 (1983), pp. 177–99; Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Why was British Growth so Slow during the Industrial Revolution?" *Journal of Economic History* 44, 3 (1984), pp. 687–712.

[5] See the seminal work of Stephan Epstein, in particular his *Freedom and Growth: The Rise of States and Markets in Europe, 1300–1750* (London, 2000). Note his conclusion (p. 69) that "the late medieval crisis . . . may have marked the most decisive step in the continent's long trajectory to capitalism and world hegemony." L. R. Poos, *A Rural Society after the Black Death: Essex, 1350–1525* (Cambridge, 1991) makes a different (but compelling) case against a sharp break between the later Middle Ages and the early modern period.

[6] Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie, "History that Stands Still," [orig. pub. 1974] in *The Mind and Method of the Historian*, trans. Siân and Ben Reynolds (Chicago, 1981), pp. 11–27.

[7] See the essays collected in I. A. A. Thompson and Bartolomé Yun Casalilla, eds., *The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: New Perspectives on the Economic and Social History of Seventeenth-Century Spain* (Cambridge, 1994), especially chapters 3–4.

[8] See, for example, Jürgen Schlumbohm, *Lebensläufe, Familien, Höfe: die Bauern und Heuerleute des Osnabrückischen Kirchspiels Belm in proto-industrieller Zeit, 1650–1860* (Göttingen, 1994) and Liana Vardi, *The Land and the Loom: Peasants and Profit in Northern France, 1680–1800* (Durham, 1993).

causes, or even to eschew explanatory characterization altogether.[9] Originally conceived as a fundamental hinge in European social history, the early modern period is now threatened with reduction to an arbitrary chronological convenience.[10]

The irony of this conceptual implosion is that the early modern period is gaining increased significance from the broader perspective of world history just as it loses its cachet within European history. That medieval Europe was no wealthier (and probably poorer) than the Islamic and East Asian worlds has long been known.[11] It is now also becoming clear that the standard indices originally developed to gauge the economic performance of early modern Europe – life expectancy, urbanization levels, agricultural productivity, and so on – reveal no significant European lead over much of Asia before 1800.[12] Yet unless one wishes to write off to historical accident the undeniable gulf in material prosperity which emerged between the West and "the Rest" during the nineteenth century,[13] three crucial implications follow. First, the long-term causes of European economic primacy are to be sought in the early modern period. They are also to be sought within European society, since, for all the suffering it inflicted on the non-Western world, European colonialism never generated profits on a large enough scale to explain the Industrial Revolution.[14] Second, whatever differentiated Western Europe as a whole from the non-Western world ultimately mattered more than regional variation within Western Europe.[15] Finally, any discussion of the economic origins of the rise of the West will have to go beyond the question of technologies of production. Technical innovation did become

[9] See, for example, Peter Musgrave, *The Early Modern European Economy* (Basingstoke, 1999) and Robert S. DuPlessis, *Transitions to Capitalism in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1997).

[10] William J. Bouwsma, "The Renaissance and the Drama of Western History," *American Historical Review* 84, 1 (1979), pp. 1–15 is a stimulating analysis of the similar fate befalling the concept of the Renaissance, itself a victim of the invention of the early modern period.

[11] The most important work in this kind of comparative history has been done by Angus Maddison. See in particular his *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective* (Paris, 2001), *Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run* (Paris, 1998) and *Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development: A Long-Run Comparative View* (Oxford, 1991). See also Paul Bairoch, *Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes* (New York, 1993).

[12] Roy Bin Wong, *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience* (Ithaca, 1997).

[13] As in Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: Europe, China, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, 2000). For an insightful critique of some of the excesses of anti-Eurocentrism, see Ricardo Duchesne, "Between Sinocentrism and Eurocentrism: Debating Andre Gunder Frank's *Re-Orient: Global Economy in the Asian Age*," *Science and Society* 65, 4 (Winter) (2001–2), pp. 428–63.

[14] Patrick O'Brien, "European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery," *Economic History Review* 35, 1 (1982). See also his "The Foundations of European Industrialization: From the Perspective of the World," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 4, 3 (1991), pp. 288–317.

