

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-82804-8 - States and Markets: A Primer in Political Economy

Adam Przeworski

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

Contents

Preface	<i>page</i> ix
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Decentralized allocation mechanisms	1
1.2 Centralized allocation mechanisms	7
1.3 Political-economic equilibria	10
1.4 Plan of the book	15
 Section I: Decentralized mechanisms	17
2 Market miracles and market failures	19
2.1 Readings	19
2.2 Introduction	19
2.3 Walrasian market	20
2.4 Market failures	28
2.4.1 Increasing returns	28
2.4.2 Public goods	30
2.4.3 Externalities	35
2.4.4 Are transaction costs a source of market failure?	38
2.5 Conclusion	40
3 Incomplete markets, imperfect information	42
3.1 Readings	42
3.2 Introduction	42
3.3 Causes of market incompleteness	43
3.3.1 Futures markets	43
3.3.2 Risk markets	44

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Table of Contents

[More information](#)vi **Contents**

3.3.3	Public goods and externality markets	45
3.3.4	Markets for future labor	45
3.4	Consequences of missing markets	46
3.5	Conclusion and some implications	53
4	Principal-agent framework	55
4.1	Readings	55
4.2	Introduction	55
4.3	Preliminaries	55
4.3.1	General assumptions	55
4.3.2	Risk postures, utility functions, and risk allocation	58
4.3.3	Questions to be answered	61
4.4	Analysis	64
4.4.1	Imperfect, symmetric, verifiable information	64
4.4.2	Asymmetric information	69
4.5	Conclusion	75
Section II: Centralized mechanisms		77
5	The state	79
5.1	Readings	79
5.2	Introduction	80
5.3	Demand for coercion: Structures of interests and compliance	82
5.4	Forms of state	85
5.4.1	Objectives of rulers	85
5.4.2	Technologies of rent extraction	88
5.4.3	Technologies for replacing rulers	92
5.5	The structure of the state	94
5.5.1	Collective decision making	94
5.5.2	Delegation and implementation	95
6	Governments and private agents: Regulation	99
6.1	Readings	99
6.2	Introduction	100
6.3	A general model of regulation	102
6.4	Moral hazard of the principal	105
6.5	Endogenous regulation	108
6.6	Regulatory capture	113

Contents

vii

6.7 Competing interests	117
6.8 Money and politics	120
6.9 Appendix: Optimal regulation under incomplete information	122
7 Politicians and bureaucrats: Oversight	128
7.1 Readings	128
7.2 Introduction	128
7.3 Generic problems of oversight	130
7.4 Political uses of public power	134
7.5 Checks and balances	137
7.5.1 Multipartisan control	138
7.5.2 Contramajoritarian control	140
7.6 Insulated bureaucracies	143
7.7 Conclusion: Politics and administration	145
8 Citizens and politicians: Representation	147
8.1 Readings	147
8.2 Introduction	148
8.3 A simple model of electoral accountability	149
8.4 Voters' control over politicians	153
8.5 Conclusion	157
Section III: The state and the economy	159
9 Government and economic growth	161
9.1 Readings	161
9.2 Mechanics of growth	162
9.3 Optimal growth	164
9.4 Government and economic growth	167
9.5 Politics of economic growth	170
9.6 Appendix: Some steps in the Barro (1990) model	177
10 Government and redistribution	181
10.1 Readings	181
10.2 Introduction	181
10.3 Preferences for equality	182
10.4 Positive theories of redistribution	186
10.4.1 Models of party competition	186
10.4.2 Applications to redistribution	192
10.5 Democracy and efficiency	199

viii **Contents**

11	Government and insurance	203
11.1	Readings	203
11.2	Justifications of the welfare state	203
11.2.1	Solidarity	203
11.2.2	Insurance	205
11.2.3	Militarism	206
11.2.4	Efficiency	206
11.3	Risk pooling and the welfare state	206
11.4	Endogenous provision of compulsory insurance	209
12	Epilog	213
13	Additional references	216
	Index	221