

Index

ability, and knock-out competitions, 178–9 aesthetics: and differences in procedures of rational assessment, 39; difficulty of establishing pre-eminent claims of, 19; and ethical criticism, 167; and qualification, 84. See also art

ambiguity: and notions of probability and improbability, 52, 69–77; in syllogisms, 100–5

analytic arguments: and claims to knowledge, 206, 214; and irrelevance of analytic criteria, 153–6, 228–32; and layout of arguments, 114–25; and substantial arguments, 125–31, 133, 134, 155, 216; and transcendentalism, 210–11

analytic syllogisms, and working versus idealised logic, 137–43. *See also* syllogisms

anthropology, and re-ordering of logical theory, 234

apodeixis: definition of, 2; and logic as system of eternal truths, 163–4,

applied logic, and comparative methods, 235

argument: and ambiguities in syllogism, 100–5; data and warrants in pattern of, 89–95; force and criteria in assessment of, 28–33; and formal validity, 110–14; impossibilities and features of in different fields, 21–8; and irreducibility of standards in different fields, 36–40; and notion of 'field', 154–5; as organism, 87; phases of, 15–21; probability and quality of, 83; and problem of assessment-procedure, 12–15; purposes of, 12; and simplicity, 133–4; and 'universal premisses', 105–9; and use of modal term 'probably', 48; warrants and pattern of, 91–100. *See also* analytic arguments; field-dependent arguments; substantial arguments

Aristotelianism, and seventeenth-century revolution in thought, 167–8

Aristotle: and backing of warrants, 121; and concept of apodeixis, 2, 163–4, 171; and logic as formal science, 3, 5; mathematics and theory of logic, 172, 173; and substantial arguments, 139; and syllogisms, 100

art, as implicit model for logic, 4. See also aesthetics

assertion: and definition of claim, 11–12; and mathematical statements, 225; as purpose of argument, 12; and use of term 'intuition', 223

assessment: and field-dependence of standards, 33–6; and 'force' or 'criteria' as modal terms, 28–33; and irreducibility of standards, 36–40; and problem of procedure in arguments, 12–15; and use of 'cannot' as modal term, 21–8

242 Index

astronomy: and planetary dynamics, 127–8; and reductionism, 213 Austin, J. L., 45, 49, 198, 219, 228 authenticity, and differences in assessment of arguments in different fields, 38 Ayer, A. J., 215

backing of warrants: and patterns of argument, 91–100, 101–2, 104, 107–8; in substantial and analytic arguments, 116–18, 139–40. *See also* warrants behaviourism, and substantial arguments, 212 belief, and probability, 42–3, 59–60 Berkeley, George, 81–2, 214–15

Boole, George, 81, 164

calculus: and knock-out competitions, 184–5, 187–8, 189, 190; and mathematical theory, 192–3; modern

differential form of, 229. See also mathematics

'cannot': and field-invariant force versus field-dependent standards, 35–6, 38; as modal term in assessment of arguments, 21–8, 32

Carnap, Rudolf: and mathematical logic, 172, 173; and predictions, 169; and probability theory, 42, 43–4, 69–70, 75, 76, 77, 148–9, 164; and psychologism, 79–81

civil cases, and canons of legal argument, $\ensuremath{^{15}\text{--}16}$

claims: and aesthetics, 19; and definition of assertion, 11–12; distinction between conclusions and, 90–1; general, psychological and moral in epistemological theory, 204–6; probability and improper or mistaken, 53–7. *See also* knowledge

cognising: and claims to knowledge, 220, 228; questions about observable mental processes of, 198–9

cognition: intuition and mechanisms of, 221–8; processes of and epistemological theory, 196, 201

coherence, and rational assessment, 158–9

Collingwood, R. G., 237–8

comparative logic, and logical theory, 234, 235-6

conclusions: and analytic arguments, 122; datum and backing of warrants, 101–2; distinction between claims and, 90–1; and stages in presentation of argument, 19–21; in substantial and analytic arguments, 116–18; and 'universal premisses', 106

consistency, and rational assessment, 158–9, 160. *See also* inconsistency

context: and frequencies or proportions of alternatives, 64; and mental processes of cognising, 199; and 'possibility' as modal term, 34

contradiction: and consistency, 160; and mathematical impossibility, 30

criminal cases, and canons of legal argument, 15-16

criteria, for use of modal terms, 28–33 criticism: ethical versus aesthetic, 167; of improper or mistaken claims, 54, 57

data: and analytic syllogisms, 124–5; and backing of warrants, 98–9, 101–2; and patterns of arguments, 91–5; and 'universal premisses', 106

