Introduction

The thesis of this book is embarrassingly unsophisticated: humans speak; other animals don't. This zoological platitude formed the basis – indeed, the motivation – for much of the ancient Greeks' profound and influential exploration of what it means to be human.

It has long been found useful in both literary and anthropological studies to quote out of context Lévi-Strauss' famous observation (he was critiquing totemism) that animals are chosen to convey certain ideas not because they are good to eat, but because they are good to think with.[1] But for the agrarian Greeks, whose hands were dirty from the earth and animals they worked with and struggled against every day, animals were also good to think about. The Greeks were hard-working pragmatists as well as our intellectual and cultural forebears. They were farmers, and their understanding of human nature and animals was shaped by very different "formative" experiences than those of most of us who study them. To take what I hope is an extreme example, my own childhood familiarity with animals in the suburbs of Los Angeles was limited to a series of family basset-hounds (not exactly Laconian hunting dogs), my sister's pet rat, and a blood-sucking half-moon parrot named Socrates, whom my mother, like the Athenian mob 2,400 years before, finally shipped off to Hades with a tainted beverage.

In the United States, where family farmers are no longer "statistically relevant" – where there are more prison inmates than full-time farmers of any kind, and where ranchers are a dying breed[2] – most of us regularly encounter animals only as fuzzy house companions or on our plates. In this, we are very much unlike the ancient Greeks we read and write about. Few of them could afford to feed a mouth that did not help put food

[1] Lévi-Strauss (1969) 162; see Lloyd (1983) 8 n.7.

[2] Hanson (1996) xvi; Schlosser (2001) 8 with 278 n.8, 133–47. It is sobering to remember that not until 1910 did the United States have more industrial laborers than farm workers. A recent survey showed that many of us spend more than 95 percent of our lives indoors; Bekoff (2002) 139.

on the table in return. In a world where food shortage was just one bad harvest away, only the most wealthy could spare the produce to support ornamental creatures. (We will quickly be reminded that the bad boys of archaic literature, Hesiod and Semonides, included most wives under this rubric.) Possession of a "useless" animal was a mark of prestige, a statement of and advertisement for one's status.[3] Alcibiades' large and handsome dog cost seventy minas and served the explicit purpose, according to Plutarch, of drawing attention to his owner's notoriety, especially when Alcibiades whacked off its beautiful tail.[4]

Nor are we much like the Greeks in our diet. The average American eats 197 pounds of meat each year, much of it shrink-wrapped or dispensed in cardboard boxes and buckets.[5] Athens, on the other hand, which may have provided its citizens with twice as much meat as most other cities, probably distributed less than five pounds of beef yearly to individuals in public sacrifices.[6] And the Greeks derived virtually *all* of what they called meat (*krea*) from animals whose throats were slit in religious ritual – cattle, pigs, sheep, and goats. Isocrates at one point (7.29) grumbles that the Athenians create festivals just for the free meat.[7] Nevertheless, the hungry in antiquity

[3] See Sallares (1991) 311–13, 383. He observes that the horse in Athens was the prestige animal *par excellence* given its difficult diet, small size, and Attica's lack of good pasture land and unsuitability to cavalry; see Arist. *Pol.* 1289b33–41. Purchasing, maintaining, and equipping a horse were expensive; see Anderson (1961) 136–9; Spence (1993) 183, 272–86, who estimates the cost of a horse alone was equivalent to ten months' wages for a skilled craftsman in classical Athens. The hoplite ethos of archaic and classical Athens was antithetical to horsemanship as well; see Spence (1993) 164–230; Hanson (1995) 114.

[4] *Alc.* 9. "Everyone" in Athens objected to the mutilation. Alcibiades' intention was to give Athenians something notorious to focus on so they would ignore his other faults. Plutarch also observes that Alcibiades sent more horses and chariots to the Olympic Games than any king in Greece; cf. Thuc. 6.16.2.

[5] See Table 1-1 on p. 3 of the U.S.D.A.'s *Agriculture Fact Book 2000*; this includes beef, pork, veal, lamb, chicken, turkey, fish and shellfish.

