Introduction: disentangling Judaism and Enlightenment

The legacy of the Enlightenment remains deeply mired in political and philosophical controversy. The core Enlightenment values of freedom, toleration and the paramountcy of reason are now securely enshrined as the guiding principles of modern liberal democracy, but this has not produced the transparent, virtuous, ordered and contented society that the *philosophes* of the eighteenth century optimistically envisaged. Is this because we need more Enlightenment, or have we already had a good deal too much? Postmodern critics of the alleged instrumentalism and naivety of Enlightenment reason, such as Jean-François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty, have been vigorously and prominently engaged by Jürgen Habermas, for whom there can be no viable alternative to a sustained commitment to the 'Enlightenment project', and to its central vision of the establishment of undistorted communication.[1] Despite the highly historical nature of the questions at stake, the detailed contours of eighteenth-century European thought have been surprisingly little explored in this debate.[2] In order to evaluate the fate of the Enlightenment, however, it is surely vital to understand the context and the contingencies of its emergence.

The history of European Jewry since 1789 sharply highlights the ambiguities of modernity. In the most obvious sense, Jews were seemingly the most dramatic beneficiaries of the Enlightenment. In 1790 and 1791, after much debate, the revolutionaries of the French First Republic swept away the various legal, economic and bureaucratic restrictions that had regulated Jewish life for centuries, initiating the faltering process of Jewish emancipation that was soon exported across Europe by Napoleon.[3] The arguments of those

[1] See Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (1987) esp. 336–67; Józef Niżnik and John T. Sanders, eds., *Debating the State of Philosophy: Habermas, Rorty and Kolakowski* (1996); N. J. Rengger, *Political Theory, Modernity and Postmodernity* (1995) 1–11; John Gray, *Enlightenment's Wake* (1995) 144–84.

[2] For a recent corrective see Daniel Gordon, ed., *Postmodernism and the Enlightenment* (2001).

[3] Arthur Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews* (1968) 314–68; Simon Schwarzfuchs, *Napoleon, the Jews and the Sanhedrin* (1979).

who pressed most eagerly for the integration of the Jews into the social and political mainstream were suffused with the language of Enlightenment rationalism and improvement: we need only observe the title of Christian Wilhelm Dohm's highly influential 1781 essay, *On the Civic Improvement of the Jews*, or that of the prize essay title set by the Royal Society of Metz in 1785, won by Henri Grégoire, the leading advocate of the emancipation of the Jews of eastern France – 'How to Make the Jews Happy and Useful'.[4] However, this enthusiastically integrationist attitude was not in every way ameliorative. The denial of the distinctiveness of Jewish identity and community life meant the end of the considerable legal and fiscal autonomy typically enjoyed by Jewish communities in the early modern period. It also fixed Jewish difference as a problem. Jews were now to be accorded respect as citizens, but not necessarily as Jews. Despite the energetic attempts of many nineteenth-century western European Jews, particularly the most successful and prosperous, to assimilate into mainstream, secular society, Jewish difference became an increasingly intense popular preoccupation, leading to the emergence of antisemitism as an explicit political creed in late nineteenth-century Germany.[5]

The eager and intense rush of droves of German Jews from ghetto traditionalism to flourishing prominence in the secular high culture of the *Bildungsbürgertum* was one of the most visible social transformations that accompanied the dawn of the modern age. There was never, however, a comfortable 'German-Jewish symbiosis': German-Jewish identity was inescapably bifurcated, its two components always eluding easy reconciliation.[6] Modernity, and its universalist ideals, enticed Jews in particular; but these same ideals persistently destabilised the significance, and for some even the legitimacy, of Jewishness itself. There was clearly no inexorable highway from the tensions of post-Enlightenment modernity to the genocide of Auschwitz and elsewhere. However, as Zygmunt Bauman has argued, while the Holocaust was in many ways a product of the political, social and technological structures of the modern state, it simultaneously also stands as an extreme anti-modernist assault on the disorienting complexities of modernity, which seemed to crystallise in the cultural indefinability

[4] See Robert Liberles, 'From Toleration to *Verbesserung*: German and English Debates on the Jews in the Eighteenth Century', *Central European History* 21:1 (1989) 1–31; David Sorkin, *The Transformation of German Jewry 1780–1840* (1999 (1987)) 23–30; Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770–1870* (1973) 57–79.