[15] Philip C. C. Huang, *The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China* (Stanford, CA, 1985), pp. 9–10.

the hallmark of European economic superiority, but the origins of that superiority in an era of technological stagnation suggest that a history of innovation depends on a prior history of incentives and institutions.[16]

In my own view, the question of early modern social transition has been encumbered by an unfortunate fixation on the technology of production, which was in no small part derived from post-war models of Third World economic development. The problem started with the perfectly correct observation that industrial societies have more efficient technologies of production than pre-industrial societies, allowing the former to produce necessary goods (above all food) in far greater amounts and with far fewer workers than the latter. Industrial societies thereby free a great many people to produce luxuries, offer services, and do all of the other things that make the industrialized world an allegedly better place to live. Indeed, industrial societies have a lot more *people*, period, than pre-industrial societies.

Now, in the particular context of early modern Europe, two empirically irrefutable observations played a key role in ushering in the preoccupation with productive technology. First, Europe was in these centuries an overwhelmingly rural society operating at (by modern standards) a rather modest level of technical efficiency (especially in agriculture). Second, early modern Europe seems to have experienced considerable difficulties in sustaining the people that it did have. From the last decades of the sixteenth century onwards, historians have documented soaring increases in food prices, slumps in long-distance trade and industrial production, the multiplication of plagues and famines, and demographic stagnation or even decline in region after region all over the continent. It was thus an easy step to conclude that a biological ceiling was imposed by these technological shortcomings, a ceiling lifted only with the advent of modern science and technology during the Enlightenment. Having reached this at least initially plausible (and far from preposterous) conclusion, historians then began hunting – all too often in vain, as it turned out[17] – for the surge in productivity and production that allowed early modern Europe to escape the constraints of the biological ceiling.

The unexamined assumption of this Malthusian vision of early modern social history (associated in particular with a group of French scholars known as the

[16] Which is not to say that every specific invention was directly produced by its institutional context or that context can explain the timing of what have been called "macroinventions." Joel Mokyr, *The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress* (New York, 1990). Also N. F. R. Crafts, "Macroinventions, Economic Growth, and 'Industrial Revolution' in Britain and France," *Economic History Review* 48, 3 (1995), pp. 591–8; David S. Landes, "Some Further Thoughts on Accident in History: A Reply to Professor Crafts," *Economic History Review* 48, 3 (1995), pp. 599–60.

[17] Michel Morineau, *Les faux-semblants d'un démarrage économique: agriculture et démographie en France au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1971) is a classic investigation.

Annales school)[18] is that the technological capacity for increased production itself called into being the necessary institutions and practices to distribute surpluses and allow for economic specialization and development. This assumption, if I may be forgiven the metaphor, puts the cart before the horse. The argument here is that secure and transferable property rights, dense market networks, and the widespread use of money and credit were essential prerequisites for any dramatic gains in agricultural production.[19] Furthermore, I would contend, the pervasion of both the individual peasant household and rural society as a whole by market relations amounted to a genuine social and even cultural transformation, independent of the subsequent realization of increased productivity.[20]

It will of course be objected that nobody really believes in the original Malthusian model any more, and furthermore that there is no reason to revive an outdated Marxist preoccupation with the transition between various historical modes of production. Surely the prudent course would be to content ourselves with the position that the early modern economy was never completely stationary, but grew very slowly in the very long term with so much regional variation that any analytical generalizations are hazardous. Prudent, yes, but deeply disingenuous as well.

In the first place, such an approach refuses honest engagement with the mass of accumulated evidence that something began to go seriously wrong with the early modern European economy at the end of the sixteenth century. Even in the case of England, the most credible early modern success story, fourteenth-century levels of population and agricultural productivity would not be exceeded until after 1750.[21] In the same way, recent efforts to rehabilitate the agrarian economy of early modern France have produced an overall picture strikingly similar to LeRoy Ladurie's conclusion that "For [all] the apparent movement, things had really stayed much the same."[22] If the fate of all grand historical

[18] For overviews of the work of this school, see Peter Burke, *The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School, 1929–89* (Stanford, CA, 1990) and Philippe Carrard, *Poetics of the New History: French Historical Discourse from Braudel to Chartier* (Baltimore, 1992).

[19] This is not to deny the often reciprocal relation between institutions and technical change, but when all qualifications have been made I still incline towards the logical priority of the former. See in this regard Mark Overton, *Agricultural Revolution in England: The Transformation of the Agrarian Economy 1500–1850* (Cambridge, 1996), esp. pp. 146–7, 203–7.