[6] Jameson (1988a) 105. It is extremely difficult to determine how much meat was eaten at sacrifices – we do not even know if the civic distribution included the wives, children, and dependants of male citizens; see Osborne (1993); Rosivach (1994) esp. 157–8; Garnsey (1999) 100–12. We have no good data on how much meat could have derived from private sacrifies, or how much poultry, fish, ham, or sausage (that is, animal flesh available outside of the sacrificial meal) was eaten; see Isager and Skydsgaard (1992) 94–6. Frost (2001) offers us his own classical Greek recipe for pork sausage. Certainly, old animals frequently became dinner, young males were culled from herds of sheep and goats, and parts of animals inappropriate for sacrifice were preserved in various ways. Thus meat other than that from public rites – estimated by Rosivach (1994) 11–66 to take place 40–5 times each year in fourth-century Athens – was likely to be available in small supplies to some Greeks sporadically during the year, and in famine situations such resources may have been crucial; see Jameson (1983) 9; Gallant (1991) 121–7. The meat from sacrifices was not all eaten on the spot – it would often be sold raw to butcher shops; Jameson (1999) 327–31. Berthiaume (1982) 64–9 argues that there is some evidence for occasional differences between the meat from sacrifices and meat sold in the agora (that is, not all meat came from the altars, although it all seems to have been killed in a religious context).

[7] Jameson (1999) 326.

were willing to eat a wide variety of creatures, and just about every part of a dead animal found its way into the kitchen. The Hippocratic writer of *On Regimen* lists as animals "that are eaten" cattle, goats, pigs, sheep, donkeys, horses, dogs, wild boar, deer, hares, foxes, and hedgehogs.[8] Most Greeks clearly enjoyed animal flesh when they could get their hands on it. Comic drama is awash with animals, references to animal butchering,[9] and drooling couch potatoes who dream of meat-filled utopias. Teleclides in his *Amphictyons* (in Ath. 268b–d), for example, has a character recall the "olden days" when a river of broth (with conduits of sauces), like some modern-day sushi boat, whisked hot slices of meat to lounging diners. But in contrast to the perfunctory fast-food frenzy of today, meat-eating for the Greeks was consistently linked with the social and civic functions of animal sacrifice: vegetarianism and cannibalism were equally freakish perversities that meant the rejection of human community and civilization itself.[10]

Live animals were even more important in the agrarian polis, however, since they were needed for wool, transport, plowing, protection, manure, and edible by-products. Milk and cheese are far more economical for producing calories and protein than animal flesh. There are few less efficient ways of feeding a community than by waiting for animals to turn grain into animal protein – cattle have a feed-protein conversion efficiency of only 6 percent. Greek goats today give six times as many calories in milk as in meat, and nearly three times as much protein. Classical Greeks would

[8] Hippoc. *Vict.* 2.46 (6.544–6 L.), cited in Parker (1983) 357, who notes that most of these species are supported by other evidence, although some were eaten only by the poor and in times of food shortage. Porphyry (*Abst.* 1.14) claims that horses, dogs, and asses were not eaten; see Jameson (1988a) 115 n.5 for the ambiguity of the archaeological material. Wilkins (2000a) 17–21 has a rather unappetizing list of the parts of the animal considered edible. An excellent survey of foods eaten in classical Greece can be found in Dalby (1995) 57–92. Fowl were also occasionally sacrificed, and perhaps fish (although most fish seem to have been excluded from regular sacrifice). For the amount of fish likely to have been eaten in classical Greece and its social significance, see Wilkins (1993) and Davidson (1997) 3–35. Fish were a luxury food, oddly enough; see Wilkins (2000a) 293–304. Both mollusk and demersal species of fish have a very low labor input:caloric output ratio; see Gallant (1991) 120–1. On the "absolute coincidence of meat-eating and sacrificial practice," see: Jameson (1988a) 87; Detienne (1989); Durand (1989); but also the cautions of Osborne (1993). The role of animals in sacrifice will be further discussed in Chapter 4. On the heroic diet of Homeric warriors, see Chapter 3.

[9] The dialogue between the Sausage-Seller and the Paphlagonian tanner in Aristophanes' *Knights* (340–497) is especially sharp: McGlew (2002) 98–9 observes that they fight as if "to determine whether the Sausage-Seller can gut the city more completely than the leather maker can tan it."