[5] See Peter Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria* (1988) esp. 47–57.

[6] Paul Mendes-Flohr, *German Jews: A Dual Identity* (1999) esp. 1–24; *Divided Passions: Jewish Intellectuals and the Experience of Modernity* (1991); Gershom Scholem, *On Jews and Judaism in Crisis* (1976) 61–92; George Mosse, *German Jews Beyond Judaism* (1985) esp. 1–20.

of the Jews.[7] The precariousness of the Jewish position in European society of course long predates the eighteenth century. Nonetheless, the struggles, dilemmas and overarching tragedy of the modern European Jewish experience cannot be understood without an awareness of the Enlightenment paradoxes and contradictions that essentially defined the parameters of the barbed embrace of Jewishness and modernity.

Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer's seminal *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, written in 1944 in exile from Nazi Germany, bleakly but brilliantly recognised the fraught relationship of eighteenth-century idealism to the authoritarianism of the fascist era. Enlightenment reason, they argued, had become self-destructive: having crushed the remnants of myth, uncertainty and individuality that are essential to the human spirit, it had become an instrument of economic domination and cultural deception, from which the mass delusion of antisemitism served as a convenient decoy.[8] 'Wholly enlightened man', they wrote, 'has lost himself.'[9] Antagonism towards Jews, they realised, was not simply a random outlet for this alienation. The mythic power of Judaism itself attracted ire, because it exposed the limits of Enlightenment rationalism:

> The Jews seemed to have succeeded where Christianity failed: they diffused magic by its own power – turned against itself as ritual in the service of God . . . And so they are thought to lag behind advanced civilization and yet to be too far ahead of it: they are both clever and stupid, similar and dissimilar. They are declared guilty of something that they were the first to overcome: the lure of base instincts, reversion to animality and to the ground, the service of images.[10]

Whereas the Enlightenment sought to eliminate all dependency on myth, Judaism most anciently and thoroughly incorporated mythic structures into its cultural codes of meaning and identity. Its endurance therefore frustrated the aspiration of Enlightenment thought towards absolute rationalist mastery. Elemental desires, forbidden within the logic of Enlightenment, are sublimated into a jealous hostility towards Jews: 'There is no antisemite who does not basically want to imitate his mental image of a Jew.'[11]

Adorno and Horkheimer's Enlightenment is only loosely articulated with the historical Enlightenment of eighteenth-century Europe. They essentially conflated Enlightenment with the exploitative instrumentalism of capitalism, which they detected incipiently even in the individualistic cunning of Homer's Odysseus. Judaism, they argued, was not structurally

[7] Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (1989) esp. 6–12, 39–46.
[8] Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1989 (1944)) esp. 173–6.
[9] *Ibid*., 38. [10] *Ibid*., 186. [11] *Ibid*., 184.

indispensable as the foil of Enlightenment: it could readily be substituted, just as capitalism itself was able to shuffle its units of rationalised production according to expediency.[12] Adorno and Horkheimer's reluctance to place too much weight on the specific significance of Judaism in modern European thought was due not only to their Marxism, but also to the cultural ambivalences inherent in their own position as militantly secular and assimilated German Jews. However, an understanding of the tragic predicament of this final generation of German-Jewish intellectuals itself requires a more sustained examination of the specific entanglement of Jewishness and Enlightenment rationalism.[13]

The Enlightenment was, of course, a diverse and eclectic intellectual movement, incorporating the celebration of passion and sensibility as well as of reason.[14] Much postmodern criticism has underestimated or ignored this complexity, caricaturing the Enlightenment as falsely monolithic and relentlessly absolutist.[15] However, Adorno and Horkheimer's negative dialectic of disillusionment must be balanced against its positive twin, with which they conclude their text, and which has since been forcefully emphasised by Habermas: rational thought contains within itself the possibility of overcoming its own limitations.[16] It is meaningless to place the Enlightenment monolithically in the dock. Not only is modern thought so suffused with Enlightenment concepts that such a trial would entail an unsustainable degree of intellectual schizophrenia, but the wider historical impact of the Enlightenment – as the Jewish experience so powerfully demonstrates – has been profoundly double-edged.

