

Introduction

Richard Hey, a fellow of Magdalene College, Cambridge, wrote in 1784:

Perhaps, however, it will even be urged, that some private Vices are *directly* beneficial to the Public; that the Vice of Luxury, for instance, promotes every useful Art and a general Civilization of Manners. But, whatever Good may in fact arise from any Vice, it is enough to see that the same Good might be produced by other means, if all Vice were taken out of the World.

A highly important issue was clearly at stake. Hey firmly maintained that vices must never be accepted even if they happened to promote a 'useful Art and a general Civilization of Manners' simply because these same benefits could always be produced by better means. In particular, Hey was convinced that a 'Refinement of Manners... as an external ornament... will spring up as the genuine fruit of the Heart' – that there was a close link between outward civility and the inner self. The crucial question was not, however, whether luxury was beneficial or detrimental to 'a general Civilization of Manners'. Luxury was merely Hey's illustrative example. The real issue at stake was duelling: 'Arguments therefore in favour of Duelling must be intirely nugatory, even if they can prove that it counteracts the operations of other Vices, or is directly productive of some good Effects.'

As Hey's ruminations suggest, duelling was closely entangled with the larger debate about civility and politeness in early modern England. Hey's account also indicates that there was a sharp disagreement over whether duelling was beneficial or detrimental to civility. Many agreed with Hey who endeavoured to distance duelling from civility. But we can infer from his urgent need to emphasise this distinction that there were some who argued that duelling, in fact, played a highly beneficial role by enhancing the level of politeness.

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¹ Richard Hey, A dissertation on duelling (Cambridge, 1784), pp. 93-4.



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The aim of this book is to examine the debate about courtesy, civility and politeness from the middle of the sixteenth century until the early eighteenth century on the one hand, and the central role of duelling in that debate on the other. Above all, the book endeavours to study the intellectual context, circumstances and conditions which created, spread and maintained the ideology of duelling in early modern England, and the various ways in which its opponents sought to undermine it.

In Hey's account of civility, politeness sprang up 'as the genuine fruit of the Heart'. He was thus convinced that there was a direct link between one's inner self and appearance. But again his insistence on this interpretation makes it plain that others repudiated it and asserted that there was, and behoved to be, no such link. Many, in fact, argued that politeness was often used to disguise rather than reveal one's inner feelings. It is a central claim, which I attempt to substantiate in this book, that duelling was at the heart of this debate about the proper definition of civility.

The duel of honour was a peculiar social institution of early modern and modern Europe. It was part of a complex though coherent social and ideological phenomenon, which lasted several centuries in most parts of Europe.² There were three distinctive features of modern duels. In the early eighteenth century, John Cockburn pinned down two of these by pointing out that duels were occasioned by 'Piques and private Quarrels' and 'fought secretly without *Publick Licence*'.³ The third central feature of duelling was the irrelevance of the outcome of the fight for the ultimate purpose of the ritual. The duellists were engaged in the fight to demonstrate their sense of honour by being threatened with death rather than to achieve a definite result.⁴ As one nobleman explained to another in 1660, 'He that will Fight, though he have never so much the worse, loses no reputation.'⁵

These three aspects – a private or secret fight, caused by an insult and organised by a challenge in order to prove one's sense of honour rather than to overcome one's opponent – gave the duel of honour its quintessential characteristics. As an anonymous late eighteenth-century commentator defined duelling:

² Schneider 1984, p. 273.

⁴ See e.g. Frevert 1995, pp. 2–3.

³ John Cockburn, The history and examination of duels. Shewing their heinous nature and the necessity of suppressing them (London, 1720), p. xiv.

⁵ Henry Pierrepoint, marquis of Dorchester, The lord marquesse of Dorchesters letter to the Lord Roos (London, 1660), p. 11.