[10] Holocausts, in which entire animals were sacrificed (and sometimes thrown alive into a fire) to the gods, were rare; Jameson (1988a) 88. Sacrifice and meat-eating were important elements of other ancient Mediterranean cultures in Mesopotamia, Israel, and Egypt. Katz's (1990) comparative analysis of the roles of sacrifice reveals that each culture found quite different meaning in its rituals.

marvel at the golden age world of modern America, where 70 percent of all cereals grown are transformed into burgers, bacon, and chicken nuggets.[11]

The non-human beast in antiquity derived much of its symbolic force from its ubiquitous and very real presence in daily life.[12] Animals were never merely mirrors of ideology but living, breathing, odorous, and unwitting partners in a struggle for survival. These beasts – who often lived right in the house – were a palpable part of the relentless challenge of working with, taming, or being overwhelmed by a difficult environment in an indifferent universe.[13]

We twenty-first-century Westerners, however, often find ourselves so divorced from the natural world that animals have lost much of the evocative power they possessed for the Greeks. Our de-natured, cuddly animals are not so much good to think about or with as good to *sell* with – witness the lucrative industries spawned by Mickey, Garfield, Tony, Simba, Miss Piggy, Willy, Barney, Franklin, and all their furry friends. TV commercials amuse us, and apparently create successful "brand loyalty," with slovenly (but articulate) chickens trying in vain to con their way into the Foster Farms slaughterhouse. We have carefully severed the flesh and blood of nature from the steaks and gravy of culture, thereby attenuating the potency of both. The popularity of zoos (alien to the classical Greeks but which in the United States now draw far more people than professional sporting

[11] Sources for these statistics can be found in Payne (1985) 226, cited in Jameson (1988a) 103; Rifkin (1992) 160–1. Cattle, goats, and sheep do not seem to have been raised solely for meat, but very young animals and those that had already been productive were culled for food; see Burford (1993) 144–59, and especially Rosivach (1994) 79–106. Pigs, raised beyond infancy only for their meat, could thrive on household and garden waste. Hodkinson (1988) 41–7 argues for fairly extensive growing of fodder crops for animals in the classical period, though contra are Skydsgaard (1988) 81 and Isager and Skydsgaard (1992) 103; see Sarpaki (1992) and Garnsey (1992) 151–2 for the importance of legumes in human diet, and Luce (2000) on how vetch came increasingly to be regarded as food for cattle. Even Hodkinson, however, accepts the conclusions of Foxhall and Forbes (1982) 74 that the Greeks got 70–5 percent of their calories from grain alone; cf. Garnsey (1988), whose entire study of famine and food supply in antiquity is based on the availability of grain. Most of the rest of the classical diet derived from milk products, especially cheese from the milk of sheep and goats; Amouretti (2000) provides a recent survey. To judge from bones found in rubbish heaps, the Greeks hunted and consumed wild animals such as deer, boar, bear, partridge, pigeon, and duck. But the labor input:caloric output ratio would have been low; see Gallant (1991) 119–20, and below, Chapter 3, for the ideology of hunting. For animals as traction, see the "Final Discussion" (168–71) in Wells (1992). Sacrificed animals also supplied hides.

[12] This is true for most ancient as well as modern non-industrialized societies; see the articles in Willis (1990).

[13] Even a casual glance at vase-painting and sculpture reveals that the Greeks surrounded themselves with animals in their art as well. And they appreciated a realistically rendered cow as much as anyone: the *Greek Anthology* has more epigrams in praise of Myron's famous bronze heifer (originally standing in the Athenian agora) than of any other work of art; see Klingender (1971) 67.

events[14]) and wildlife documentaries similarly reveals our fascination with an exotic world completely foreign to – and safely locked away from – our quotidian experience.