However, precisely because of its complexity and its inescapability, the Enlightenment, and its internal tensions and lacunae, remain of supreme importance. Many of the ideas and modes of thought that crystallised in this period have since been largely absorbed into the realm of the semi-invisible, unchallenged assumptions of the modern age. The history of the early articulation of these ideals of rationality, toleration and independence

[12] *Ibid*., 43–80, 207. See also Ronald Schechter, 'Rationalizing the Enlightenment: Postmodernism and Theories of Anti-Semitism', in Gordon, ed., *Postmodernism and the Enlightenment*, 95–7.

[13] See Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination* (1973) esp. 31–5; John Murray Cuddihy, *The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Lévi-Strauss and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity* (1987) esp. 153–4; Mosse, *German Jews*, 61–2.

[14] See Susan James, *Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy* (1997); Mark S. Micale and Robert L. Dietle, eds., *Enlightenment, Passion, Modernity* (2000); David Marshall, *The Surprising Effects of Sympathy: Marivaux, Diderot, Rousseau and Mary Shelley* (1988); Schechter, 'Rationalizing the Enlightenment', 110–13.

[15] See Daniel Gordon, 'On the Supposed Obsolescence of the French Enlightenment', *Postmodernism*, 201–21.

[16] Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic*, 208; Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse*, 84–6.

of thought challenges the transparency of these concepts, and in so doing offers vital insights into the internal structure and defining birthmarks of notions on which an immense political and philosophical burden is now freighted.

The charting of these new philosophical parameters was a tortuous and troubled process. As Ernst Cassirer long ago noted, the Enlightenment, despite its prevalent secularism, was inevitably profoundly indebted to religious thought: 'The more insufficient one finds previous religious answers to basic questions of knowledge and morality, the more intensive and passionate become these questions themselves.'[17] In defining their ideas around and against those of traditional Christianity, the pioneers of the Enlightenment continued to work within a frame of reference that was largely conditioned by theological orthodoxies. Judaism, seen as not only the most venerably orthodox but also as the most inscrutable and most potentially subversive strand of theology, was uniquely difficult for Enlightenment thinkers to negotiate. Their awkward and contradictory articulations of the relationship between Judaism and Reason bring into sharp relief the problematics of Enlightenment highlighted by Adorno and Horkheimer, and enable us to situate these tensions within the historical context that conditioned their emergence.

Throughout the Enlightenment the question of the status of Judaism and of Jews was a key site of intellectual contestation, confusion and debate. Because of the centrality of the Jewish scriptures, adopted in the form of the Old Testament as the foundational document on which the claims to legitimacy of Christianity were based, Judaism was the most obvious target for those who sought to attack the Judaeo-Christian tradition at its roots. In much Enlightenment thought, the vital conceptual space of that which is most deeply antithetical to reason – Enlightenment's defining 'Other' – was occupied above all by the Jew. Rational inquiry opposed Jewish legalism; belief in progress opposed Jewish traditionalism; the scholarly, urbane, cosmopolitan citizen of the Republic of Letters opposed the petty-minded, mumbling ghetto rabbi. But these easy oppositions hovered above much more difficult and threatening imponderables. In exposing the Old Testament as both thoroughly implausible and extremely unedifying as a historical account, Enlightenment critics also faced their inability to offer any conclusive alternative to the Judaic account of the roots of European society. While attacking the tribalism and insularity of Jewish nationhood, the eighteenth century was also a period in which conscious attempts were

[17] Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (1951 (1932)) 136.

made to construct loosely equivalent myths and rituals of national patriotisms; these identities were inevitably based on national divisions which the transnational Jews awkwardly blurred. Most fundamentally, the Enlightenment vision of universal tolerance and emancipation stood uneasily alongside the identification of Judaism as so atavistically contrary to all emancipatory values and modes of thought.

Judaism was thus profoundly ensnared in the relationship between the Enlightenment and the Christian worldview from and against which it emerged. It is a key argument of this study that the significance of Judaism during the Enlightenment can only be understood in the context of this relationship, and, concomitantly, that the complexities clustered around Judaism are of central importance for a general understanding of the Enlightenment itself. The inevitable inconclusiveness of attempts to reconceptualise history, ethics and politics in purely rational and transparent terms was highlighted above all by the persistent anomaly of the Jewish case. The shifts and ambiguities of Enlightenment thought concerning Judaism crucially influenced the shape of Jewish political emancipation, and have undergirded the vicissitudes, triumphs and tragedies of European Jewish life ever since.