[20] On this subject the work of Jan de Vries is indispensable, in particular his "The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution," *Journal of Economic History* 54, 2 (1994), pp. 249–70 and "Between Purchasing Power and the World of Goods: Understanding the Household Economy in Early Modern Europe" in John Brewer and Roy Porter, eds., *Consumption and the World of Goods* (London, 1993), pp. 85–132.

[21] Bruce M. S. Campbell and Mark Overton, "A New Perspective on Medieval and Early Modern Agriculture: Six Centuries of Norfolk Farming *c.* 1250–*c.* 1850," *Past and Present* 141 (1993), pp. 38–105.

[22] LeRoy Ladurie, "History that Stands Still," p. 21. Philip T. Hoffman, *Growth in a Traditional Society: The French Countryside, 1450–1815* (Princeton, 1996) is an impressive

theories is either falsification or banality, it is surely the latter which has befallen the *Annales* school. Much more seriously, by retaining the traditional analytic categories while disputing the numbers, the gradualist continuity narrative perpetuates an older expectation of where to look for meaningful social change and thereby impedes appreciation of those significant developments which did occur, but outside the realm of output statistics.

I therefore offer this book as an effort to reconcile the impressive empirical basis of the Malthusian scenario with its inherently implausible implication that most of Europe experienced no significant social change in the two centuries after 1560. This is, in other words, an effort to redeem the old question of the transition from feudalism to capitalism,[23] and the key to that redemption is to reconsider the terms originally used to frame the project of social transition. Recent work in development economics is highly suggestive here, as it is an open secret that the traditional neoclassical economic model is powerless to explain the gross disparities of material well-being which persist in the world today. In a world of frictionless exchange, inefficient practices and groups should rapidly be weeded out and replaced by more efficient competitors. That this has not, in fact, taken place underscores the problems of co-ordination and inclusion in human societies, problems heavily influenced by the structure of property rights and exchange practices.[24]

The essential precondition for realizing the potential of innovative productive technologies is a reliable, dense and broadly based network of socio-economic exchanges. Hindrances to such a network can be social, economic, or cultural, and the shift from a fragmented to a networked society is likely to be a complicated, drawn-out, but very significant process. Furthermore, I would argue, one of the most helpful ways to follow these changes concretely is to look at the inscription of human activity in time and space. That the time–space constitution of human activity is no mere backdrop, but rather an essential part of what those activities are is hardly an idea original to myself, and has become a commonplace in recent theoretical sociology (associated in particular with the

critique of the *Annales* vision, but its conclusion that growth averaged one half percent per annum, was confined to selected regions, and was vulnerable to erasure in times of crisis qualifies but hardly shatters the argument advanced by Morineau in 1971. Recent quantitative analysis of French demographic and price data confirms a close correlation between grain prices and mortality during the seventeenth century. See David R. Weir, "Life under Pressure: France and England 1670–1870," *Journal of Economic History* 44, 1 (1984), pp. 27–48.

[23] The modern discussion began with the debate (1950–2) in *Science and Society*; the relevant articles are collected in Paul Sweezy, Maurice Dobb, Kohachiro Takahashi, et al., *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism* (London, 1978). See also R. J. Holton, *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism* (Basingstoke, 1985).

[24] I must here acknowledge a considerable theoretical debt to the work of Douglass C. North, in particular his *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York, 1981) and *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge, 1990).

work of Anthony Giddens).[25] On the other hand, the extension of this insight to historical research has almost exclusively focused on the industrial era and on the transformation of experience by technological, rather than institutional, change.[26] For the early modern period, the latter was the more important vector and receives correspondingly more attention here.

The argument that superficial continuities of form can conceal dramatic shifts in underlying mechanisms also governed the choice of the region for investigation: the lands of the Benedictine monastery of Ottobeuren, located in the countryside of Upper Swabia amid the political confetti of the German southwest. No serious scholar would advance Germany, and least of all its agrarian sector, as an economic "leader" in early modern Europe, and German industrialization was late by West European standards.[27] In world historical perspective, however, the rapidity with which the late nineteenth-century German economy – and German agriculture, too[28] – caught up with England and the Low Countries seems rather more significant than Germany's late start. Bavaria clearly had rather more in common with Belgium than it ever did with Bengal, and I find the long-term convergence in the social history of Western Europe a rather more compelling concern than the narrower question "Why was England first?"[29] And yet, although research on the early modern German peasantry has accelerated dramatically in recent years,[30] it is the political relations between subject and overlord which have commanded most attention. Material life looms rather larger in this account of a region – usually known as the Allgäu – which never industrialized, and which in modern Germany is notable primarily for its

[25] See his *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis* (Berkeley, CA, 1979); *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, Vol. I: *Power, Property and the State* (Berkeley, CA, 1981); *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge, 1984). Also suggestive is Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford, 1991).