The usual suspects rounded up in recent classical scholarship are thus not generally the flesh and blood creatures of the farm but those perhaps even more serviceable beasts of the creative imagination used symbolically in Greek literature.[15] With these "constructed" creatures we in classics have grown quite comfortable. The bibliography on the literary use of animals in various classical authors and genres is immense. Merely corralling the scholarship on the creatures in the three authors examined in this study – Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato – has often felt like a Herculean (if not Sisyphean) task. Heroic lions in Homer have been hunted nearly to extinction, ominous serpents de-fanged in the *Libation Bearers*, Plato's horses of the soul broken and saddled. So many eagle-eyed readers have already tracked the animal imagery in Greek literature that one can't help but worry that the once dangerous and magnificent beasts have become a bit familiar, tamed by the frequent scholarly safaris. What can we possibly have left to learn? Can't we just leave the poor critters alone?

Well, no. But in contrast to most previous studies of animals in Greek literature and culture, this book examines neither specific beastly imagery nor the Greek philosophical debates about the nature of non-human animals. In fact, in several chapters animals paradoxically almost disappear entirely. Instead, I pursue the thematic implications of the most obvious and important criterion separating human and non-human animals in Greek thought – the ability to speak. The silence of beasts provided the cultural backdrop against which the Greeks played out their particular visions of what makes a life worth living for humans. This difference between other animals and us was *not* originally thought to be that we possessed rationality, despite what the fourth- and third-century philosophers

[14] Arluke and Sanders (1996) 1. They also note that pet owners spend more on animal food than parents spend on baby food each year.

[15] Many books and articles have been written about real animals in specific aspects of Greek life, such as elephants in war (there is an entire website on these creatures alone), hunting, or sacrifice, and about individual species (e.g. dogs, apes, dolphins, horses, snakes, frogs, fish, insects – even polar bears). Some studies borrow modern anthropological approaches (e.g. Csapo's [1993] Geertzian analysis of Greek cockfights). An encyclopedic compilation in German of facts about a wide variety of animals in several ancient cultures is now nearly a hundred years old (Keller (1963), originally published in 1909–13. But as yet there exists no broad analysis of the various roles of animals in the daily life of classical Greece; see Lonsdale (1979) and Bodson (1983) for brief surveys. More recent studies can be found by Martini et al. in: Dinzelbacher (2000) 29–144; cf. Lorenz (2000); Dumont (2001). As de Fontenay's book (1998) reveals, to write a history of animals is to write a history of theology, economics, class, gender, war, and philosophy.

would have us believe. The primacy of reason as a distinguishing criterion derived over time from the far more obvious fact of experience that beasts do not speak. "Dumb" animals do not possess any language. For a human to be made speechless is to become dead, sometimes literally but always culturally – nothing better than a beast. The corpses of Persian dead in Greece, we read in Aeschylus, are mute (*aphôna*), mangled by fish who are poetically and poignantly labeled "the voiceless children" (*anaudôn . . . paidôn*) of the sea (*Pers.* 576–80).[16]

Eventually, this lack of speech was connected with irrationality, but that association was a later and secondary philosophical embellishment. If speech is what separates us from the beasts, then the more we master it the more human we become. Equally, the less we are able to articulate our thoughts, the less morally and politically significant we appear. In what becomes a convenient and nearly irreversible cycle, second-class moral and political status can be explained, justified, and maintained by carefully monitoring the opportunity to speak. In ancient Hellas, you are what you can say.[17]

SEPARATING MAN FROM BEAST: GREECE IS THE WORD

Scholars have thoroughly examined the Greek philosophers' endeavors to explain what it is that makes us different from other animals. The Greeks were consumed with this effort, virtually inventing the familiar topos "man alone of the animals is/possesses *x*." Richard Sorabji has documented over three dozen of their answers, including man's unique ability to laugh, distinguish good and bad, know God, do geometry, engage in sex at all seasons (and with other species!), and walk upright, as well as our possession of grammar, shame, and hands.[18] Aristotle alone came up with nearly two dozen different claims for the uniqueness or exceptional character of man.[19] We all are familiar with the answer that many philosophers of the fourth

[16] All translations are my own. I have adopted one of the comfortably capricious systems of transliteration of ancient Greek commonly used in classical scholarship.