The significance of these ambiguities, however, resonate beyond the Jewish case. The limits of Enlightenment are today challenged and strained by all perspectives that question the transcendental authority of technocratic rationalism. While the tensions between Judaism and Enlightenment were, as I hope this study will demonstrate, uniquely intense and historically significant, they are closely related to the more general problematics of the relationship of Enlightenment rationality to whatever it cannot readily encompass. The legacy of the Enlightenment is far too omnipresent for any wholesale rejection of its values to be meaningful. However, an awareness of its complexity, imperfection and historical contingency can offer an important social and political safeguard against the self-contradictory but seductive pitfalls of Enlightenment fundamentalism.

ANTI-, PHILO- AND ALLOSEMITISMS

Viewed within the broad temporal perspective of Jewish history, the relative civility of the Enlightenment has appeared to some historians as a deceptive interlude between the religious persecution of the medieval era and the political antisemitism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Arthur Hertzberg, in his *The French Enlightenment and the Jews: The Origins of Modern Anti-Semitism*, unequivocally signals in his subtitle his aspiration to close this apparent historical gap. Although he closely examines the

anti-Judaic animus of many of the English Deists and French *philosophes*, the key figure in his narrative is Voltaire, whose notoriously hostile pronouncements on Jews and Judaism repeatedly recur in many of his writings. For Hertzberg, Voltaire is the 'vital link' between medieval and modern antisemitism.[18] Jew-hatred, he argues, was not a deformation of Enlightenment reason, but was deeply ingrained within its spirit, which, in this respect at least, merely coated ancient prejudices with a fresh veneer of secularism.[19]

Scholars of non-Jewish attitudes towards Jews have generally emphasised deep historical continuities in patterns of prejudice and projection. Explanations for these continuities have been rooted in psychology, sociology, anthropology, theology and in hybrids of all these and other causal factors.[20] These multifarious studies have immensely illuminated the multidimensionality and historical persistence of anti-Jewish prejudice. However, synthetic interpretations of this phenomenon stand in inevitable tension with a historical attentiveness to the distinctive nature of anti-Jewish attitudes at different times and places. This problem has been heightened by the question of terminology: should the word 'antisemitism', technically an anachronism when applied to periods prior to the late nineteenth century, be restrictively defined, or avoided altogether, in relation to the premodern era? According to Gavin Langmuir, the chimerical irrationality of European Jew-hatred in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries marks a passage from 'anti-Judaism' to 'antisemitism'. Peter Schäfer, challenging this distinction, has argued that the ancient Egyptian and Greek accusations of Jewish 'misanthropy', although to some extent a response to actual Jewish separatism in certain circumstances, should nonetheless be considered as antisemitic.[21]

[18] Hertzberg, *French Enlightenment*, 313.

[19] *Ibid*., 7. For similar arguments, see Jacob Katz, *From Prejudice to Destruction: Anti-Semitism, 1700–1933* (1980) 27–33; D. Sorkin, 'Jews, the Enlightenment and Religious Toleration: Some Reflections', *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* (1992) 3–16.

[20] For essentially psychological interpretations of antisemitism, see Theodor Adorno *et al*., *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950); Léon Poliakov, *The History of Anti-Semitism*, 4 vols. (1965–85) e.g. vol. 111, 91; Jean-Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew* (1948) esp. 143ff. For sociological interpretations see Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, 39–45; Hannah Arendt, *The Burden of Our Time* (1951) 56ff.; and, with a stronger anthropological accent, Hyam Maccoby, *A Pariah People* (1996). On Christian antisemitism see James Parkes, *The Jew and his Neighbour* (1930) esp. 62–81; *The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue* (1934) esp. 42–45, 81–85; Joshua Trachtenberg, *The Devil and the Jews* (1966); Gavin Langmuir, *History, Religion and Antisemitism* (1990) esp. 295–305; Robert Chazan, *Medieval Stereotypes and Modern Antisemitism* (1997) esp. 125–40; Stephen R. Haynes, *Jews and the Christian Imagination* (1995) esp. 9–24. For a multicausal overview see Robert S. Wistrich, *Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred* (1991); Paul Lawrence Rose, *Revolutionary Antisemitism in Germany from Kant to Wagner* (1990).

