

Contents

Preface	page xvii
DIVINITY	
I. 'God', 'god', and God	3
1. Existence and essence questions	3
2. Names in questions of existence and belief	4
3. Etymology and semantics	6
4. The core attitudinal conception of God	9
5. The philosophers' conception of God – God as a	
perfect being	11
6. The common conception of traditional theology	12
7. Might there be a god, even if there is not a perfect being?	19
8. Might there not be a god, even if there is a perfect being?	24
ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD	
II. Classical Ontological Arguments	29
1. Introduction	29
2. Part One: René Descartes's ontological proof	31
3. Part Two: "Mr. Spinoza, meet Mr. Russell"	40
4. Part Three: St. Anselm's argument of Proslogion II	59
5. Part Four: Immanuel Kant's critique of Descartes's	
ontological argument	66
Appendix A. Symbols and symbolizations	70
Appendix B. Derivations and models	71
Appendix C. Rules of inference and forms of derivations	78



x Contents

III. M. dana M. dal Ontala dal Americanta	01
III. Modern Modal Ontological Arguments	81
1. Norman Malcolm's argument	81
2. Charles Hartshorne's argument	82
3. A fly in the ointment?	86
4. Other Anselmian arguments	88
5. 'It's the possibility!'	89
6. Foes of ontological arguments say that their	0.0
possibility-premises beg questions	90
7. Friends of ontological arguments respond	91
8. But that – that conceivability entails possibility – is simply	
not true!	92
9. A demotion of the argument from a proof, to a	
license to believe	96
Appendix A. 'Possible worlds'	99
A1. Worlds enough	99
A2. Truth and actuality at possible worlds	101
A3. Modal realism without tears	102
A4. This is not a story	103
A5. A logic for possible worlds	103
Appendix B. Modal logic	105
B1. Sentential modal logic	105
B2. Hartshorne's modal ontological argument	108
B3. Quantified modal logic	110
IV. Kurt Gödel's Ontologischer Beweis	115
1. Introduction	115
2. Language and logic	117
3. Axioms, definitions, and two theorems	118
4. That it is necessary that there is a God-like being	125
5. Would that be God, could it be God?	128
6. Modal collapse	132
7. Concluding recommendations	135
Appendix A. Notes in Kurt Gödel's hand	144
Appendix B. Notes in Dana Scott's hand	145
Appendix C. Mainly derivations	146
C1. A logic for Gödel's system	146
C2. Two promised derivations	148
C3. Derivations of theorems in Gödel's system	149
C4. Derivations for Anderson's emendation of	
Gödel's system	157
•	
V. First Causes: "The Second Way"	168
1. Part 1, Question 2, of Summa Theologica –	1.00
"The Existence of God"	168



Contents	xi
2. An articulation of the Second Way	170
3. 'Efficient causes' in the argument – sustaining, or generating?	175
4. The infinite and infinite regresses	181
5. The preliminary conclusion	190
6. There is a gap in the argument	192
7. On the ultimate conclusion, that God exists: Whether this	
would follow even if all was well in the argument to it	193
Appendix A. Notes on Aquinas's other ways	195
Appendix B. Bangs and infinite regresses of causes	198
B1. Big bang!!	198
B2. A blast from the recent past – William Lane Craig's	
kalām causal argument	198
VI. Ultimate Reasons: Proofs a contingentia mundi	200
1. Classical sources	200
2. A Leibnizian cosmological argument	208
3. On the premises, and terminology	209
4. Comparisons with ontological, and again with first cause,	
arguments	214
5. Cleanthes' objection	215
6. A 'small problem' with our Leibnizian argument	217
7. That 'small problem' with the argument goes into bigger	
problems for its 'ambition'	218
8. <i>Proofs</i> a contingentia mundi – <i>what a nice bad idea</i>	222
Appendix A. Leibniz's problem with necessity	228
A1. What, according to Leibniz, is the reason for the	
existence of the World?	228
A2. Has he given a sufficient reason?	228
A3. Leibniz's 'trilemma'	229
Appendix B. Contingency in John Leslie's Axiarchism	233
Appendix C. Robert C. Koons's 'New Look' cosmological	
argument	234
C1. A start-up problem	234
C2. A terminal problem	236
VII. Look 'Round! – Arguments from Design	238
1. The argument of the Dialogues – first statement	239
2. On assessing arguments for causal explanations	243
3. Probabilities, plain and conditional	247
4. Bayes's theorems	252
5. A 'particular discussion of the evidence' – the Dialogues,	232
Parts 5–8, 10, and 11	258
6. Part 12 of the Dialogues: Hume's 'philosophical theism'	264
7. New facts and new theories	272
	,