[17] Speech remains extremely important in modern Greece, where "silence cannot be easily tolerated"; Sifianou (1997) 74–8. After the classical age, language remained a key issue of Hellenic identity. Elites during the Second Sophistic relied on the artificial resuscitation of the language of classical Athens as a source of political authority. Similarly, the lengthy conflict between demotic and *katharevousa* has only recently been sorted out; see Swain (1996) 17–42.

[18] Sorabji (1993) 89–93; see Renehan (1981) 246–52 for the "man alone is . . ." topos. Longo (2000) offers an interesting examination of the emphasis on the uniqueness of the human hand in Greek philosophy.

[19] See Lloyd (1983) 26–35, with his discussion of the contradictory and imprecise nature of many of these claims.

and third centuries settled upon: man possesses the faculty of reason (*logos*) and other animals do not. Humans alone have *logos*, and this assumption in turn shaped the subsequent examination of the various characteristics associated with rationality, such as beliefs, perception, memory, intention, self-consciousness, etc.

Man is a *zôïon logikon*, a rational animal. All other *zôïa* are *alogika.* (Old habits die hard: the modern Greek word for horse is *alogo*.) The philosophical schools did not agree on how reason works, or on its moral consequences, and even Aristotle is inconsistent as to exactly what animals' souls do and do not possess.[20] But as Sorabji demonstrates, Aristotle introduces the "crisis" both for the philosophy of mind and theories of morality by devising a "scientific" structure for denying reason to animals.[21] Plato laid the foundations by narrowing the content of perception and expanding the content of belief. He places tremendous emphasis on *logos*, but he also grants animals a reasoning part of the soul on occasion. Some passages seem to ascribe to non-human animals cognitive and moral capabilities that are human-like. His theory of reincarnation depends upon similar souls within beasts and humans.[22] Moreover, most people in the Platonic view actually lack *logos* in its purest, philosophical sense. *Logos* is required to live the philosophic life, and few of us would qualify. Plato, too, has an incipient scale of being: certain human lives are not merely "like" but actually synonymous with the lives of beasts.[23]

But with Aristotle, the link between *logos* and humans, and the rejection of *logos* from the non-human, becomes explicit. To become fully

[20] Cole (1992) 45–51 shows that there is a tension in Aristotle's ethology: some passages deny, and some grant, intelligence and moral substance to beasts.

[21] Sorabji's (1993) superb book is an exploration of this crisis and its consequences. Earlier important studies of Aristotle on men and animals are Fortenbaugh (1971); (1975) 65–70; Clark (1975) passim; Dierauer (1977) 100–61; Lloyd (1983) 18–57; Preus (1990); see also de Fontenay (1998) 87–101; Lorenz (2000) 220–41. Alcmaeon of Croton (*fl.* early fifth century) was one of the first to differentiate humans from other animals on the basis of our "understanding" (*xuniêsi*) versus their "perception" (*aisthanetai*, *DK* 24 A5).

[22] See references in Dierauer (1977) 67–97; Renehan (1981) 241; Sorabji (1993) 9–12; Dierauer (1997) 9–10. The best study I have found of Plato's treatment of reason in animals is in an unpublished paper by Cole (1991); see also Preus (1990) 72–4; Pinotti (1994). *Logistikon* in Plato, however, can comprise the whole contents of soul before it enters body. If animals do not have it, then they do not have a soul (cf. *Phdr.* 24b–c; see Rohde [1925] 483 n.40). Later Platonists denied the entrance of the human soul into animals. Proclus, for example, insists that when Plato suggests the soul of Thersites chose the body of an ape (*Resp.* 10.620c) the philosopher means not that the soul entered the body of a beast but took on its character only (*In Platonis Timaeum* 329d); see McDermott (1938) 147 and n.5; Smith (1984). At one point, Plato defines man, etymologically, as the lone creature who looks up at what he has seen and thinks about it (*Cra.* 399c).

[23] Cole (1991); Baldry (1965) 53–5; e.g. *Tim.* 90eff.: if a man fails to make proper use of reason, his soul in its second incarnation will "sink" into that of a woman, bird, four-footed creature, etc.; see also Solmsen (1955) 160–4.

human, we must exercise our capacity for *logos*. It is our definition, our inherent goal, our *telos*. This Aristotelian concept, when linked with Christian metaphysics through various migrations, has been perhaps the single most influential principle in Western religious and ethical thought.

