# Philosophy of Experimental Biology

*Philosophy of Experimental Biology* explores some central philosophical issues concerning scientific research in modern experimental biology, including genetics, biochemistry, molecular biology, developmental biology, neurobiology, and microbiology. It seeks to make sense of the explanatory strategies, concepts, ways of reasoning, approaches to discovery and problem solving, tools, models, and experimental systems deployed by modern life science researchers and also integrates recent developments in historical scholarship, in particular the New Experimentalism. It concludes that historical explanations of scientific change that are based on local laboratory practice need to be supplemented with an account of the epistemic norms and standards that are operative in science. This book should be of interest to philosophers and historians of science as well as to scientists.

Marcel Weber is Swiss National Science Foundation Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University of Basel, Switzerland.

### CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND BIOLOGY

General Editor Michael Ruse Florida State University

Advisory Board

Michael Donoghue Yale University Jean Gayon University of Paris Jonathan Hodge University of Leeds Jane Maienschein Arizona State University Jesús Mosterín Instituto de Filosofía (Spanish Research Council) Elliott Sober University of Wisconsin Nils-Christian Stenseth University of Oslo Daniel W. McShea Duke University Alfred I. Tauber The Immune Self: Theory or Metaphor? Elliott Sober From a Biological Point of View Robert Brandon Concepts and Methods in Evolutionary Biology Peter Godfrey-Smith Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature William A. Rottschaefer The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency Sahotra Sarkar Genetics and Reductionism Jean Gayon Darwinism's Struggle for Survival Jane Maienschein and Michael Ruse (eds.) Biology and the Foundation of Ethics Jack Wilson Biological Individuality Richard Creath and Jane Maienschein (eds.) Biology and Epistemology Alexander Rosenberg Darwinism in Philosophy, Social Science, and Policy Peter Beurton, Raphael Falk, and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (eds.) The Concept of the Gene in Development and Evolution David Hull Science and Selection James G. Lennox Aristotle's Philosophy of Biology Marc Ereshefsky The Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy Kim Sterelny The Evolution of Agency and Other Essays William S. Cooper The Evolution of Reason Peter McLaughlin What Functions Explain Steven Hecht Orzack and Elliott Sober (eds.) Adaptationism and Optimality Bryan G. Norton Searching for Sustainability Sandra D. Mitchell Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism Gregory J. Cooper The Science of the Struggle for Existence Joseph LaPorte Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change William F. Harms Information & Meaning in Evolutionary Processes Markku Oksanen and Juhani Pietarinen Philosophy & Biodiversity Jason Scott Robert Embryology, Epigenesis, and Evolution

# Philosophy of Experimental Biology

MARCEL WEBER

University of Basel





## **CAMBRIDGE** UNIVERSITY PRESS

32 Avenue of the Americas, New York NY 10013-2473, USA

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521829458

© Marcel Weber 2005

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2005

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

ISBN 978-0-521-82945-8 Hardback ISBN 978-0-521-14344-8 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

For Andrea, Liliane, and Ardian

## Contents

Pre	<i>page</i> xiii		
Ack	knowl	edgements	XV
1.	Intro	1	
2.	Reductionism and the Nature of Explanations		18
	2.1	The Mechanism of Action Potentials in	
		Neurotransmission	21
	2.2	Explanatory Heteronomy	24
	2.3	Laws and Natural Kinds	29
	2.4	Functions and Functional Explanation	35
	2.5	Multiple Realization and the New Reductionism	41
	Sum	imary	49
3.	Discovery: Solving Biological Problems		51
	3.1	Molecular Genetics: Deduced from Experiments?	55
	3.2	Mendelian Genetics: Resolving Anomalies	63
	3.3	The Urea Cycle: Intelligible to Reason	73
	3.4	Is There a Logic of Generation?	82
	Sum	imary	86
4.	Scientific Inference: Testing Hypotheses		88
	4.1	The Oxidative Phosphorylation Controversy in	
		Biochemistry	91
	4.2	Experimental Tests of Mitchell's Theory	96
	4.3	Underdetermination and Duhem's Problem	101
	4.4	Reconstitution and Closure	106
	4.5	Why Biochemists Are Not Bayesians	108
	4.6	Arguing from Error	113

#### Contents

	4.7	The Control Experiment	118		
	Sum	imary	126		
5.	Exp	erimental Systems: A Life of Their Own?	127		
	5.1	Experimental Systems as Functional Units			
		of Research	131		
	5.2	Ox-Phos Revisited	136		
	5.3	The Role of Epistemic Norms	143		
	5.4	Local Settings versus Universal Standards	149		
	Sum	Imary	153		
6.	Mod	lel Organisms: Of Flies and Elephants	154		
	6.1	The Molecularization of Drosophila	157		
	6.2	Model Organisms as "Systems of Production"	164		
	6.3	The Shortcomings of Technological and Economic			
		Metaphors	169		
	6.4	Preparative Experimentation	174		
	6.5	"Right Choices" or Co-Construction?	176		
	6.6	What Can be Learned from Studying Model			
		Organisms?	179		
	Sum	imary	186		
7.	Refe	erence and Conceptual Change: Out of Mendel's Garden?	188		
	7.1	The Gene Concept in Flux	194		
	7.2	Changing Modes of Reference	203		
	7.3	Classical and Molecular Genes in Drosophila	215		
	7.4	Biological Variability, Essentialism, and Floating			
		Reference	223		
	Sum	imary	227		
8.	Developmental Biology and the Genetic Program:				
	Exp	laining Ontogeny	229		
	8.1	A Critique of Developmental Systems Theory	232		
	8.2	Pattern Formation in Drosophila	243		
	8.3	The Concept of Information in Developmental Biology	248		
	8.4	Is DNA a Master Molecule?	256		
	Sum	imary	263		
9.	Scie	ntific Realism: In Search of the Truth	266		
	9.1	Realism about What?	268		
	9.2	The "Miracle Argument"	274		
	9.3	The Experimentalist Argument	278		