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A duel, I think, is a combat between two persons, with danger of their lives, entered into without any public authority for it, in consequence of a challenge given by one of the parties, who imagines that he himself, or some person dear to him, has been affronted by the other, and intends by these means to wipe off the affront that is supposed to have been received.⁶

The duel of honour ultimately derived from various medieval forms of single combat – most importantly from the judicial duel, where the truth of the accusation in a criminal or civil case was ascertained by a trial by battle. The origins of the judicial duel are to be found in Germanic customary law and it was widespread all over the Continent through the early Middle Ages, but absent in England until the Norman Conquest. Trial by combat was used as a last resort to decide whether the defendant was culpable; it was allowable when all the other possibilities had been exhausted.⁷ But the ideas of honour and the lie were soon brought in, although it is hardly necessary to think that honour was always involved.⁸ When someone was accused of a crime, he gave the other the lie by denying the crime;9 this riposte brought honour in. Either the plaintiff or the defendant was lying and by offering to fight they vindicated their word and thus their honour. It was the issue of lying that the combat was thought to resolve. 10 More importantly, although the judicial combat was employed in a wide variety of cases, many of them implied an accusation of bad faith. This was the case with charges of treason, perjury and of breaches of agreement.11 The aptness of the combat in such cases is obvious. Robert Bartlett has recently pointed out that 'charges of treason, breach of truce, or perjury involved not only the imputation of a wrong, but also the implicit accusation of bad faith. In such circumstances an exculpatory oath was clearly not acceptable, for the charge implied that no trust could be placed in the word of the

⁶ [Anon.], Reflections on duelling, and on the most effectual means for preventing it (Edinburgh, 1790), p. 4.

⁷ Keen 1984, p. 204. See in general Keen 1965; Neilson 1890.

⁸ This seems to be Pitt-Rivers's view, Pitt-Rivers 1966, p. 28.

⁹ In fourteenth-century France it was debated whether it was incumbent on the defendant to give the plaintiff the lie, Morel 1964, p. 614.

Nee Morel 1964, pp. 606-7, 614; Pitt-Rivers 1966, p. 32; Montesquieu, The spirit of the laws, transl. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge 1989), xxvIII, 20, pp. 559-60. According to F. R. Bryson 1935, p. 55 n1, the earliest known use of giving the lie as a prelude to combat is from the ninth century.

¹¹ See e.g. the Lombard law described in F. R. Bryson 1938, p. xv; Morel 1964, p. 633. For the Lombard law concerning duels, see e.g. Giovanni da Legnano, *Tractatus de bello, de represaliis et de duello* (1360), ed. Thomas Erskine Holland, transl. James Leslie Brierly (Washington, D.C., 1917), pp. 344–5; Honoré Bonet, *The tree of battles*, transl. G. W. Coopland (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), pp. 196–8.



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accused.'12 The judicial combat was thus closely entangled with bad faith and lying, keeping one's word and honour. It should further be noted that the right to settle one's disputes by combat was closely associated with free status, although it was only in the later Middle Ages that it began to be a distinctive aristocratic activity.¹³

Civilians saw the trial by battle, among many other traditional aspects, as barbarian, but customary law percolated down into the schools, and issues dealing with the judicial duel were widely discussed amongst civil lawyers. In his painstaking study on the evolution of the trial by combat into the duel of honour in France, Henri Morel has argued that the origins of the theory of the point of honour lay in the Bartolist legal tradition where it was asserted that for a duel to be allowed it had to be shown that the honour of at least one of the party was at stake. It was above all Baldus de Ubaldis who, despite his own prevarication, became the chief authority for later generations of jurists in matters of the duel. Sometimes Baldus argued that although the trial by combat is allowed by the customary laws, it was against 'humanity' and 'natural reason', and thus strictly forbidden by the civil and canon law. 14 But elsewhere he argued that 'for the defense of honour' it was permissible. 15 In the middle of the fourteenth century Giovanni da Legnano, another civil lawyer, gave what must have been a standard list of three different kinds of combat. The fight could be fought for 'compurgation, glory, or exaggeration of hatred'. 16

Despite medieval precedents, the duel of honour was essentially a Renaissance creation. As many recent scholars have emphasised, during the first half of the sixteenth century the medieval forms of single combat were refashioned in Italy into a duel of honour which replaced the vendetta. This development has been seen as a civilising process, because it decreased the level of violence: a gentleman's honour became private, individual, and he was no longer obliged to continue the old cycles of revenge. Underlying the duel was thus a new notion of honour, which required a novel form of behaviour.

¹² Bartlett 1986, pp. 106–8, citation p. 108. See also Keen 1984, p. 175; P. Brown 1975.

¹³ Bartlett 1986, pp. 109–10, 125.