Although this distinction, based upon the possession of reason, has seemed absolutely natural to most Westerners, it is hard to find another culture that has accepted it so completely. As Robert Renehan notes in his study of the Greek anthropocentric view of man, "[t]hat man differs from animals because of his intelligence, so far from being a natural way of looking at things, is an exceptional mode of thought in the history of man."[24] And in fact rationality is *not* the earliest determinant of human uniqueness we find in Greek thought, and it did not go unchallenged, even by Aristotle's successors.

As any first-year student of Greek can testify, *logos* is a tricky word (the LSJ lists over fifty different possible translations). Closely linked to the idea of reason, and more central to the word's basic meaning, is "speech." This noun derives from the same root as the verb *legô*, which means "to gather," "to count," "to recount, tell," and ultimately "to say." The first attested meaning of *logos*, in Homer and Hesiod, has nothing to do with rationality but clearly denotes speech (*Il.* 15.393; *Od.* 1.55–7; Hes. *Op.* 78, 106, 789, *Theog.* 229, 890; cf. *Hymn Hom. Merc* 317–18). When Heraclitus and Parmenides use *logos* not simply as a "verbal utterance" but as something rational – that is, rationality in speech and thought (even outside the human mind and voice) – they set the word on its fateful and well-documented course.[25] It is in this *secondary* development that the word becomes not just the outward form by which inward thought is articulated, but the inward thought itself, the ability to give voice to some reasoned conception (rather than merely to express pleasure and pain, for example). Ultimately, *logos*

[24] Renehan (1981) 239.

[25] See especially Heracl. 1, 2, 50 and Parm. 7. The meaning of *logos* in these passages is disputed, but there is agreement that the word has moved beyond mere articulate language; see Boeder (1959) 82–91; Lincoln (1997), with references to previous scholarship on *logos*. Lincoln shows that *logos* in its early appearances not only refers to speech but in particular to the language of women, as well as the weak, young, and shrewd, that is delightful but also deceptive. The verbal form in Homer more usually means "to gather," but "recount" or "tell" is not uncommon (e.g. *Il.* 13.292; 20.244; *Od.* 3.296; 12.165; 14.197; 23.308); see Janko (1992) ad *Il.* 13.292. The LSJ suggests that the verb first means "say" or "speak" in Hesiod (*Theog.* 27), but the use at *Od.* 203 is very similar; see West (1966) ad *Theog.* 27; Russo (1992) ad *Od.* 19.203. Since I am not interested in the "rational" side of *logos per se* in this study, the long-standing debate over the movement in Greek thought from *muthos* to *logos* is not of immediate concern; see the articles in Buxton (1999) for a recent review of this discussion. Neither do I pursue the philosophical critiques of the inefficacy or limits of *logos*; see Mortley (1986); Roochnik (1990).

comes to mean argument, thought, reason, and dozens of other related ideas.

As we shall see, the most important early Greek vision of the difference between humans and other animals was the most obvious one of all: we talk; they do not.[26] Early Greek has a poetic word, *meropes*, used only as an epithet of humans. It was unclear even to the classical Greeks exactly what the word meant, but later it was thought to derive from two words that signify "dividing the voice," that is, "articulate." Even if this is a false etymology, which it probably is,[27] the invention and promulgation of this derivation itself reveal the natural connection in the Greek mind between speaking and being human.

This link similarly underlies Herodotus' celebrated tale of Pharaoh Psammetichus' test (2.2).[28] Eager to discover which of two nations – Egypt or Phrygia – was the oldest, Psammetichus ordered two newborn children to be raised by a shepherd, who was not to speak a word in their presence. Two years later, both children began to cry out *bekos*, a Phrygian word for bread. The Egyptians immediately conceded that Phrygia was the oldest culture (and, without need of further evidence, claimed second prize). The Pharaonic experiment assumes that philology recapitulates phylogeny. Even without any adult modeling, because the children are human they must eventually speak, and they will utter humanity's primal, "natural" language.