xii Contents 8. The argument from design – millennial editions 277 9. It is best to leave God-like beings out of otherwise natural explanations 287 Appendix. Swinburne's teleological argument, and his cumulative argument, for the existence of God 288 A1. Swinburne's teleological argument 288 A2. The 'logic' of this argument 289 A3. The argument compared with Cleanthes' 290 A4. 'Cumulative confirmation' – 'Don't try this at home!' 291 A5. On Swinburne's cumulative argument for the existence of God 294 VIII. Clouds of Witnesses – "Of Miracles" 298 Introductory and prefatory remarks 298 1. 'Miracles' 302 2. 'Laws of nature' 305 3. Evidence for miracles, and for God 309 4. On the first part of Hume's general maxim 312 5. A condition that is not only necessary, but also sufficient, for testimony sufficient to establish a miracle 318 6. On the second part of Hume's maxim 319 7. Bayes's theorem for the evidence of testimony 319 8. Thomas Bayes and Bayes's theorems 321 9. Richard Price 322 10. Lotteries – Price thought they made his case 324 11. Hume, 'I must weigh this' 327 12. Two experiments 328 13. Responses to these results 329 Appendix A. A proof of Hume's theorem 331 Appendix B. Condorcet's rule, witness reliability, and 'last degrees of assurance' 333 B1. Bayesing Condorcet's rule 333 B2. Witness reliability 335 B3. On last degrees of assurance 336 ON TWO PARTS OF THE COMMON CONCEPTION IX. Romancing the Stone 345 1. On the 'common names' of God 345 2. Omnipotence 346 3. 'Essential properties'? 350 4. On whether omnipotence is possible 353 5. *On essential omnipotence* 361



Contents	xiii
6. On necessarily everlasting existence conjoined with	
essential omnipotence	364
7. On omnipotence conjoined with other conditions	
and attributes	364
8. What is left for God of omnipotence?	365
Appendix. A formal articulation of the argument of Section	1 5 367
X. 'God Knows (Go Figure)'	369
1. Introduction	369
2. The primary argument from the impossibility of a set	of
the reflective parts of an omniscient's knowledge	370
3. 'Totalities'	374
4. The argument trimmed	374
5. Subtotalities, mappings, more than, and Cantor for	
totalities	375
6. On kinds of multiplicities	378
7. Taking the measure of these challenges to omniscience	
8. All truths and possibilities for omniscience	382
9. Divine knowledge, a guarded recommendation	386
10. Taking stock, to move on	388
11. Grim's radical argument against omniscience	389
12. Conclusions	391
Appendix. Notes on Cantorian set theory	394
A1. Power sets	394
A2. Cardinalities	394
A3. Cantor's Theorem	395
A4. Cardinalities of power sets	397
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF GOD	
XI. Atheologies, Demonstrative and Evidential	401
1. 'That that's sawce for a goose is sawce for a gander'	401
2. Ambitious atheistic demonstrations	403
3. Modest atheistic demonstrations	404
4. Hume's argument in Part 11 of the Dialogues	405
5. The evidential argument from evil of Rowe (1986)	409
6. The evidential arguments from evil of Rowe (1988)	
and (1996)	413
7. A Bayesian issue for evidence of evil	427
8. Another skeptic	429
9. It can be different strokes for different folks	432
Appendix. Promised derivations	432



xiv **Contents** XII. The Logical Problem of Evil 436 1. The argument from evil 437 2. The argument from the world's not being a best world 439 3. The argument from the world's not being a best divinely creatable world 461 4. The argument from the world's not being a best divine bet world 465 5. The problem of the best 466 6. The argument from there being a better world than this one 468 7. A dilemmatic argument to the world's being improvable 470 8. Might love be the answer? 477 Appendix A. On alleged incompatibilities of divine omniscience and freedom 479 A1. An argument from the purported impossibility of foreknowledge of exercises of freedom 481 A2. Mere everlasting omniscience and freedom: An argument 'after' one of Nelson Pike's 483 A3. An adaptation of the argument to essential everlasting omniscience without necessary existence 486 A4. A similar argument for essential everlasting omniscience with necessary existence 490 Appendix B. A deduction in Section 2.2.3 spelled out 494 PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THEISTIC BELIEFS XIII. Pascalian Wagers 499 499 1. Theoretical and practical reasons 2. The wager 501 3. Part Two. Belief-options 503 4. Part Three. On the variety of possible Pascalian wagers 506 5. Case 2: Believing would have only other-world rewards 514 6. Case 3: Belief is not considered to be cost-free 516 7. Case 4: Alternative reward-policies for salvation are taken seriously 518 8. Variants of Cases 3 and 4 520 9. Case 5: Competing God-hypotheses are taken seriously 521 10. Case 6: Alternative policies not only for rewards, but also for punishments, are taken seriously 522 11. Case 7: Reason itself is considered another great thing 524 12. Case 8: All goods and evils are considered commensurable 52.7

13. Case 9: God would frown upon willful believing

528



Contents	XV
Appendix. Hyperreals and decision theory	532
A1. Hyperreals	532
A2. Hyperreals in decision theory	536
Notes	539
References	630
Index of Names	647