[21] Gavin Langmuir, *Toward a Definition of Antisemitism* (1990) 16–17, 311–52; Peter Schäfer, *Judeophobia: Attitudes Toward the Jews in the Ancient World* (1997) 197–211.

While these debates are valuable, the historical extension of the concept of antisemitism is also perilous. The most acute danger of this strategy is that it obscures the embeddedness of 'antisemitic' attitudes within diverse wider structures of thought. The Pauline commitment to a universalist community of faith carries with it an inescapable streak of intolerance towards Jewish difference. This hostility is, however, inextricable from Paul's enunciation of his Christian ethic of inclusive love: it would therefore be extremely simplistic to characterise Paul as antisemitic.[22] A broadly similar knot applies in the case of Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire, whose anti-Jewish animus, I argue, was closely woven into the same intellectual structures that energised his political polemics against intolerance, superstition and authoritarianism. The accusation of antisemitism, and the immediate recoil that it induces, short-circuits investigation of the complicated relationship between the violent undercurrents of Voltairean Enlightenment – or Pauline Christianity – and their recuperable, or even indispensable, emancipatory ideals.

Enlightenment attitudes towards Judaism were also far from unremittingly negative. The notion of the Jews as God's chosen people, which inspired intensive Christian study of Jewish texts during the seventeenth century, mutated during the Enlightenment into a widespread fascination with Jewish rituals and themes. Hopes for the economic regeneration of the Jews, which so animated reformists such as Dohm and Grégoire in the 1780s, were inspired not only by disdain for the Jews' current condition but also by a belief in their prodigious economic potential. While rabbinic Judaism was frequently derided, ancient Judaism was commonly believed to encapsulate the essence of the perfect polity. A tradition of 'philosemitism', advanced by some historians in juxtaposition to the more familiar narrative of antisemitism, might appear to offer a suitable rubric for these more positive attitudes.[23] However, use of this category readily leads to the same oversimplifications as its opposite. The same philosophical problems drew many Enlightenment thinkers both to the idealisation and simultaneously to the repudiation of elements of Judaism.

Several scholars have attempted to demarcate between what they have discerned as two distinctly separate traditions of Enlightenment thought concerning Jews: one positive and reformist, the other negative and

[22] Daniel Boyarin, *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* (1994) 136–57.

[23] David Katz, 'The Phenomenon of Philo-Semitism', *Christianity and Judaism* (1992) 327–61; Hilary L. Rubinstein and William D. Rubinstein, *Philosemitism* (1999). For an early use of this term, primarily in relation to seventeenth-century Sweden, see Hans Joachim Schoeps, *Philosemitismus im Barock* (1952).

antisemitic.[24] However, while individuals such as Voltaire might seem relatively easy to categorise, others – most notably Pierre Bayle – evade straightforward classification. In this study I shall eschew the use not only of the terms philo- and antisemitism, but also of any one-dimensional positive-to-negative spectrum along which differing attitudes to Judaism can be ranged. Such schematisation is inappropriate for a period in which the consideration of Judaism took place in very tenuous, if any, relation to encounters with actual Jews. It also cannot encompass the complexity of the issues in which Judaism was ensnared, or the confused ambivalence with which it was widely regarded in the Enlightenment period.

According to Zygmunt Bauman, the overarching characteristic of Western attitudes to Jews is 'allosemitism': the conviction that Jews are in some sense radically different from all others. Allosemitism is fundamentally ambivalent. In the structural logic of Christianity, in medieval society and in the sociological transformations of early modernity, Jews occupied intermediate positions of quintessential incongruity. Never quite fitting into dominant categories, they have persistently stood for 'ambivalence incarnate', and have repeatedly served as lightning conductors for opposition to the intellectual and social complexity highlighted by their existence.[25] This analytical framework accounts for the intricate mix of admiration and repulsion, and of identification and expulsion, that suffuses so much Enlightenment writing on Jewish topics. A similar ambivalence has been identified in very different contexts, such as Ancient Rome, and, despite an effective absence of Jews, modern Japan.[26] The conceptual 'slipperiness' of Jewish difference, while it has been reinforced by the social and economic roles filled by Jews in certain historical contexts, is to some extent the product of the irreducible tension between Judaism and the philosophical drive for integrative tidiness. The Enlightenment negotiation of its ambivalence towards Judaism had its own unique dynamics and consequences. However, it also forms part of the eternal problematic, sustainedly focused on Judaism, of how to situate difference within a philosophical and political totality.