Plato and Aristotle put speech before rationality in important ways, a fact that is often missed or underemphasized. Reasoning for Plato, we should remember, is the silent debate of the soul within itself, and belief is the silent conclusion to a question posed in the inner debate.[29] And although later Platonists such as Plotinus and Proclus would insist on the inexpressibility of the highest truths, and Plato himself emphasized the difficulties of grasping and conveying the highest wisdom, he also demanded that philosophers "give an account" (*logon didonai*) of what they know.[30] Without

[26] Good discussions of speech as the defining characteristic of humans in classical thought, with further references, can be found in Dierauer (1977) 32–5; Buxton (1982) 48–62; Thalmann (1984) 78–9; Sorabji (1993) 80–6; Pelliccia (1995) 25–30, 55–79, 103–8. Harrison (1998) argues that the idea that language sets humans apart from animals is less prevalent among the ancient Greeks than in modern times, but even he must admit that there must be a distinction if the analogy of foreign speech with the sounds of birds is to dehumanize the language of barbarians; see below, Chapter 4. Harriott (1982) 13 makes some provocative comments in passing on the significance of animals' inability to speak.

[27] E.g. Hsch.; Schol. on *Il.* 1.250; see Kirk (1985) ad *Il.* 1.250.

[28] See the discussion of Harrison (1998) with references in note 131.

[29] *Tht.* 184d–187b; 189e–190a; *Soph.* 263e; *Phlb.* 38c–e; also Aristotle at *Ath. Pol.* 76b25f.; see Sorabji (1993) 10.

[30] Lloyd (2002) 99.

language, there is no rationality at all. The *logos* denied in adjective *aloga* was originally speech, and only later spread its semantic wings to encompass "irrationality."[31]

Animals obviously do not speak as we do, and this fact was later taken as proof by many philosophers that non-humans had no capacity for language or rational thought. The strength of this link is in fact currently more intensely debated in the scientific literature than ever before, and I will return to it in the Epilogue. Even Aristotle himself, unlike the later Hellenistic philosophers (especially the Stoics), does not provide a sustained discussion of the relation between language and thought. He may have seen language more as a means of developing rationality than as being directly constitutive of it.[32] But in his famous account of the origins of the polis – before his discussion of natural rulers and subjects on the basis of mastery of *logos* (rationality in this case) – he makes clear that no community is possible at all without speech. Humans alone can speak, and speech enables communities to be formed for the pursuit of justice. Language, man's unique endowment, enables him to sort out what is right and wrong:

> For nature, as we say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who possesses speech (*logos*). The *voice* (*phônê*), to be sure, signifies pain and pleasure and therefore is found in other animals [. . .] but *speech* is for expressing the useful and the harmful, and therefore also the just and the unjust. For this is the peculiar characteristic of man in contrast to the other animals, that he alone has perception of good and evil, and just and unjust and the other such qualities, and the participation in these things makes a household and a city-state (polis). (*Politics* 1253a9–19)

Language has its *telos* in pursuing justice, thus making the polis possible. Here, *logos* is speech with an attitude, with an inherent purpose. And the polis, as Aristotle argues here and in his *Ethics*, through its laws and customs habituates humans into the good life. Except as a "creature of a polis" (*politikon zôïon*) – and on this almost all Greeks agreed – we cannot be human at all, but must be either a beast or a god.[33]

[31] Dierauer (1977) 33; Lorenz (2000) 222.

[32] See: Gill (1991) 174–80; Everson (1994b) 7–8; especially Sorabji (1993) (versus Gill on pages 20–8) for discussion and references; Preus (1990) 85–99 for the Peripatetics. For the Stoics, the connection is secure: the rational animal, the only animal worthy of moral consideration, has linguistic, propositional context to its impressions; see *LS* 53T with 53V, 33A–D; for Stoic language, Long (1971); for rationality, Inwood (1985) 18–41, 66–91. Good on the place of language in the Pyrrhonists is Glidden (1994); Clark (2000) provides an introductory sketch of the significance of animal passions.

[33] For the implications of Aristotle's biological conception of the political animal for human politics, see: Depew (1995); Kullman (1991). Kullman (on pages 99–100) concludes that Aristotle claims that "there are also other animals which are political, but that man is especially political because of his