[26] E. P. Thompson, "Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," *Past and Present*, 38 (1967), pp. 56–97 and Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century* (Berkeley, CA, 1986) have been enormously influential in different ways. See also Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space 1880–1918* (Cambridge, MA, 1983).

[27] Hubert Kiesewetter, "Zur Dynamik der regionalen Industrialisierung in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert: Lehren für die Europäische Union?" *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte* 1 (1992), pp. 79–112 and Richard Tilly, "German Industrialization and Gerschenkronian Backwardness," *Rivista di Storia Economica* 6, 2 (1989), pp. 139–64.

[28] Patrick K. O'Brien and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, "Agricultural Productivity and European Industrialization, 1890–1980," *Economic History Review* 45, 3 (1992), pp. 514–36.

[29] Moreover, given the current relative economic strengths of Britain and Germany, one might feel justified in suggesting that at least in the long run, first is not necessarily best. In this regard see P. K. O'Brien, "Path Dependency, or Why Britain Became an Industrialized and Urbanized Economy Long Before France," *Economic History Review* 49, 2 (1996), pp. 213–49.

[30] The best recent introductions are the relevant volumes of the *Enzyklopädie Deutscher Geschichte*, in particular André Holenstein, *Bauern zwischen Bauernkrieg und Dreißigjährigem Krieg* (Munich, 1996) and Werner Trossbach, *Bauern 1648–1806* (Munich, 1993).

impenetrable dialect and conservative politics. Usually overlooked in the contemporary perception of the Allgäu is its unusually resilient agrarian economy[31] and its unusual agrarian history: during the early modern period the Allgäu became the bread-basket for the industrialization of neighboring Switzerland. The peasants of Ottobeuren clearly figured something out. This is their story.

[31] In an economic climate where German farmers are increasingly dependent on supplementary by-employment, the region boasts one of the highest proportions of full-time farms in the country. Geoff A. Wilson and Olivia J. Wilson, *German Agriculture in Transition: Society, Politics and Environment in a Changing Europe* (Basingstoke, 2001), pp. 31–5.

1. *Right and might* (c. *1480*–c. *1560*)

History does not record when Anna Maier was born; neither does it record when she died.[1] It does pay rather closer attention to her older brother Johann, who entered the world perhaps two years before his sister in November of 1486, and predeceased her by at least twenty-five years in February of 1543. Both siblings grew up in the Upper Swabian village of Egg, in what is now part of the German province of Bavaria, and was then the lordship of the Benedictine monastery of Ottobeuren. Johann left Egg at the age of eight to be schooled by his uncle Martin Maier, a priest in the city of Rottenburg. The boy went on to study philosophy, law, and theology at the universities of Heidelberg, Cologne and Freiburg, changed his name to Johann Eck, and rose to fame (and notoriety) as the theologian who locked horns with Martin Luther at the Leipzig disputations of 1519.[2] As for Anna, whose story this is, she remained in Egg and inherited the family farm.

The *Hof*, as a large farm like this was called, had originally been held by Anna's grandfather. It came to her father, Michael Maier, in 1483,[3] and sometime around the year 1515 passed to her husband, Thoma Schaupp.[4] It was

[1] Anna is not among the four children listed with her parents in Staatsarchiv Augsburg [hereinafter StAA], Kloster Literalien [hereinafter KL] Ottobeuren 601-I, "Leibeigenbuch 1486/7," f. 21r. The original dating of this MS. to *c.* 1450–80 is incorrect. Through a close comparison with the monastery's charters, I have found that the register must have been drawn up sometime between November 1486 and May 1487. This redating has been accepted by the Staatsarchiv Augsburg (personal communication 13 July 1998).

[2] Theodor Wiedmann, *Dr. Johann Eck, Professor der Theologie an der Universität Ingolstadt* (Regensburg, 1865), pp. 425–31 remains the most detailed treatment of Johann Eck's family. For a more recent, though in this regard derivative work, see Max Ziegelbauer, *Johannes Eck: Mann der Kirche im Zeitalter der Glaubensspaltung* (St. Ottilien, 1987), pp. 3–11. Neither of these discusses Eck's family on the basis of manuscript sources.