¹⁴ Baldus de Ubaldis, Consiliorum, sive responsorum (5 vols., Venice, 1575), II, consilium, clxv, fo. 44^r; consilium, ccxlvii, fo. 71^r; consilium, ccxliii, fos. 96^{r-v}.

¹⁵ Cited in Morel 1964, p. 634.

¹⁶ Legnano, Tractatus, p. 331. See also Nicholas Upton, The essential portions of Nicholas Upton's De studio militari, transl. John Blount, ed. Francis Pierrepoint Barnard (Oxford, 1931), pp. 9–22; Bonet, The tree of battles, pp. 206–7. Cf. F. R. Bryson 1938, p. xi.

¹⁷ For recent studies, see Erspamer 1982; Muir 1993; Muir 1994; Weinstein 1994; Quint 1997.

¹⁸ Muir 1994, pp. 76, 78; Quint 1997, p. 265.



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Therefore, from the very beginning the duel of honour was an integral part of the new Renaissance ideology of courtesy and civility. It was created within a new court culture, where the prime emphasis was placed on sophisticated manners and where courtiers and gentlemen were compelled to control and repress their emotions. The code enforced the requirement that courtiers and gentlemen be agreeable and pleasing to one another. This entailed both the cultivation of the virtue of honest dissimulation and the avoidance of meaningful discourse in conversation. As Edward Muir has pointed out, 'it became discourteous to be truthful', while at the same time accusing someone of lying was by far the most serious insult, which immediately questioned a gentleman's honour. ¹⁹ Within such an ideology duelling was seen as the only legitimate option for protecting the gentleman's tarnished honour. ²⁰

Both the Renaissance theory of duelling and the wider ideology of Renaissance courtesy were in large part creations of the printing press. During the second third of the sixteenth century many Italian presses were busily publishing dozens of treatises and manuals on courtesy and nobility, honour and the duel, which all elaborated various aspects of *la scienza cavalleresca*. This flood of treatises on honour and duelling not merely codified new manners and theories; it also helped to limit the level of aristocratic violence in a very real sense. The code of courtesy in general and that of duelling in particular became so elaborate that it often replaced the actual fight altogether. The sophisticated and highly publicised charges and countercharges, challenges and ripostes substituted for the duel, to such an extent that the very success of the duelling manuals has been offered as a reason for the decline of duelling in Italy.²¹ As Donald Weinstein has recently pointed out,

The duel scenario is poorly understood if we consider one part of it as form and the other as substance, the exchange of *cartelli* as play-acting and the exchange of blows as the real thing. At least as it developed in Italy after the middle of the sixteenth century, both words and action were part of the contest, the aim of which was to shame one's enemies and to defend, display and enhance one's own honour. The duel imagined (and avoided) was as real and as serious as the

¹⁹ Muir 1994, pp. 80–1; Muir 1997, pp. 121–2, 141–4.

Muir 1993, pp. 252-6; Muir 1994, pp. 76, 78; Quint 1997, pp. 233, 265. See also F. R. Bryson 1938; F. R. Bryson 1935; Erspamer 1982; For France see Billacois 1986; Herr 1955; Bennetton 1938; Morel 1964; Schneider 1984; G. A. Kelly 1986; Nye 1990. For Germany see Frevert 1995; McAleer 1994; Deak 1986. For the South of the United States see Wyatt-Brown 1982; Greenberg 1985; Stowe 1987, ch. 1; Greenberg 1996. For Ireland see J. Kelly 1995; J. Kelly 1994; Barry 1981. For Russia see Reyfman 1999.

²¹ Billacois 1986, pp. 76–7; see Weinstein 1994, p. 215; Becker 1988, p. 33.



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duel fought; conversely, the exchange of blows was as much theatre and play as the exchange of arguments and insults. Both were virtuoso performances acted before 'the world' of gentlemen and cavaliers, the world that counted most.²²

Although the close link between the novel theory of courtesy and the ideology of duelling in Renaissance Italy is well established and widely accepted, numerous commentators in France and England have strongly contrasted them. Taking their cue from students of the ideology of absolutism, they have seen duelling exclusively as an inheritance from the medieval world of knights and pitted it against the emerging theory of civility. L. W. B. Brockliss has recently claimed that whilst duelling was in France a way 'to channel and control the endemic violence of the court', its ideology was nonetheless derived from 'late-medieval concepts of honour'. 'It was only towards the mid-seventeenth century', Brockliss goes on, 'that courtiers finally began to judge each other by the polish of their manners rather than by their pugnacity and brio.'23 In more general European terms, John Adamson sets duelling as part of 'an inherited value-system' over against new 'courtly *politesse*' and 'decorum'.²⁴

