Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups

This book argues that the Korean financial crisis of 1997 was due to the inertia of both the business groups known as chaebols and the Korean government, which prevented adaptation to changing external environments. After the Korean government stopped central economic planning and pursued economic liberalization in the 1980s, the transition created a void under which neither the government nor markets could monitor chaebols' investment activities. Chaebols pursued ambitious expansions that often lacked a strong economic rationale. The intricate web of cross-shareholding, debt guarantees, and vertical integration resulted in extensive cross-subsidization and kept chaebols from shedding unprofitable businesses. The government's continued interventions in banks' lending practices created "moral hazards" for both chaebols and banks.

This treatment demonstrates how the structure of chaebols, which was once optimal for their rapid growth, later inhibited other adaptations and for all practical purposes became nearly dysfunctional. The book argues that restructuring of chaebols should focus on improving corporate governance systems. After such restructuring, the author predicts, chaebols will reemerge as stronger, more focused global players.

Sea-Jin Chang is Professor of Business Administration at Korea University. Previously, he was a faculty member at the Stern School of Business at New York University. He has also held visiting appointments at Stanford University and INSEAD, France. Prior to his doctoral study at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, he worked for large telecommunication companies in Korea and Japan.

Professor Chang's research focuses on understanding the process of creating operating synergies among diversified lines of business and building a strong local organization after foreign entry. His research has been published in journals such as *Review of Economics and Statistics*, *Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Management Studies*, and the *Academy of Management Journal*. He sits on the editorial boards of several leading journals in strategy and international business. He has also written several textbooks in strategy and international business.

To my teachers and colleagues

Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups

The Rise and Fall of Chaebols

SEA-JIN CHANG

Korea University



Cambridge University Press	
0521814359 - Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The Ris	e
and Fall of Chaebols	
Sea-Jin Chang	
Frontmatter	
More information	

PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa

http://www.cambridge.org

© Sea-Jin Chang 2003

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2003

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

Typeface Times 11/14 pt. System $LAT_EX 2_{\mathcal{E}}$ [TB]

A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Chang, Sea-Jin. Financial crisis and transformation of Korean business groups : the rise and fall of chaebols / Sea-Jin Chang. p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-521-81435-9

1. Corporations – Korea (South) – Finance. 2. Conglomerate corporations – Korea (South) 3. Financial crises – Korea (South) 4. Corporate governance – Korea (South) I. Title.

HG4247 .C47 2002

338.8'095195-dc21 2002066516

ISBN 0 521 81435 9 hardback

Contents

Preface		<i>page</i> ix
1 Introduction		1
From Asian Mira	acle to Asian Crisis	3
Chaebols: The K	orean Business Groups	9
	Framework of this Book	24
2 The Evolution of	of Chaebols	43
The Developmer	nt of Chaebols in Korea	45
Brief Histories o	f the Top Five Chaebols	62
The Growth Stra	tegy of Chaebols	70
The Environmen	tal Shift	75
3 Chaebols' Diver	rsified Business Structure	79
The Extent of Ch	naebols' Diversification	81
Intragroup Resou	arce Sharing	87
	tructure of Chaebols	98
•	nd Economic Performance	105
4 Vertical Integra	tion of Chaebols	111
The Scope of Ch	aebols' Vertical Integration	113

CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press	
0521814359 - Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business Groups: The R	₹ise
and Fall of Chaebols	
Sea-Jin Chang	
Frontmatter	
More information	

vi	Contents	
М	otives for Vertical Integration: Pros and Cons	118
Pe	erformance Implications of Chaebols'	
	Vertical Integration	123
5 Tł	he Capital Structure of Chaebols	131
Fi	nancial Market Environments in Korea	133
Ca	apital Structure of Chaebols	141
Cł	naebols' Internal Capital Markets and	
	Cross-subsidization	149
Co	ollapse of Chaebols and Financial Institutions	
	During the Crisis	157
6 Cl	haebols' Ownership and Governance Structure	161
	naracteristics of the Ownership Structure	
	of Chaebols	163
	ne Corporate Governance System in Korea	170
Ag	gency Problems in Chaebols	176
7 Tł	he Restructuring of Chaebols	187
Th	ne Restructuring Policy of the Korean	
	Government	189
Re	estructuring of the Financial Sector	191
Re	estructuring of the Corporate Sector	195
En	nhancement of the Corporate Governance	
	System	208
Pe	erspectives on the Restructuring of Chaebols	212
8 Co	onclusion	217
Th	he Crisis and the Fall of Chaebols: A Summary	219
Βı	usiness Groups in Other Countries	224
	ne Taming of Chaebols	231
Th	ne Future of Chaebols and the Developmental State	238

Cambridge University Press	
0521814359 - Financial Crisis and Transformation of Korean Business G	roups: The Rise
and Fall of Chaebols	
Sea-Jin Chang	
Frontmatter	
More information	

Contents	vii
Appendixes	
1. Data Used in this Book	245
2. Comparing the Profitability of Group-affiliated	
Companies and Independent Companies	249
3. Profitability of Group-affiliated Firms	264
4. The Impact of Vertical Integration in Chaebols	275
5. Determinants of the Capital Structure of Chaebols	284
6. Profitability and Stock Ownership of Affiliates	291
7. Intragroup Business Transactions and	
Ownership Structures of the Top Five Chaebols	299
8. Key Economic Statistics	309
Notes	311
References	327
Index	345