[24] Richard H. Popkin, 'Medicine, Racism, Anti-Semitism: A Dimension of Enlightenment Culture', in G. S. Rousseau, ed., *The Languages of Psyche: Mind and Body in Enlightenment Thought* (1990) 413ff.; Miriam Yardeni, *Anti-Jewish Mentalities in Early Modern Europe* (1990) 207; Paul H. Meyer, 'The Attitude of the Enlightenment towards the Jew', *SVEC* 26 (1963) 1161–205; Frank Manuel, *The Broken Staff: Judaism Through Christian Eyes* (1992) 108.

[25] Zygmunt Bauman, 'Allosemitism: Premodern, Modern, Postmodern', in Brian Cheyette and Laura Marcus, eds., *Modernity, Culture and 'the Jew'* (1998) 143–56, esp. 146.

[26] Schäfer, *Judeophobia*, 180–95; David G. Goodman and Masanori Miyazawa, *The Jews in the Japanese Mind* (1995) esp. 220–60.

This conundrum was equally present within Jewish thought. The social and religious boundaries that segregated Jewish from non-Jewish life had been eroding in much of western Europe since the sixteenth century, due to more intensive economic contacts and the influence of prominent 'Court Jews', who increasingly absorbed the values of the non-Jewish elite society they largely inhabited.[27] This led inevitably to the emergence among Jews of a radical questioning of the relationship of Jewish difference to the universalistic scientific and political ideals that were in the ascendant in the non-Jewish world. It is no accident that arguably the single most influential thinker of the Early Enlightenment – Baruch Spinoza – emerged from among the Sephardim of Amsterdam. This small but immensely dynamic community was uniquely caught in the eye of the intellectual storms that accompanied the emergence of modernity. The seventeenth-century Sephardim of north-west Europe, and of Amsterdam above all, deserve to figure far more prominently in the history of the beginnings of the Enlightenment than has generally been acknowledged. Their reincorporation within this wider intellectual history clearly dislocates accounts that see the current between Judaism and the Enlightenment flowing only in one direction.

However, it is nonetheless true that in the eighteenth century Jews essentially responded to the Enlightenment rather than fashioned it. Moses Mendelssohn, the son of a Torah scribe from Dessau, wrestled from the 1750s onwards to reappraise Judaism in accordance with the natural philosophy of Gottfried Leibniz and Christian Wolff.[28] Central and eastern European *maskilim* – proponents of Enlightenment in the Jewish world – soon promoted reforms that ultimately transformed the structures of traditional Jewish life, while Jewish intellectuals in France and England both defended and rethought Judaism in the fast-changing intellectual climate of the late eighteenth century.[29] The implications and consequences of these varying modes of *Haskalah* – Jewish Enlightenment – are of course of immense importance, but they form a later and essentially different story

[27] Jonathan I. Israel, *European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism* (1989) 41–2, 243–6; Selma Stern, *The Court Jew* (1950): Michael Graetz, 'Court Jews in Economics and Politics', in Vivian B. Mann and Richard I. Cohen, eds., *From Court Jews to the Rothschilds: Art, Patronage and Power 1600–1800* (1996) 27–43; Jacob Katz, *Exclusiveness and Tolerance: Studies in Jewish–Gentile Relations in Medieval and Modern Times* (1961) 156–68.

[28] Allan Arkush, *Moses Mendelssohn and the Enlightenment* (1994) esp. 1–35; David Sorkin, *Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment* (1996) esp. 5–14.

[29] Jacob Katz, *Exclusiveness and Tolerance*, 169–196; *Tradition and Crisis: Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages* (2000 (1957)) 214–36; Frances Malino, *A Jew in the French Revolution: The Life of Zalkind Hourwitz* (1996); David B. Ruderman, *Jewish Enlightenment in an English Key: Anglo-Jewry's Construction of Modern Jewish Thought* (2000).