deduction: and analytic syllogisms, 138–9, 142–3; and contrast between scientific and mathematical arguments, 147–8; and distinction between analytic and substantial arguments, 134, 141; and formal validity, 112–14, 143

defeasibility, and layout of arguments, 131-2

deontic logic, 173 Descartes, René, 71, 229, 230–1 designation and designatum, and probability, 60, 61, 64, 65, 69 Dewey, Thomas, 3–4, 5

empathy, and historical knowledge, 208 empiricism: and probability, 71; and re-ordering of logical theory, 234, 236–7

episteme, and logic as formal science, 2, 3 epistemology: ambiguous status of, 195, 196; as branch of comparative applied logic, 196; and claims to knowledge, 201–6; development of in seventeenth century, 196–7; intuition and mechanism of cognition, 221–8; and irrelevance of analytic ideal, 228–32;



Index 243

and justification of induction, 217–21; radical re-ordering of, 234–8; substantial arguments and transcendentalism, 206–16. *See also* logic; philosophy and philosophers ethics: and aesthetic criticism, 167; and analytic arguments, 161; and distinction between force and criteria, 31; and 'universal premisses', 109

Euclid, 168, 186

evaluative terms, use of in logical arguments, 30–2

evidence: ambiguity and concepts of probability and, 70–7; and assessment of arguments in different fields, 39; presentation of in series of stages, 17–21; and probability, 50–1, 68, 69, 83; and use of modal term 'probably', 48; variable relevance of in different kinds of cases, 16

exception, and modal qualifiers, 93-4 expectation, and the notion of probability, 61-6

experience, and notions of probability and expectation, 62–3, 68

field-dependent arguments: and analytic criteria, 154; and backing of warrants, 96; definition of, 15; distinguishing field-invariant from, 21; and epistemological theory, 202; and use of terms 'can' and 'possible', 35–6

field-invariant arguments: and analytic criteria, 154; and assessment of arguments, 33–6; and criteria of possibility, 34, 35–6; definition of, 15; distinguishing field-dependent from, 21; and epistemological theory, 202

fields of arguments, 14–15 force: and backing of warrants, 104; and development of mathematical theory of probability, 84; and justification of induction, 220–1; as modal term in assessment of arguments, 28–33; probability and use of term, 82

form: and backing of warrants, 96; use of term in logic, 40. See also logical form formal logic, and mathematics, 172–3 formal validity: and analytic syllogisms, 137; and definition of 'deductive', 112–14, 143 Frege, Gottlob, 80, 164 frequencies of alternatives, and definitions of 'probability', 63–4, 68, 73

geometry: form of and validity of arguments, 88; and knock-out competitions, 186; and logical theory, 164–5. *See also* mathematics grounds, and backing of warrants, 104–5

Hare, R. M., 149–50 Hart, H. L. A., 131–2 history: empathy and claims to knowledge in, 208; and reductionist approach, 213; and re-ordering of logical theory, 234, 237–8 Hume, David, 9, 141, 151–3, 161–2, 214,

imagination, and understanding,

215

impossibility: definition of, 140–1; distinction between force and criteria and notion of mathematical, 29–30; and distinguishing features of arguments in different fields, 21, 38; nature of formal and theoretical, 26

impropriety: of judicial procedure, 27–8; and use of word 'cannot', 24–6 inconsistency, and knock-out competitions, 180. *See also* consistency

induction: and contrast between scientific and mathematical arguments, 147–8; and deductive arguments, 144–5; and distinction between analytic and substantial arguments, 134; epistemological theory and justification of, 217–21; and warrant-establishing arguments, 113

inference: and logic as development of sociology, 4, 5; and moral arguments, 149–50; and notion of formal validity, 112

innate ideas, in epistemology, 197 inter alia clause, and pattern of argument, 99–100

intuition, and mechanisms of cognition, 221-8

intuitionism. See transcendentalism

244 Index

Jean, James, 79

jurisprudence: and layout of arguments, 89; and mathematical logic, 173; and procedures of rational assessment, 39–40; view of logic as generalised, 7–8, 10, 235. See also law

justificatory arguments: and induction in epistemological theory, 217–21; and similarities of pattern and procedure, 16–17; and statements of assertions and facts, 14

Kneale, William: and distinction between deductive and inductive arguments, 144–5; and notion of probability, 42–3, 49–50, 58, 59, 61, 66–9, 70, 74, 77–8; and scientific conclusions, 148; and truth-value of statements, 75

knock-out competition, and system-building, 175–94

knowledge: epistemological theory and claims to, 200, 201, 218; and knock-out competitions, 181; misconceptions in theory of, 229; probability, belief, and, 42–3