A similar analysis has dominated the scholarly work on civility and duelling in early modern England. True, in Lawrence Stone's account of the early modern English aristocracy, duelling occupies a small but distinctive place in the process from endemic brawling and violence in the Middle Ages to the more controlled forms of violence in early modern England. Stone attributed this development to a variety of causes, one of which was a change in the prevalent honour code. In the early seventeenth century', he concluded, the duel thus succeeded in diverting the nobility from faction warfare with armed gangs without leading to a dislocation of social intercourse by incessant fighting over trivial slights, real or imagined.

²² Weinstein 1994, p. 217, in general pp. 215–20; Quint 1997, pp. 248–9, 257–63; Muir 1993, pp. 264–70.

²³ Brockliss 1999, p. 294.

²⁴ Adamson 1999a, pp. 20–1. See also Chaline 1999, pp. 87–8.

No comprehensive historical studies on duelling in England have appeared since the middle of the nineteenth century. For the earlier scholarship see Hamilton 1829; Millingen 841; Steinmetz 1868; Truman 1884. For particular cases see Bowers 1937a; Bowers 1937b; Andrew 1980; McCord Jr. 2000; Stater 1999. For general but rather anecdotal and impressionistic references to duelling see e.g. Sieveking 1916; Sieveking 1917; Bowers 1934; C. L. Barber 1957, pp. 18, 27, 273–5; Akrigg 1962, pp. 248–58; Thomas 1965; Maxwell 1966, pp. 84–106; Bowers 1971, pp. 31–4; Broude 1975; Girouard 1981, p. 60; Malcolm 1981; Loose 1982; Butler 1984; Clark 1985, pp. 109–16; Strachan 1989, pp. 12, 42, 68; MacCaffrey 1991, p. 26; Gilmour 1992, pp. 263–83; Thomas 1993, p. 48; Loades 1997, pp. 116–17; Gaskill 2000, pp. 209–10.

Stone 1965, pp. 242–50, 223–34, citation, p. 250; see also Stone and Stone 1984, p. 409; Stone 1987, p. 302. For an excellent brief summary of Stone's argument see Cust 1999. I am grateful to Richard Cust for allowing me to read and cite his unpublished work.



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Yet, despite Stone's analysis where the duel of honour was juxtaposed with the much more chaotic and endemic aristocratic violence of the Middle Ages, more recent commentators have sought its ideological context in the medieval honour community and more particularly in the Elizabethan chivalric revival.²⁷ Such a view became easier to sustain once the Elizabethan chivalric revival was no longer seen as merely strengthening the Tudor monarchy through its conventions of feudal loyalty and romantic devotion, but rather as an outlet for aristocratic pride, magnanimity and belligerency.²⁸

This perspective has led several scholars to insist that the duel of honour was essentially an inheritance from the ideology of England's chivalrous past. Distinguishing between 'the Christian humanist ideal of honor' and 'the neo-chivalric cult of honor', Paul N. Siegel has argued that whereas the former was expounded in the courtesy books and the works of moral philosophy, the latter stemmed 'from the chivalric notion of personal military glory', consisted of 'the artificial rules of a decadent chivalry' and was expounded in the duelling treatises.²⁹ Similarly, for Richard McCov, the challenges and single combats of Elizabethan aristocrats were epitomes of the chivalrous 'rites of knighthood'; they were outlets for chivalric pride and magnanimity.³⁰

The strongest analysis to this effect has been offered by Mervyn James in his wide-ranging essay, 'English politics and the concept of honour, 1485–1642'.31 One of the central themes of James's essay is to describe the transformation of the medieval concept of honour into a modern one. The medieval concept of honour was characterised by 'a stress on competitive assertiveness'. In the sixteenth century it underwent a transformation, which resulted in the emergence of 'a "civil" society in which the monopoly both of honour and violence by the state was asserted'.32 It was, in other words, a transformation from a freedom of feudal belligerency of the knights into a state where violence as well as honour were the sole domain of the monarch. James's account resists a glib explanation of the birth of a centralised absolutist state. According to him, key ideological roles in this transformation were played by Protestantism and humanism rather than the concrete 'order-keeping forces at the disposal of the state'. 'Civil order', he argues, 'depended,

²⁷ Ferguson 1986. ²⁸ McCoy 1989, pp. 1–27. For the older view see Yates 1977, pp. 88–111.