[3] StAA, Kloster Urkunden [hereinafter KU] Ottobeuren 414 [1 Nov. 1483].

[4] Thoma Schaupp's charter of admission has not survived. There is, however, a record of Michael Maier's retirement from farming and the associated maintenance agreement between him and Schaupp in StAA, KU Ottobeuren 973 [16 Aug. 1524]. By this time Schaupp already held the *Hof*. Note that since Anna was not born before 1488, she is unlikely to have married earlier than 1513.

the largest *Hof* in Egg, measuring some 110 *jauchert* or 46.5 hectares,[5] and it instantly made Anna's household one of the richest in the village.[6] With wealth came social status: Anna's father served as village *Amman*, or mayor, until his death in 1525, and the office would subsequently be handed along with the *Hof* to Anna's husband.[7] Retaining that position of wealth and prominence, on the other hand, turned out to be more of a struggle.

Thoma Schaupp died during the later 1520s, whereupon Anna took to husband a certain Simon Bürklin. Simon's death in 1533 again left Anna a widow, but she soon remarried, this time to Jerg Wagner.[8] Quite apart from the attendant emotional strain, these repeated losses imposed serious fiscal pressure on Anna's household. In law, the *Hof* was never owned outright by any of those who farmed it. Instead, formal ownership remained with the monastery, which leased the *Hof* to each new (male) tenant for the term of his life. As a woman, Anna could not lease the *Hof* by herself, and thus could not remain a widow if she wanted to stay on the property. It did not matter that Anna had been born on the *Hof*; each remarriage required a new lease to the "new" tenant. And at each new grant, the monastery exacted a hefty transfer fee, known as *Erdschatz*. Three *Erdschatz* payments within twenty-five years was a great deal of money, especially since Anna had so many children – a 1548 census lists her with eight[9] – to care for.

The repeated *Erdschatz* charges seem to have been a source of considerable anger to Anna's family. Her brother Johann Eck, now far away in Ingolstadt, took time from his polemics against the Reformation to write several letters to the Ottobeuren monk and humanist Nikolaus Ellenbog, sometimes asking for Ellenbog's intercession with the Abbot on behalf of Eck's relatives,[10] and

[5] The size and size rank of the *Hof* are documented in StAA, KL Ottobeuren 102, "Steuerbuch 1620," ff. 272r–294v. The *Maierhof* is the first property listed. The earliest (1575) measurement of the *Hof*'s surface area is recorded in StAA, KL Ottobeuren 27, "Erdschatzbuch 1576–1603" (*sic*), f. 228r.

[6] For Thoma Schaupp's wealth see StAA, KL Ottobeuren 541, Heft 2 "Generalrechnung 1529." This document has been mislabeled; it is in fact a tax register drawn up in 1525. The returns from Egg are on ff. 26r–29r; Thoma Schaupp is assessed 8.5 *gulden* on f. 28v.

[7] For Michael Maier's service as *Amman* see Ziegelbauer, *Johannes Eck*, p. 3. For the wealth and service as *Amman* of Anna's third husband, Jerg Wagner, see StAA, KL Ottobeuren 64, "Steuerregister 1546," f. 17r.

[8] Simon Bürklin is mentioned as holding the Egg *Maierhof* in 1530. StAA, KL Ottobeuren 4, "Rotulus Probationum Tomus IV," Document 309C, ff. 1131r–1137r (*Urfehdebrief* of Caspar Maÿr of Egg [4 Apr. 1530]). The 'Rotulus Probationum' is an enormous multi-volume compilation of document copies drawn up in 1616 in connection with a lawsuit. Jerg Wagner's 1533 admission to the *Maierhof* is recorded in StAA KL Ottobeuren 27, f. 225r.

[9] StAA, KL Ottobeuren 600, "Leibeigenbuch 1548," f. 188r.

[10] Nikolaus Ellenbog, *Briefwechsel*, edited by Andreas Bigelmair and Friedrich Zoepfl, *Corpus Catholicorum* 19/21 (Münster in Westfalen, 1938), VI/28, pp. 320–1; Johann Eck to Nikolaus Ellenbog, 23 Apr. 1533. Eck wrote "Caeterum sororem meam commendo tibi et conventui," but promptly warned "faciatis, quod aequum est, ne provocetis Eckium ad ea, a quibus semper pro honore monasterii abstinuit."