Laplace, Pierre Simon de, 73, 127 law: and formalities of judicial process in criminal and civil cases, 15–16; and procedures of rational assessment, 39–40. *See also* jurisprudence

legislation: assessment and grading in appraising programmes of, 32; and warrants backed by statutory provisions, 108

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 71, 164 Locke, John, 214

logic: and analytic criteria, 153–6; counter-view of as technology, 5–6; deduction and treatises on formal, 113; divergence between everyday use and theory of, 155–6; epistemology as branch of general, 196; as formal science, 3–5, 6, 9; as generalised jurisprudence, 7–8, 10; hypothesis on working and idealised, 136–53; and misconceptions in theory of knowledge, 229; modalities of, 156–63; and qualified psychologism, 80; subject matter of, 81; system-building and

systematic necessity, 174–94; as system of eternal truths, 163–73; themes in studies of, 1–10; types of and statements of assertions and facts, 13–14; use of terms and theory of, 6–7. *See also* argument; epistemology; logical form; logical relations; probability; theory

logical form: and notion of formal validity, 110–11; operation of arguments and traditional notion of, 88; and simplicity in layout of arguments, 131. *See also* form; logic

logical gulf, and epistemological theory, 207-8, 210, 216, 230-2

logical necessity: and causal necessity, 191; special notion of, 174–94. *See also* necessity

logical possibility, and claims to knowledge, 230. See also possibility

logical relations: and logic as system of eternal truths, 169–70, 171; and probability, 148–9; and semantics, 80

mathematics: and analytic arguments, 118; and assertions, 225; formal logic and analytic ideal of, 229; as ideal for formulation of logical theory, 164–6, 171–2; and knock-out competitions, 183–6; and logical form, 40; and notion of impossibility, 29–30; and notion of possibility, 34–5; probability and methods of, 84; and view of logic as science, 6; warrants and problem of applicability in, 95. *See also* calculus; geometry

meaning, and distinction between 'force' and 'criteria', 33

metaphor: and concept of probability, 42, 61–2; and view of logic as generalized jurisprudence, 7

Mill, J. S., 230

Mises, Richard von, 72, 73

modal terms: and development of mathematical theory of probability, 85; 'force' and 'criteria' in assessment of arguments, 28–33; and stages in presentation of argument, 17–21; warrants and patterns of argument, 93–4. See also qualifiers

Moore, G. E., 63, 215



Index 245

morality: inferences in arguments of, 149–50; obligation and logical categories of truth and validity, 173

'naturalistic fallacy', 63, 67–8 necessary arguments, and analytic syllogisms, 137 necessity: and formal system of calculus, 191; and modal terms, 19–20; system-building and systematic, 174–94

Newton, Isaac, 113

objectivity, and probability-statements, 65, 67

obligation, moral notion of, 173

perception, and process of cognition, 226 phenomenalism, and substantial arguments, 211–14

philosophy and philosophers: ambiguity and concept of probability, 71; and claims of knowledge, 227–8; and definition of probability, 57–61; and differences across fields in assessment of arguments, 37–40; divergence between questions of 'ordinary man' and, 9; general use of evaluation terms in, 30–2; and steps in re-ordering of ideas, 233; and use of 'probably' in predictions, 47. See also argument; epistemology; logic

physics: and mathematical theory, 193, 229; and nature of formal and theoretical impossibilities, 26

physiology: and epistemology, 234–5; and organism as analogy for argument,

Piaget, Jean, 195 Plato, 229

Platonism, and seventeenth-century revolution in thought, 167, 168

possibility: definition of, 140–1; and field-invariant force versus field-dependent standards, 35–6; and logical modalities, 157–8; modal terms and mathematical concept of, 34–5; modal terms and stages in presentation of argument, 17–19.

practice, concepts or themes in logical, 6, 8–10

precision, and mathematical theory of probability, 86

predictions: and development of mathematical theory of probability, 84, 85; evidence and probability of, 76; and improper or mistaken claims, 56–7; and logic as system of eternal truths, 169; and temporal gulf, 232; and use of term 'probably', 47–9

presumption, and stages in argument presentation, 20-1

Prior, A. N., 150–1, 161, 167
probability: and ambiguity, 69–77;
definition of, 57–61; development of
concepts of, 82–6; and expectation,
61–6; and improper or mistaken claims,
53–7; and logical relations, 148–9;
origins of notions of and examples of
adverb 'probably', 44–9; psychology
and theory of, 77–82; relations between
knowledge, belief, and, 42–3; and use
of neologisms 'probabilify' and