²⁹ Siegel 1964, pp. 40–7. See also Mason 1935, pp. 8–10.

³⁰ McCoy 1989, especially p. 58. See also McCoy 1996.

³¹ Mervyn James 1986, pp. 308-415. The essay was originally published in 1978. Shapin 1994, p. 108, accepts James's interpretation. Cf. also Cust 1995a, pp. 80-1.

³² Mervyn James 1986, pp. 308–9.



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to a much greater extent than in the bureaucratized societies of a later age, on the effective internalization of obedience, the external sanctions being so often unreliable.'33 A central element in the old chivalric idea of honour was its closeness to violence. In wartime this quality was directed to martial prowess but in time of peace it became self-assertiveness, which was always liable to escalate to a violent expression of the duel.³⁴ In James's account, therefore, the duel was one of the most 'characteristic expressions' of 'honour violence', of the knightly code of honour, as exemplified by Sir Philip Sidney's proneness to challenge the earl of Oxford.³⁵

This account has met with wide acceptance. For many a scholar the duelling theory was by and large a remnant from the ideology of the medieval honour community. Since 1978, when James's study was published, the honour culture of early modern England has been thoroughly examined. Following anthropological work on honour, historians of early modern England have emphasised the ubiquity and central importance of honour and reputation not only for the male elite but also for many other social groups as well. They had meaning and significance both in the private sphere of the household and in the public sphere beyond it. At the same time historians have also stressed that the notions of honour and reputation could differ significantly between various social groups. The same time historians have also stressed that the notions of honour and reputation could differ significantly between various social groups.

Whilst recent scholars have expanded the area which honour and reputation occupied in early modern England, they have also questioned James's rather neat transition from one honour culture to another, and in its stead have perceived multi-vocality. 'Reading early modern authors on the subject of honour', Cynthia Herrup has recently written, 'what comes through most strongly is not transition, but multi-vocality, even self-contradiction.'38 Historians have in other words challenged James's rather linear story of modernisation.³⁹ But in so far as duelling and its ideology are concerned, this conclusion has merely confirmed James's earlier analysis. It is the clear-cut transition from one honour

³⁶ Keen 1984, pp. 249–50; Keith M. Brown 1986, pp. 203–7; Richard Barber 1970, pp. 175–7; Pinciss 1978; Guy 1995, p. 7; Ferguson 1960, pp. 13–14; Ferguson 1986, pp. 96–7, 111–12; Day 1995; Heal 1996.

Marston 1973; Fletcher 1985; Dabhoiwala 1996; Foyster 1996; Gowing 1996; Heal 1996; Herrup 1996; Llewellyn 1996; Walker 1996. For an earlier French example see Farge 1989. For an excellent recent summary see Smuts 1999, pp. 8–17, which perceptively avoids the dichotomy between medieval honour culture and early modern politeness culture.

 $^{^{38}}$ Herrup 1996, p. 138. See also Herrup 1999, p. 77.

³⁹ For a recent critique of James's analysis of the Tudor north see Palmer 2000.



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culture to another which is called in doubt, not the definitions of these cultures. Duelling in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century has still been taken as a clear sign of the vitality of an earlier honour culture which allegedly demonstrates multi-vocality. Little wonder then that duelling is habitually described as a 'neo-feudal' custom.⁴⁰ When the earl of Essex was 'fighting duels' he not only 'proselytized his belief in the nobility's right to use violence in the defence of honour'; he also expressed 'the neo-feudal dimension' of his self-fashioned image. 41 And Lord Eure's fashionable education, his employment by the government and his European tour have recently been juxtaposed (rather than linked) with his propensity to duelling, which ostensibly was part of his 'general sympathy for the old faith, and an acceptance of the violent elements of the honour code'.42 To embrace a code of honour which required a gentleman to defend his reputation by a challenge was tantamount to exhibiting 'many features associated with the age of chivalry'.⁴³ Although Steven Shapin associates the duelling theory with civil conversation, he nonetheless argues that 'chivalric honour culture' underlay duelling.44 Similarly, in her study on the early modern notions of civility, Anna Bryson notes that the duelling theory was a recent import from Italy, but sees the wider ideology in which it was embedded as 'left over' from the late medieval political world.45