Preface

The Asian Crisis in 1997 affected almost everyone in Korea. Thousands of companies went out of business, and many workers lost their jobs. Foreign investors fled the country, major banks became insolvent, and the government depleted its foreign reserves as the country went bankrupt. This crisis was financially and emotionally painful for me. I had returned to Korea in 1994. At that time, Korea's prospects looked bright. Korean firms continued to grow at a phenomenal rate and had expanded aggressively overseas. Every Korean I met was proud of his country, and businessmen were confident that Korea would soon catch up to Japan, which had served as a role model for Korea. As one of the faithful, I sold my stock in U.S. companies and invested the proceeds in Korean firms. Right after the crisis, however, my net worth in dollars had shrunk to one eighth of what it had been. My wife once teased me, asking how a business school professor could be such a lousy investor. Like many Koreans, I was determined to find out who had ruined my country and stolen my pride.

The widespread consensus was that chaebols were to blame for Korea's downfall. Chaebols, which are powerful groups of

Х

Preface

affiliated companies that helped catalyze Korea's economic development, have long been admired and criticized. On one hand, people admired them. Korea's top college graduates lined up to work for them. In downtown Seoul, where the insignias of Hyundai, Samsung, LG, Daewoo, and SK were displayed everywhere, the strength of Korea's economy was palpable. The chaebol chairmen who managed these empires seemed glamorous. On the other hand, chaebols were the subject of fear, disdain, and resentment. They were blamed for devouring Korea's resources and squeezing out smaller companies. Newspapers reported many incidents of chaebols making illegal contributions to politicians and receiving favors in return. Foreign governments often charged chaebols with dumping and other unfair business practices. Western businessmen believed chaebols were analogous to cancer cells that grew without purpose and thereby killed neighboring cells before consuming themselves.

As I researched chaebols, I learned that they were neither crazy nor irrational. Rather, chaebols had been efficient given their environment. By sharing financial and intangible resources such as brands, technology, and human resources among affiliates, their internal markets had created enormous synergies. Such resource sharing had been the source of Korean firms' competitive advantage and had enabled Korea's economy to grow quickly. Yet the Asian Crisis revealed chaebols' fatal weaknesses. The resource sharing among legally independent affiliates was possible only because chaebols were centralized, and their chairmen wielded immense power. There was no way to guard against the ill-conceived strategies of these chairmen, who pursued diversification that lacked any economic rationale, cross-subsidized unprofitable affiliates, and diverted profits to affiliates in which they and their families owned large equity stakes. All these activities wasted the synergies

Preface

xi

created through resource sharing. The intricate web of crossshareholding, debt guarantees, and vertical integration further inhibited chaebols' efforts to restructure. During the transition from a state-controlled economy to a market-oriented economy in the years prior to the Asian Crisis, neither the Korean government nor the markets could monitor or guide chaebols' investment activities.

This book argues that wholesale criticisms of chaebols and radical prescriptions for chaebols, such as breaking them up, are wrong. It proposes instead that the Korean government needs to build institutional infrastructures, especially corporate governance systems, which will help markets function better. Other laws that protect minority shareholders' rights and strictly enforce the Fair Trade Act will make practices such as expropriation and cross-subsidization more difficult and will ensure that chaebols' investment decisions are sound. At the same time, increased international competition in their home markets will force chaebols to focus on their core businesses. By revamping its corporate governance system and trade policies, the Korean government can unleash the power of hardworking managers and workers, who were a key factor behind Korea's dramatic economic growth. I have no doubt that when chaebols are reformed, they will once again become strong global players.

As I researched and wrote about chaebols during the last five years, I realized how much I had learned – and continue to learn – from my teachers and colleagues. For this reason, I dedicate this book to them as a way of expressing my deep gratitude. Byung-Hyou Chong of the Seoul National University taught me industrial organization economics in college and encouraged me to pursue graduate work. Edward Bowman, Hubert Gatignon, Bruce Kogut, Dan Levinthal, and Harbir Singh of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania were

xii

Preface

exemplary scholars who guided me through my doctoral studies. I am also indebted to my colleagues, who have been always a source of insight and encouragement. Tom Pugel and other colleagues at the Stern School of New York University created an intellectually stimulating environment. My colleagues at Korea University also provided me an environment in which I could concentrate on research. In particular, Linsu Kim helped me start this book project and Dean Jangro Lee of the Institute of Business Research provided me special funding for this research.

While writing this book, I benefited from the detailed comments and helpful suggestions of Neil Fligstein, Mark Granovetter, Mauro Guillen, Tarun Khanna, Bruce Kogut, Tom Pugel, Seungdon Oh, Harbir Singh, three anonymous readers for Cambridge University Press, and seminar participants from Stanford University, University of Michigan, New York University, University of British Columbia, and Ewha University. Jaebum Hong of the Korea Information Service and Panseop Lee, Hyeonjung Park, Sekeun Park, and Kyungbae Son of Korea University helped me greatly in accessing and processing data for this work. John Lafkas copyedited the manuscript and provided helpful comments before I submitted it for review. Scott Parris, the editor at Cambridge University Press, and his fellow staff members encouraged and endured me as I prepared the manuscript. They did a wonderful job of turning my work into a book. Last but not least, I would like to thank my family, whose kindness, love, and understanding made this long journey possible.