'probabilification', 49–53, 66–9 'probable': and examples of use of adverb 'probably', 44–9, 83; modal qualifiers and definition of, 141; as pre-scientific term, 43–4

probable arguments, and analytic syllogisms, 137

proper form: and logical possibility, 158, 159; and validity of arguments, 88

proportions of alternatives, and definitions of probability, 63–4, 68

propositions: and logical theory, 6, 166; and medieval statement-logic, 167–8; system-building and systematic necessity, 175–94

psychologism, and probability theory, 77, 79–81

psychology: and epistemology, 196, 234–5; and logic as formal science, 3, 5; and notion of logical form, 40; and probability theory, 77–82

Pythagoras, 168

 $\begin{array}{c} \text{qualification, and concept of probability,} \\ 83\text{--}4 \end{array}$

qualifiers: and analytic syllogisms, 138; and distinction between analytic and substantial arguments, 126–7; and kinds of warrants, 93–4. *See also* modal terms

246 Index

quasi-syllogisms: and construction of arguments, 101; and distinction between analytic and substantial arguments, 128–30; and rational competence, 125; and tautology test, 121–2. *See also* syllogisms

Quine, W. V., 166, 171

Ramsey, F. P., 70, 79
ratios, and probability, 72–3
rebuttal, and modal qualifiers, 93–4, 95
reductionism, and substantial arguments,
211, 212
reliability, and objectivity in
probability-statements, 66
Richards, I. A., 215
Ross, W. D., 132
Russell, Bertrand, 80, 160
Ryle, Gilbert, 112

scepticism: and justification of induction, 217–18; and substantial arguments, 211–14

science: claims to certainty in experimental, 145; and innovations, 237; and nature of formal and theoretical impossibilities, 26; status of logic as formal, 3–5, 6, 8; and theory of probability, 82; and use of 'probably' in predictions, 47–9

self-evidence, and analytic syllogisms, 121, 122

simplicity, and layout of arguments, 133-4

skill, and knock-out competitions, 178–9 social reforms, assessment and grading in appraisal of, 32

sociology, and theory of logic, 3–4, 40 solutions, and stages in argument presentation, 18, 20

standards: for layout of arguments, 89; and mathematical theory of probability, 84

Sterne, Laurence, 238 Stevenson, C. L., 215

Strawson, P. F., 145-8, 164, 171

subjectivism, and notion of probability, 57, 59–61, 65–6, 77

substantial arguments: and analytic arguments and syllogisms, 125–31, 133, 134, 138, 155; and applied logic, 235; and layout of arguments, 114–18; and logical gulf, 210; and transcendentalism, 206–16 syllogisms: ambiguity in and layout of arguments, 100–5; and analytic arguments, 119–25. *See also* analytic

syllogisms; quasi-syllogisms symbolism, and knock-out competitions,

system-building, and systematic necessity, 174–94

tautology test, and analytic syllogisms, 121, 123

technology, and view of logic, 5–6 temporal gulf, and predictions, 232

theory, logical: fundamental notions of and use of terms, 6–7; over-simplification and traditional beginning of, 134; radical re-ordering of, 234–8. *See also* logic

thinking, and psychologism, 80 transcendentalism, and substantial arguments, 206–11

trustworthiness: and objectivity in probability-statements, 66; of predictions, 57

truth: logic as system of eternal, 163–73; relativity of to evidence, 76

understanding: experimental inquiry into development of, 195; and imagination, 152–3

'universal premisses', and layout of arguments, 105–9

Urmson, J. O., 70

Utilitarianism, and consequences of legislation and social action, 32

validity: of analytic arguments and analytic syllogisms, 122, 137; and features of form, 40; as intra-field, 235; sources of and layouts of arguments, 88; traditional concept of 'formal', 102, 110–14

verification test, and analytic syllogisms, 121, 122-3

vis viva, debate about nature of, 71

Waismann, Friedrich, 80 warrants: and analytic syllogisms, 124–5, 137, 139–40; and data in analytic



Index 247

arguments, 118–19, 120; and notion of formal validity, 111–14; and substantial arguments, 127; as substitution-rules, 194; and 'universal premisses', 106. *See also* backing of warrants

Whewell, William, 229–30, 238 Wisdom, John, 211 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 233 Wodehouse, P. G., 222 Wright, G. H. von, 173