If courtesy and civility are widely seen as important cultural and intellectual themes of Elizabethan and early Stuart England, similar concepts occupy an even more central place in the historiography of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. As Lawrence Klein has put it, 'in later seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century England, the term "politeness" came into particular prominence as a key word'.⁴⁶

Although some commentators of Restoration and Augustan politeness acknowledge the obvious links with their subject-matter on the one hand and the earlier tradition of courtesy and civility on the other, it has become characteristic to emphasise its essential novelty. Some commentators have spoken about 'the Progress of Politeness',⁴⁷ whilst others, such as Klein, have gone so far as to call "politeness" a new definition of

 $^{^{40}}$ Heal and Holmes 1994, p. 5. In general Fletcher 1985; Hibbard 1996; Amussen 1995, pp. 294, 221–2.

⁴¹ Guy 1995, p. 7. ⁴² Heal 1996, p. 174.

⁴³ Cust 1995b, p. 92; see also Cust 1995a, pp. 80–1, Cust 1999, pp. 1–2; Heal and Holmes 1994, pp. 18–19.

⁴⁴ Shapin 1994, pp. 107–14, especially pp. 107, 108.
45 Anna Bryson 1998, pp. 272–5, 236–7.

⁴⁶ Klein 1994, p. 3. For a recent general critique see Berry 2001.

⁴⁷ Barker-Benfield 1992, pp. 78–9.



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gentility'.⁴⁸ Many recent commentators agree, so much so that a notion of 'a rise in the ideal of "civility"' in the period has quickly established itself as a commonplace.⁴⁹ 'New standards of conduct', we have been told, 'were introduced for men, particularly those from the urban middle and upper classes, which placed a high value on restraint, civility and refined public conversation'.⁵⁰ Another recent commentator maintains that 'the period [1660–1800] saw the emergence of an explicitly innovative concept of social refinement – politeness', and goes on talking about 'a new culture of politeness'.⁵¹

One of the central features underlying the novelty of politeness, many of these commentators argue, was its distaste of old-fashioned honour culture. Just as many scholars juxtapose the emergent culture and ideology of courtesy and civility with the lingering culture of honour and violence (including duelling as its offspring) in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, so commentators of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century contrast novel politeness with older honour culture. According to Barker-Benfield, 'the pressure against dueling' in the early eighteenth century illustrates the rapid progress of politeness.⁵² And Robert Shoemaker concurs.⁵³ Tim Hitchcock and Michèle Cohen link duelling with the declining notions of male honour and characterise the Restoration and Augustan rise of politeness as 'the gradual displacement of the concept of honour by the concept of civility'.⁵⁴ Peter Burke has also recently witnessed a shift from 'the "honour system", with duelling as its chief characteristic, to 'the "politeness system", and Philip Carter claims that duelling was incompatible with politeness.⁵⁵

It is a chief aim of this book to seek to question these increasingly prevalent accounts. The difficulty in dovetailing these claims of the neat early modern transition from an honour culture to a politeness culture with the fact that duelling was, of course, an early modern and modern phenomenon, lasting from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, should make us wary. No less complicated is the bracketing of the chronology of these assessments with the fact that the most vigorous and sophisticated theoretical defence of duelling took place in the early eighteenth century,

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⁴⁸ Klein 1993b, p. 77. See also Klein 1994, pp. 3-14. Cf. Klein 1995b, p. 228, where he acknowledges the connection to the earlier tradition of courtesy and civility.

⁴⁹ E.g. Hitchcock and Cohen 1999, p. 14; Burke 2000. ⁵⁰ Shoemaker 1999, p. 137.

⁵¹ Carter 2001, pp. 1, 80; see generally pp. 1-2, 23-4, 32-4, 210.

⁵² Barker-Benfield 1992, pp. 79–80.

⁵³ Shoemaker 1999, pp. 136–9, 142, 145, 147–8. See also Foyster 1999b, pp. 35–6, 179–81.

⁵⁴ Hitchcock and Cohen 1999, pp. 14-15.

⁵⁵ Burke 2000, pp. 37, 46; Carter 2001, pp. 71–2, 133–4, 182, 214. See also Gregory 1999, p. 98.