#### Contents

9.4 The Argument from Independent Determinations	281			
9.5 Experimental Artifacts: Lessons from the Mesosome	287			
Summary				
Notes				
Bibliography				
Index				

## Preface

In the century between the rediscovery of Mendel's laws (1900) and the completion of the Human Genome Project (2001), biology has come a very long way. During this time, biologists have made spectacular advances in understanding the cellular and molecular basis of life. This knowledge has considerable potential for improving people's lives – a potential that is only beginning to be realized. Thus, in terms both of the knowledge it produces and of the technological opportunities it offers, modern experimental biology is one of the most successful scientific endeavors of all time. Yet remarkably little is known about its epistemology and the underlying metaphysics.

This book explores some central philosophical issues concerning scientific research in modern experimental biology, that is, in areas such as genetics, biochemistry, molecular biology, microbiology, neurobiology, and developmental biology. Evolutionary theory – traditionally the center of attention in the philosophy of biology – only appears marginally, and only where it is relevant to understanding experimental biology. There already exists a massive amount of philosophical literature on evolutionary theory (including a book by this author, Weber 1998a), while experimental biology has not received the philosophical attention that it deserves and needs.

In addition to filling this gap, the present work also reveals a certain independence of experimental biology from evolutionary theory. This is not necessarily to imply that Theodosius Dobzhansky was mistaken when he said, "Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution," but perhaps that there are different ways of making sense of things. This book is an attempt to make sense of the explanatory strategies, concepts, ways of reasoning, approaches to discovery and problem solving, tools, models, and experimental systems deployed by modern life science researchers. To a considerable extent, this can be done independent of evolutionary theory. However, I will also show where evolutionary thinking is indispensable.

xiii

#### Preface

The readers I have in mind are philosophers and historians of science as well as practicing scientists. To the latter group of potential readers, apologies are extended for the strange questions sometimes asked by philosophers. Philosophy is a long and highly elaborate discussion that has been going on for more than 2,000 years now, and some of the questions raised by philosophers today are a result of things that were said by other philosophers centuries ago. But philosophy and modern science are birds of a feather. Their common historical origins should ensure that communication is possible across the boundaries of today's academic specialties. I have tried to facilitate this by providing brief introductions to the philosophical issues at the beginnings of the chapters, and to the scientific principles involved when I discuss actual examples from experimental biology.

Teachers may find the book helpful for a graduate-level course in philosophy of biology. In particular, it could complement the standard readings in philosophy of evolutionary biology. For courses in general philosophy of science, this book covers some of the central problems in the field, such as laws and explanation, reduction, scientific inference, experimentation, discovery and problem solving, and scientific realism. Traditionally, these issues are treated in the context of physics. But classical physics is outdated, while contemporary physics is incomprehensible to anyone without a Ph.D. in physics. By contrast, the science covered in this book should be accessible to everyone with some basic knowledge of biology.

If the book should lead students, teachers, and researchers to a deeper appreciation of some of the exciting philosophical problems that lurk behind the headline-making scientific discoveries of modern biology, my aim would be fulfilled.

## Acknowledgements

Special thanks to Paul Hoyningen-Huene for his continuing support. The great team spirit at the center for Philosophy and Ethics of Science at the University of Hannover has been a major inspiration during the genesis of this book. A part of the book was written in spring 2001 at the Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science in Berlin. I am grateful to Hans-Jörg Rheinberger and his group for giving me access to their stimulating intellectual community and for their patience in listening to a philosopher's problems. Martin Carrier, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Peter McLaughlin, and three anonymous readers for Cambridge University Press have read drafts of the whole work and have provided valuable criticism. Individual chapters were read by Roberta Millstein, Tatjana Tarkian, Hanne Andersen, Douglas Allchin, Jay Aronson, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Howard Sankey, Ken Waters, Daniel Sirtes, Werner Eisner, Ingo Brigandt, Helmut Heit, Renato Paro, Ulrich Stegmann, and Eric Oberheim. Their numerous objections, criticisms, comments, and suggestions (as well as some kind words and a few insults) allowed me to write a much better book than I could have accomplished all by myself. Of course, none of these colleagues should be held responsible for any of the shortcomings that remain.

My research has also benefited from discussions with a number of scientists, especially Gottfried Schatz, Walter Gehring, Renato Paro, and Bernhard Dobberstein. Thanks also to Greta Backhaus and Liliane Devaja for their help with the illustrations.

Furthermore, I wish to thank audiences at the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science and the University of Minnesota's Studies of Science and Technology Program in Minneapolis, the Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science in Berlin, the Department of Medical Philosophy and Clinical Theory at the University of Copenhagen, the 1999 Spring School in Science and Technology Studies at the University of Zürich, the Zentrum für Molekulare Biologie (ZMBH) at the University of Heidelberg, and the philosophy

#### Acknowledgements

departments at the Universities of Bielefeld, Heidelberg, Erfurt, and Münster for stimulating discussion of paper presentations related to this book. Last but not least, I thank my editor, Michael Ruse, for his encouragement, and Stephanie Achard for seeing the book through the press.

My apologies go to those colleagues whose original work on the relevant topics is not cited. The literature in the history and philosophy of biology as well as in general philosophy of science has grown vast; I could not read it all.